Chart showing the U.S. Navy's interpretation of the events of the first part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was an alleged pair of attacks by naval forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (commonly referred to as North Vietnam) against two American
destroyers, the USS Maddox
and the USS Turner Joy. The attacks were alleged to have occurred on
2 August and 4 August, 1964 in
the Gulf of Tonkin.
Later research, including a report released in 2005 by the National Security
Agency, indicated that the second attack most likely did not occur, but also attempted to dispel the long-standing
assumption that members of the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson had
knowingly lied about the nature of the incident. [1]
The outcome of the incident was the passage by Congress of the Southeast Asia
Resolution (better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), which granted
Johnson the authority to assist any Southeast Asian country whose government was
considered to be jeopardized by "communist aggression". The resolution served as Johnson's
legal justification for escalating American involvement in the Vietnam Conflict.
Background
-
Although the United States attended the Geneva Conference (1954), it refused
to sign the Geneva Accords (1954). The Accords mandated, among other measures,
a ceasefire line, intended to separate Vietnamese independence and French forces, and elections to determine the rulership of
Vietnam on both sides of the line, within 2 years. It also forbade the political interference of other countries in the area, the
creation of new governments without the stipulated elections, and foreign military presence. The United States promptly subverted
all of the measures of the Accords at once when it installed anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem
as President of South Vietnam, and gave him military backing. By 1961, poor decisions by Diem, almost all against the counsel of
his American advisors, including refusals to hold elections, and attacks on Buddhism (the majority religion in southern Vietnam),
and other ethnic groups, had made him unpopular. In that year, a popular uprising began, headed by the National Liberation Front. The U.S. also began providing direct support to the South
Vietnamese in the form of military and financial aid and military advisors, the number of which grew from 600 in 1961 to 16,000
by the end of John F. Kennedy's presidency in 1963.
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration. While Kennedy had originally
supported the policy of sending military advisors to Vietnam, he had begun to alter his thinking due to the military ineptitude
of the Saigon government and its inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms.
Shortly before his assassination in November 1963, he had begun limited recall of American forces. Johnson's views were likewise
complex, but he had supported military escalation in Vietnam as a means to challenge the
expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. The Cold War
policy of containment was to be applied to prevent the "fall" of Southeast Asia under the
precepts of the domino theory. After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more
American forces to support the Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in Southeast Asia.
According to the U.S. Naval Institute[2], a highly
classified program of covert attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North
Vietnam) known as Operation 34A, had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. In 1964 the program was transferred to the
Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (SOG). For the
maritime portion of the covert operation, Tjeld-class fast patrol boats had been
purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam. Although the crews of the boats were
South Vietnamese naval personnel, approval of the plan came directly from Admiral U.S.
Grant Sharp, Jr., CINCPAC in Honolulu. After the coastal attacks
began, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control
Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the terms of the Geneva
Accords, but the U.S. denied any involvement. Four years later, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted to Congress that the U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in the South
Vietnamese attacks against the DRV. The Maddox, although aware of the operations, was not directly involved in these
attacks.
Veterans of U.S. Navy SEAL teams stated that U.S.-trained South Vietnamese
commandos were active in the area on the days of the attacks. Deployed from Da Nang in
Norwegian-built fast patrol boats, the Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN, 'soldiers that fight under the
sea') made attacks in the Gulf area on the nights of 31 July and 3 August.
On July 31, LDNN commandos in "Nasty" fast attack boats attacked a radio transmitter on the island of Hon Nieu. On 3 August,
they used a shipboard cannon to bombard a radar site at Cape Vinh Son. The North Vietnamese responded by attacking hostile ships
visible in the area. While US officials were less than honest about the full extent of hostilities that led to the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, critical claims that a naval commander fired
weapons solely to create an international incident tend to overlook circumstances
and opportunistic responses that suggest a less intentional motivation. [citation needed]
The Incident
Photograph taken from the USS
Maddox August 2,
1964 and
showing North Vietnamese patrol boats
Daniel Ellsberg, who was on duty in the Pentagon that night receiving messages from
the ship, reports that the ships were on a secret mission (codenamed Desoto) near North Vietnamese territorial waters. On
31 July 1964, the American destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731) began an electronic intelligence collection mission in the
Gulf of Tonkin. Admiral George Stephen
Morrison was in command of the local fleet from his flagship USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31). The ship was under orders not to approach closer
than eight miles (13 km) from the North's coast and four miles (6 km) from Hon Nieu island. [1] When the SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the ship was
120 miles (193 km) away from the attacked area. [2]
First Attack
On 2 August the Maddox was, as Pentagon insists, attacked by three North Vietnamese
P-4 patrol torpedo boats 28 miles (45 km) away from the North Vietnamese coast in
international waters.[3] The Maddox evaded a
torpedo attack and opened fire with its five-inch (127 mm) guns, forcing the patrol
craft away. U.S. aircraft launched from Ticonderoga then attacked the retiring P-4s, claiming one as sunk and one heavily
damaged. In fact, none of the three vessels was sunk. The Maddox, suffering very minor damage from a single
14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet, retired to South Vietnamese waters where she was joined by the destroyer Turner Joy.
Alleged Second Attack
On 4 August, another Desoto patrol on the North Vietnam coast was launched by
Maddox and the Turner Joy, led by Captain John J. Herrick. This time their orders indicated that the ships were to
close no more than 11 miles (18 km) from the coast of North Vietnam. [4] The destroyers received radar and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack by the
North Vietnamese navy. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual
reports of enemies.
An hour later, at 1:27 p.m. Washington time, Herrick sent a cable in which he admitted that the attack may never have happened
and that there may actually have been no Vietnamese naval craft in the area: "Review of action makes many reported contacts and
torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No
actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken" (Ellsberg, 9-10).
An hour later, Herrick sent another cable, stating, "Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning.
Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft" (Ellsberg 10). In response to requests for confirmation, at around 4:00
p.m. Washington time, Herrick cabled, "Details of action present a confusing picture although certain that the original ambush
was bona fide." (Ellsberg 10).
At 6:00 p.m. Washington time (5:00 a.m. in the Gulf of Tonkin), Herrick cabled yet again, this time stating, "the first boat
to close the Maddox probably fired a torpedo at the Maddox which was heard but not seen. All subsequent
Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing ship's own propeller beat"
[sic] (Ellsberg 10).
In 1965, Lyndon Johnson commented: "For all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there." [5]
In 1981, Herrick and journalist Robert Scheer re-examined Herrick's ship's log and
determined that the first 4 August torpedo report which Herrick had maintained had occurred -- the "apparent ambush" -- was in
fact unfounded (Ellsberg 10).
Although information obtained well after the fact supported Turner Joy Captain Herrick's statements about the
inaccuracy of the later torpedo reports as well as the 1981 Herrick/Scheer conclusion about the inaccuracy of the first,
indicating that there was no North Vietnamese attack that night, at the time U.S. authorities and all of the Maddox crew
said they were convinced that an attack had taken place. As a result, planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation were
sent to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilities (Operation Pierce
Arrow).
Differing views of the Incident
There are differing views about whether the 2 August incident was provoked by the U.S. One view is that the actions of the
Maddox were provocative to the North Vietnamese because they coincided with the covert South Vietnamese raids. Since the
Desoto patrols were conducted in order to gather just the sort of electronic emissions that the SOG 34A raids would
provoke, it was a reasonable assumption that the two were "piggybacked." The destroyer's presence also may have been mistaken by
the North Vietnamese as a sign that it was also involved directly in the raids.
Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not provoke the confirmed 2
August attack. He claimed that DRV radar had tracked Maddox along the coast, thus being aware that the destroyer
had not actually attacked North Vietnam. Yet they ordered their patrol boats to engage it anyway. He also noted that orders given
to Maddox to stay eight miles (13 km) off the DRV coast put the ship in international waters, as North Vietnam claimed
only a five-mile (8 km) nautical limit as its territory. In addition, many nations had previously carried out similar missions
all over the world, and the USS John R. Craig had earlier conducted an
intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident.[6]
Later statements
On 4 August, 1964, squadron commander James Stockdale was one of the U.S. pilots flying overhead during the second alleged attack; unlike the
first attack, this one was believed to have been a false alarm. In the early 1990s, he recounted: "[I] had the best seat in the
house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there… There was
nothing there but black water and American fire power." Stockdale said his superiors ordered him to keep quiet about this. After
he was captured, this knowledge became a heavy burden. He later said he was concerned that his captors would eventually force him
to reveal what he knew about this terrible secret.[citation needed]
In 1995, retired Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, meeting with former
Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara, categorically denied that Vietnamese gunboats had attacked American destroyers on 4 August, while admitting to
the attack on 2 August.[7][8] A taped conversation of a meeting several weeks after passage of the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution was released in 2001, revealing that McNamara expressed doubts to President Lyndon B. Johnson that the attack had even occurred. Taking into consideration documents and
transcripts released by the U.S. National Security Agency and the
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, the consensus is that
this second attack never happened.[citation needed]
In the Fall of 1999, retired senior CIA engineering executive S. Eugene Poteat wrote
that he was asked in early August 1964 to determine if the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an
imagined one. He asked for further details on time, weather and surface conditions. No further details were forthcoming. In the
end he concluded that there were no torpedo boats on the night in question, and that the White House was interested only in
confirmation of an attack, not that there was no such attack.[9] In October, 2005 the New York Times reported that Robert
J. Hanyok, a historian for the U.S. National Security Agency, had concluded
that the NSA deliberately distorted the intelligence reports that it had passed on to policy-makers regarding the 4 August
incident. He concluded that the motive was not political but was probably to cover up honest intelligence errors. [10]
Mr. Hanyok's conclusions were initially published within the NSA in the Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition of Cryptologic
Quarterly, about five years before they were revealed in the Times article. According to intelligence officials, the
view of government historians that the report should become public was rebuffed by policymakers concerned that comparisons might
be made to intelligence used to justify the Iraq war that commenced in
2003.[11]
Reviewing the NSA's archives, Mr. Hanyok concluded that the NSA had initially misinterpreted North Vietnamese intercepts,
believing there was an attack on 4 August. Midlevel NSA officials almost immediately discovered the error, he concluded, but
covered it up by altering documents, so as to make it appear the second attack had happened. Robert McNamara, said in October
2005 that he believed intelligence reports regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident were decisive to the war's expansion.[citation needed]
On 30 November 2005, the NSA released the first installment
of previously classified information regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including Mr. Hanyok's article, "Skunks, Bogies,
Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring
2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.
The Hanyok article stated that intelligence information was presented to the Johnson administration "in such a manner as to
preclude responsible decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events."
Instead, "only information that supported the claim that the communists had attacked the two destroyers was given to Johnson
administration officials."[citation needed]
Southeast Asia Resolution
-
Lyndon Johnson, who was up for election that year, launched retaliatory air strikes and went on national television on
4 August. Although the Maddox had been involved in providing intelligence support for
South Vietnamese attacks at Hon Me and Hon Ngu, Defense Secretary McNamara denied, in his testimony before Congress, that the U.S. Navy had supported South Vietnamese military operations in the Gulf. He
thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since the ship had been in international
waters. He also claimed that there was "unequivocable proof" of an "unprovoked" second attack against the
Maddox.[citation needed]
As a result of his testimony, on 7 August, Congress passed a joint resolution (H.J. RES 1145), titled the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted President Johnson the authority to conduct
military operations in Southeast Asia without the benefit of a declaration of war. The Resolution gave President Johnson approval
"to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its
freedom." Both Johnson and President Richard Nixon used the Resolution as a justification
for escalated involvement in Indochina.[citation needed]
Interpretation
The "Gulf of Tonkin Incident" defined the beginning of large-scale involvement of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. Historians
have shown that the second incident was, at its best interpretation, an overreaction of eager naval forces.
Vietnam's Navy Anniversary Day is August 5, the date of the
second attack, Vietnamese time, where "one of our torpedo squadrons chased the U.S.S. Maddox from our coastal waters, our
first victory over the U.S. Navy". [12]
See also
Notes
- ^ http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/pent4.htm Pentagon Papers]
- ^ Pentagon Papers
- ^ Pentagon Papers
- ^ Pentagon Papers
- ^ Cohen, Jeff (1994-07-27).
30-year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie
Launched Vietnam War. Retrieved on 2007-05-09.
- ^ Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat — Vietnam in
Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978) P. 42
- ^ "McNamara asks Giap: What happened in Tonkin Gulf?". (November 9, 1995). Associated Press
- ^ CNN Cold War -
Interviews: Robert McNamara, retrieved January 23, 2007
- ^ S. Eugene Poteat, "Engineering in the CIA: ELINT, Stealth and the Beginnings of Information
Warfare", The Bent of Tau Beta Pi, Fall 1999
- ^ Shane, Scott (December 2, 2005). "Vietnam War Intelligence 'Deliberately
Skewed,' Secret Study Says". New York Times.
- ^ "Robert J. Hanyok: His NSC study on Tonkin Gulf Deception". (October 31, 2005). New York Times.
- ^ Pike, PAVN, p. 110
References
- Ellsberg, Daniel (2002). Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking.
External links
- The Gulf of Tonkin
Incident, 40 Years Later; Flawed Intelligence and the Decision for War in Vietnam — National Security Archive at George Washington University
- NSA declassified documents released on
11/30/05
- Vietnam Study, Casting
Doubts, Remains Secret
- From Vietnam
to Iraq: Lessons from Tonkin Gulf Lies by Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq
- Tonkin Gulf reports cooked? Historian's research finds intelligence errors covered up
- LBJ's address to the nation, August
5, 1964
- Pentagon Papers[3]
- Cronkite: Gulf of
Tonkin's Phantom Attack
- US Navy
Historical Site showing charts and photos of the incident
- Analysis Casts Doubt on Vietnam War Claims — Calvin Woodward, Associated Press, Dec. 1, 2005. "A spy-agency analysis
released Thursday contends a second attack on U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin never happened, casting further doubt on the
leading rationale for escalation of the Vietnam War."
- Robert J. Hanyok, "Skunks,
Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter
2000/Spring 2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.
- 30-year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie
Launched Vietnam War — Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting
(FAIR): Media Beat July 27, 1994
- Tonkin Gulf
Intelligence "Skewed" According to Official History and Intercepts — National
Security Archive at George Washington University
- Ronnie E. Ford "New Light on
Gulf of Tonkin"
- Original Document: Tonkin
Gulf Resolution
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