| Dictionary: friendly fire |
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| Insurance Dictionary: Friendly Fire |
Kindling intentionally set in a fireplace, stove, furnace, or other containment that has not spread beyond it. Property insurance does not protect against damage from a friendly fire. For example, smoke damage to the inside of a fireplace is not covered because the fire is in its normal habitat; to insure it would be insuring against a certainty. Insurance is designed to provide coverage against the fortuitous loss. See also Hostile Fire.
| Military History Companion: friendly fire |
Modern circumlocution for attacks on soldiers by their own side, a decidedly unfriendly act but a well-established reality of war. It even occurred in hand-to-hand combat because men were not recognized as being friendly or because, in the press of battle, a weapon drawn back to strike a foe might hit a friend instead. The sharp bronze butt of the hoplite spear often caused casualties in the rear ranks when it was drawn back to strike: Plutarch (see Greek historians) describes how in a battle in the streets of Argos in 272 ‘many died from the accidental blows which they inflicted among each other’.
The adoption of gunpowder weapons complicated matters. The smoke they produced so liberally made IFF difficult. At Rezonville/Gravelotte in 1870 a French regiment was gently reproved by a strange brigadier who arrived to announce: ‘Mes enfants, you probably do not know it, but you are firing on my brigade.’ Accidents were frequent when weapons were handled in closely packed ranks, and their avoidance was one aim of drill. Front-rank soldiers who knelt to fire and bobbed up to load were often shot by their rear-rank comrades: Marshal Saint-Cyr attributed one-quarter of French infantry casualties in the Napoleonic era to this cause.
Carelessness and misunderstandings kill men even off the battlefield. A corporal of the British 43rd Regiment survived the storming of Badajoz in 1812, only to be killed when a soldier fired his musket while cleaning it. During the British civil wars Lt Col Arthur Swayne ‘was slain by his boy, teaching him to use his arms. He bid the boy aim at him (thinking the gun had not been charged) which he did only too well.’ Lt Col Thomas Gonne of the 17th Lancers was supervising pistol practice the very day his regiment received orders to leave for the Zulu war, and accidentally shot himself. Any army in the field will produce a steady trickle of casualties as friendly patrols are engaged: WW I poet Siegfried Sassoon was shot by one of his NCOs when coming back from patrol. Weapon handling is worsened by tiredness, fear, and poor training. During the Vietnam war the US army recorded 846 cases of ‘accidental self-destruction’ and 939 ‘accidental homicides’, in all over 4 per cent of the total ground-action fatalities.
As engagement ranges increased so too did the propensity for friendly fire to cause casualties. Once artillery was used primarily in indirect fire, engaging a target invisible to the gun's detachment, all sorts of errors were possible. The position of gun or target might be inaccurately located on the map; barrels might be worn or charges faulty; and the members of the detachment might load the wrong charge or set an incorrect bearing or elevation on the sight. The tactical situation might have not been grasped by the gunners: the gallant French defence of the village of Samogneux, outside Verdun, collapsed when a newly arrived battery of French 155 mm guns engaged it. Commanders and their staff sometimes made lethal errors and engaged positions their own men held. Gen Charles Percin reckoned that 75, 000 French soldiers were killed by their own artillery in WW I.
Aircraft made their own lethal contribution. Guderian's panzer corps was struck by its own supporting Stukas the day after it crossed the Meuse in 1940, and a brigade commander was among the killed. The German practice of placing the national flag on the engine-deck of tanks (and painting it on the decks of warships) arose not from patriotism but a desire to make IFF clear. Allied ground forces in Normandy used a white star for the same reason, and in the Gulf war in 1990-1 Allied vehicles bore a distinguishing chevron. Yet despite this there were still casualties from friendly air power. American troops preparing for COBRA in 1944 were struck twice by strategic bombers. In one incident 111 men were killed (including Lt Gen Leslie J. McNair, the highest-ranking US army fatality of the war) and another 490 were wounded. Accidental American air attack on a British unit in the Gulf war caused both casualties and resentment.
The fact remains that casualties from friendly fire are, as John Horsfall says, ‘a hazard inseparable from war’. Good training and slick procedures will help reduce them. When they occur they will be likely to generate disproportionate impact, especially if the friend producing the fire is an ally or coalition partner.
Bibliography
— Richard Holmes
| US Military History Companion: Friendly Fire |
So‐called friendly fire, sometimes termed fratricide or amicicide, is officially defined by the U.S. Army as “the employment of friendly weapons … which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel.” Intentional firing on friendly troops and true accidents are properly excluded from the definition.
The difficulties posed by terrain, poor visibility, and the type and size of operations all contribute to friendly fire. The immediate causes include mechanical defects, simple carelessness, poor spatial orientation, misidentification of the target, and miscalculation of firing data. Poor coordination of the movement of forces on the battlefield, lack of training, and poor discipline also play a role; but the fear, uncertainty, and excitement of the combat environment are perhaps the most important factors.
The statistical dimensions of the friendly fire problem have yet to be defined; reliable data are simply not available in most cases. Operational and medical reports suggest, however, that the relationship of friendly fire casualties to overall friendly casualties is between 2 percent and 25 percent. In the Persian Gulf War of 1991, there were 615 American casualties; 23 percent of the personnel (35 killed and 72 wounded) and 77 percent of the combat vehicle losses were attributable to friendly fire.
Whatever the statistical reality, friendly fire is known to have occurred in all of America's wars, and the victims have ranged from the rawest recruits to very senior officers. The Confederate general “Stonewall” Jackson died after being mistakenly shot by one of his own soldiers at Chancellorsville in 1863. In World War II, Lieut. Gen. Lesley J. McNair and 813 other Americans were killed or wounded near St. Lô in Normandy in one of the most costly incidents of friendly fire ever to occur. The use of American medium and heavy bombers to provide close support for ground troops in Operation Cobra, the breakout of Allied forces from Normandy, resulted in mistaken bombing of American positions on two successive days, 24–25 July 1944. The planned ground attack was delayed but ultimately succeeded despite the frightful toll.
Earlier, in July 1943, nervous American naval and ground troops Gela, Sicily, fired on aircraft carrying paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division and caused 319 casualties (88 dead, 162 wounded, and 69 missing) plus 80 aircraft destroyed or badly damaged. In the Pacific, a month later, 15–16 August, 28 Americans and Canadians were killed and 55 wounded during the invasion of Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. There were no enemy troops on the island; all of the casualties were from friendly fire.
As weapons have become more complicated and more deadly, the ability of human beings to control them has been stretched to its limits, and both the number and the severity of friendly fire incidents have increased. Modern armies search earnestly for ways to reduce or eliminate friendly fire. Improved training and sophisticated electronic devices are sure to have a positive effect, yet it is equally certain that the problem cannot be eradicated altogether. As long as men make war, friendly fire will continue to occur.
[See also Casualties.]
Bibliography
| US Military Dictionary: friendly fire |
Weapon fire coming from one's own side, especially fire that causes accidental injury or death to one's own forces.
See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.
| Law Encyclopedia: Friendly Fire |
Fire burning in a place where it was intended to burn, although damages may result. In a military conflict, the discharge of weapons against one's own troops.
A fire burning in a fireplace is regarded as a friendly fire, in spite of the fact that extensive smoke damage might result therefrom. Ordinarily, when an individual purchases fire insurance, the coverage does not extend to damages resulting from a friendly fire but only to loss resulting from an uncontrollable hostile fire.
| Military Dictionary: friendly fire |
(DOD) In casualty reporting, a casualty circumstance applicable to persons killed in action or wounded in action mistakenly or accidentally by friendly forces actively engaged with the enemy, who are directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force. See also casualty.
| Wikipedia: Friendly fire |
Friendly fire is an expression meaning fire from one's own side or allied forces, as opposed to fire coming from enemy forces, and was a term originally adopted by the United States military.
Friendly fire occurs when there was intent to do harm to the enemy which causes injury to one's own side. A death resulting from a negligent discharge is not considered friendly fire. Neither is murder, whether premeditated or in the heat of the moment, and nor is deliberate firing on one’s own troops for disciplinary reasons classified as friendly fire as in these cases there is no intent to harm the enemy. [1] Similarly, inadvertent harm to non-combatatants or structures, usually referred to as "collateral damage" is also not considered to be friendly fire.[2]
Many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) militaries refer to these incidents as blue on blue, which derives from military exercises where NATO forces were identified by blue pennants, hence "blue", and Warsaw Pact forces were identified by orange pennants. Another term for such incidents is fratricide, a word that originally refers to the act of a person killing their brother.
Friendly fire is often seen as an inescapable result of combat. Attempts to reduce this effect by military leaders generally come down to identifying the causes of friendly fire and overcoming repetition of the incident through training, tactics and technology.
The primary cause of friendly fire is commonly known as the "fog of war" which attributes friendly fire incidents to the confusion inherent in warfare. Friendly fire that is the result of apparent recklessness or incompetence may fall into this category. The concept of a fog of war has come under considerable criticism, as it can be used as an excuse for poor planning, weak or compromised intelligence and incompetent command.
Fog of war incidents fall roughly into two classes:[1]
A number of situations can lead to or exacerbate the risk of friendly fire. Poor terrain and visibility are major factors. Soldiers fighting on unfamiliar ground can become disoriented more easily than on familiar terrain. The direction from which enemy fire comes may not be easy to identify, and poor weather conditions and combat stress may add to the confusion, especially if fire is exchanged. Accurate navigation and 'fire discipline' is vital.[5]
In high-risk situations, leaders need to ensure units are properly informed of the location of friendly units and to issue clear, unambiguous orders, but they must also react correctly to responses from soldiers who are capable of using their own judgement. Miscommunication can be deadly. Radios, field telephones, and signalling systems can be used to address the problem, but when these systems are used to co-ordinate multiple forces such as ground troops and aircraft, their breakdown can dramatically increase the risk of friendly fire. When allied troops are operating the situation is even more complex, especially with language barriers to overcome. [5]
Most militaries use extensive training to ensure troop safety as part of normal co-ordination and planning, but are not always exposed to possible friendly-fire situations to ensure they are aware of situations where the risk is high. Difficult terrain and bad weather can't be controlled, but soldiers must be trained to operate effectively in these conditions, as well as trained to fight at night. Such simulated training is now commonplace for soldiers worldwide. Avoiding friendly fire can be as straightforward as ensuring 'fire discipline' is instilled in troops, so that they fire and cease firing when they're told to. Firing ranges now also include 'Don't Fire' targets. [6]
The increasing sophistication of weaponry, and the tactics employed against American forces to deliberately confuse them has meant that while overall casualties have fallen for American soldiers in the late 20th and 21st centuries, the overall deaths due to friendly fire in American actions have risen dramatically. In the 1990 Gulf War, most of the Americans killed by their own forces were crew members of armored vehicles hit by anti-tank rounds. The response in training includes recognition training for Apache helicopter crews to help them distinguish American tanks and armored vehicles at night and in bad weather from those of the enemy. In addition, tank gunners must watch under fire in drills for "friendly" robotic tanks that pop out on training courses in California's Mojave Desert. They also study video footage to help them recognize American forces in battle more quickly. [7]
Improved technology to assist in identifying friendly forces is also an ongoing response to friendly fire problems. From the earliest days of warfare identification systems were visual and developed into extremely elaborate suits of armour with distinctive heraldic patterns. When radar was developed during World War II, IFF systems to identify aircraft developed into a multitude of radio beacons.
Correct navigation is vital to ensuring units know where they are in relation to their own force and the enemy. Efforts to provide accurate compasses inside metal boxes in tanks and trucks has proven difficult, with GPS a major breakthrough. Government contractors are rushing to perfect infra-red and carbon dioxide laser beacons that can be mounted on armored vehicles and that will identify themselves to their own forces. [7]
Other technological changes include hand-held navigational devices that use satellite signals, giving ground forces the exact location of enemy forces as well as their own. The use of infra-red lights and thermal tape that are invisible to observers without night-goggles, or fibres and dyes that reflect only specific wavelengths are still in their infancy, but may prove to be key identifiers for friendly infantry units at night.
There is also some development of remote sensors to detect enemy vehicles - the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) uses a combination of acoustic, sesmic vibration, and infrared to not just detect, but identify vehicles. [6]
Some tactics make friendly fire virtually inevitable, such as the practice of dropping barrages of mortars on enemy machine gun posts in the final moments before capture. This practice continued throughout the 20th century since machine guns were first used in World War I, and the high friendly fire risk has generally been accepted by troops since machine gun emplacements are tactically so valuable, and at the same time so dangerous that the attackers wanted them to be shelled, considering the shells far less deadly than the machine guns.[6] Tactical adjustments include the use of "kill boxes", or zones that are placed off-limits to ground forces while allied aircraft attack targets, which goes back to the beginning of military aircraft in World War I.[7]
The shock and awe battle tactics adopted by the American military - overwhelming power, battlefield awareness, dominant maneuvers, and spectacular displays of force - are employed because they are believed to be the best way to win a war quickly and decisively, reducing casualties on both sides. However, if the only people doing the shooting are American, then a high percentage of total casualties are bound to be the result of friendly fire, blunting the effectiveness of the shock and awe tactic. It is probably the fact that friendly fire has proven to be the only fundamental weakness of the tactics that has caused the American military to take significant steps to overturn a blasé attitude to friendly fire and assess ways to eliminate it.[6]
On September 23 1950, Hill 282 was attacked by 1st Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, part of the British 27th Brigade in the United Nations force. Having captured it and facing strong North Korean counter-attacks, the Argylls, devoid of artillery support, called in an allied air-strike. A group of F-51 Mustangs of U.S. Air Force’s 18th Fighter Bomber Wing circled the hill. The Argylls had laid down yellow air-recognition panels correctly in accordance with that day’s planning, but the North Koreans imitated similar panels on their own positions in white. The Mustangs, confused by the panels, mistakenly napalm-bombed and strafed the Argylls’ hill-top positions. Despite a desperate counter-attack by the Argylls to regain the hill, during which Major Kenny Muir was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross, the Argylls, much reduced in numbers, were forced to relinquish the position. Over 60 of the Argylls’ casualties were caused by the friendly air-strike.
8,000 such incidents have been estimated for the Vietnam War;[27][28][29] one was the inspiration for the book and film Friendly Fire.
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