Phenomena that occur in association with, or are supervenient upon, a given set of events, yet supposedly are not caused by those events. The term is applied particularly to the mind–brain problem. An epiphenomenal account of mind is that mental events, and especially
consciousness, occur during physical brain activity but are not caused by physical activity. They are supposed, rather, to run in parallel but to be autonomous. This, of course, leaves the mind totally inexplicable and mysterious from the point of view of physiology and everything we know of the physical world.
René Descartes narrowly avoided epiphenomenalism, holding that the bodies and brains of organisms are 'mere' machines and supposing that mind is causally linked to the brain at the pineal gland. Mind and brain were, for Descartes, largely independent, and this is also so for many more modern psychologists, philosophers, and neurophysiologists — such as
William James and Sir John Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) — who hold forms of interactive parallelism. These are almost statements of epiphenomenalism, except for limited causal interaction between mind and brain. It is indeed often thought that mind (especially awareness of pain, colours, emotions, etc.) is more affected by physical brain states than it, considered as a largely separate entity, itself affects the brain. The common-sense view is that most behaviour is automatic (in physiological terms, controlled largely by
reflexes) without corresponding mental events, and that only when there is deliberate or conscious volition does mind affect behaviour.
(Published 1987) Bibliography- Milner, A. D., and Goodale, M. A. (1995). The Visual Brain in Action.
- Popper, K., and Eccles, J. (1977). The Self and its Brain.