n.
Trade between nations without protective customs tariffs.
freetrader free trader n.| Dictionary: free trade |
Trade between nations without protective customs tariffs.
freetrader free trader n.| 5min Related Video: free trade |
| Geography Dictionary: free trade |
Trade between countries which takes place completely free of restrictions. Such trade allows specialization in member states of free trade areas, and lowers costs because, together with competition, the markets are increased. Within a free trade area there are no barriers, such as tariffs and quotas. However, there is not necessarily a common policy on trade with countries outside the free trade area. See efta, world trade organization.
| Political Dictionary: free trade |
The absence of barriers to international trade. Up to the nineteenth century, under the system of mercantilism, Europeans faced two main kinds of barriers to trade: first, there were duties, quotas, and prohibitions restricting the movement of goods from one customs area to another; second, controls on participation in particular trades imposed by corporations like the British or Dutch East India Companies.
1813 the British East India Company was deprived of its monopoly over trade between Britain and India. Following a prolonged public campaign, the repeal of the Corn Laws 1846 opened the British market to cheap foreign grain. The exemplary force of these events was all the greater because they appeared to be applications of the cogent and appealing liberal economic theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Moreover, rapid growth in international trade, coinciding with increasing wealth and an extended period of general peace in Europe, at first appeared to confirm these theories. Ricardo had argued in his theory of comparative advantage that free trade between nations would bring gains to both parties to an exchange, even when one was the more efficient producer of every good they traded. This was because trade encouraged even an unproductive national economy to devote resources to those branches of production in which they would be least inefficiently employed.
But Ricardo never promised that the gains from trade would be evenly distributed, and a nationalist critique of free trade pioneered by Alexander Hamilton in the United States and Friedrich List in Germany gathered strength towards the end of the century. It even gained ground among traditionally liberal British businessmen, now buffeted by the trade cycle and threatened by new centres of manufacturing industry in continental Europe and North America.
The campaign for tariff reform in Britain was only one facet of a general drift away from free trade. By the 1930s not just the practice but even the ideology had been largely abandoned because it was held to provide disproportionate gains to established industrial economies and to lack a satisfactory mechanism for the realization of their potential comparative advantage by newly developing economies. In its place came bilateral systems of exchange within currency areas, the British system of imperial preference within the sterling area being only one example.
Because bilateralism coincided with a sharp fall in the volume of international trade and was held by powerful members of the Roosevelt administration to have contributed indirectly to the outbreak of the Second World War, the allied powers reinstated a limited form of free trade within a dollar-exchange monetary system in the later 1940s. Under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) of 1947 (see World Trade Organization), successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) outlawed quantitative restrictions on trade, such as quotas, and achieved greatly reduced tariffs on the principal classes of manufactured goods traded between leading industrialized economies. But although this contributed to a sharp increase in levels of trade and prosperity during the 1950s and 1960s, it steadily became more and more evident that many non-tariff barriers, including complex administrative procedures, ingeniously drafted health and safety regulations, and nationalistic public procurement policies, still impeded free exchange of goods and services. Moreover the GATT had permitted a number of exceptions to its general principles from the outset. Trade in temperate-zone agricultural goods was not covered, nor in textiles and clothing, and both became subject to extremely restrictive regimes devised by the United States, Japan, and the European Community to protect their own producers. The GATT also allowed discrimination in favour of each other by groups of countries pledged to the formation of a free trade area or customs union, such as the European Union.
Add to this the extent to which goods such as automotive components, oil, or aluminium are traded internationally within large multinational corporations at administered rather than market prices, together with the renewed prevalence of smuggling (especially of precious metals and illegal drugs), and it becomes hard to discern clearly any causal relation between prosperity and the imperfect contemporary implementation of liberal free trade theory. Be this as it may, the most impressive rates of economic growth achieved in recent years have without exception been achieved by export-oriented countries like Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea, that have relied very heavily on market access provided by this system of managed liberalism; and this has confirmed free trade once again as the effectively unchallenged ideal type of international commerce.
— Charles Jones
| Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: free trade |
For more information on free trade, visit Britannica.com.
| British History: free trade |
The basic tenet of the theory is that free trade, which is the absence of any artificial restrictions on the level or composition of trade or the price at which commodities are exchanged, represents the best form of organization in international markets. Free trade assumes a state of perfect competition.
The fact remains that there are very few examples of any country following a complete free trade policy, Victorian Britain constituting a notable exception. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 brought a shift in political perceptions by removing the protection traditionally given to agriculture in favour of securing cheap imported food for the industrial areas. (See protectionism.) The anomaly of the British adoption of free trade, by contemporary international standards, is a reflection of the unusual economic structure of the country. In the Victorian period the British economy was heavily dependent on international trade and finance, especially the latter. No other country, before or since, has diverted such a large share of national income to overseas investment. Furthermore, British industry depended heavily on export markets. It was thus in the interests of the British economy that international trade flourished.
The First World War severely undermined the British balance of payments as overseas investments were sold to pay for the war. The 1929-32 depression marked the end of free trade. In 1932 a general tariff was introduced imposing a 10 per cent import tax, but allowing preferential treatment to Commonwealth countries in return for concessions on British exports.
| US History Encyclopedia: Free Trade |
The economic rationale for free trade lies in the principle that if trade is free, certain goods and services can be obtained at lower cost abroad than if domestic substitutes are produced in their place. The concept has each country producing for export those goods in which production is relatively efficient, thereby financing the import of goods that would be inefficiently produced at home. This comparative advantage in production between nations is expected to shift over time with changes in such factors as resource endowments and rates of technological advance. Free trade is therefore thought to facilitate the optimal use of economic resources: each country commands a higher level of consumption for a given level of resource use than would be otherwise possible. Advocates of tariff protection take exception to the doctrine on two fundamental bases: at times national goals other than maximized consumption must be served (for example, national defense), and the interests of specific groups do not parallel those of the nation as a whole. Thus, the history of tariffs and other barriers to free trade is a chronicle of shifting economic interests between industries and geographic areas.
Until 1808 the export of American farm and forest products to foreign markets was so profitable and imports were so cheap that there was little incentive to engage in manufacturing. Existing duties were low and designed for revenue rather than protection. War and embargo in the years 1808–1815 stimulated manufacturing (wool, cotton, iron); restoration of peace caused a flood of imports. Free trade then became a sectional issue, a strong protectionist movement developing in the middle and western states. Depression in 1819 and 1820 convinced workers that protection was necessary to save jobs from foreign competition, whereas farmers felt that building strong American industry would create higher demand and prices for farm goods. New England was divided between the manufacturing and the commercial interests, while the South solidly favored free trade because of its desire for cheap imports and fear of English retaliation against raw cotton imported from the United States.
By 1833 free-trade sentiment revived, as northern farmers, believing that young industries no longer needed protection, joined forces with John C. Calhoun and the South in an alliance that kept tariffs low until 1860. After the Civil War the protectionists controlled tariff policy for many years. Continued southern devotion to free trade and persistent, although wavering, low-tariff sentiment in the West produced only the short-lived horizontal duty reduction of 1872 and a few haphazard reductions in 1883. In the campaign of 1888 free-traders rallied around Grover Cleveland as the tariff for the first time became strictly a party issue. But the protectionists won again and passed the Tariff Act of 1890.
Popular hatred of monopoly—evidenced in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890—came to the support of free trade by implicating the tariff as "the mother of trusts." Cleveland won election in 1892 against the high-tariff Republicans, but the Democrats were torn over free silver and lost the opportunity to liberalize tariffs. However, continued antitrust feeling had bred such hostility to extreme protectionism that even the Republicans promised tariff reduction in the election of 1908. Sectional interests continued to thin the ranks of free-traders; the West and South demanded lower tariffs in general but supported the particular agricultural tariffs that served their interests in the Tariff Act of 1909.
Recurring economic crises, particularly the depressions of 1893–1897 and 1907–1908, further shook public confidence in the virtues of the "American system." Only the large industrial interests appeared to be consistently served by the cyclical pattern of economic growth (for example, Standard Oil's combining of small companies during depression, as indicated in the Sherman antitrust case of 1911). The height of tariffs, identified closely by the public with large industry, became a major political issue in 1912. The victorious Democrats promised reduction but held that no "legitimate" industry would be sacrificed. Although a considerable number of items were placed on the free list, rates were reduced, on an average, 10 percent only.
After World War I, with the Republicans in power, extreme protection held sway. Agriculture accepted any tariffs on farm products—although still grumbling about industrial tariffs—and the South found its former solid free-trade front broken by districts with a stake in tariffs on products of farm and factory. In the campaign of 1928 the tariff positions of the two major parties were scarcely distinguishable. Following a full year of debate in Congress, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act became law in 1930; the act constructed the highest tariff wall in the nation's history, and its contribution to the shrinkage of world trade and the severity of worldwide depression was considerable. Revulsion from the indiscriminate protectionism, distress with the worsening depression, and the leadership of Cordell Hull, an old-fashioned southern tariff liberal, again turned the country toward trade liberalization.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and its twelve extensions through 1962 beat a steady retreat from the high-water mark of protection reached in 1930. Reacting to the severe decline in the volume of U.S. exports after 1930, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt conceived reciprocal trade concessions as an antidepression measure to generate recovery in export-related industries. Following World War II a political impetus was added; by opening its markets, the United States could assist the war-ravaged European economies in reconstruction and could similarly aid the development in poor nations. The economic implications of the Trade Agreements Act and its extensions were conflicting: there was a steady trend of tariff reduction, expedited after 1945 through the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the application of the unconditional most-favored-nation concept; but the reductions were tempered by a "no-injury" philosophy, adopted to minimize injury to domestic industry. Escape clauses, peril points, and national security regulations have hedged the U.S. commitment to agreed tariff reductions. The 1958 extension was notable in firmly establishing these concepts and the necessary enforcement machinery. Under the peril-point provision the U.S. tariff commission was to determine before negotiations the level to which a tariff rate could fall before seriously damaging the domestic industry; this estimate was to provide an effective limit to the authority extended negotiators. An industry experiencing severe injury from a tariff already reduced could petition for relief under the escape clause, which had appeared in U.S. trade agreements since 1943; if the U.S. Tariff Commission found sufficient injury, the concession could be withdrawn.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 made a significant departure from the reciprocal agreements in providing programs for alleviating injury caused by trade liberalization. Benefits and retraining for labor and special loans and tax treatment for industry were extended on the rationale of reallocating resources into more efficient uses. The reciprocal trade legislation had avoided this process by rescinding the tariff reduction when injury was inflicted. Administration of the provisions of the 1962 act has been difficult, however, because of the difficulty of distinguishing losses owing to increased imports from losses owing to the domestic industry's inefficiency. The 1962 act extended authority for sizable tariff reductions, to be negotiated through the offices of GATT during the five years following. Tariff reductions on items not excepted from this Kennedy Round of negotiations amounted to about 35 percent. As the U.S. trade balance worsened in the late 1960s, culminating in a trade deficit in 1971—the first in the twentieth century—the forces of protection threatened to reverse the forty-year trend of trade liberalization.
Throughout the 1970s, the executive branch resisted congressional initiatives to raise trade barriers. In 1980, Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency ushered in a new era of free trade in American foreign policy, one that would last for the remainder of the century and beyond. In the 1980s the Reagan Administration promoted a new round of GATT talks, and by the early 1990s the United States, Mexico, and Canada had agreed to create a continental free trade zone, known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The collapse of communism added momentum to the global trend toward free trade and free markets. During the 1990s governments across the world embraced free-trade policies, including countries that once belonged to the communist bloc, such as Russia, Poland, and China. By the early twenty-first century free trade had emerged as a cornerstone of the new global economy. Nevertheless, substantial opposition to free-trade policies remained an active force in global politics. In particular, environ-mental and labor groups condemned free trade policies on the grounds that they made it easier for multinational corporations to pollute the environment and to pay sweat-shop wages without fear of government regulation. The debate over free trade showed no signs of cooling off as the twenty-first century began.
Bibliography
LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963.
Lake, David A. Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Milner, Helen V. Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Terrill, Thomas E. The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy, 1874–1901. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.
—Thomas L. Edwards/A. G.
| Columbia Encyclopedia: free trade |
Internal Free Trade
Free trade within national borders is in some countries a comparatively recent development. Jean Baptiste Colbert tried to abolish internal trade barriers in France in the 17th cent., but that was not accomplished until the French Revolution, a hundred years later. In the German states Prussia took the lead in organizing the Zollverein movement after 1818. The desire to assure freedom from internal trade barriers in the United States was a factor in calling the Constitutional Convention. In Britain, the classic home of the free-trade movement, the term free trade was first used during the agitation for removal of the privileges of the chartered companies in the 17th cent.
International Free Trade
In 18th-century Britain, free trade eventually came to mean the desire for a moderate tariff policy in international trade, especially with France. The rapid growth of British industry in the late 1700s (see Industrial Revolution) gave added force to the attack on international trade restrictions (see mercantilism). Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) provided a powerful intellectual basis for the free trade movement, and the later work of David Ricardo was important in developing the notion of comparative advantage as an argument in its favor. The most important practical blow in favor of the free-trade movement came with the formation (1839) of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and the repeal (1846) of the corn laws. The Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 represented perhaps the high-water mark of free trade.
After World War I, Britain reintroduced protection and a system of imperial preference in an attempt to establish a greater measure of economic autonomy. France, along with other European nations, historically followed a policy of protection. In the period of international economic dislocation in the mid-1930s, the United States reversed earlier policy and signed reciprocal trade treaties with many foreign governments, embracing a policy of selective tariff reduction for economic and political reasons. At present the United States is a relatively low tariff nation, although it still maintains a fairly restrictive system of import quotas. Japan also has restrictive import quotas, as well as high tariffs and other trade restrictions.
After World War II, strong sentiment developed throughout the world against protection and high tariffs and in favor of freer trade. The results were new organizations and agreements on international trade such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1948), the Benelux Economic Union (1948), the European Economic Community (Common Market, 1957), the European Free Trade Association (1959), Mercosur (1991), and the World Trade Organization (1995). In 1993 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was approved by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In the early 1990s the nations of the European Union (the successor organization to the Common Market) undertook to remove all barriers to the free movement of trade and employment across their mutual borders.
Critics of free trade zones argue that such measures are detrimental to domestic economies. In the case of NAFTA, for example, opponents contended that the jobs of some American workers would be “exported” to Mexico, where labor costs are lower. Many have continued to oppose the international impetus toward freer trade, arguing the accords not only fail to protect jobs in more developed nations but also harm workers and the environment in less developed nations, where the laws are more lax or less enforced. Despite such objections, support for free trade has continued. In Apr., 2001, for example, 34 nations of the Western Hemisphere committed themselves to the development of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, though movement toward such an organization subsequently stalled. In May, 2004, the Central American Free Trade Agreement was finalized by the United States and five Central American nations; the Dominican Republic is also a member of the group. The United States, Japan, China, and other countries have also negotiated bilateral free-trade agreements with individual nations or regional trade associations; such agreements generally open trade in some areas while preserving the protection of politically sensitive economic sectors.
See also reciprocal trade agreement.
Bibliography
See G. B. Doern and B. W. Tomlin, Faith and the Free Trade Story (1991); D. B. Yoffie, Beyond Free Trade: Firms, Governments, and Global Competition (1993); A. E. Eckes, Jr., Opening America's Market (1995); J. J. Schott, The World Trading System (1997).
| Economics Dictionary: free trade |
| Wikipedia: Free trade |
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| Fair trade |
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| Free trade |
| Protectionism
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Free trade is a type of trade policy that allows traders to act and transact without interference from government. Thus, the policy permits trading partners mutual gains from trade[citation needed], with goods and services produced according to the theory of comparative advantage.
Under a free trade policy, prices are a reflection of true supply and demand, and are the sole determinant of resource allocation. Free trade differs from other forms of trade policy where the allocation of goods and services amongst trading countries are determined by artificial prices that do not reflect the true nature of supply and demand. These artificial prices are the result of protectionist trade policies, whereby governments intervene in the market through price adjustments and supply restrictions[citation needed]. Such government interventions generally increase the cost of goods and services to both consumers and producers.
Interventions include subsidies, taxes and tariffs, non-tariff barriers, such as regulatory legislation and quotas, and even inter-government managed trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (contrary to their formal titles.)--any governmental market intervention resulting in artificial prices that do not reflect the principles of supply and demand.
Most states conduct trade polices that are to a lesser or greater degree protectionist.[1] One ubiquitous protectionist policy employed by states comes in the form agricultural subsidies whereby countries attempt to protect their agricultural industries from outside competition by creating artificial low prices for their agricultural goods.[2]
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The value of free trade was first observed and documented by Adam Smith in his magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations in 1776.[3] Later, David Ricardo made a case for free trade by presenting specialized an economic proof featuring a single factor of production with constant productivity of labor in two goods, but with relative productivity between the goods different across two countries.[3] Ricardo's model demonstrated the benefits of trading via specialization--states could acquire more than their labor alone would permit them to produce. This basic model ultimately led to the formation of one of Economic's fundamental laws: The Law of Comparative Advantage. The Law of Comparative Advantage states that each member in a group of trading partners should specialize in and produce the goods in which they possess lowest opportunity costs relative to other trading partners. This specialization permits trading partners to then exchange their goods produced as a function of specialization. Under a policy of free trade, trade via specialization maximizes labor, wealth and quantity of goods produce, exceeding what an equal number of autarkic states could produce.
Arguments for protectionism fall into the economic category (trade hurts the economy) or the moral category (the effects of trade might help the economy, but have ill effects in other areas). The moral category is wide, including concerns of Income inequality, environmental degradation, supporting child labor and sweatshops, race to the bottom, wage slavery,accentuating poverty in poor countries, harming national defense, and forcing cultural change.[4]
Free trade implies the following features[citation needed]:
Also: History of international trade.
It is known that various prosperous world civilizations throughout history have engaged in trade. Based on this, theoretical rationalizations as to why a policy of free trade would be beneficial to nations developed over time, especially in Europe, and especially in Britain, over the past five centuries. Before the appearance of Free Trade doctrine, and continuing in opposition to it to this day, the policy of mercantilism had developed in Europe in the 1500s. Early economists opposed to mercantilism were David Ricardo and Adam Smith.
Economists that advocated free trade believed trade was the reason why certain civilizations prospered economically. Adam Smith, for example, pointed to increased trading as being the reason for the flourishing of not just Mediterranean cultures such as Egypt, Greece, and Rome, but also of Bengal (East India) and China. The great prosperity of the Netherlands after throwing off Spanish Imperial rule, and declaring Free Trade and Freedom of thought, made the Free Trade/Mercantilist dispute the most important question in economics for centuries. Free trade policies have battled with mercantilist, protectionist, isolationist, communist, and other policies over the centuries.
Wars have been fought over trade, such as the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, the Opium Wars between China and Great Britain, and other colonial wars. All developed countries have used protectionism due to an interest in raising revenues, protecting infant industries, special interest pressure, and, prior to the 19th century, a belief in mercantilism.
Many classical liberals, especially in 19th and early 20th century Britain (e.g. John Stuart Mill) and in the United States for much of the 20th century (e.g. Cordell Hull), believed that free trade promoted peace. The British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) was brought up on this belief, which underpinned his criticism of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 for the damage it did to the interdependent European economy. After a brief flirtation with protectionism in the early 1930s, he came again to favour free trade so long as it was combined with internationally coordinated domestic economic policies to promote high levels of employment, and international economic institutions that meant that the interests of countries were not pitted against each other. In these circumstances, 'the wisdom of Adam Smith' again applied, he said.
Some degree of Protectionism is nevertheless the norm throughout the world. In most developed nations, controversial agricultural tariffs are maintained. From 1820 to 1980, the average tariffs on manufactures in twelve industrial countries ranged from 11 to 32%. In the developing world, average tariffs on manufactured goods are approximately 34%.[5]:66
Currently, the World Bank believes that, at most, rates of 20% can be allowed by developing nations ; but Ha-Joon Chang believes higher levels may be justified because the productivity gap between developing and developed nations is much higher than the productivity gap which industrial countries faced. (A general feature is that the underdeveloped nations of today are not in the same position that the developed nations were in when they had a similar level of technology, because they are weak players in a competitive system; the developed nations have always been strong players, although formerly at an overall lower level.) If the main defense of tariffs is to stimulate infant industries, a tariff must be high enough to allow domestic manufactured goods to compete for the tariff to be possibly successful. This theory, known as import substitution industrialization, is largely considered to be ineffective for currently developing nations,[6]:311 and studies by the World Bank have determined that export-oriented industrialization policies correlate with higher economic growth as observed with the Four Asian Tigers. These assessments are based mainly on theory and observational study of correlations, and thus suffer from a number of weaknesses such as small sample size and numerous confounding variables (see the critical review section below).
Trade in colonial America was regulated by the British mercantile system through the Acts of Trade and Navigation. Until the 1760s, few colonists openly advocated for free trade, in part because regulations were not strictly enforced—New England was famous for smuggling—but also because colonial merchants did not want to compete with foreign goods and shipping. According to historian Oliver Dickerson, a desire for free trade was not one of the causes of the American Revolution. "The idea that the basic mercantile practices of the eighteenth century were wrong," wrote Dickerson, "was not a part of the thinking of the Revolutionary leaders".[7] Free trade came to what would become the United States as a result of American Revolutionary War, when the British Parliament issued the Prohibitory Act, blockading colonial ports. The Continental Congress responded by effectively declaring economic independence, opening American ports to foreign trade on April 6, 1776. According to historian John W. Tyler, "Free trade had been forced on the Americans, like it or not."[8]
The 1st U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, advocated tariffs to help protect infant industries in his "Report on Manufactures." This was a minority position, however, which the "Jeffersonians" strongly opposed for the most part. Later, in the 19th century, statesmen such as Senator Henry Clay continued Hamilton's themes within the Whig Party under the name "American System." The opposition Democratic Party contested several elections throughout the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s in part over the issue of the tariff and protection of industry. The Democratic Party favored moderate tariffs used for government revenue only, while the Whig's favored higher protective tariffs to protect favored industries. The economist Henry Charles Carey became a leading proponent of the "American System" of economics. This mercantilist "American System" was opposed by the Democratic Party of Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, James K. Polk, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan.
The fledgling Republican Party led by Abraham Lincoln, who called himself a "Henry Clay tariff Whig," strongly opposed free trade and implemented at 44 percent tariff during the Civil War in part to pay for railroad subsidies, the war effort, and to protect favored industries.[9] President William McKinley stated the United States' stance under the Republican Party (which won every election for President until 1912, except the two non-consecutive terms of Grover Cleveland) as thus:
"Under free trade the trader is the master and the producer the slave. Protection is but the law of nature, the law of self-preservation, of self-development, of securing the highest and best destiny of the race of man. [It is said] that protection is immoral…. Why, if protection builds up and elevates 63,000,000 [the U.S. population] of people, the influence of those 63,000,000 of people elevates the rest of the world. We cannot take a step in the pathway of progress without benefitting mankind everywhere. Well, they say, ‘Buy where you can buy the cheapest'…. Of course, that applies to labor as to everything else. Let me give you a maxim that is a thousand times better than that, and it is the protection maxim: ‘Buy where you can pay the easiest.' And that spot of earth is where labor wins its highest rewards."[10]
On the other side:
The growing Free Trade Movement sought an end to the tariffs and corruption in state and federal governments by every means available to them, leading to several outcomes. The first and most important was the rise of the Democratic Party with Grover Cleveland at its helm. The next most important were the rise of the "Mugwumps" within the Republican party. For many Jeffersonian radicals, neither went far enough or sufficiently effective in their efforts and looked for alternatives. The first major movement of the radical Jeffersonians evolved from the insights of a young journalist and firebrand, Henry George. - Kenneth R. Gregg, George Mason University History News Network
The tariff and support of protection to support the growth of infrastructure and industrialization of the nation became a leading tenet of the Republican Party thereafter until the Eisenhower administration and the onset of the Cold War, when the Democratic and Republican parties switched positions.
In the 1930s, the US adopted the protectionist Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act which raised rates to all time highs beyond the Lincoln levels, which many economists believe exacerbated the Great Depression. Europe, which had less protectionism at the time, had largely come out of the depression while the US remained mired in the depression. Franklin D. Roosevelt resorted to Hamilton's earlier formula of tariff Reciprocity coupled with subsidy to industry which went unbroken until the 1970s when protectionism was reduced after the Kennedy Round of trade talks in the late sixties.
Since the end of World War II, in part due to industrial supremacy and the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. government has become one of the most consistent proponents of reduced tariff barriers and free trade, having helped establish the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization (WTO); although it had rejected an earlier version in the 1950s (International Trade Organization or ITO). Since the 1970s U.S. government has negotiated numerous managed trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2006, and a number of bilateral agreements (such as with Jordan).
The literature analysing the economics of free trade is extremely rich with extensive work having been done on the theoretical and empirical effects. Though it creates winners and losers, the broad consensus among members of the economics profession in the U.S. is that free trade is a large and unambiguous net gain for society.[11] [12] In a 2006 survey of American economists (83 responders), "87.5% agree that the U.S. should eliminate remaining tariffs and other barriers to trade" and "90.1% disagree with the suggestion that the U.S. should restrict employers from outsourcing work to foreign countries."[13] Quoting Harvard economics professor N. Gregory Mankiw, "Few propositions command as much consensus among professional economists as that open world trade increases economic growth and raises living standards."[14] Nonetheless, quoting Prof. Peter Soderbaum of Malardalen University, Sweden, "This neoclassical trade theory focuses on one dimension, i.e., the price at which a commodity can be delivered and is extremely narrow in cutting off a large number of other considerations about impacts on employment in different parts of the world, about environmental impacts and on culture." [15] Most free traders would agree that there are winners and losers from free trade, but argue that this is not a reason to argue against free trade, because free trade is supposed to bring overall gain due to idea that the winners have gained enough to make up for the losses of the losers and then some. Chang argues otherwise. The winners do not always make enough to compensate for the losers, as is the case when the economy gets smaller and even if the winners do make enough to compensate for the losers, this compensation is not always from the workings of the market meaning some people are worse off. Adding to his argument is the idea that in order for the losers of free trade competition to be fully compensated, some sort of compensation vehicle such as a welfare program is needed to sustain them until they are able to find a job that is equal to or better than their previous job. If they do not find a job that is equal to or better than the one they had, they are worse off and America is worse off because if this trend continued, trading a better job for a worse job, then America would really be in trouble. The problem is that only economically developed, wealthy countries like the U.S. or Britain have effective welfare mechanisms whereas many developing countries have little to no welfare system to speak of and do not even have the opportunity to create one that functions because of the pace that they are being pushed to conform to a very open free trade system.[16] Two simple ways to understand the benefits of free trade are through David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage and by analyzing the impact of a tariff or import quota.
A simple economic analysis using the law of supply and demand and the economic effects of a tax can be used to show the theoretical benefits of free trade.[17]
The chart at the right analyzes the effect of the imposition of an import tariff on some imaginary good. Prior to the tariff, the price of the good in the world market (and hence in the domestic market) is Pworld. The tariff increases the domestic price to Ptariff. The higher price causes domestic production to increase from QS1 to QS2 and causes domestic consumption to decline from QC1 to QC2. This has three main effects on societal welfare. Consumers are made worse off because the consumer surplus (green region) becomes smaller. Producers are better off because the producer surplus (yellow region) is made larger. The government also has additional tax revenue (blue region). However, the loss to consumers is greater than the gains by producers and the government. The magnitude of this societal loss is shown by the two pink triangles. Removing the tariff and having free trade would be a net gain for society. [18][19]
An almost identical analysis of this tariff from the perspective of a net producing country yields parallel results. From that country's perspective, the tariff leaves producers worse off and consumers better off, but the net loss to producers is larger than the benefit to consumers (there is no tax revenue in this case because the country being analyzed is not collecting the tariff). Under similar analysis, export tariffs, import quotas, and export quotas all yield nearly identical results. Sometimes consumers are better off and producers worse off, and sometimes consumers are worse off and producers are better off, but the imposition of trade restrictions causes a net loss to society because the losses from trade restrictions are larger than the gains from trade restrictions. Free trade creates winners and losers, but theory and empirical evidence show that the size of the winnings from free trade are larger than the losses. [17]
According to mainstream economic theory, global free trade is a net benefit to society, but the selective application of free trade agreements to some countries and tariffs on others can sometimes lead to economic inefficiency through the process of trade diversion. It is economically efficient for a good to be produced by the country which is the lowest cost producer, but this will not always take place if a high cost producer has a free trade agreement while the low cost producer faces a high tariff. Applying free trade to the high cost producer (and not the low cost producer as well) can lead to trade diversion and a net economic loss. This is why many economists place such high importance on negotiations for global tariff reductions, such as the Doha Round.[17]
In an assessment of the literature on the theory and empirical research relating to the benefits of free trade, Sonali Deraniyagala and Ben Fine found that much of the work was flawed, and concluded that the extent to which free trade benefits economic development is unknown.[20] Theoretical arguments are largely dependent upon specific empirical assumptions which may or may not hold true. In the empirical literature, many studies suggest the relationship is ambiguous, and the data and econometrics underlying a set of empirical papers showing positive results have been critiqued. The best of these papers use a simplified model, and the worst involve the regression of an index of economic performance on an index of openness to trade, with a mix of these two approaches common. In some cases, Deraniyagala and Fine claim, these indexes of openness actually reflect trade volume rather than policy orientation. They also observe that it is difficult to disentangle the effects of reverse causality and numerous exogenous variables.
In Kicking Away the Ladder, Ha-Joon Chang reviews the history of free trade policies and economic growth, and notes that many of the now-industrialized countries had significant barriers to trade throughout their history. Protectionism under the auspices of the infant industry argument (related to import substitution industrialization), was first pursued by Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s in opposition to the admonition of Adam Smith, who advised that the United States focus on agriculture, where it had a comparative advantage. In the 1840s Friedrich List, known as the father of the infant industry argument,[5]:3 advocated the infant industry argument for Germany. Chang's research shows that the United States and Britain, sometimes considered to be the homes of free trade policy, were aggressive protectionists. Britain did end its protectionism when it achieved technological superiority in the late 1850s with the repeal of the Corn Laws, but tariffs on manufactured products had returned to 23% by 1950. The United States maintained weighted average tariffs on manufactured products of approximately 40-50% up until the 1950s, augmented by the natural protectionism of high transportation costs in the 1800s.[5]:17 The most consistent practitioners of free trade have been Switzerland, the Netherlands, and to a lesser degree Belgium.[5]:59
Chang describes the export-oriented industrialization policies of the Asian Tigers as "far more sophisticated and fine-tuned than their historical equivalents".[5]:50
American intellectual Noam Chomsky argues that David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, often offered to promote free trade, assumes that capital is more or less immobile and labor highly mobile, but today these assumptions have been reversed in practice.[21]
Free trade is often opposed by domestic industries that would have their profits and market share reduced by lower prices for imported goods.[22][23] For example, if United States tariffs on imported sugar were reduced, US sugar producers would receive lower prices and profits, while US sugar consumers would spend less for the same amount of sugar because of those same lower prices. Economics says that consumers would necessarily gain more than producers would lose.[24][25] Since each of those few domestic sugar producers would lose a lot while each of a great number of consumers would gain only a little, domestic producers are more likely to mobilize against the lifting of tariffs.[23] More generally, producers often favor domestic subsidies and tariffs on imports in their home countries, while objecting to subsidies and tariffs in their export markets.
Socialists frequently oppose free trade on the ground that it allows maximum exploitation of workers by capital. For example, Karl Marx wrote in The Communist Manifesto, "The bourgeoisie... has set up that single, unconscionable freedom -- Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation."
"Free trade" is opposed by many anti-globalization groups, based on their assertion that so-called Free Trade agreements generally do not increase the economic freedom of the poor, and frequently make them poorer.[citation needed][clarification needed Who?Where?To what extent?] Whether the "Free Trade" agreements are really for free trade or for government-managed trade is perhaps moot ; these opponents see the deals as being materially harmful to the common people. Nevertheless, if the deals are essentially for government-managed trade, arguing against them is not a direct argument against free trade per se. For example, it is argued [26] that letting subsidized corn from the US into Mexico freely under NAFTA at prices well below production cost (dumping) is ruinous to Mexican farmers. Of course, such subsidies violate free trade, so this argument is not actually against free trade.
Some free trade economists[who?] have recently begun to express their own doubts concerning the concept and practice of free trade. Alan S. Blinder, for example, a professor of economics at Princeton University, and former Federal Reserve Board vice chairman and advisor to Democratic presidential candidates, had previously argued, along with most economists[citation needed], that free trade enriches the U.S. and its trading partners[which?]. Jobs may be lost here in the short run, they say, but the total U.S. net national product must, by the economic laws of comparative advantage, be raised in the long run.[citation needed] The gains of the winners exceed the losses of the losers. This has been called "creative capitalist destruction."
However, Jagdish Bhagwati believes that new communication technology will put 30-40 million American jobs at risk in 10–20 years.[27] In addition Bhagwati has not completely rejected free trade or ideas about comparative advantage, but advocates greater protection for displaced workers and an improved education system, since trade changes types of jobs, not the number. For example, technology has allowed Indians in call centers to do the work of Americans at lower wages. Which may cause tens of millions of additional American workers start to experience an element of job insecurity that has heretofore been reserved for manufacturing workers. The debate is, "Should government encourage forces of globalization or try to restrain them?" Latin America performed poorly since tariff cuts in 1980s and 1990s, compared to protectionist China and Southeast Asia. According to Samuelson, it is wrong to assume a necessary surplus of winnings over losings.[cite this quote] The paper, "Will inventions A or B lower or raise the new market-clearing real wage rates that sustain high-to-full employment" in China and America?, condemned "economists' over-simple complacency about globalization" and said that workers don't always win.[vague] Some economists[who?] try to emphasize that trade barriers should exist to help poor nations build domestic industries and give rich nations time to retrain workers. [28]
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa has denounced the "sophistry of free trade", in an introduction he wrote for a book titled The Hidden Face of Free Trade Accords. One of the authors of that book is today Correa's Energy Minister, Alberto Acosta. Citing as his source the book, Kicking Away the Ladder, [3] written by a Korean economist based at Cambridge University, Ha-Joon Chang, Correa identified the difference between an "American system" opposed to "a British System" of free trade. The latter, he says, was explicitly viewed by the Americans as "part of the British imperialist system." Correa wrote that Chang showed that it was Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, and not Friedrich List who was the first to present a systematic argument defending industrial protectionism. (Correa includes List's National System of Political Economy in his bibliographic references.)
The following alternatives for free trade are proposed[by whom?]: balanced trade, fair trade, protectionism and Tobin tax.
The relative costs, benefits and beneficiaries of free trade are debated by academics, governments and interest groups. A number of arguments for and against in the ongoing public debate can be seen in the free trade debate article.
Depending on the specific context, use of the term free trade can signify one or more of the above conditions. However, it is fundamental that only governments can restrict trade: they have the legal monopoly over the use of physical force to influence trade in a geographical area.
The term free trade has become very politically based, and it is not uncommon for so-called "free trade agreements" to impose additional trade restrictions. Such restrictions on trade are often due to domestic political pressure by powerful corporate, environmental or labor interest groups seeking special protections of their interests.
Free trade agreements are a key element of customs unions and free trade areas. The details and differences of these agreements are covered in their respective articles. Opportunities for free trade will likely increase with global warming, with the opening of new trade routes due to melting ice in the Northwest Passage and other similar areas. It is also likely that the environmentalists who believe in goods being made locally will to have an effect on world trade.
Concepts/topics
Trade organizations
Other lists
Criticism
Conservative opposition to free trade
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