free trade

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n.
Trade between nations without protective customs tariffs.

free trader free trader n.


Policy in which a government does not discriminate against imports or interfere with exports. A free-trade policy does not necessarily imply that the government abandons all control and taxation of imports and exports, but rather that it refrains from actions specifically designed to hinder international trade, such as tariff barriers, currency restrictions, and import quotas. The theoretical case for free trade is based on Adam Smith's argument that the division of labour among countries leads to specialization, greater efficiency, and higher aggregate production. The way to foster such a division of labour, Smith believed, is to allow nations to make and sell whatever products can compete successfully in an international market.

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Trade between countries which takes place completely free of restrictions. Such trade allows specialization in member states of free trade areas, and lowers costs because, together with competition, the markets are increased. Within a free trade area there are no barriers, such as tariffs and quotas. However, there is not necessarily a common policy on trade with countries outside the free trade area. See efta, world trade organization.


The absence of barriers to international trade. Up to the nineteenth century, under the system of mercantilism, Europeans faced two main kinds of barriers to trade: first, there were duties, quotas, and prohibitions restricting the movement of goods from one customs area to another; second, controls on participation in particular trades imposed by corporations like the British or Dutch East India Companies.

1813 the British East India Company was deprived of its monopoly over trade between Britain and India. Following a prolonged public campaign, the repeal of the Corn Laws 1846 opened the British market to cheap foreign grain. The exemplary force of these events was all the greater because they appeared to be applications of the cogent and appealing liberal economic theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Moreover, rapid growth in international trade, coinciding with increasing wealth and an extended period of general peace in Europe, at first appeared to confirm these theories. Ricardo had argued in his theory of comparative advantage that free trade between nations would bring gains to both parties to an exchange, even when one was the more efficient producer of every good they traded. This was because trade encouraged even an unproductive national economy to devote resources to those branches of production in which they would be least inefficiently employed.

But Ricardo never promised that the gains from trade would be evenly distributed, and a nationalist critique of free trade pioneered by Alexander Hamilton in the United States and Friedrich List in Germany gathered strength towards the end of the century. It even gained ground among traditionally liberal British businessmen, now buffeted by the trade cycle and threatened by new centres of manufacturing industry in continental Europe and North America.

The campaign for tariff reform in Britain was only one facet of a general drift away from free trade. By the 1930s not just the practice but even the ideology had been largely abandoned because it was held to provide disproportionate gains to established industrial economies and to lack a satisfactory mechanism for the realization of their potential comparative advantage by newly developing economies. In its place came bilateral systems of exchange within currency areas, the British system of imperial preference within the sterling area being only one example.

Because bilateralism coincided with a sharp fall in the volume of international trade and was held by powerful members of the Roosevelt administration to have contributed indirectly to the outbreak of the Second World War, the allied powers reinstated a limited form of free trade within a dollar-exchange monetary system in the later 1940s. Under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) of 1947 (see World Trade Organization), successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) outlawed quantitative restrictions on trade, such as quotas, and achieved greatly reduced tariffs on the principal classes of manufactured goods traded between leading industrialized economies. But although this contributed to a sharp increase in levels of trade and prosperity during the 1950s and 1960s, it steadily became more and more evident that many non-tariff barriers, including complex administrative procedures, ingeniously drafted health and safety regulations, and nationalistic public procurement policies, still impeded free exchange of goods and services. Moreover the GATT had permitted a number of exceptions to its general principles from the outset. Trade in temperate-zone agricultural goods was not covered, nor in textiles and clothing, and both became subject to extremely restrictive regimes devised by the United States, Japan, and the European Community to protect their own producers. The GATT also allowed discrimination in favour of each other by groups of countries pledged to the formation of a free trade area or customs union, such as the European Union.

Add to this the extent to which goods such as automotive components, oil, or aluminium are traded internationally within large multinational corporations at administered rather than market prices, together with the renewed prevalence of smuggling (especially of precious metals and illegal drugs), and it becomes hard to discern clearly any causal relation between prosperity and the imperfect contemporary implementation of liberal free trade theory. Be this as it may, the most impressive rates of economic growth achieved in recent years have without exception been achieved by export-oriented countries like Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea, that have relied very heavily on market access provided by this system of managed liberalism; and this has confirmed free trade once again as the effectively unchallenged ideal type of international commerce.

— Charles Jones

The basic tenet of the theory is that free trade, which is the absence of any artificial restrictions on the level or composition of trade or the price at which commodities are exchanged, represents the best form of organization in international markets. Free trade assumes a state of perfect competition.

The fact remains that there are very few examples of any country following a complete free trade policy, Victorian Britain constituting a notable exception. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 brought a shift in political perceptions by removing the protection traditionally given to agriculture in favour of securing cheap imported food for the industrial areas. (See protectionism.) The anomaly of the British adoption of free trade, by contemporary international standards, is a reflection of the unusual economic structure of the country. In the Victorian period the British economy was heavily dependent on international trade and finance, especially the latter. No other country, before or since, has diverted such a large share of national income to overseas investment. Furthermore, British industry depended heavily on export markets. It was thus in the interests of the British economy that international trade flourished.

The First World War severely undermined the British balance of payments as overseas investments were sold to pay for the war. The 1929-32 depression marked the end of free trade. In 1932 a general tariff was introduced imposing a 10 per cent import tax, but allowing preferential treatment to Commonwealth countries in return for concessions on British exports.

The economic rationale for free trade lies in the principle that if trade is free, certain goods and services can be obtained at lower cost abroad than if domestic substitutes are produced in their place. The concept has each country producing for export those goods in which production is relatively efficient, thereby financing the import of goods that would be inefficiently produced at home. This comparative advantage in production between nations is expected to shift over time with changes in such factors as resource endowments and rates of technological advance. Free trade is therefore thought to facilitate the optimal use of economic resources: each country commands a higher level of consumption for a given level of resource use than would be otherwise possible. Advocates of tariff protection take exception to the doctrine on two fundamental bases: at times national goals other than maximized consumption must be served (for example, national defense), and the interests of specific groups do not parallel those of the nation as a whole. Thus, the history of tariffs and other barriers to free trade is a chronicle of shifting economic interests between industries and geographic areas.

Until 1808 the export of American farm and forest products to foreign markets was so profitable and imports were so cheap that there was little incentive to engage in manufacturing. Existing duties were low and designed for revenue rather than protection. War and embargo in the years 1808–1815 stimulated manufacturing (wool, cotton, iron); restoration of peace caused a flood of imports. Free trade then became a sectional issue, a strong protectionist movement developing in the middle and western states. Depression in 1819 and 1820 convinced workers that protection was necessary to save jobs from foreign competition, whereas farmers felt that building strong American industry would create higher demand and prices for farm goods. New England was divided between the manufacturing and the commercial interests, while the South solidly favored free trade because of its desire for cheap imports and fear of English retaliation against raw cotton imported from the United States.

By 1833 free-trade sentiment revived, as northern farmers, believing that young industries no longer needed protection, joined forces with John C. Calhoun and the South in an alliance that kept tariffs low until 1860. After the Civil War the protectionists controlled tariff policy for many years. Continued southern devotion to free trade and persistent, although wavering, low-tariff sentiment in the West produced only the short-lived horizontal duty reduction of 1872 and a few haphazard reductions in 1883. In the campaign of 1888 free-traders rallied around Grover Cleveland as the tariff for the first time became strictly a party issue. But the protectionists won again and passed the Tariff Act of 1890.

Popular hatred of monopoly—evidenced in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890—came to the support of free trade by implicating the tariff as "the mother of trusts." Cleveland won election in 1892 against the high-tariff Republicans, but the Democrats were torn over free silver and lost the opportunity to liberalize tariffs. However, continued antitrust feeling had bred such hostility to extreme protectionism that even the Republicans promised tariff reduction in the election of 1908. Sectional interests continued to thin the ranks of free-traders; the West and South demanded lower tariffs in general but supported the particular agricultural tariffs that served their interests in the Tariff Act of 1909.

Recurring economic crises, particularly the depressions of 1893–1897 and 1907–1908, further shook public confidence in the virtues of the "American system." Only the large industrial interests appeared to be consistently served by the cyclical pattern of economic growth (for example, Standard Oil's combining of small companies during depression, as indicated in the Sherman antitrust case of 1911). The height of tariffs, identified closely by the public with large industry, became a major political issue in 1912. The victorious Democrats promised reduction but held that no "legitimate" industry would be sacrificed. Although a considerable number of items were placed on the free list, rates were reduced, on an average, 10 percent only.

After World War I, with the Republicans in power, extreme protection held sway. Agriculture accepted any tariffs on farm products—although still grumbling about industrial tariffs—and the South found its former solid free-trade front broken by districts with a stake in tariffs on products of farm and factory. In the campaign of 1928 the tariff positions of the two major parties were scarcely distinguishable. Following a full year of debate in Congress, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act became law in 1930; the act constructed the highest tariff wall in the nation's history, and its contribution to the shrinkage of world trade and the severity of worldwide depression was considerable. Revulsion from the indiscriminate protectionism, distress with the worsening depression, and the leadership of Cordell Hull, an old-fashioned southern tariff liberal, again turned the country toward trade liberalization.

The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and its twelve extensions through 1962 beat a steady retreat from the high-water mark of protection reached in 1930. Reacting to the severe decline in the volume of U.S. exports after 1930, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt conceived reciprocal trade concessions as an antidepression measure to generate recovery in export-related industries. Following World War II a political impetus was added; by opening its markets, the United States could assist the war-ravaged European economies in reconstruction and could similarly aid the development in poor nations. The economic implications of the Trade Agreements Act and its extensions were conflicting: there was a steady trend of tariff reduction, expedited after 1945 through the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the application of the unconditional most-favored-nation concept; but the reductions were tempered by a "no-injury" philosophy, adopted to minimize injury to domestic industry. Escape clauses, peril points, and national security regulations have hedged the U.S. commitment to agreed tariff reductions. The 1958 extension was notable in firmly establishing these concepts and the necessary enforcement machinery. Under the peril-point provision the U.S. tariff commission was to determine before negotiations the level to which a tariff rate could fall before seriously damaging the domestic industry; this estimate was to provide an effective limit to the authority extended negotiators. An industry experiencing severe injury from a tariff already reduced could petition for relief under the escape clause, which had appeared in U.S. trade agreements since 1943; if the U.S. Tariff Commission found sufficient injury, the concession could be withdrawn.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 made a significant departure from the reciprocal agreements in providing programs for alleviating injury caused by trade liberalization. Benefits and retraining for labor and special loans and tax treatment for industry were extended on the rationale of reallocating resources into more efficient uses. The reciprocal trade legislation had avoided this process by rescinding the tariff reduction when injury was inflicted. Administration of the provisions of the 1962 act has been difficult, however, because of the difficulty of distinguishing losses owing to increased imports from losses owing to the domestic industry's inefficiency. The 1962 act extended authority for sizable tariff reductions, to be negotiated through the offices of GATT during the five years following. Tariff reductions on items not excepted from this Kennedy Round of negotiations amounted to about 35 percent. As the U.S. trade balance worsened in the late 1960s, culminating in a trade deficit in 1971—the first in the twentieth century—the forces of protection threatened to reverse the forty-year trend of trade liberalization.

Throughout the 1970s, the executive branch resisted congressional initiatives to raise trade barriers. In 1980, Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency ushered in a new era of free trade in American foreign policy, one that would last for the remainder of the century and beyond. In the 1980s the Reagan Administration promoted a new round of GATT talks, and by the early 1990s the United States, Mexico, and Canada had agreed to create a continental free trade zone, known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The collapse of communism added momentum to the global trend toward free trade and free markets. During the 1990s governments across the world embraced free-trade policies, including countries that once belonged to the communist bloc, such as Russia, Poland, and China. By the early twenty-first century free trade had emerged as a cornerstone of the new global economy. Nevertheless, substantial opposition to free-trade policies remained an active force in global politics. In particular, environ-mental and labor groups condemned free trade policies on the grounds that they made it easier for multinational corporations to pollute the environment and to pay sweat-shop wages without fear of government regulation. The debate over free trade showed no signs of cooling off as the twenty-first century began.

Bibliography

LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963.

Lake, David A. Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Milner, Helen V. Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Terrill, Thomas E. The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy, 1874–1901. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.

—Thomas L. Edwards/A. G.

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free trade, in modern usage, trade or commerce carried on without such restrictions as import duties, export bounties, domestic production subsidies, trade quotas, or import licenses. The basic argument for free trade is based on the economic theory of comparative advantage: each region should concentrate on what it can produce most cheaply and efficiently and should exchange its products for those it is less able to produce economically.

Internal Free Trade

Free trade within national borders is in some countries a comparatively recent development. Jean Baptiste Colbert tried to abolish internal trade barriers in France in the 17th cent., but that was not accomplished until the French Revolution, a hundred years later. In the German states Prussia took the lead in organizing the Zollverein movement after 1818. The desire to assure freedom from internal trade barriers in the United States was a factor in calling the Constitutional Convention. In Britain, the classic home of the free-trade movement, the term free trade was first used during the agitation for removal of the privileges of the chartered companies in the 17th cent.

International Free Trade

In 18th-century Britain, free trade eventually came to mean the desire for a moderate tariff policy in international trade, especially with France. The rapid growth of British industry in the late 1700s (see Industrial Revolution) gave added force to the attack on international trade restrictions (see mercantilism). Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) provided a powerful intellectual basis for the free trade movement, and the later work of David Ricardo was important in developing the notion of comparative advantage as an argument in its favor. The most important practical blow in favor of the free-trade movement came with the formation (1839) of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and the repeal (1846) of the corn laws. The Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 represented perhaps the high-water mark of free trade.

After World War I, Britain reintroduced protection and a system of imperial preference in an attempt to establish a greater measure of economic autonomy. France, along with other European nations, historically followed a policy of protection. In the period of international economic dislocation in the mid-1930s, the United States reversed earlier policy and signed reciprocal trade treaties with many foreign governments, embracing a policy of selective tariff reduction for economic and political reasons. At present the United States is a relatively low tariff nation, although it still maintains a fairly restrictive system of import quotas. Japan also has restrictive import quotas, as well as high tariffs and other trade restrictions.

After World War II, strong sentiment developed throughout the world against protection and high tariffs and in favor of freer trade. The results were new organizations and agreements on international trade such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1948), the Benelux Economic Union (1948), the European Economic Community (Common Market, 1957), the European Free Trade Association (1959), Mercosur (1991), and the World Trade Organization (1995). In 1993 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was approved by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In the early 1990s the nations of the European Union (the successor organization to the Common Market) undertook to remove all barriers to the free movement of trade and employment across their mutual borders.

Critics of free trade zones argue that such measures are detrimental to domestic economies. In the case of NAFTA, for example, opponents contended that the jobs of some American workers would be "exported" to Mexico, where labor costs are lower. Many have continued to oppose the international impetus toward freer trade, arguing the accords not only fail to protect jobs in more developed nations but also harm workers and the environment in less developed nations, where the laws are more lax or less enforced. Despite such objections, support for free trade has continued. In Apr., 2001, for example, 34 nations of the Western Hemisphere committed themselves to the development of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, though movement toward such an organization subsequently stalled. In May, 2004, the Central American Free Trade Agreement was finalized by the United States and five Central American nations; the Dominican Republic is also a member of the group. The United States, Japan, China, and other countries have also negotiated bilateral free-trade agreements with individual nations or regional trade associations; such agreements generally open trade in some areas while preserving the protection of politically sensitive economic sectors.

See also reciprocal trade agreement.

Bibliography

See G. B. Doern and B. W. Tomlin, Faith and the Free Trade Story (1991); D. B. Yoffie, Beyond Free Trade: Firms, Governments, and Global Competition (1993); A. E. Eckes, Jr., Opening America's Market (1995); J. J. Schott, The World Trading System (1997).


Unrestricted trade among nations without government tariffs or customs duties on imports.

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Free trade is a policy by which a government does not discriminate against imports or interfere with exports by applying tariffs (to imports) or subsidies (to exports) or quotas. According to the law of comparative advantage the policy permits trading partners mutual gains from trade of goods and services.[citation needed]

Under a free trade policy, prices emerge from supply and demand, and are the sole determinant of resource allocation. 'Free' trade differs from other forms of trade policy where the allocation of goods and services among trading countries are determined by price strategies that may differ from those that would emerge under deregulation. These governed prices are the result of government intervention in the market through price adjustments or supply restrictions, including protectionist policies. Such government interventions can increase as well as decrease the cost of goods and services to both consumers and producers.[citation needed]

Since the mid-20th century, nations have increasingly reduced tariff barriers and currency restrictions on international trade. Other barriers, however, that may be equally effective in hindering trade include import quotas, taxes, and diverse means of subsidizing domestic industries. Interventions include subsidies, taxes and tariffs, non-tariff barriers, such as regulatory legislation and import quotas, and even inter-government managed trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (contrary to their formal titles) and any governmental market intervention resulting in artificial prices.[citation needed]

Contents

Features of free trade

Free trade implies the following features:[citation needed]

  • Trade of goods without taxes (including tariffs) or other trade barriers (e.g., quotas on imports or subsidies for producers)
  • Trade in services without taxes or other trade barriers
  • The absence of "trade-distorting" policies (such as taxes, subsidies, regulations, or laws) that give some firms, households, or factors of production an advantage over others
  • Free access to markets
  • Free access to market information
  • Inability of firms to distort markets through government-imposed monopoly or oligopoly power

Economics of free trade

Economic models

Two simple ways to understand the proposed benefits of free trade are through David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage and by analyzing the impact of a tariff or import quota. An economic analysis using the law of supply and demand and the economic effects of a tax can be used to show the theoretical benefits and disadvantages of free trade.[1][2]

Widgets cannot be produced to the right of the Supply curve.
The pink regions are the net loss to society caused by the existence of the tariff.

Advantages of tariffs

This graph demonstrates the benefits of tariffs to a domestic industry. Assume that Japan wants to protect a domestic industry that is only able to produce and sell widgets at the price Ptariff. Since there are other countries that are exporting the same widgets at a price of Pworld, Japan's industry is threatened to go out of business should widgets be imported into their country without a tariff. This graph also shows that as long as Ptariff does not fall above the intersection of the Supply and Demand lines, then an equilibrium can be reached in which there are no shortages of demand or excesses of supply, and so Japan's industry can produce and sell widgets to the same degree as manufacturers in any other country.[2][3]

In this case, the higher price would not cause domestic production to increase from QS1 to QS2, since it has already been assumed in our example that Japan cannot afford to enter the widget market below the price Ptariff as the world economy has for price Pworld. The effect of the tariff would limit imports and create a higher demand for domestically produced widgets (QS2 - QS1) but have no effect on consumer prices, since the graph shows that for all quantities to the left of the intersection of the Supply and Demand curves, consumers will buy whatever widgets enter the market. As increasing widget sales allow more widget producers to enter the market and the quantity of imported + domestic widgets in Japan approaches QE then the tariff can be phased out since the market will be at equilibrium (E) and the PE market price will be enough for Japan's widget manufacturers to stay in business.[4]

Currently, the World Bank believes that, at most, rates of 20% can be allowed by developing nations[citation needed]; but Ha-Joon Chang believes higher levels may be justified because the productivity gap between developing and developed nations is much higher than the productivity gap which industrial countries faced. (A general feature is that the underdeveloped nations of today are not in the same position that the developed nations were in when they had a similar level of technology, because they are weak players in a competitive system; the developed nations have always been strong players, although formerly at an overall lower level.[5]

Counter arguments to this point of view are that the developing countries are able to adopt technologies from abroad, whereas developed nations had to create new technologies themselves, and that developing countries have far richer markets to which to export than was the case in the 19th century.) If the main defense of tariffs is to stimulate infant industries, a tariff must be high enough to allow domestic manufactured goods to compete for the tariff to be successful. This theory, known as import substitution industrialization, is largely considered ineffective for currently developing nations.[6]

Disadvantages of tariffs

The chart at the right analyzes the effect of the imposition of an import tariff on some imaginary good. Prior to the tariff, the price of the good in the world market (and hence in the domestic market) is Pworld. The tariff increases the domestic price to Ptariff. The higher price causes domestic production to increase from QS1 to QS2 and causes domestic consumption to decline from QC1 to QC2.[4][7]

This has three main effects on societal welfare. Consumers are made worse off because the consumer surplus (green region) becomes smaller. Producers are better off because the producer surplus (yellow region) is made larger. The government also has additional tax revenue (blue region). However, the loss to consumers is greater than the gains by producers and the government. The magnitude of this societal loss is shown by the two pink triangles. Removing the tariff and having free trade would be a net gain for society.[4][7]

An almost identical analysis of this tariff from the perspective of a net producing country yields parallel results. From that country's perspective, the tariff leaves producers worse off and consumers better off, but the net loss to producers is larger than the benefit to consumers (there is no tax revenue in this case because the country being analyzed is not collecting the tariff). Under similar analysis, export tariffs, import quotas, and export quotas all yield nearly identical results.[1]

Sometimes consumers are better off and producers worse off, and sometimes consumers are worse off and producers are better off, but the imposition of trade restrictions causes a net loss to society because the losses from trade restrictions are larger than the gains from trade restrictions. Free trade creates winners and losers, but theory and empirical evidence show that the size of the winnings from free trade are larger than the losses.[1]

Trade diversion

According to mainstream economic theory, the selective application of free trade agreements to some countries and tariffs on others can sometimes lead to economic inefficiency through the process of trade diversion. It is economically efficient to produce a good in the country that can make it for the lowest cost, but this does not always take place if a high cost producer has a free trade agreement while the low cost producer faces a high tariff. Applying free trade to the high cost producer (and not the low cost producer as well) can lead to trade diversion and a net economic loss. This is why many economists place such high importance on negotiations for global tariff reductions, such as the Doha Round.[1]

Opinion of economists

The literature analysing the economics of free trade is extremely rich with extensive work having been done on the theoretical and empirical effects. Though it creates winners and losers, the broad consensus among members of the economics profession in the U.S. is that free trade is a large and unambiguous net gain for society.[8] [9] In a 2006 survey of American economists (83 responders), "87.5% agree that the U.S. should eliminate remaining tariffs and other barriers to trade" and "90.1% disagree with the suggestion that the U.S. should restrict employers from outsourcing work to foreign countries."[10]

Quoting Harvard economics professor N. Gregory Mankiw, "Few propositions command as much consensus among professional economists as that open world trade increases economic growth and raises living standards."[11] Nonetheless, quoting Prof. Peter Soderbaum of Malardalen University, Sweden, "This neoclassical trade theory focuses on one dimension, i.e., the price at which a commodity can be delivered and is extremely narrow in cutting off a large number of other considerations about impacts on employment in different parts of the world, about environmental impacts and on culture."[12]

Most free traders would agree that although increasing returns to scale might mean that certain industry could settle in a geographical area without any strong economic reason derived from comparative advantage, this is not a reason to argue against free trade because the absolute level of output enjoyed by both "winner" and "loser" will increase with the "winner" gaining more than the "loser" but both gaining more than before in an absolute level.

One critique of free trade is the infant industry argument. The argument advances that protectionism is frequently required to allow growth of nascent industries, as their competitors already employ significant economics of scale by virtue of their size or other factors after a long period of growth.[13]

History

Early era

Before the appearance of free trade doctrine, and continuing in opposition to it to this day, the policy of mercantilism had developed in Europe in the 16th century. Two early British economists who were opposed to mercantilism were Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

Economists that advocated free trade believed trade was the reason why certain civilizations prospered economically. Adam Smith, for example, pointed to increased trading as being the reason for the flourishing of not just Mediterranean cultures such as Egypt, Greece, and Rome, but also of Bengal (East India) and China. The great prosperity of the Netherlands after throwing off Spanish Imperial rule and pursuing a policy of free trade[14] made the free trade/mercantilist dispute the most important question in economics for centuries. Free trade policies have battled with mercantilist, protectionist, isolationist, communist, populist, and other policies over the centuries.

Trade in colonial America was regulated by the British mercantile system through the Acts of Trade and Navigation. Until the 1760s, few colonists openly advocated for free trade, in part because regulations were not strictly enforced—New England was famous for smuggling—but also because colonial merchants did not want to compete with foreign goods and shipping. According to historian Oliver Dickerson, a desire for free trade was not one of the causes of the American Revolution. "The idea that the basic mercantile practices of the eighteenth century were wrong," wrote Dickerson, "was not a part of the thinking of the Revolutionary leaders".[15]

Free trade came to what would become the United States as a result of American Revolutionary War, when the British Parliament issued the Prohibitory Act, blockading colonial ports. The Continental Congress responded by effectively declaring economic independence, opening American ports to foreign trade on April 6, 1776. According to historian John W. Tyler, "Free trade had been forced on the Americans, like it or not."[16]

The 1st U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, advocated tariffs to help protect infant industries in his "Report on Manufactures." This was a minority position, though the "Jeffersonians" strongly opposed for the most part. Later, in the 19th century, statesmen such as Senator Henry Clay continued Hamilton's themes within the Whig Party under the name "American System." The opposition Democratic Party contested several elections throughout the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s in part over the issue of the tariff and protection of industry.

The Democratic Party favored moderate tariffs used for government revenue only, while the Whigs favored higher protective tariffs to protect favored industries. The economist Henry Charles Carey became a leading proponent of the "American System" of economics. This mercantilist "American System" was opposed by the Democratic Party of Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, James K. Polk, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan.

The fledgling Republican Party led by Abraham Lincoln, who called himself a "Henry Clay tariff Whig", strongly opposed free trade and implemented a 44-percent tariff during the Civil War—in part to pay for railroad subsidies and for the war effort, and to protect favored industries.[17] William McKinley (later to become President of the United States) stated the stance of the Republican Party (which won every election for President from 1868 until 1912, except the two non-consecutive terms of Grover Cleveland) as thus:

Under free trade the trader is the master and the producer the slave. Protection is but the law of nature, the law of self-preservation, of self-development, of securing the highest and best destiny of the race of man. [It is said] that protection is immoral…. Why, if protection builds up and elevates 63,000,000 [the U.S. population] of people, the influence of those 63,000,000 of people elevates the rest of the world. We cannot take a step in the pathway of progress without benefitting mankind everywhere. Well, they say, ‘Buy where you can buy the cheapest'…. Of course, that applies to labor as to everything else. Let me give you a maxim that is a thousand times better than that, and it is the protection maxim: ‘Buy where you can pay the easiest.' And that spot of earth is where labor wins its highest rewards.[18]

Many classical liberals, especially in 19th and early 20th century Britain (e.g., John Stuart Mill) and in the United States for much of the 20th century (e.g., Cordell Hull), believed that free trade promoted peace.[citation needed] Woodrow Wilson included free-trade rhetoric in his "Fourteen Points" speech of 1918:

The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, all we see it, is this: [...] 3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.[19]

The British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) grew up with a belief in free trade; this underpinned his criticism of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 for the damage it did to the interdependent European economy. After a brief flirtation with protectionism in the early 1930s, he came again to favour free trade so long as it was combined with internationally coordinated domestic economic policies to promote high levels of employment, and international economic institutions that meant that the interests of countries were not pitted against each other. In these circumstances, "the wisdom of Adam Smith" again applied, he said.[citation needed]

In Kicking Away the Ladder, development economist Ha-Joon Chang reviews the history of free trade policies and economic growth, and notes that many of the now-industrialized countries had significant barriers to trade throughout their history. The United States and Britain, sometimes considered the homes of free trade policy, employed protectionism to varying degrees at all times. Britain abolished the Corn Laws, which restricted import of grain, in 1846 in response to domestic pressures, and it reduced protectionism for manufactures in the mid 19th century, when its technological advantage was at its height, but tariffs on manufactured products had returned to 23% by 1950. The United States maintained weighted average tariffs on manufactured products of approximately 40–50% up until the 1950s, augmented by the natural protectionism of high transportation costs in the 19th century.[20] The most consistent practitioners of free trade have been Switzerland, the Netherlands, and to a lesser degree Belgium.[21] Chang describes the export-oriented industrialization policies of the Asian Tigers as "far more sophisticated and fine-tuned than their historical equivalents".[22]

Some degree of protectionism is nevertheless the norm throughout the world. Most developed nations maintain controversial[citation needed] agricultural tariffs. From 1820 to 1980, the average tariffs on manufactures in twelve industrial countries ranged from 11 to 32%. In the developing world, average tariffs on manufactured goods are approximately 34%.[23]

Since the end of World War II, in part due to industrial supremacy and the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. government has become one of the most consistent proponents of reduced tariff-barriers and free trade, having helped establish the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization (WTO); although it had rejected an earlier version in the 1950s (International Trade Organization or ITO).[24][citation needed] Since the 1970s U.S. governments have negotiated numerous managed-trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2006, and a number of bilateral agreements (such as with Jordan).[citation needed]

Current status

Singapore is the top country in the Enabling Trade Index.

Most countries in the world are members of the World Trade Organization[25], which limits in certain ways but does not eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers. Most countries are also members of regional free trade areas (see map) that lower trade barriers among participating countries.

The European Union / European Economic Area and the North American Free Trade Agreement are the world's largest free trade areas.[citation needed]

Degree of free trade policies

The Enabling Trade Index measures the factors, policies and services that facilitate the trade in goods across borders and to destination. It is made up of four sub-indexes: market access; border administration; transport and communications infrastructure; and business environment. The top 20 countries are:[26]

  1.  Singapore 6.06
  2. Flag of Hong Kong.svg Hong Kong 5.70
  3.  Denmark 5.41
  4.  Sweden 5.41
  5.  Switzerland 5.37
  6.  New Zealand 5.33
  7.  Norway 5.32
  8.  Canada 5.29
  9.  Luxembourg 5.28
  10.  Netherlands 5.26
  1.  Iceland 5.26
  2.  Finland 5.25
  3.  Germany 5.20
  4. Flag of Austria.svg Austria 5.17
  5.  Australia 5.13
  6.  United Arab Emirates 5.12
  7.  United Kingdom 5.06
  8.  Chile 5.06
  9.  United States 5.03
  10.  France 5.02

Opposition

The relative costs, benefits and beneficiaries of free trade are debated by academics, governments and interest groups.

Arguments for protectionism fall into the economic category (trade hurts the economy) or the moral category (the effects of trade might help the economy, but have ill effects in other areas); a general argument against free trade is that it is colonialism or imperialism in disguise. The moral category is wide, including concerns of income inequality, environmental degradation, supporting child labor and sweatshops, race to the bottom, wage slavery, accentuating poverty in poor countries, harming national defense, and forcing cultural change.[27]

Free trade is often opposed by domestic industries that would have their profits and market share reduced by lower prices for imported goods.[28][29] For example, if United States tariffs on imported sugar were reduced, U.S. sugar producers would receive lower prices and profits, while U.S. sugar consumers would spend less for the same amount of sugar because of those same lower prices. The economic theory of David Ricardo holds that consumers would necessarily gain more than producers would lose.[30][31] Since each of those few domestic sugar producers would lose a lot while each of a great number of consumers would gain only a little, domestic producers are more likely to mobilize against the lifting of tariffs.[29] More generally, producers often favor domestic subsidies and tariffs on imports in their home countries, while objecting to subsidies and tariffs in their export markets.

Real Wages vs Trade as a Percent of GDP
Real Wages vs Trade as a Percent of GDP[32][33]

Socialists frequently oppose free trade on the ground that it allows maximum exploitation of workers by capital. For example, Karl Marx wrote in The Communist Manifesto, "The bourgeoisie... has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – tree Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation." Nonetheless, Marx favored free trade solely[34] because he felt that it would hasten the social revolution. To those who oppose socialism, this becomes an argument against free trade.

"Free trade" is opposed by many anti-globalization groups, based on their assertion that free trade agreements generally do not increase the economic freedom of the poor or the working class, and frequently make them poorer. Where the foreign supplier allows de facto exploitation of labor, domestic free-labor is unfairly forced to compete with the foreign exploited labor, and thus the domestic "working class would gradually be forced down to the level of helotry."[35] To this extent, free trade is seen as nothing more than an end-run around laws that protect individual liberty, such as the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (outlawing slavery and indentured servitude).

It is important to distinguish between arguments against free trade theory, and free trade agreements as applied. Some opponents of NAFTA see the agreement as being materially harmful to the common people, but some of the arguments are actually against the particulars of government-managed trade, rather than against free trade per se. For example, it is argued[36] that it would be wrong to let subsidized corn from the U.S. into Mexico freely under NAFTA at prices well below production cost (dumping) because of its ruinous effects to Mexican farmers. Of course, such subsidies violate free trade theory, so this argument is not actually against the principle of free trade, but rather its selective implementation.

Colonialism

It has long been argued that free trade is a form of colonialism or imperialism, a position taken by various proponents of economic nationalism and the school of mercantilism. In the 19th century these criticized British calls for free trade as cover for British Empire, notably in the works of American Henry Clay, architect of the American System[37] and by German American economist Friedrich List.[38]

More recently, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa has denounced the "sophistry of free trade" in an introduction he wrote for a book titled The Hidden Face of Free Trade Accords, written in part by Correa's current Energy Minister Alberto Acosta. Citing as his source the book Kicking Away the Ladder, written by Ha-Joon Chang, Correa identified the difference between an "American system" opposed to a "British System" of free trade. The latter, he says, was explicitly viewed by the Americans as "part of the British imperialist system." According to Correa, Chang showed that it was Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, and not Friedrich List, who was the first to present a systematic argument defending industrial protectionism.

Alternatives

The following alternatives for free trade have been proposed: balanced trade, fair trade, protectionism, and Tobin tax.[citation needed]

In literature

The value of free trade was first observed and documented by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, in 1776.[39] He wrote,

It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy.... If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage.[40]

This statement uses the concept of absolute advantage to present an argument in opposition to mercantilism, the dominant view surrounding trade at the time, which held that a country should aim to export more than it imports, and thus amass wealth.[41] Instead, Smith argues, countries could gain from each producing exclusively the good(s) in which they are most suited to, trading between each other as required for the purposes of consumption. In this vein, it is not the value of exports relative to that of imports that is important, but the value of the goods produced by a nation. The concept of absolute advantage however does not address a situation where a country has no advantage in the production of a particular good or type of good.[42]

This theoretical shortcoming was addressed by the theory of comparative advantage. Generally attributed to David Ricardo who expanded on it in his 1817 book On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,[43] it makes a case for free trade based not on absolute advantage in production of a good, but on the relative opportunity costs of production. A country should specialize in whatever good it can produce at the lowest cost, trading this good to buy other goods it requires for consumption. This allows for countries to benefit from trade even when they do not have an absolute advantage in any area of production. While their gains from trade might not be equal to those of a country more productive in all goods, they will still be better off economically from trade than they would be under a state of autarky. [44][45]

See also

Concepts/topics:

Trade organizations:

References

  1. ^ a b c d Steven E. Landsburg "Price Theory and Applications" Sixth Edition Chapter 8
  2. ^ a b Thom Hartmann "Unequal Protection" Second Edition Chapter 20. p.255
  3. ^ Harold James "The End of Globalization" Third Printing, 2001, p. 109 (ISBN 0-674-00474-4)
  4. ^ a b c Alan C. Stockamn "Introduction to Economics" Second Edition Chapter 9
  5. ^ Pugel (2007), International Economics, pp 311–312
  6. ^ Pugel (2007), International Economics, pp 311–312
  7. ^ a b N. Gregory Mankiw "Macroeconomics" Fifth Edition Chapter 7
  8. ^ Fuller, Dan; Geide-Stevenson (Fall 2003). "Consensus Among Economists: Revisited" (PDF). Journal of Economic Review 34 (4): 369–387. doi:10.1080/00220480309595230. http://www.indiana.edu/~econed/pdffiles/fall03/fuller.pdf. 
  9. ^ Friedman, Milton. "The Case for Free Trade". Hoover Digest 1997 (4). http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3550727.html. 
  10. ^ Whaples, Robert (2006). "Do Economists Agree on Anything? Yes!". The Economists' Voice 3 (9). doi:10.2202/1553-3832.1156. 
  11. ^ Mankiw, Gregory (2006-05-07). "Outsourcing Redux". http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/05/outsourcing-redux.html. Retrieved 2007-01-22. 
  12. ^ Post-Autistic Economics Review, Sept 2007
  13. ^ Krueger, Anne; Baran Tuncer (Dec 1982). "An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument". The American Economic Review 72 (5): 1142–1144. http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/econ/Krueger,%2520An%2520Empirical%2520Test%2520of%2520the%2520Infant.pdf. Retrieved 4 January 2011. 
  14. ^ Appleby, Joyce (2010). The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism. New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
  15. ^ Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution, p 140.
  16. ^ Tyler, Smugglers & Patriots, p 238.
  17. ^ Lind, Matthew. "Free Trade Fallacy". Prospect. Archived from the original on 6 January 2006. http://web.archive.org/web/20060106154801/http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=1080. Retrieved 3 January 2011. 
  18. ^ William McKinley speech, October 4, 1892 in Boston, MA William McKinley Papers (Library of Congress)
  19. ^ Fourteen Points
  20. ^ Chang (2003), Kicking Away the Ladder, p 17
  21. ^ Chang (2003), Kicking Away the Ladder, p 59
  22. ^ Chang (2003), Kicking Away the Ladder, p 50
  23. ^ Chang (2003), Kicking Away the Ladder, p 66
  24. ^ http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/pera9707.pdf
  25. ^ "Members and Observers". World Trade Organisation. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. Retrieved 3 January 2011. 
  26. ^ World Economic Forum. "Rankings: Global Enabling Trade Report 2010". http://www.weforum.org/pdf/GETR10/GETR10-Overall-Rankings.pdf. 
  27. ^ Boudreaux, Don Globalization, 2007
  28. ^ William Baumol and Alan Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy, p. 722.
  29. ^ a b Brakman, Steven; Harry Garretsen, Charles Van Marrewijk, Arjen Van Witteloostuijn (2006). Nations and Firms in the Global Economy : An Introduction to International Economics and Business. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-83298-4. 
  30. ^ Richard L. Stroup, James D. Gwartney, Russell S. Sobel, Economics: Private and Public Choice, p. 46.
  31. ^ Pugel, Thomas A. (2003). International economics. Boston: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-07-119875-X. 
  32. ^ "Earnings - National". Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject. Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://bls.gov/data/#wages. Retrieved 16 March 2012. 
  33. ^ "Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product". National Income and Product Accounts Table. U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=2010&LastYear=2011&3Place=N&AllYearsChk=YES&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid. Retrieved 16 March 2012. 
  34. ^ "It is in this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, that I vote in favor of free trade." Marx, Karl On the Question of Free Trade Speech to the Democratic Association of Brussels at its public meeting of January 9, 1848
  35. ^ Marx, Karl The Civil War in the United States, ¶ 23.
  36. ^ Institute for Agricultural and Trade Policy NAFTA Truth and Consequences: Corn
  37. ^ "Gentlemen deceive themselves. It is not free trade that they are recommending to our acceptance. It is, in effect, the British colonial system that we are invited to adopt; and, if their policy prevail, it will lead, substantially, to the recolonization of these States, under the commercial dominion of Great Britain.", "In Defense of the American System, Against the British Colonial System." 1832, Feb 2, 3, and 6, Clay, Henry (1843). The Life and Speeches of Henry Clay. II. pp. pp. 23–24 
  38. ^ "Had the English left everything to itself—'Laissez faire, laissez aller', as the popular economical school recommends—the [German] merchants of the Steelyard would be still carrying on their trade in London, the Belgians would be still manufacturing cloth for the English, England would have still continued to be the sheep-farm of the Hansards, just as Portugal became the vineyard of England, and has remained so till our days, owing to the stratagem of a cunning diplomatist."
  39. ^ Bhagwati (2002), Free Trade Today, p 3
  40. ^ Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp 264–265
  41. ^ Pugel (2007), International Economics, p 33
  42. ^ Pugel (2007), International Economics, p 34
  43. ^ Ricardo (1817), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Chapter 7 "On Foreign Trade"
  44. ^ Bhagwati (2002), Free Trade Today, p 1
  45. ^ Pugel (2007), International Economics, pp 35–38 and p 40

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EFTA (abbreviation)
ICFTU (abbreviation)
NAFTA (abbreviation)
Cobden, Richard (British politician)