Persian Wars

For other Persian wars, see Roman-Persian Wars, Arab-Persian Wars, Persian Gulf Wars, and Military history of Iran.

The Greco-Persian Wars Greek hoplite and Persian warrior depicted fighting of an ancient kylix, 5th century BC Date 499–450 BC Location Mainland Greece, Thrace, Aegean Islands, Asia Minor, Cyprus, and Egypt Result Stalemate Territorial changes Thrace and Ionia gain independence from Persia Belligerents Greek city states including Athens and Sparta Achaemenid Empire Commanders Miltiades, Themistocles, Leonidas I †, Pausanias, Cimon †, Pericles Darius I, Mardonius †, Datis †, Artaphernes, Xerxes I, Artabazus, Megabyzus

v • d • e Greco–Persian Wars Ionian Revolt 1st Naxos – Sardis – Ephesus – Cyprus – Marsyas – Labraunda – Pedasus – Lade – Miletus – Chios – Malene First Persian invasion Lindos – 2nd Naxos – Karystos – Eretria – Marathon Second Persian invasion Thermopylae – Artemisium – Salamis – Potidea – Olynthus – Plataea – Mycale The Greek counterattack Sestos – Cyprus – Byzantium Wars of the Delian League Eion – Skyros – Karystos – 3rd Naxos – Eurymedon – Thasos – Chersonesos – Pampremis – Memphis – Prosopitis – Mendisium – Citium – Salamis in Cyprus

The Greco-Persian Wars (also often called the Persian Wars), were a series of conflicts between the Persian Empire and city-states of the Hellenic world that started in 499 BC and lasted until 450 BC. The collision between the fractious political world of the Greeks, and the enormous empire of the Persians began when Cyrus the Great conquered Ionia in ca. 550 BC. Struggling to rule the independently-minded cities of Ionia, the Persians appointed tyrants to rule each of them. This would prove the source of much trouble for both Greek and Persian alike.

In 499 BC, the then-tyrant of Miletus, Aristagoras, embarked on an expedition to conquer the island of Naxos, with Persian support. The expedition was a debacle, and pre-empting his dismissal, Aristagoras instead incited (with little difficulty) the whole of Hellenic Asia Minor into rebellion against the Persians. This was the beginning of the Ionian Revolt, which would last until 493 BC, progressively drawing more regions of Asia Minor into the conflict. Aristagoras secured military support from Athens and Eretria, and in 498 BC, these forces helped in the capture and burning of the Persian regional capital of Sardis. The Persian king Darius the Great vowed to have revenge on Athens and Eretria for this act. The revolt continued, with the two sides effectively stalemated throughout 497–495 BC. In 494 BC, the Persians regrouped, and attacked the epicentre of the revolt in Miletus. At the Battle of Lade, the Ionians suffered a decisive defeat, and the rebellion collapsed, the final embers being stamped out by the following year.

Seeking to secure his empire from further revolts, and from the interference of the mainland Greeks, Darius embarked on a scheme to pacify Greece, and to punish Athens and Eretria for the burning of Sardis. The first Persian invasion of Greece began in 492 BC, with the Persian general Mardonius subjugating Thrace and Macedon before several mishaps forced an early end to the campaign. In 490 BC a second force was sent to Greece, this time across the Aegean, under the command of Datis and Artaphernes. This expedition subjugated the Cyclades, before besieging, capturing and razing Eretria. However, whilst en route to attack Athens, the Persian force was decisively defeated by the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon, ending the Persian efforts for the time being. Darius therefore began to plan for the complete conquest of Greece, but died in 486 BC, responsibility for the conquest passing to his son Xerxes I. In 480 BC, Xerxes personally led the second Persian invasion of Greece, accompanied by a legendarily enormous army. Victory over the Allied Greek states (led by Sparta and Athens) at the famous Battle of Thermopylae allowed the Persians to overrun most of Greece, but seeking to destroy the Allied fleet, the Persians suffered a severe defeat at the Battle of Salamis. The following year, the Allies went on the offensive, defeating the Persian army at the Battle of Plataea, and thereby ending the invasion of Greece.

The Allies followed up their success by destroying the rest of the Persian fleet at the Battle of Mycale, before expelling Persian garrisons from Sestos (479 BC) and Byzantium (478 BC). The actions of the general Pausanias at the siege of Byzantium alienated many of the Greek states from the Spartans, and the anti-Persian alliance was therefore reconstituted around Athenian leadership, as the so-called Delian League. The Delian League continued to campaign against Persia for the next three decades, beginning with the expulsion of the remaining Persian garrisons from Europe. At the Battle of the Eurymedon in 466 BC the League won a double victory which finally secured freedom for the cities of Ionia. However, the involvement of the League in supporting an Egyptian revolt (from 460–454 BC) resulted in a catastrophic defeat and a suspension of campaigning. A fleet was despatched to Cyprus in 451 BC, but achieved little, and when it withdrew, the Greco-Persian Wars drew to a quiet end. Some historical sources suggest that the end of hostilities was marked by a peace treaty between Athens and Persia, the so-called Peace of Callias.

Sources

Herodotus, the main source for this conflict

Almost all the primary sources for the Greco-Persian Wars are Greek; the Persians do not appear to have written anything identifiable as a history of their own.^[1] By some distance, the main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the Greek historian Herodotus. Herodotus, who has been called the 'Father of History',^[2] was born in 484 BC in Halicarnassus, Asia Minor (then under Persian overlordship). He wrote his 'Enquiries' (Greek—Historia; English—(The) Histories) around 440–430 BC, trying to trace the origins of the Greco-Persian Wars, which would still have been relatively recent history (the wars finally ending in 450 BC).^[3] Herodotus's approach was entirely novel, and at least in Western society, he does seem to have invented 'history' as we know it.^[3] As Holland has it: "For the first time, a chronicler set himself to trace the origins of a conflict not to a past so remote so as to be utterly fabulous, nor to the whims and wishes of some god, nor to a people's claim to manifest destiny, but rather explanations he could verify personally."^[3]

Some subsequent ancient historians, despite following in his footsteps, criticised Herodotus, starting with Thucydides.^[4][5] Nevertheless, Thucydides chose to begin his history where Herodotus left off (at the Siege of Sestos), and therefore evidently felt that Herodotus's history was accurate enough not to need re-writing or correcting.^[5] Plutarch criticised Herodotus in his essay "On The Malignity of Herodotus", describing Herodotus as "Philobarbaros" (barbarian-lover), for not being pro-Greek enough, which suggests that Herodotus might actually have done a reasonable job of being even-handed.^[6] A negative view of Herodotus was passed on to Renaissance Europe, though he remained well read.^[7] However, since the 19th century his reputation has been dramatically rehabilitated by archaeological finds which have repeatedly confirmed his version of events.^[8] The prevailing modern view is that Herodotus generally did a remarkable job in his Historia, but that some of his specific details (particularly troop numbers and dates) should be viewed with skepticism.^[8] Nevertheless, there are still some historians who believe Herodotus made up much of his story.^[9]

Thucydides continued Herodotus's narrative

Unfortunately, the military history of Greece between the end of the second Persian invasion of Greece and the Peloponnesian War (479–431 BC) is poorly attested by surviving ancient sources. This period, sometimes referred to as the pentekontaetia by ancient scholars, was a period of relative peace and prosperity within Greece.^[10][11] The richest source for the period, and also the most contemporary with it, is Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, which is generally considered by modern historians to be a reliable primary account.^[12][13][14] Thucydides only mentions this period in a digression on the growth of Athenian power in the run up to the Peloponnesian War, and the account is brief, probably selective and lacks any dates.^[15][16] Nevertheless, Thucydides's account can be, and is used by historians to draw up a skeleton chronology for the period, on to which details from archaeological records and other writers can be superimposed.^[15]

Much extra detail for the whole period is provided by Plutarch, in his biographies of Themistocles, Aristides and especially Cimon. Plutarch was writing some 600 years after the events in question, and is therefore very much a secondary source, but he often explicitly names his sources, which allows some degree of verification of his statements.^[17] In his biographies, he explicitly draws on many ancient histories which have not survived, and thus often preserves details of the period which are omitted in Herodotus and Thucydides's accounts. The final major extant source for the period is the universal history (Bibliotheca historica) of the 1st century BC Sicilian, Diodorus Siculus. Much of Diodorus's writing concerning this period seems to be derived from the much earlier Greek historian Ephorus, who also wrote a universal history.^[18]

Further scattered details can be found in Pausanias's Description of Greece, whilst the Byzantine Suda dictionary of the 10th century AD preserves some anecdotes found nowhere else. Minor sources for the period include the works of Pompeius Trogus (epitomized by Justinus), Cornelius Nepos and Ctesias of Cnidus (epitomized by Photius), none of which are in their original textual form.

Origins of the conflict

In the dark age that followed the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization, significant numbers of Greeks had emigrated to Asia Minor and settled there. These settlers were from three tribal groups: the Aeolians, Dorians and Ionians.^[19] The Ionians had settled about the coasts of Lydia and Caria, founding the twelve cities which made up Ionia.^[19] These cities were Miletus, Myus and Priene in Caria; Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedos, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea and Erythrae in Lydia; and the islands of Samos and Chios.^[20] Although the Ionian cities were independent from each other, they acknowledged their shared heritage, and had a common temple and meeting place, the Panionion. They thus formed a 'cultural league', to which they would admit no other cities, or even other tribal Ionians.^[21][22]

The cities of Ionia had remained independent until they were conquered by the Lydians of Western Asia Minor. The Lydian king Alyattes II attacked Miletus, ending with a treaty of alliance between Miletus and Lydia, which meant that Miletus would have internal autonomy but follow Lydia in foreign affairs.^[23] At this time, the Lydians were also in conflict with the Median Empire, and the Milesians sent an army to aid the Lydians in this conflict. Eventually a peaceable settlement was established between the Medes and the Lydians, with the river Halys set up as the frontier between the kingdoms.^[24] The famous Lydian king Croesus succeeded his father Alyattes in around 560 BC and then set about conquering the other Greek city states of Asia Minor.^[25]

The Persian prince Cyrus led a rebellion against the last Median king Astyages in 553 BC. Although the Persians had been, until this point, a rather backward and irrelevant part of the Median empire, Cyrus was a grandson of Astyages and was moreover supported by part of the Median aristocracy.^[26] By 550 BC, the rebellion was over, and Cyrus had emerged victorious, founding the Persian Empire in place of the Median realm in the process.^[26] Croesus saw the disruption in the Median/Persian lands as an opportunity to extend his realm and asked the oracle of Delphi whether he should make war. The Oracle is supposed to have replied with one of its famously ambiguous answers, saying that "if Croesus was to cross the river Halys he would destroy a great empire".^[27] Blind to the ambiguity of this prophecy, Croesus attacked the Persians, but was eventually defeated and Lydia fell to Cyrus.^[28]

The Persian Empire in 490 BC.

While fighting the Lydians, Cyrus had sent messages to the Ionians asking them to revolt against Lydian rule, which the Ionians had refused to do.^[29] After Cyrus finished the conquest of Lydia, the Ionian cities now offered to be his subjects under the same terms as they had been subjects of Croesus.^[29] Cyrus refused, citing the Ionians' unwillingness to help him previously. The Ionians thus prepared to defend themselves, and Cyrus sent the Median general Harpagus to conquer Ionia.^[30] He first attacked Phocaea; the Phocaeans decided to entirely abandon their city and sail into exile in Sicily, rather than become Persian subjects (although many subsequently returned).^[31] Some Teians also chose to emigrate when Harpagus attacked Teos, but the rest of the Ionians remained, and were in turn conquered.^[32]

In the years following their conquest, the Persians found the Ionians difficult to rule. Elsewhere in the empire, Cyrus was able to identify elite native groups to help him rule his new subjects – such as the priesthood of Judea.^[33] No such group existed in Greek cities at this time; while there was usually an aristocracy, this was inevitably divided into feuding factions.^[33] The Persians thus settled for sponsoring a tyrant in each Ionian city, even though this drew them into the Ionians' internal conflicts. Furthermore, a tyrant might develop an independent streak, and have to be replaced.^[33] The tyrants themselves faced a difficult task; they had to deflect the worst of their fellow citizens' hatred, while staying in the favour of the Persians.^[33] While Greek states had in the past often been ruled by tyrants, this was a form of government generally on the decline.^[34] Moreover, past tyrants had at least tended (and needed) to be strong and able leaders, whereas the rulers appointed by the Persians were simply place-men. Backed by the Persian military might, these tyrants did not need the support of the population, and could thus rule absolutely.^[34] On the eve of the Greco-Persian wars, Ionia (and Greek Asia Minor in general) was thus a bubbling cauldron of discontent.^[35]

Ionian Revolt (499–493 BC)

The Ionian Revolt, and associated revolts in Aeolis, Doris, Cyprus and Caria, were military rebellions by several regions of Asia Minor against Persian rule, lasting from 499 to 493 BC. At the heart of the rebellion was the dissatisfaction of the Greek cities of Asia Minor with the tyrants appointed by Persia to rule them, along with the individual actions of two Milesian tyrants, Histiaeus and Aristagoras.^[33][36] In 499 BC the then tyrant of Miletus, Aristagoras, launched a joint expedition with the Persian satrap Artaphernes to conquer Naxos, in an attempt to bolster his position in Miletus (both financially and in terms of prestige).^[36][37] The mission was a debacle,^[38] and sensing his imminent removal as tyrant, Aristagoras chose to incite the whole of Ionia into rebellion against the Persian king Darius the Great.^[35]

Map showing main events of the Ionian Revolt

In 498 BC, supported by troops from Athens and Eretria, the Ionians marched on, captured, and burnt Sardis.^[39] However, on their return journey to Ionia, they were followed by Persian troops, and decisively beaten at the Battle of Ephesus.^[40] This campaign was the only offensive action by the Ionians, who subsequently went on the defensive. The Persians responded in 497 BC with a three pronged attack aimed at recapturing the outlying areas of the rebellion,^[41] but the spread of the revolt to Caria meant that the largest army, under Daurises, relocated there.^[42] While initially campaigning successfully in Caria, this army was annihilated in an ambush at the Battle of Pedasus.^[43] This resulted in a stalemate for the rest of 496 and 495 BC.^[44]

By 494 BC the Persian army and navy had regrouped, and they made straight for the epicentre of the rebellion at Miletus.^[45] The Ionian fleet sought to defend Miletus by sea, but were decisively beaten at the Battle of Lade, after the defection of the Samians.^[46] Miletus was then besieged, captured, and its population was enslaved.^[47] This double defeat effectively ended the revolt, and the Carians surrendered to the Persians as a result.^[48] The Persians spent 493 BC reducing the cities along the west coast that still held out against them,^[49] before finally imposing a peace settlement on Ionia which was generally considered to be both just and fair.^[50]

The Ionian Revolt constituted the first major conflict between Greece and the Persian Empire, and as such represents the first phase of the Greco-Persian Wars. Although Asia Minor had been brought back into the Persian fold, Darius vowed to punish Athens and Eretria for their support for the revolt.^[50] Moreover, seeing that the myriad city states of Greece posed a continued threat to the stability of his Empire, he decided to conquer the whole of Greece.^[50]

First invasion of Greece (492–490 BC)

With the completion of the pacification of Ionia, the Persians began planning their next moves; to extinguish the threat to their empire from Greece, and to punish Athens and Eretria.^[51] The resultant first Persian invasion of Greece consisted of two main campaigns.^[51]

492 BC: Mardonius's Campaign

Map showing events of the first phases of the Greco-Persian Wars

The first campaign in 492 BC, led by Darius's son-in-law Mardonius,^[52] re-subjugated Thrace, which had nominally been part of the Persian empire since 513 BC.^[53] Mardonius was also able to force Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia, whereas it had previously been an independent ally.^[54] However, further progress in this campaign was prevented when Mardonius's fleet was wrecked in a storm off the coast of Mount Athos. Mardonius himself was then injured in a raid on his camp by a Thracian tribe, and after this he returned with the expedition to Asia.^[54][55]

The following year, having demonstrated his intentions, Darius sent ambassadors to all parts of Greece, demanding their submission.^[56] He received it from almost all of them, excepting Athens and Sparta, both of whom executed the ambassadors.^[56] With Athens still defiant, and Sparta now effectively at war with him, Darius ordered a further military campaign for the following year.^[57]

490 BC: Datis and Artaphernes' Campaign

In 490 BC Datis and Artaphernes (son of the satrap Artaphernes) were given command of an amphibious invasion force, and set sail from Cilicia.^[57] The Persian force sailed from Cilicia firstly to the island of Rhodes, where a Lindian Temple Chronicle records that Datis besieged the city of Lindos, but was unsuccessful.^[58] The fleet sailed next to Naxos, in order to punish the Naxians for their resistance to the failed expedition that the Persians had mounted there a decade earlier.^[59] Many of the inhabitants fled to the mountains; those that the Persians caught were enslaved.^[60] The Persians then burnt the city and temples of the Naxians.^[60] The fleet then proceeded to island-hop across the rest of the Aegean on its way to Eretria, taking hostages and troops from each island.^[59]

The task force sailed on to Euboea, and to the first major target, Eretria.^[61] The Eretrians made no attempt to stop the Persians landing, or advancing, and thus allowed themselves to be besieged.^[62] For six days the Persians attacked the walls, with losses on both sides;^[62] however, on the seventh day two reputable Eretrians opened the gates and betrayed the city to the Persians.^[62] The city was razed, and temples and shrines were looted and burned. Furthermore, according to Darius's commands, the Persians enslaved all the remaining townspeople.^[62]

Battle of Marathon

The Greek wings envelop the Persians

The Persian fleet next headed south down the coast of Attica, landing at the bay of Marathon, roughly 25 miles (40 km) from Athens ^[63] Under the guidance of Miltiades, the general with the greatest experience of fighting the Persians, the Athenian army marched to block the two exits from the plain of Marathon. Stalemate ensued for five days, before the Athenians (for reasons that are not completely clear) decided to attack the Persians.^[64] Despite the numerical advantage of the Persians, the hoplites proved devastatingly effective against the more lightly armed Persian infantry, routing the wings before turning in on the centre of the Persian line. The remnants of the Persian army fled to their ships and left the battle.^[65] Herodotus records that 6,400 Persian bodies were counted on the battlefield; the Athenians lost only 192 men. ^[66].

As soon as the Persian survivors had put to sea the Athenians marched as quickly as possible to Athens.^[67] They arrived in time to prevent Artaphernes from securing a landing in Athens. Seeing his opportunity lost, Artaphernes brought the year's campaign to an end and returned to Asia.^[68]

The Battle of Marathon was a watershed in the Greco-Persian wars, showing the Greeks that the Persians could be beaten. It also highlighted the superiority of the more heavily armoured Greek hoplites, and showed their potential when used wisely.^[65] The Battle of Marathon is perhaps now more famous as the inspiration for the Marathon race. Although historically inaccurate, the legend of a Greek messenger running to Athens with news of the victory, and then promptly expiring, became the inspiration for this athletics event, introduced at the 1896 Athens Olympics, and originally run between Marathon and Athens.^[69]

Interbellum (490–480 BC)

Persian Empire

Darius began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition.^[70] Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I.^[71] Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece.^[72] Since this was to be a full scale invasion it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state.^[73] However, the campaign was delayed by one year because of another revolt in Egypt and Babylonia.^[74]

The Persians had the sympathy of a number of Greek city-states, including Argos, which had pledged to defect when the Persians reached their borders.^[75] The Aleuadae family, who ruled Larissa in Thessaly, saw the invasion as an opportunity to extend their power.^[76] Thebes, though not explicitly 'medizing', was suspected of being willing to aid the Persians once the invasion force arrived.^[77][78]

In 481 BC, after roughly four years of preparation, Xerxes began to muster the troops for the invasion of Europe. Herodotus gives the names of 46 nations from which troops were drafted.^[79] The Persian army was gathered in Asia Minor in the summer and autumn of 481 BC. The armies from the Eastern satrapies was gathered in Kritala, Cappadocia and were led by Xerxes to Sardis where they passed the winter.^[80] Early in spring it moved to Abydos where it was joined with the armies of the western satrapies.^[81] Then the army which Xerxes had mustered marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.^[82]

Size of the Persian Forces

For further information see Size of the Persian Forces

The numbers of troops which Xerxes mustered for the second invasion of Greece have been the subject of endless dispute. Modern scholars tend to reject as unrealistic the figures of 2.5 million given by Herodotus and other ancient sources as a result of miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors. The topic has been hotly debated but the consensus revolves around the figure of 200,000.^[83]

The size of the Persian fleet is also disputed, although perhaps less so. Herodotus gives a number of 1,207, which is concurred with (approximately) by other ancient authors. The numbers are (by ancient standards) consistent, and this could be interpreted that a number around 1,200 is correct. Among modern scholars some have accepted this number, although suggesting that the number must have been lower by the Battle of Salamis.^[84][85][86] Other recent works on the Persian Wars reject this number, 1,207 being seen as more of a reference to the combined Greek fleet in the Iliad generally claim that the Persians could have launched no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean.^[87][88][86]

Greek City States

Athens

A year after Marathon, Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, was injured in a minor battle. Taking advantage of his incapacitation, the powerful Alcmaeonid family arranged for him to be prosecuted.^[89] The Athenian aristocracy, and indeed Greek aristocrats in general, were loath to see one person pre-eminent, and such maneuvers were commonplace.^[89] Miltiades was given a massive fine for the crime of 'deceiving the Athenian people', but died weeks later as a result of his wound.^[89] In the wake of this prosecution, the Athenian people chose to use a new institution of the democracy, which had been part of Cleisthenes's reforms, but remained so far unused.^[89] This was 'ostracism'—each Athenian citizen was required to write on a shard of pottery (ostrakon) the name of a politician that they wished to see exiled for a period of ten years.^[89] This may have been triggered by Miltiades's prosecution, and used by the Athenians to try and stop such power-games amongst the noble families.^[89] Certainly, in the years following years 487 BC), the heads of the prominent families, including the Alcmaeonids, were exiled.^[89] The career of a politician in Athens thus became fraught with more difficulty, since displeasing the population was likely to result in exile.^[89]

Bust of Themistocles

The politician Themistocles, with his power-base firmly established amongst the poor, moved naturally to fill the vacuum left by Miltiades's death, and in that decade became the most influential politician in Athens.^[89] However, the support of the nobility began to coalesce around the man who would become Themistocles's great rival - Aristides.^[90] Aristides cast himself as Themistocles's opposite - virtuous, honest and incorruptible - and his followers called him "the just".^[90] During this decade, Themistocles continued to advocate the expansion of Athenian naval power.^[89] The Athenians were certainly aware throughout this period that the Persian interest in Greece had not ended.^[91] Themistocles seems to have realised that for the Greeks to survive the coming onslaught required there to be a Greek navy which could hope to face up to the Persian navy, and he therefore attempted to persuade the Athenians to build such a fleet.^[92][89] Aristides, as champion of the zeugites (the upper, 'hoplite-class') vigorously opposed such a policy.^[90]

In 483 BC, a massive new seam of silver was found in the Athenian mines at Laurium.^[93] Themistocles proposed that the silver should be used to build a new fleet of 200 triremes, whilst Aristides suggested it should instead be distributed amongst the Athenian citizens.^[94] Themistocles avoided mentioning Persia, deeming that it was too distant a threat for the Athenians to act on, and instead focussed their attention on Aegina.^[93] At the time, Athens was embroiled in a long-running war with the Aeginetans, and building a fleet would allow the Athenians to finally defeat them at sea.^[93] As a result, Themistocles's motion was carried easily, although only 100 warships of the trireme type were to be built.^[93] Aristides refused to countenance this; conversely Themistocles was not pleased that only 100 ships would be built.^[94] Tension between the two camps built over the winter, so that the ostracism of 482 BC became a direct contest between Themistocles and Aristides.^[94] In what Holland characterises as, in essence, the world's first referendum, Aristides was ostracised, and Themistocles's policies were endorsed.^[94] Indeed, becoming aware of the Persian preparations for the coming invasion, the Athenians voted for the construction of more ships than Themistocles had initially asked for.^[94] In the run up to the Persian invasion, Themistocles had thus become the foremost politician in Athens.^[95]

Sparta

The Spartan king Demaratus had been stripped of his kingship in 491 BC, and replaced with his cousin Leotychides. Sometime after 490 BC Demaratus, humiliated in Sparta, had chosen to go into exile, and had made his way to Darius's court in Susa.^[70] Demarartus would henceforth act as an advisor to Darius, and then Xerxes, on Greek affairs, accompanying Xerxes during the second Persian invasion. In the run-up to the second invasion, Demaratus sent an apparently blank wax tablet to Sparta. When the wax was removed, a message was found scratched on the wooden backing, warning the Spartans of Xerxes plans. This message was probably intended as a benevolent warning by Demaratus; the Persians may have allowed the message to have been sent in order to sow dissension amongst the Spartans.^[96]

The Greek Alliance

In 481 BC Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta.^[97] Support thus began to coalesce around these two states. A congress of states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed.^[98] This confederation had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. Herodotus does not formulate an abstract name for the union but simply calls them "οἱ Ἕλληνες" (the Greeks) and "the Greeks who had sworn alliance" (Godley translation) or "the Greeks who had banded themselves together" (Rawlinson translation).^[99] Hereafter, they will be referred to as the 'Allies'. Sparta and Athens had a leading role in the congress but interests of all the states played a part in determining defensive strategy.^[100] Little is known about the internal workings of the congress or the discussions during its meetings. Only 70 of the approximately 700 Greek cities sent representatives. Nevertheless, this was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.^[101]

Second Invasion of Greece (480–479 BC)

Early 480 BC: Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly

Major events in the second invasion of Greece

Having crossed into Europe in April 480 BC, the Persian army began its march to Greece, taking 3 1/2 months to travel unopposed from the Hellespont to Therme. It paused at Doriskos where it was joined by the fleet. Xerxes reorganized the troops into tactical units replacing the national formations used earlier for the march.^[102]

The Allied 'congress' met again in the spring of 480 BC and agreed to defend the narrow Vale of Tempe, on the borders of Thessaly, and thereby block Xerxes's advance.^[103] However, once there, they were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed and that the army of Xerxes was overwhelming, and the Greeks retreated. ^[104] Shortly afterwards, they received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont.^[104] A second strategy was therefore suggested by Themistocles to the allies. The route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica and the Peloponnesus) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the very narrow pass of Thermopylae. This could easily be blocked by the Greek hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent the Persians bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied navies could block the straits of Artemisium. This dual strategy was adopted by the congress.^[105] However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth should it come to it, whilst the women and children of Athens had been evacuated en masse to the Peloponnesian city of Troezen.^[106]

August 480 BC: Battles of Thermopylae & Artemisium

The estimated time of arrival of Xerxes at Thermopylae coincided uncomfortably with both the truce for the Olympic games, and the Spartan festival of Carneia, during both of which warfare was considered sacrilegious.^[107] Nevertheless, the Spartans considered the threat so grave that they despatched their king Leonidas I with his personal bodyguard (the Hippeis) of 300 men (in this case, the customary elite young men in the Hippeis were replaced by veterans who already had children).^[107] Leonidas was supported by contingents from the Allied Peloponnesian cities, and other forces which the Allies picked up en route to Thermopylae.^[107] The Allies proceeded to occupy the pass, rebuilt the wall the Phocians had built at the narrowest point of the pass, and waited for Xerxes's arrival.^[108]

The pass of Thermopylae

When the Persians arrived at Thermopylae in mid-August, they initially waited for three days for the Allies to disperse. When Xerxes was eventually persuaded that the Allies intended to contest the pass, he sent his troops to attack.^[109] However, the Allied position was ideally suited to hoplite warfare, the Persian contingents being forced to attack the Phalanx head on.^[110] The Allies thus withstood two full days of battle and everything Xerxes could throw at them. However, on the second day, they were betrayed by a local resident named Ephialtes who revealed a mountain path that led behind the Allied lines to Xerxes. Aware that they were being outflanked, Leonidas dismissed the bulk of the Allied army, remaining to guard the rear with perhaps 2,000 men. On the final day of the battle, the remaining Allies sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter as many Persians as they could, but eventually they were all killed or captured.^[111]

Simultaneous with the battle at Thermopylae, an Allied naval force of 271 triremes defended the Straits of Artemisium against the Persians, thus protecting the flank of the forces at Thermopylae.^[112] Here the Allied fleet held off the Persians for three days; however, on the third evening the Allies received news of the fate of Leonidas and the Allied troops and Thermopylae. Since the Allied fleet was badly damaged, and since it no longer needed to defend the flank of Thermopylae, the Allies retreated from Artemisium to the island of Salamis.^[113]

September 480 BC: Battle of Salamis

Victory at Thermopylae meant that all Boeotia fell to Xerxes; and left Attica open to invasion. The remaining population of Athens was evacuated, with the aid of the Allied fleet, to Salamis. ^[114] The Peloponnesian Allies began to prepare a defensive line across the Isthmus of Corinth, building a wall, and demolishing the road from Megara, thus abandoning Athens to the Persians.^[115] Athens thus fell to the Persians; the small number of Athenians who had barricaded themselves on the Acropolis were eventually defeated, and Xerxes then ordered Athens to be razed.^[116]

The Persians had now captured most of Greece, but Xerxes had perhaps not expected such defiance; his priority was now to complete the war as quickly as possible ^[117] If Xerxes could destroy the Allied navy, he would be in a strong position to force an Allied surrender;^[118] conversely by avoiding destruction, or as Themistocles hoped, by destroying the Persian fleet, the Allies could prevent the completion of the conquest.^[119] The Allied fleet thus remained off the coast of Salamis into September, despite the imminent arrival of the Persians. Even after Athens fell, the Allied fleet still remained off the coast of Salamis, trying to lure the Persian fleet to battle.^[120] Partly as a result of subterfuge on the part of Themistocles, the navies met in the cramped Straits of Salamis.^[121] There, the Persian numbers were an active hindrance, as ships struggled to maneuver and became disorganised.^[122] Seizing the opportunity, the Allied fleet attacked, and scored a decisive victory, sinking or capturing at least 200 Persian ships, and thus securing the Peloponnessus.^[123]

According to Herodotus, after the loss of the battle Xerxes attempted to build a causeway across the channel to attack the Athenian evacuees on Salamis, but this project was soon abandoned. With the Persians' naval superiority removed, Xerxes feared that the Allies might sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges.^[124] His general Mardonius volunteered to remain in Greece and complete the conquest with a hand-picked group of troops, whilst Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of the army.^[125] Mardonius over-wintered in Boeotia and Thessaly; the Athenians were thus able to return to their burnt-out city for the winter.^[117]

June 479 BC: Battles of Plataea and Mycale

Persian warriors, possibly Immortals, a frieze in Darius's palace at Susa. Silicious glazed bricks, c. 510 BC

Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnesus, felt hard done by, and refused to join the Allied navy in Spring.^[126] Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, whilst the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponessus.^[126] Mardonius moved to break the stalemate, by offering peace to the Athenians using Alexander I of Macedon as intermediate.^[127] The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was on hand to hear the offer, but rejected it.^[127] Athens was thus evacuated again, and the Persians marched south and re-took possession of it. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with Megara and Plataea sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not.^[128] The Spartans thus assembled a huge Allied army and marched to meet the Persians.^[129]

When Mardonius heard the Allied army was on the march, he retreated into Boeotia, near Plataea, trying to draw the Allies into open terrain where he could use his cavalry.^[130] The Allied army however, under the command of the regent Pausanias, stayed on high ground above Plataea to protect themselves against such tactics.^[131] After several days of maneuver and stalemate, Pausanias ordered a night-time retreat towards the Allies' original positions.^[131] This, however, went awry, leaving the Athenians, and Spartans and Tegeans isolated on separate hills, with the other contingents scattered further away near Plataea.^[131] Seeing that the Persians might never have a better opportunity to attack, Mardonius ordered his whole army forward.^[132] However, the Persian infantry proved no match for the heavily armoured Greek hoplites,^[133] and the Spartans broke through to Mardonius's bodyguard and killed him.^[134] The Persian force thus dissolved in rout; 40,000 troops managed to escape via the road to Thessaly,^[135] but the rest fled to the Persian camp where they were trapped and slaughtered by the Greeks, thus finalising the Greek victory.^[136][137]

On the afternoon of the Battle of Plataea, Herodotus tells us that rumour of the Greek victory reached the Allied navy, at that time off the coast of Mount Mycale in Ionia.^[138] Their morale boosted, the Allied marines fought and won a decisive victory at the Battle of Mycale the same day, destroying the remnants of the Persian fleet, crippling Xerxes' sea power, and marking the ascendancy of the Greek fleet.^[139]

Greek counterattack (479–478 BC)

Mycale and Ionia

Mycale was, in many ways, the beginning of a new phase in the conflict, in which the Greeks would go on the offensive against the Persians.^[140] The most immediate result of the victory at Mycale was to trigger a second revolt amongst the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The Samians and Milesians had actively fought against the Persians at Mycale, thus openly declaring their rebellion, and the other cities followed in their example.^[141][142]

Sestos

Shortly after Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done.^[143] The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians.^[143] The Persians in the region, and their allies, made for Sestos, the strongest town in the region. Amongst them was one Oeobazus of Cardia, who had with him the equipment from the pontoon bridges.^[144] The Persian governor, Artayctes had made no preparations for a siege, not believing that the Allies would attack.^[145] The Athenians therefore were able to lay a siege around Sestos.^[143] The siege dragged on for several months, causing some discontment amongst the Athenian troops.^[146] Eventually, when the food ran out in the City, the Persians made there way to the least well besieged part of the walls, and fled at nightfall.^[147] The Athenians were thus able to take possession of the city the next day.^[147]

Most of the Athenian troops were sent off straight away to pursue the Persians.^[147] The party of Oeobazus, however, was captured by a Thracian tribe, and Oeobazus was sacrificied to the god Plistorus.^[148] The Athenians eventually caught Artayctes, killing some of the Persians with him, but taking most captive, including Artayctes.^[148] Artayctes was crucified at the request of the people of Elaeus, which Artayctes had plundered whilst governor of the Chersonesos.^[149] The Athenians, having pacified the region then sailed back to Athens, taking the cables from the pontoon bridges with them as trophies.^[150]

Cyprus

In 478 BC, still operating under the terms of the Hellenic alliance, the Allies sent out a fleet composed of 20 Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships supported by an unspecified number of allies, under the overall command of Pausanias. According to Thucydides, this fleet sailed to Cyprus and "subdued most of the island".^[151]. Exactly what Thucydides means by this is unclear. Sealey suggests that this was essentially a raid to gather as much booty as possible from the Persian garrisons on Cyprus.^[152] There is no indication that the Allies made any attempt to actually take possession of the island, and shortly after they sailed to Byzantium.^[151] Certainly, the fact that the Delian League repeatedly campaigned in Cyprus suggests that the island was not garrisoned by the Allies in 478 BC, or that the garrisons were quickly expelled.

Byzantium

The Greek fleet then sailed to Byzantium, which they besieged, and eventually captured.^[151] Control of both Sestos and Byzantium gave the allies command of the straits between Europe and Asia (over which the Persians had crossed), and allowed them access to the merchant trade of the Black Sea.^[153]

The aftermath of the siege was to prove troublesome for Pausanias. Exactly what happened is unclear; Thucydides gives few details, although later writers added plenty of lurid insinuations.^[153] Through his arrogance and arbitrary actions (Thucydides says "violence"), Pausanias managed to alienate many of the Allied contingents, particularly those which had just been freed from Persian overlordship.^{[153][152][154]} The Ionians and others asked the Athenians to take leadership of the campaign, to which they agreed. ^[154] The Spartans, hearing of his behaviour then recalled Pausanias, and tried him on charges of collaborating with the enemy. Although he was aquitted, his reputation was tarnished and he was not restored to his command.^[154]

Pausanias returned to Byzantium as a private citizen in 477 BC, and took command of the city until he was expelled by the Athenians. He then crossed the Bosporus and settled in Colonae in the Troad, until he was accused of colloborating with the Persians and was recalled by the Spartans for trial (after which he starved himself to death).^[155] The timescale is unclear, but Pausanias may have remained in possession of Byzantium until 470 BC. ^[155]

In the meantime, the Spartans had sent Dorkis to Byzantium with a small force, to take command of the Allied force. However, he found that the rest of the Allies were no longer prepared to accept Spartan leadership, and thus returned home. Relieved, the Spartans withdrew, no longer wishing to continue fighting the Persians.^[154]

Wars of the Delian League (477–450 BC)

Delian League

Athens and her "empire" in 431 BC. The empire was the direct descendant of the Delian League

After Byzantium, Sparta was eager to end her involvement in the war. The Spartans were of the view that, with the liberation of mainland Greece, and the Greek cities of Asia Minor, the war's purpose had already been reached. There was also perhaps a feeling that securing long-term security for the Asian Greeks would prove impossible.^[156] In the aftermath of Mycale, the Spartan king Leotychides had proposed transplanting all the Greeks from Asia Minor to Europe as the only method of permanently freeing them from Persian dominion. Xanthippus, the Athenian commander at Mycale, had furiously rejected this; the Ionian cities were originally Athenian colonies, and the Athenians, if no-one else, would protect the Ionians.^[156] This marked the point at which the leadership of the Greek Alliance effectively passed to the Athenians.^[156] With the Spartan withdrawal after Byzantium, the leadership of the Athenians became explicit.

The loose alliance of city states which had fought against Xerxes's invasion had been dominated by Sparta and the Peloponnesian league. With the withdrawal of these states, a congress was called on the holy island of Delos to institute a new alliance to continue the fight against the Persians. This alliance, now including many of the Aegean islands, was formally constituted as the 'First Athenian Alliance', commonly known as the Delian League. According to Thucydides, the official aim of the League was to "avenge the wrongs they suffered by ravaging the territory of the king".^[157] In reality, this goal was divided into three main efforts—to prepare for future invasion, to seek revenge against Persia, and to organize a means of dividing spoils of war. The members were given a choice of either offering armed forces or paying a tax to the joint treasury; most states chose the tax.^[157] League members swore to have the same friends and enemies, and dropped ingots of iron into the sea to symbolize the permanence of their alliance. The Athenian politician Aristides would spend the rest of his life occupied in the affairs of the alliance, dying (according to Plutarch) a few years later in Pontus, whilst determining what the tax of new members was to be.^[158]

Campaigns against Persia

Map showing the locations of battles fought by the Delian League, 477–450 BC

Throughout the 470s BC, the Delian League campaigned in Thrace and the Aegean to remove the remaining Persian garrisons from the region, primarily under the command of the Athenian politician Cimon.^[159] In the early part of the next decade, Cimon began campaigning in Asia Minor, seeking to strengthen the Greek position there.^[160] At the Battle of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia, the Athenians and allied fleet achieved a stunning double victory, destroying a Persian fleet and then landing the ships' marines to attack and rout the Persian army. After this battle, the Persians took an essentially passive role in the conflict, anxious not to risk battle, where possible.^[161]

Towards the end of the 460s BC, the Athenians took the ambitious decision to support a revolt in the Egyptian satrapy of the Persian empire. Although the Greek task force achieved initial success, they were unable to capture the Persian garrison in Memphis, despite a 3 year long siege.^[162] The Persians then counterattacked, and the Athenian force was itself besieged for 18 months, before being wiped out.^[163] This disaster, coupled with ongoing warfare in Greece, dissuaded the Athenians from resuming conflict with Persia.^[164] In 451 BC, a truce was agreed in Greece, and Cimon was able to lead an expedition to Cyprus. However, whilst besieging Kition Cimon died, and the Athenian force decided to withdraw, winning another double victory at the Battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus in order to extricate themselves.^[165] This campaign marked the end of hostilities between the Delian League and Persia, and therefore the end of the Greco-Persian Wars.^[166]

Peace with Persia

After the Battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus, Thucydides makes no further mention of conflict with the Persians, simply saying that the Greeks returned home.^[165] Diodorus, on the other hand, claims that in the aftermath of Salamis, a full-blown peace treaty (the "Peace of Callias") was agreed with the Persians.^[167] Diodorus was probably following the history of Ephorus at this point, who in turn was presumably influenced by his teacher Isocrates — from whom we have the earliest reference to the supposed peace, in 380 BC.^[18] Even during the 4th century BC the idea of the treaty was controversial, and two authors from that period, Callisthenes and Theopompus appear to reject its existence.^[168]

It is possible that the Athenians had attempted to negotiate with the Persians previously. Plutarch suggests that in the aftermath of the victory at the Eurymedon, Artaxerxes had agreed a peace treaty with the Greeks, even naming Callias as the Athenian ambassador involved. However, as Plutarch admits, Callisthenes denied that such a peace was made at this point (ca. 466 BC).^[161] Herodotus also mentions, in passing, an Athenian embassy headed by Callias, which was sent to Susa to negotiate with Artaxerxes.^[169] This embassy included some Argive representatives and can probably be therefore dated to ca. 461 BC (after forging of the alliance between Athens and Argos).^[18] This embassy may have been an attempt to reach some kind of peace agreement, and it has even been suggested that the failure of these hypothetical negotiations led to the Athenian decision to support the Egyptian revolt.^[170] The ancient sources therefore disagree as to whether there was an official peace or not, and if there was, when it was agreed.

Opinion amongst modern historians is also split; for instance, Fine accepts the concept of the Peace of Callias,^[18] whereas Sealey effectively rejects it.^[171] Holland accepts that some kind of accommodation was made between Athens and Persia, but no actual treaty.^[172] Fine argues that Callisthenes's denial that a treaty was made after the Eurymedon does not preclude a peace being made at another point. Further, he suggests that Theopompus was actually referring to a treaty that had allegedly been negotiated with Persia in 423 BC.^[18] If these views are correct, it would remove one major obstacle to the acceptance of the treaty's existence. A further argument for the existence of the treaty is the sudden withdrawal of the Athenians from Cyprus in 450 BC, which makes most sense in the light of some kind of peace agreement.^[173] On the other hand, if there was indeed some kind of accommodation, Thucydides's failure to mention it is odd. In his digression on the pentekontaetia his aim is to explain the growth of Athenian power, and such a treaty, and the fact that the Delian allies were not released from their obligations after it, would have marked a major step in the Athenian ascendancy.^[174] Conversely, it has been suggested that certain passages elsewhere in Thucydides's history are best interpreted as referring to a peace agreement.^[18] There is thus no clear consensus amongst modern historians as to the treaty's existence.

If the treaty did indeed exist, its terms were humiliating for Persia. The ancient sources which give details of the treaty are reasonably consistent in their description of the terms:^{[167][18][168]}

• All Greek cities of Asia were to 'live by their own laws' or 'be autonomous' (depending on translation).
• Persian satraps (and presumably their armies) were not to travel west of the Halys (Isocrates) or closer than a day's journey on horseback to the Aegean Sea (Callisthenes) or closer than three days' journey on foot to the Aegean Sea (Ephorus and Diodorus).
• No Persian warship was to sail west of Phaselis (on the southern coast of Asia Minor), nor west of the Cyanaean rocks (probably at the eastern end of the Bosporus, on the north coast).
• If the terms were observed by the king and his generals, then the Athenians were not to send troops to lands ruled by Persia.

Aftermath & later conflicts

Towards the end of the conflict with Persia, the process by which the Delian League became the Athenian Empire reached its conclusion.^[172] The allies of Athens were not released from their obligations to provide either money or ships, despite the cessation of hostilities.^[174] In Greece, the First Peloponnesian War between the power-blocs of Athens and Sparta, which had continued on-off since 460 BC, finally ended in 445 BC, with the agreement of a thirty year truce.^[175] However, the growing enmity between Sparta and Athens would lead, just 14 years later, into the outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War.^[176] This disastrous conflict, which dragged on for 27 years, would eventually result in the utter destruction of Athenian power, the dismemberment of the Athenian empire, and the establishment of a Spartan hegemony over Greece.^[177] However, not just Athens suffered — the conflict would significantly weaken the whole of Greece.^[178]

Repeatedly defeated in battle by the Greeks, and plagued by internal rebellions which hindered their ability to fight the Greeks, after 450 BC Artaxerxes I and his successors instead adopted a policy of divide-and-rule.^[178] Avoiding fighting the Greeks themselves, the Persians instead attempted to set Athens against Sparta, regularly bribing politicians to achieve their aims. In this way, they ensured that the Greeks remained distracted by internal conflicts, and were unable to turn their attentions to Persia.^[178] There was no open conflict between the Greeks and Persia until 396 BC, when the Spartan king Agesilaus briefly invaded Asia Minor; as Plutarch points out, the Greeks were far too busy overseeing the destruction of their own power to fight against the "barbarians".^[166]

If the wars of the Delian League shifted the balance of power between Greece and Persia in favour of the Greeks, then the subsequent half-century of internecine conflict in Greece did much to restore the balance of power to Persia. The Persians entered the Peloponnesian War in 411 BC forming a mutual-defence pact with Sparta and combining their naval resources against Athens in exchange for sole Persian control of Ionia. In 404 BC when Cyrus the Younger attempted to seize the Persian throne, he recruited 13,000 Greek mercenaries from all over the Greek world of which Sparta sent 700-800, believing they were following the terms of the treaty and unaware of the army's true purpose. After the failure of Cyrus, Persia tried to regain control of the Ionian city-states. The Ionians refused to capitulate and called upon Sparta for assistance, which she provided, in 396–395 BC. Athens, however, sided with the Persians, which led in turn to another large scale conflict in Greece, the Corinthian War. In 387 BC, Sparta, confronted by an alliance of Corinth, Thebes and Athens during the Corinthian War, sought the aid of Persia to shore up her position. Under the so-called "King's Peace" which brought the war to an end, Artaxerxes II demanded and received the return of the cities of Asia Minor from the Spartans, in return for which the Persians threatened to make war on any Greek state which did not make peace.^[179] This humiliating treaty, which undid all the Greek gains of the previous century, sacrificied the Greeks of Asia Minor so that the Spartans could maintain their hegemony over Greece.^[180] It is in the aftermath of this treaty that Greek orators began to refer to the Peace of Callias (whether fictional or not), as a counterpoint to the shame of the King's Peace, and a glorious example of the "good old days" when the Greeks of the Aegean had been freed from Persian rule by the Delian League.^[18]

No other Greek force challenged Persia for nearly 60 years until Phillip II of Macedon, who, in 338 BC formed an alliance called οι Ελληνες (the Greeks), modelled after the alliance of 481 BC, and set in motion an invasion of the western part of Asia Minor. He was murdered before he could carry out his plan. His son, Alexander III of Macedon, known as Alexander the Great, set out in 334 BC with 38,000 soldiers. Within three years his army had conquered the Persian Empire and brought the Achaemenid dynasty to an end, bringing Greek culture up to the banks of the Indus river.

See also

• Persian Empire
• History of Greece

References

Bibliography

Ancient Sources

• Herodotus, The Histories (Godley translation, 1920)
• Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War
• Xenophon, Anabasis, Hellenica
• Plutarch, Parallel Lives; Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Cimon
• Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica
• Cornelius Nepos, Lives of the Emminent Commanders; Miltiades, Themistocles

Modern Sources

• Boardman J, Bury JB, Cook SA, Adcock FA, Hammond NGL, Charlesworth MP, Lewis DM, Baynes NH, Ostwald M & Seltman CT (1988). The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 5. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521228042. 
• Burn, A.R. (1985). "Persia and the Greeks". in Ilya Gershevitch, ed.. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 2: The Median and Achaemenid Periods The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 5. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521228042. 
• Dandamaev, M. A. (1989). A political history of the Achaemenid empire (translated by W.J. Vogelsang). BRILL. ISBN 9004091726. 
• de Souza, Philip (2003). The Greek and Persian Wars, 499-386 BC. Osprey Publishing, (ISBN 1-84176-358-6)
• Fine, John Van Antwerp (1983). The ancient Greeks: a critical history. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674033140. 
• Finley, Moses (1972). "Introduction". Thucydides – History of the Peloponnesian War (translated by Rex Warner). Penguin. ISBN 0140440399. 
• Green, Peter (1996). The Greco-Persian Wars. University of California Press. 
• Higbie, Carolyn (2003). The Lindian Chronicle and the Greek Creation of their Past. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924191-0. 
• Holland, Tom (2006). Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West. Abacus. ISBN 0385513119. 
• Kagan, Donald (1989). The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0801495563. 
• Köster, A.J.. "Studien zur Geschichte des Antikes Seewesens". Klio Belheft 32. 
• Lazenby, JF (1993). The Defence of Greece 490–479 BC. Aris & Phillips Ltd. ISBN 0856685917. 
• Sealey, Raphael (1976). A history of the Greek city states, ca. 700-338 B.C.. University of California Press. ISBN 0520031776. 

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Greco-Persian Wars

• The Persian Wars at History of Iran on Iran Chamber Society
• Article in Greek about Salamis, includes Marathon and Xerxes' campaign
• EDSITEment Lesson 300 Spartans at the Battle of Thermopylae: Herodotus’ Real History