Ethical naturalism

Ethical naturalism (also called moral naturalism or naturalistic cognitivistic definism^[1]) is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion.
4. These moral features of the world can be reduced to some set of non-moral features.

This makes ethical naturalism a definist form of moral realism, which is in turn a form of cognitivism. Ethical naturalism stands in opposition to ethical non-naturalism, which denies that moral terms refer to anything other than irreducible moral properties, as well as to all forms of moral anti-realism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all).

Ethical naturalism has been criticized most prominently by ethical non-naturalist G. E. Moore, who formulated the Open Question Argument. Garner and Rosen say that a common definition of "natural property" is one "which can be discovered by sense observation or experience, experiment, or through any of the available means of science." They also say that a good definition of "natural property" is problematic but that "it is only in criticism of naturalism, or in an attempt to distinguish between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic definist theories, that such a concept is needed."^[2]

It is important to distinguish the versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell Realism, from the position that 'what is, is right'. This later view is often criticized by proponents of sociobiology, as part of a defense of the fact-value distinction. However, a sophisticated ethical naturalist does not believe, in any straightforward sense, such a slogan. Moreover, ethical naturalism rejects the fact/value distinction: it suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge.

Theory of value

The theory of value — an important branch of ethics — contains a number of theories of what "good" means or, construed differently, what sorts of things are good. One could look at the theory of value as a way of determining how to reduce goodness to non-ethical properties, for there are many examples of such reductions in value theory. Hedonism, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure. It should be noted, however, that not all philosophers working on value theory would view their theories as "reductions".

Ethical theories which can be naturalistic

• Altruism
• Cornell realism
• Ethical egoism
• Natural law libertarianism
• Objectivism
• Humanistic ethics
• Utilitarianism

Notes

1. ^ Garner & Rosen 1967, p. 228
2. ^ Garner & Rosen 1967, p. 239

References

• Garner, Richard T.; Rosen, Bernard (1967). Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics. New York: Macmillan. OCLC 362952. 

External links

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Moral Naturalism", by James Lenman, first published Thu June 1, 2006; substantive revision Mon August 7, 2006
• Philosophy 302: Naturalistic Ethics