Euthyphro dilemma

The Euthyphro dilemma is found in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro: "Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" (10a)

In monotheistic terms, this is usually transformed into: "Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral, or is it moral because it is commanded by God?" The dilemma has continued to present a problem for theists since Plato presented it and it is still an object of theological and philosophical debate.

The dilemma

Socrates and Euthyphro are discussing the nature of piety in Euthyphro. Euthyphro proposes (6e) that the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) is the same thing as what is loved by the gods (τὸ θεοφιλές), but Socrates finds a problem with this proposal, since the gods may disagree among themselves (7e). Euthyphro then restricts his definition to include only as pious what is loved by all gods unanimously (9e).

But we cannot likewise say that the reason why the pious is pious is that the gods love it. For, as Socrates presumes and Euthyphro agrees, the gods love the pious because it is pious (both parties agree on this, the first horn of the dilemma). And we cannot say that the gods love the pious because it is pious, and then add that the pious is pious because the gods love it, for this would be circular reasoning and create a chicken-and-egg problem.

To understand the difficulties the philosophers experience to come to terms with the adjective "ὅσιος", it is important to note that it carries a double meaning of "hallowed" and "profane": "hallowed" in the sense that what is "ὅσιος" is dependent on the divine, as opposed to "δίκαιος", which is justice as promulgated by human lawmakers, and "profane" in the sense that what is "ὅσιος" are actions which take place in the sphere of human relations, as opposed to "ἱερός", which refers anything religiously dedicated to the gods. Thus, the very term "ὅσιος" embodies the crux of the dilemma, viz., the attempt to separate "piety" from the divine sphere as something that can stand on its own in the human sphere.

False-dilemma response

Christian philosophers, starting with Thomas Aquinas have often answered that the dilemma is false: yes, God commands something because it is good, but the reason it is good is that "good is an essential part of God's nature". So goodness is grounded in God's character and merely expressed in moral commands. Therefore whatever a good God commands will always be good.

Fr. Owen Carroll notes that the medieval philosophical tradition Realism, to which Aquinas belonged, assumes that the model that God used when creating the universe was within Himself so that the goodness of this world reflects and participates in some limited way and extent in the infinite goodness of God's own divine nature. The position of the opposing school of Nominalism maintains that the model that God used when creating the universe is outside of God and thus the goodness of this world is alien to the goodness of God Himself. The moral consequence of the latter position is that whatever God wills is good, even if it is inherently contradictory and morally arbitrary according to human reason. Thus if God wills the damnation of any individual person the entirety of his creation is good simply because God wills it. From this perspective the definitive human virtue is an unquestioning obedience to the divine will, even if that divine will commands one to perform an act which God will then immediately condemn as evil and meriting eternal damnation. One might note that one would seem to be left with no objective standard by which to judge what is and what is not God's will. Any claims to immediate divine inspiration as imparting a knowledge of the divine will is ultimately authoritative only for the claiment and those who choose to believe him and it has to be assumed that any such claim is subject to the usual subconscious psychological forces that underlie and distort the human subjective consciousness, i.e., what traditional Christian ascetic tradition designates as the 'passions'. Fr. Carroll notes that the position that whatever God wills is good simply because God wills it is more common and historically prominent in Islamic theology and philosophy, but enters and influences Western theology and philosophy through the influence of contemporary medieval Islamic philosophical writings on Nominalism.

Some followers of the Realist approach, following Aquinas and earlier readers of Plato such as Plotinus, say that "God" is in whole or part the definition of goodness itself. John Frame and others say this avoids the naturalistic fallacy because the source of God's whims or commands is in some way the definition of good for everybody. This view led Anselm of Canterbury to say that God exists outside of all motion or change and does not really feel passions such as love. It only seems that way to our finite minds. Aristotle had proposed in his Metaphysics a similar view of Gods who feel no emotion towards the world or their worshipers, but inspire imitation.

Gnosticism and other dualistic schools similarly postulate that God is identical with goodness, which turns the dilemma into a tautology, equating the God of the universe and creation as the demiurge with the gnostic God as the true God or God of Good.

Others contend that it is also a fallacious argument, because the conclusion contains a premise (that God is in fact 'good'), making it logically flawed. This is commonly answered by noting that the statement is one of two offered conditionals, not an assumed premise.

Necessary and contingent moral values?

Some modern philosophers have also attempted to find a compromise. For example, Richard Swinburne has argued that moral values fall into two categories: the necessary and the contingent. God can decide to create the world in many different ways, each of which grounds a particular set of contingent values; with regard to these, then, the divine command theory is the correct explanation. Certain values, however, such as the immorality of rape, murder, and torture, hold in all possible worlds, so it makes no sense to say that God could have created them differently; with regard to these values, the first horn of the dilemma is the best explanation.

Different meanings of "moral"

In developing what he calls a "modified divine-command theory", R.M. Adams distinguishes between two meanings of ethical terms like "right" and "wrong":

1. the meaning that atheists conceive (which in fact Adams explains in roughly emotivist terms)
2. the meaning that has its place in religious discourse (that is, commanded or forbidden by God).

Because God is claimed benevolent, the two meanings could coincide; God is, however, free to command other than he has done, and if he had chosen to command, for example, that murder was morally right, then the two meanings would break apart, effectively choosing the second horn of the dilemma: God just happens to command what would be good in any case ("eutheism"), but allowing for a hypothetical scenario where God decides to become malevolent ("dystheism").

See also

• Morality

References

• Robert Merrihew Adams Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (2002: New York, Oxford University Press) ISBN 0-19-515371-5
• Jan Aertsen Medieval philosophy and the transcendentals: the case of Thomas Aquinas (2004: New York, Brill) ISBN 90-04-10585-9
• John M. Frame Euthyphro, Hume, and the Biblical God retrieved February 13, 2007 from http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm
• Plato Euthyphro (any edition; the Penguin version can be found in The Last Days of Socrates ISBN 0-14-044037-2) or
• Euthyphro by Plato from Project Gutenberg
• Paul Helm [ed.] Divine Commands and Morality (1981: Oxford, Oxford University Press) ISBN 0-19-875049-8
• Peter J. King, Morality & religion I (PDF file)
• Greg Koukl, Euthyphro's Dilemma, Stand to Reason commentary, 2002
• Norman Kretzmann “Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: God and the basis of morality” (in Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray [edd] Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (1999: Oxford: Blackwell) ISBN 0-631-20604-3
• Steve Lovell, C.S. Lewis and the Euthyphro Dilemma, 2002.
• God and Morality - An analysis of the Euthyphro dilemma
• See also United States v. Willow River Power Co.