The Falklands War (Spanish: Guerra de las Malvinas/Guerra
del Atlántico Sur), also called the Falklands Conflict/Crisis, was fought in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the disputed Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the
South Sandwich Islands. The Falkland Islands consist of two large and many small islands
in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina, and their name and ownership have long
been disputed. (See Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands for the
background to the latter dispute.)
The war was triggered by the occupation of South Georgia
by Argentina on 19 March 1982 followed by the occupation of the
Falklands, and ended when Argentina surrendered on 14 June 1982.
War was not actually declared by either side. The initial invasion was considered by Argentina as the re-occupation of its own territory, and by
Britain as an invasion of a British
overseas territory, and the most recent invasion of British territory by a foreign power.
In the period leading up to the war, Argentina was in the midst of a devastating
economic crisis and large-scale
civil unrest against the repressive military
junta that had been governing the country since 1976[2]. The Argentine military government, headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri, sought to maintain power by
diverting public attention playing off long-standing feelings of the Argentines towards the islands,[3] although they never thought that the United
Kingdom would respond militarily.[4] The
ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands increased
on 19 March when a group of hired Argentinian scrap metal
merchants raised their flag at South Georgia, an act
that would later be seen as the first offensive action in the war. The Argentine Military Junta, suspecting that the UK would
reinforce its South Atlantic Forces,[5] ordered the
invasion of the Falkland Islands to be brought forward to
2 April.
Word of the invasion first reached Britain via ham radio[6]. Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South
Atlantic islands, but launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Air Force, and retake
the islands by amphibious assault. After combat resulting in 258 British and 649
Argentine deaths, the British eventually prevailed and the islands remained under British control. However, as of 2007 [7] and as it has since the 19th century, Argentina shows no sign
of relinquishing its claim (the claim is included in the National Constitution
[8]).
The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. A wave of patriotic sentiment swept through both: the
Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the military government, which hastened its downfall; in the United Kingdom,
the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was bolstered. It helped Thatcher's government to victory in the 1983 general election, which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The
war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, films, and songs.
However, it is not seen as a truly major event of either military or 20th century history because of the low number of casualties
on both sides and the small size and limited economic importance of the disputed areas. The cultural and political weight of the
conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of
discussion.[9]
Lead-up to the conflict
-
- See also: Operación Azul (The Argentine
occupation of the Falklands Islands)
War
By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up an airbase at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic island of
Ascension, including a sizable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk
2 bombers, Handley Page Victor K Mk 2
refuelling aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR
Mk 2 fighters to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force
arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already been sent south to re-capture South Georgia.
Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of
the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south. One of these flights was
intercepted outside the British self-imposed exclusion zone, by a Sea Harrier; the
unarmed 707 was not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet decided to commit itself to
war.
Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on the Santa Fe
The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquet, under the command of Major Guy
Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Squadron
(SB Sqn) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the
Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA
Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill-class
submarine HMS Conqueror on 19 April,
and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on
20 April. The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21
April, but — with the southern hemisphere autumn setting in — the weather was so bad that their landings and others made
the next day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier.
The first Royal Navy ship to arrive was the type 42 destroyer HMS Glasgow.
On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the
Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the
British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine. On 25 April the
ARA Santa Fe was spotted by a Westland
Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from HMS Antrim, which attacked the Argentine
submarine with depth charges. HMS
Plymouth launched a Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS Brilliant launched a Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2. The
Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed it with its
pintle-mounted General Purpose Machine Gun; the Wessex
also fired on the Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from
HMS Endurance fired AS-12
ASM antiship missiles at the
submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from submerging. The crew abandoned the
submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.
With the Tidespring now far out to sea and the Argentine forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan
decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British force, the
Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was "Please
inform Her Majesty, that the white ensign flies alongside the union flag on the isle of South Georgia. God save the queen". Prime
Minister Thatcher broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"[10]
Black Buck raids
-
An Avro Vulcan B.Mk.1A, an earlier version of the Vulcan than the Mk.2 used for the Black Buck raids
The Operation Black Buck raids were a series of five attacks on the Islands by RAF Avro
Vulcan bombers of 44 Squadron, staged from Wideawake airbase on
Ascension Island, close to the equator. The aircraft carried either 21 1,000 lb bombs
internally or four Shrike anti-radar missiles externally. The overall effect of the raids
on the war is difficult to determine, as the raids consumed precious tanker resources[11]. The raids did minimal damage to the runway and damage to radars was quickly
repaired. Post-war propaganda[12] states that the Vulcan
raids influenced Argentina to withdraw Mirage IIIs from the Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone. It has been
suggested that the Black Buck raids were pressed home by the Royal Air Force[13]. The British armed forces had been cut in the late seventies, and the RAF may have desired a
greater role in the conflict to prevent further cuts[14].
A single crater was produced on the runway, rendering it impossible for the airfield to be used by fast jets[15]. Argentine ground crew repaired the runway[16] within twenty-four hours[17] and produced fake craters to confound British damage assessment[18]. The runway was also available for MB-339 Aermacchi jets[19].
On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack on the airfield
at Stanley. The Vulcan had originally been designed for medium-range stand-off nuclear missions in Europe and did not have the
range to fly to the Falklands, requiring several in-flight refuellings. The RAF's tanker planes were mostly converted
Handley Page Victor bombers with similar range, so they too had to be refuelled in
the air. Thus, a total of 11 tankers were required for only two Vulcans, a huge logistical
effort, given that both the tankers and bombers had to use the same strip. The attack yielded only a single hit on the
runway.
The raids, at almost 8,000 nautical miles (13 000 km) and 16 hours for the
return journey, were the longest-ranged bombing raids in history at that time (surpassed in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 by USAF Boeing B-52G Stratofortresses flying from the continental United States but using forward-positioned
tankers[20]). They are often credited with the strategic
success of causing the Argentine Air Force ("Fuerza Aerea Argentina") to withdraw all their Mirage IIIEA aircraft to protect against the possibility of similar bombing raids on the Argentine
mainland. However, according to the FAA version, Group 8 Mirages were deployed to Comodoro
Rivadavia and Rio Gallegos in April (before the raids) where they
remained until June to protect against any Chilean threat and as reserve for the strike units. Their lack of aerial refuel
capability and a smaller internal fuel capacity, as compared to the IAI Daggers, prevented
them from being used effectively over the islands, as was shown by their only engagement of the war on May 1, so they were relegated to mainland duties. Concerned about the possibility of Chilean strikes or
SAS raids, the FAA was forced to disperse its aircraft in the areas surrounding
their southern airfields. For example, several parts of the national route #3 were used for this purpose.[21]
Only minutes after the RAF's Black Buck 1, nine Fleet Air Arm BAE Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1s from HMS Hermes followed up
the raid by dropping BL755 cluster bombs on Stanley and the
smaller grass airstrip at Goose Green. The Harriers destroyed one FMA IA 58 Pucará at Goose Green[22] and caused minor damage to Stanley airfield infrastructure. The remaining runways were fully
operational through the rest of the conflict. Other Sea Harriers had taken off from the deck of HMS Invincible for combat air patrols, and although attached BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan was forbidden
to divulge the number of planes involved, he came up with the memorable phrase "I counted them all out and I counted them all
back."[23][24]
The Argentines nevertheless claimed that two Sea Harriers were downed that morning in the general area of Stanley. The
Commander of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General Oscar Jofre, gave the serial numbers of the two Sea Harriers
as XZ 458 and XZ 491. Claiming the first to a 35 mm gun and the second to a Roland missile.[25] This claim has been dismissed by a number of English language sources[26][27]
Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using
Shrike air-to-surface antiradiation missiles.
Escalation of the air war
The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway was at the capital, Stanley, and even it was too short to support fast jets. Therefore, the Argentine Air Force
(FAA) was forced to launch its major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering its efforts at forward staging,
combat air patrols and close air support
over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly
British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.
The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (McDonnell Douglas A-4
Skyhawks, Israel Aircraft Industries Daggers, English Electric B Mk 62 Canberras and Dassault Mirage
III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent
or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft)
found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely.
This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern warships, protected
by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late pop-up profile.
Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by Sea Harriers operating from
HMS Invincible. A Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.
Argentine Air Force Mirage IIIEA. Their lack of aerial refuelling capability
prevented them from being used effectively over the islands in the air-air role.
Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two
Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder
air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but without enough fuel to return
to its mainland airfield. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.
As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the
Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away
the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadron Fenix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing
to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down, killing the
squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, who was the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the War.
Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley
airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence) and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action
entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of Surface-to-air missile (SAM)
systems such as the Franco-German Roland) and Swiss-built 35 mm twin anti-aircraft
cannons. Lockheed Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles,
and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end of the conflict. The few RN Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by
day to risk in night-time blockade operations, and their Blue Fox radar was not an effective look-down over land radar.[28] The only Argentine Air Force Hercules shot down by the
British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight[29][30] when it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy
retired its last SP-2H Neptune due to airframe attrition.
Sinking of Belgrano
The Sun's infamous "Gotcha" headline
Two separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the
neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the World
War II vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA
General Belgrano — formerly the USS Phoenix, a survivor of the
1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS
Conqueror, captained by Commander Christopher
Wreford-Brown, sank Belgrano on May 2 using Mk 8
Mod 4 torpedoes of WWII-vintage design; these were chosen as they carried a
larger warhead and contact fuses and there were worries surrounding the reliability of the newer Mk 24
torpedo stock. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were
rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. Losses from Belgrano totalled just over half of
Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict, and the Belgrano remains the only ship ever sunk by a nuclear submarine in
combat.
In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA Alferez Sobral. At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the
Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light bomber shot down on
May 1. Two Sea Lynxes fired four Sea Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to
Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew were never found.
Initial reports conflated the two incidents, contributing to confusion about the number of casualties and the identity of the
vessel that sank. The Rupert Murdoch-owned British tabloid newspaper The Sun greeted the initial reports of the attack with the headline "GOTCHA". This first edition was
published before news was known that the Belgrano had actually sunk (reporting instead, erroneously, that the gunboat had
sunk) and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The headline was replaced in later editions by the more tempered "Did
1,200 Argies drown?".
The loss of ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government and also became a cause célèbre for anti-war campaigners (such as Labour MP Tam
Dalyell), who declared that the ship had been sailing away from the Falklands at the time. The vessel was outside the
exclusion zone, and sailing away from the area of conflict. However, during war, under international law, the heading of a belligerent naval vessel has
no bearing on its status. In addition, the captain of the Belgrano, Hector Bonzo, has testified that the attack was
legitimate.[31][32] In later years it has been claimed that the information on the position of the
ARA General Belgrano came from a Soviet spy satellite which was tapped by the
Norwegian intelligence service station at Fauske, Norway, and then handed over to the British. However, Conqueror
had been shadowing the Belgrano for some days, so this extra information would have been unnecessary.[33]
The sinking occurred 14 hours after Constitutional President of the Republic of
Peru Fernando Belaúnde Terry had proposed a comprehensive peace plan and
called for regional unity. With the comprehensive failure of diplomatic efforts to that point and so without any hope that
additional diplomatic efforts would lead anywhere, and with the knowledge that the delay that would be incurred by such efforts
would eliminate the military option due to the closing winter weather, this plan was not entertained by the UK.
Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval
threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The
two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier
ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the
direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented. The
attack on Belgrano was the first kill made by a nuclear submarine and only the second submarine kill since the end of the
Second World War, the other being made by PNS Hangor, a
diesel electric submarine during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.
British historian Sir Lawrence Freedman stated
in the second volume of his Official History of the Falklands that intelligence about the Belgrano did not reach
senior British commanders and politicians until the order to sink her was passed.[34] Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, commanding officer of HMS Conqueror, informed the
Admiralty four hours before his attack that the Argentine cruiser had changed course, but
this information was not passed to the Ministry of Defence or
Rear-Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward (commander of the RN task force). However, as Admiral Woodward later stated, the Belgrano's
course and speed at the time she was sunk were irrelevant - from a strategic point of view, only her position and capabilities
mattered.
Sinking of HMS Sheffield
Two days after the sinking of Belgrano, on May 2, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following
an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s in
order to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile "picket" far from the British carriers. After the ships were
detected by an Argentine Navy P-2 Neptune patrol aircraft, two Dassault Super Étendards (serial no. 202 and 203) were launched from their base at
Río Grande, each armed with a single Exocet AM39 missile. Refuelled by an
Argentine Air Force KC-130H Hercules after launch, they went in at low altitude, popped
up for a radar check at 50 miles (80 km) and released the missiles from 20 to 30 miles (30 to 50 km) away.
Glasgow, Sheffield’s sister ship and the northernmost of the
three-destroyer picket, detected the two Étendards on their first pop-up, and warned the fleet-wide anti-air warfare coordinator
in Hermes. Hermes dismissed the report as one of the many false alarms already that morning. Glasgow
continued to monitor that bearing and detected the second pop-up, and this time the tell-tale Exocet seeker radar via the ship's
ESM equipment. Again Hermes ruled the detection as spurious,
but Glasgow continued to broadcast handbrake, the codeword for Exocet radar detected.
The first missile missed HMS Yarmouth, due to her deployment of
chaff in response to the warning, whilst Glasgow repeatedly tried,
without success, to engage the other with Sea Dart missiles. Still Hermes ruled
that this was a false alarm.
Sheffield was unable to detect directly the seeker radar as, in a case of bad timing, the SCOT satellite communications
terminal was in use which deafened the onboard electronic warfare support
measures (ESM) equipment. She did not detect the missile on radar due to her radar being of a similar frequency to that of
the Exocet. It is not known why she did not respond to Glasgow's warnings, but no chaff was fired and a shipwide warning
of attack went out only seconds before impact when a watchkeeper (Lieutenant Commander Peter Walpole) identified rocket trails
visually.
Sheffield was struck amidships, with devastating effect. Whether the warhead actually exploded is debated, but raging
fires started to spread, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. Whilst alongside rendering
assistance, Yarmouth repeatedly broke off to fire anti-submarine weaponry in response to Sonar reports of torpedoes in the water (later believed to have been a misdiagnosis of the outboard motor of the
small inflatables helping with firefighting), as well as visual reports of torpedoes (in actual fact the Sheffield was
ridding herself of torpedoes to prevent explosion).
Sheffield was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days.
She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on May 10, whilst under tow from
Yarmouth, becoming an official war grave. In one sense Sheffield served her
purpose as a part of the missile picket line — she took the missile instead of the aircraft carriers.
The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May as United Nations attempts to mediate a peace were
rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction
of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC
News put it, was now an actual 'shooting war'.
SAS operations
Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard / Exocet combination, plans were made to use Special Air Service troops to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego. The aim was to destroy the missiles and the aircraft that
carried them, and to kill the pilots in their quarters. Two plans were drafted and underwent preliminary rehearsal: a landing by
approximately fifty-five SAS in two C-130 Hercules aircraft directly on the runway at Rio
Grande; and infiltration of twenty-four SAS by inflatable boats brought within a few miles of the coast by submarine. Neither
plan was implemented; the earlier airborne assault plan attracted considerable hostility from some members of the SAS, who
considered the proposed raid a suicide mission.[35]
Ironically, the Rio Grande area would be defended by four full-strength battalions of Marine Infantry of the Argentine Marine
Corps of the Argentine Navy, some of whose officers were trained in the
UK by SB Sqn years earlier.[36] After the war, Argentine marine commanders admitted that they were waiting for some kind of landing
by SAS forces but never expected a Hercules to land directly on their runways, although they would have pursued British forces
even into Chilean territory if they were attacked.[37]
A SAS reconnaissance team was dispatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS Invincible on the
night of May 17, but bad weather forced it to land 50 miles (80 km) from its target, and the
mission was aborted.[38] The pilot flew to
Chile and dropped off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and surrendering to the
Chilean authorities. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international attention at the time.
On May 14, the SAS carried out the raid on Pebble
Island at the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airfield for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground attack aircraft and T-34 Mentors.
The raid destroyed the aircraft there.
Landing at San Carlos — Bomb Alley
Context of landings in the Falklands
During the night on May 21, the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore
Michael Clapp landed on beaches around San Carlos Water, on the northwestern coast of
East Falkland facing onto Falkland Sound. The bay,
known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying Argentine jets.[39][40]
The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigade were put ashore as follows: 2nd battalion of
the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry Norland and 40 Commando (Royal Marines) from the amphibious ship HMS Fearless
were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3 Para from the amphibious ship HMS
Intrepid were landed at Port San Carlos (Green Beach) and 45 Commando from
RFA Stromness were landed at Ajax Bay (Red
Beach). Notably the waves of 8 LCUs and 8 LCVPs were
led by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour who had commanded the Falklands detachment only
a year previously. 42 Commando on the liner SS Canberra was a tactical reserve. Units
from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers etc.
and tanks were also put ashore with the landing craft, the Round table
class LSL and mexefloat barges.
Rapier missile launchers were carried as underslung loads of Sea Kings for rapid deployment.
By dawn the next day they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there
Brigadier Thompson's plan was to capture Darwin and Goose Green before turning towards Port
Stanley. Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using
Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (June 14).
At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on May 21, HMS
Antelope on May 21, and MV Atlantic
Conveyor, with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents
on May 25. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a
logistics perspective. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to
HMS Sheffield, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword after being ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentinian aircraft from
other ships at San Carlos Bay.[41] HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly
damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage because of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics. In order to avoid
the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots were forced to release ordnance from very low altitude,
consequently their bomb fuses did not have time to arm before impact.
While the attacks were undoubtedly brave, the low release of the unretarded bombs (some of which were sold to the Argentine FAA by the British years earlier) meant that many
never exploded as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. Simple free-fall bombs will, at low
altitude, impact almost directly below the dropping aircraft, therefore there is a minimum safe altitude for release. The pilots
would doubtless have been aware of this, but in the heat of Bomb Alley (the pilots need to avoid a high concentration of
anti-aircraft defences of SAMs and AAA plus the Sea Harriers' CAPs) many failed to
climb to the necessary release point. The problem was solved by the improvised fitting of retarding devices, allowing low-level bombing attacks as employed on June
8.
In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War,[42] Admiral Woodward blames the BBC World Service for these
changes to the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the matter from an
MOD official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with
being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel
H. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending
British attack on Goose Green by 2 Para. Jones had threatened to
lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in action around
Goose Green.
Thirteen bombs[43] hit British ships without
detonating. Lord Craig, the former Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: “Six better fuses and we would
have lost”[44] although Ardent and Antelope
were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuses were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released
from too low an altitude.[45][46]
The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in these attacks.
Battle of Goose Green
-
From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para, (approximately 500
men) with Artillery support from 8 Alma Cdo Bty, approached and attacked Darwin
and Goose Green, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle which
lasted all night and into the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed, and 1,050 Argentine troops
(including around 350 FAA non-combatant personnel of the Condor airfield [47]) taken prisoner. The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para was
killed. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
East Falkland showing San Carlos bridgehead, Teal Inlet, Mt Kent and Mt Challenger
With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the
San Carlos bridgehead. On 27 May, men of 45
Cdo and 3 Para started walking across East Falkland towards the coastal settlement of
Teal Inlet.
Special forces on Mount Kent
Meanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent. Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine
generals were determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 May and
28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and
commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to
Stanley. This operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA
(Self-Determination-Initiative). For the next week, the Special Air Service (SAS)
and Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre of 3 Commando Brigade waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the volunteers' 602nd Commando
Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally 2IC of the 22nd Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30
May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them — Harrier XZ 963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry
Pook — in responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes, and that led to its loss
through small-arms fire.
On the 31 May, the Royal Marines Mountain and
Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) defeated Argentine Special Forces at the Battle of Top Malo House. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain Jose
Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at Top Malo. The
Argentine commandos fired from windows and doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed metres ( ft) from the burning
house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under Captain Rod Boswell for forty-five minutes until, with their
ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender. Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side there were
two dead including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were decorated for their bravery). Only five
Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, down from Malo Hill came Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's
M&AWC patrol, brandishing a large Union Flag. One wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant
Horacio Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's position.
It is estimated that 40 Argentine Commandos were involved in the battle with the SAS and the Cadre at Top Malo House and Mount
Kent. A body count revealed four bullet-ridden Argentine Army 602nd Commando Company
killed in the firefights. Seven members of the British Special Forces were wounded during these actions. One Special Boat Squadron sergeant was killed in a blue on blue
engagement by an SAS patrol.
Major Mario Castagneto's commanding the 601st Commando Company attempted to move forward on their Kawasaki motorbikes and
commandeered Landrovers to rescue 602nd Commando Company on Estancia Mountain. Spotted
by 42 Commando of the Royal Marines, they were engaged with 81 mm mortars and forced to withdraw
to Two Sisters mountain. Captain Eduardo Villarruel on Estancia Mountain realised his position had become untenable and after
conferring with fellow officers ordered a withdrawal.[48]
The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position and extract patrols; the Argentine Army
601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties. At about 11.00 a.m. on 30 May, an
Aerospatiale SA-330 Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched
Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM)
fired by the SAS in the vicinity of Mount Kent in which six National Gendarmerie Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.
As Brigadier Julian Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that
reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine
Special Forces would have caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone,
inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."[49]
Bluff Cove and Fitzroy
The abandoned hulk of RFA
Sir Tristram in Fitzroy
By June 1, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the
new British divisional commander, Major General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient force to
start planning an offensive against Stanley.[citation needed]
During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. 32 of the dead were from
the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad
and RFA Sir Tristram on June 8.
According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and injuries of some
kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon Weston.[50]
The Guards were sent to support a dashing advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2
June, a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Westland Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines
and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook
helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy
(a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove (a settlement confusingly, and perhaps
ultimately fatally, on Port Fitzroy).
This un-coordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found
themselves with a 30 mile (48 km) string of indefensible positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air
as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy
supplies would need to be ferried by sea. Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of
