| Fear and Trembling | |
|---|---|
| Author | Søren Kierkegaard |
| Original title | Frygt og Bæven |
| Country | Denmark |
| Language | Danish |
| Series | First authorship (Pseudonymous) |
| Genre(s) | philosophy, theology |
| Publication date | October 16, 1843 |
| Published in English |
1939 - First Translation |
| Pages | ~200 |
| Preceded by | Either/Or |
| Followed by | Repetition |
Fear and Trembling (original Danish title: Frygt og Bæven) is an influential philosophical work by Søren Kierkegaard, published in 1843 under the pseudonym Johannes de silentio (John the Silent). The title is a reference to a line from Philippians 2:12, "...continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling."
Fear and Trembling presents a highly original and provocative interpretation of the Binding of Isaac story as told in Genesis Chapter 22, and uses the story as an occasion to discuss fundamental issues in moral philosophy and the philosophy of religion, such as the nature of God and faith, faith's relationship with ethics and morality, and the difficulty of being authentically religious.[1][2]
Contents |
Summary
The work begins with a meditation on the faith of Abraham when he was commanded by God to sacrifice his son Isaac.[3] Silentio gives four alternative re-tellings in which Abraham fails the test of his faith and contrasts them with his own interpretation of the story of Abraham and the faith therein demonstrated. Silentio professes to admire Abraham's faith, but he is utterly incapable of comprehending it.
Following the Preface and Prelude, there is a Panegyric Upon Abraham and a series of three Problemata, which address three specific philosophical questions raised by the story of Abraham's sacrifice.
- Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? (That is, can Abraham's intent to sacrifice Isaac be considered "good" even though, ethically, human sacrifice is unacceptable?)
- Is there an absolute duty to God? (In other words, beyond that which is ethical)
- Was it ethically defensible for Abraham to have concealed his purpose from Sarah, Eleazar, and Isaac?
Themes
In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard introduces the "Knight of Faith" and contrasts him with the "knight of infinite resignation". The latter gives up everything in return for the infinite, that which he may receive after this life, and continuously dwells with the pain of his loss. The former, however, not only relinquishes everything, but also trusts that he will receive it all back, his trust based on the "strength of the absurd".
For Kierkegaard, infinite resignation is noble and difficult, but understandable by everyone; faith, on the other hand, is founded in the belief in the absurd. The absurd is that which is contradictory to reason itself. For Abraham, this faith in the absurd manifests itself in Abraham's belief that he would kill his only son but he would nevertheless receive him again in his lifetime. Silentio's opinion is that what separates Abraham from being a killer is his faith. (In the end of the Genesis 22 story, an angel stops Abraham at the last moment. A ram appears which Abraham takes as a sign from God, and he sacrifices the ram instead of Isaac.)
Kierkegaard's pseudonymn, Johannes de silentio, argues in Problema I of Fear and Trembling that Abraham represents an exception from the ethical, which for him – as the father of faith – is suspended for a higher purpose or telos (namely, that of faith). Ordinarily, he argues, the highest and best way to live is conceived of in terms of living a good life; good people go about their daily lives concerned with the universal demand to do the right thing, which, to Kierkegaard, is the same thing as living an ethically governed existence. To live an ethical life is to abide by a moral code that applies to everyone universally (in the sense that everyone has a moral code) and, by extension, a code of conduct that others can understand and recognize. In Kierkegaard’s opinion, however, the ethical is not identical with the divine; faith exists in a separate sphere and cannot be attained merely by simply by living an “ethical” life. Abraham is an example of someone who has acted outside the ethical (by being willing to sacrifice his son, which ethics demands that he not do) because of his relationship to the divine, that is, his faith. Because Abraham’s actions and faith itself come at the expense of ethics, Abraham’s faith is a decidedly individual affair, which others, from within the “universal perspective” of the ethical, could not possibly understand. It is this that separates the “tragic heroes” of literature and history from the men of faith: the burden of the man of faith must be carried alone, while the hero is understood and lauded by all for his sufferings in the name of what is right (the ethical). He also notes that frequently the religious life is confused with the ethical or universal life, and that what we know of religion or religious men does not often occupy the same space as real faith. In short, Kierkegaard implies that the ethical and the divine occupy separate realms: the ethically noble life - a life in which a person is absolutely oriented toward and governed by the Good - is not the same as a life of faith, a life in which the individual is absolutely oriented toward God.
From an ethical standpoint, our duty as humans is not to God as such (i.e. the absolute) but rather to the universal (i.e. the ethical), and so-called religious people often confuse these two things. As Kierkegaard states, “Seen as an immediate, no more than sensate and psychic, being, the single individual is the particular that has its telos [purpose] in the universal [i.e. living the ethical life], and the individual’s task is always to express himself in this, to abrogate his particularity so as to become the universal,” (Hannay translation, 82). Given the Abraham story, this point of view is incommensurable with having faith though, because, as he sees it, the faith exhibited by Abraham requires one to be in an “absolute relation with the absolute”; one cannot simultaneously have an absolute relation to the universal. To translate, it is impossible to both have your ultimate purpose as being ethical and having absolute faith at the same time, because they occupy different territory. The paradox is that through faith the “single individual as the particular is higher than the universal, is justified before the latter, not as subordinate but superior…” (Hannay translation, 84) essentially meaning that the individual man of faith operates at a level “superior” to and higher than the universal and so can exist outside the traditional realm of ethics, as is the case with Abraham, who disregards ethics for the higher and separate purpose of coming into “an absolute relation to the absolute.”
The breach of ethics made by Abraham is clear: his ethical duty as a father and a human being was ignored when he committed to the murder of his only son. Kierkegaard stresses that such a complete removal of one’s self from the universal is necessary for the man of faith, otherwise it is not faith at all which is being adhered to but the ethical, and true commitment to the higher plane of faith must entail giving up the solid ground of ethical behavior. The story of Abraham is designed so that the reader can see clearly that, “there is no higher expression of the ethical in Abraham’s life than that the father shall love the son,” (Hannay translation, 88) and yet this is exactly the opposite of what he does, and what he must do, to become the father of faith. If his purpose is faith, Abraham must necessarily suspend ethics.
Kierkegaard makes a special point of distinguishing a person like Abraham from the tragic heroes, as they are known in the popular mind. A tragic hero is on sturdy ground throughout his suffering. This is because it is certain that what he is doing is ethically justified and will be understood and held in high esteem by all beholders; his goal is to enter into a relationship with the universal (i.e. to pursue ethics as his highest end). Therefore religious martyrs, who die in the name of what is good (the ethical) and applauded for it by the religious community, are tragic heroes but not men of great faith necessarily, precisely because their suffering is for the universal and can be understood, not absolutely individual and understood by no one but their God. The differentiation is this: “While… the tragic hero is great through his deed’s being an expression of the ethical life, Abraham is great through an act of purely personal virtue,” (Hannay translation, 88). The personal aspect is extremely important; Abraham is completely individualized by his actions, the way he has forsaken the universal, and the only one that can understand or assure his seemingly senseless suffering, his blind leap of faith, is the absolute with which has entered into a relationship (i.e. God). And, to highlight the inherent gravity of such a leap, Kierkegaard notes that if he were somehow mistaken in his unwavering personal convictions, there could be no salvation awaiting him, on Earth or in heaven.
References
English translations
- Silentio, Johannes. Fear and Trembling, edited by Sylvia Walsh and C. Stephen Evans. (2006)
- Silentio, Johannes. Fear and Trembling, edited by George Steiner. (1994)
- Silentio, Johannes. Fear and Trembling, edited by Alastair Hannay. (1985)
- Silentio, Johannes. Fear and Trembling, edited by Howard and Edna Hong. (1983)
- Silentio, Johannes. Fear and Trembling, edited by Walter Lowrie. (1941)
- Silentio, Johannes. Fear and Trembling, edited by Robert Payne. (1939)
Online references
- ^ Lippitt, John. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling
- ^ Carlisle, Clare. Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed
- ^ Baird, Forrest E.; Walter Kaufmann (2008). From Plato to Derrida. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. ISBN 0-13-158591-6.
See also
External links
- Full text, translated by L.M. Hollander
- commentary
- Podcast of Clare Carlisle interviewed about Fear and Trembling on Philosophy Bites
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