With its ability to hover, take off and land rapidly, and fly close to the world's land and seas, the helicopter has extended the efficacy of air power by bringing it down to earth. In contrast to many other aviation developments which seemed focused on creating an independent role for airpower, for most of its existence helicopter aviation has concentrated on intimate involvement with land and sea forces.

The first complete helicopter (“gyroplane”) performance was accomplished by Louis‐Charles Breguet in 1935. Four years later, Igor Sikorsky captured the imagination of the military with several demonstrations of his VS‐300, XR‐4, and XR‐6 helicopters before high‐ranking officials of various U.S. and British defense units. After developing Sikorsky's ideas, the U.S. military put helicopters into service at the end of World War II, primarily for air rescue. In the Korean War, the United States expanded on tactics developed by the French during their involvement in Algeria, and began experimentally to arm its helicopters. These innovations, along the with deployment of troops by U.S. Marine Corps helicopters, and medical evacuations (medevacs) were key developments in helicopter applications. Helicopters were also used for resupply and observation; and the potential for command and control from above became clearer. The introduction of the helicopter into the battlefield gave the United States a valuable new offensive weapon.

The experiences with helicopters in the Korean War provided impetus for postwar experimentation. Several attempts were made to integrate offensive armaments with other helicopter systems. The U.S. Army, in particular, led by Brig. Gen. Carl I. Hutton, Commandant of the Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, aided by Col. J. D. Vanderpool, sought to construct and employ helicopters which could perform in the traditional cavalry roles, including reconnaissance, flank security, and shock as well as transportation of ground troops.

There was great resistance in political and military circles towards the development of a large, sophisticated, or autonomous army aviation element. One of the main sources of this antipathy was the feeling that all air operations belonged to the air force. Many in the army feared the consequences of a bitter schism similar to that which occurred when the air force itself became autonomous from the army in the previous decade. Proponents, however, argued that army aviation was necessary to fulfill the close air support mission; there was a pervasive feeling, felt most strongly in the army, that the air force was simply not interested in supporting small ground units in close combat.

The development of the UH‐1 “Huey” helicopter gave proponents of an airmobile division the craft, which ultimately persuaded policymakers that such an organization, within the Army, could flourish. Originally planned as an air ambulance, the Huey was later rigged as a gun ship and a troop carrier. The presence of the Huey in all of its multiple roles allowed the army to ask for a division‐sized airmobile unit and to press for the infusion of helicopters into already existing ground units.

Within the army hierarchy individuals such as former paratroop commander Gen. James Gavin were advocates of an increasing role for army aviation. One of Gavin's proteges, Gen. Hamilton Howze, was a Director of Army Aviation and the chief of the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, which during the Kennedy administration advocated an Airmobile Division. Tests for a new 11th Air Assault Division, which largely used UH‐1 Hueys, under Gen. Harry Kinnard began in earnest with a key evaluator being an ardent army aviation supporter, Gen. Robert R. Williams.

In 1965, the army and the air force reached an understanding in which responsibility for helicopter operations were assigned to the army. At approximately the same time the 11th Air Assault Division was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and with its 16,000 troops and more than 400 helicopters was assigned to Vietnam. A second Army division (101st Airborne) became airmobile and aviation assets were assigned to other army and Marine units in large numbers. In many respects the Vietnam War was a “helicopter war” and by 1970 the U.S. Army operated about 12,000 aircraft, the overwhelming majority of which were helicopters.

Helicopters provided American commanders in Vietnam a great deal of flexibility in their operations. They enabled the quick evacuation of wounded troops from the battlefield and saved thousands of lives, thereby holding the politically important death statistics down. Paradoxically, helicopters enabled U.S. troops to engage in combat in areas that otherwise would be inaccessible. The ability to land helicopters in any area with a small cleared space enabled the United States to establish bases known as LZs (landing zones), which produced a battlefield which distinctly lacked a clear demarcation between the friendly and enemy lines. The airmobile capability of helicopters created a more effective fighting force for Vietnam, but it also limited the imagination of tacticians who used this asset in cases where helicopters may not have been the wisest choice to employ. Nevertheless, the sound of helicopters became associated with the Vietnam War in the nightly news and motion pictures.

In 1983, army aviation became a separate branch within the United States army. This was a step along the way toward demand for greater autonomy for army aviators. The Marine Corps organizational structure also promotes considerable autonomy for their aviation forces. Following Vietnam, the army acquired an advanced attack helicopter, the AH‐64 Apache, a modern multi‐purpose craft, the UH‐60 Black Hawk, and an armed reconnaissance craft, the OH‐58D Kiowa Warrior. Other services use, among other helicopters, variants of these craft.

Operation Desert Storm, the American‐led assault to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, was initiated in early 1991 by Apache attacks on Iraqi long range radar. The Persian Gulf War presented army aviation with the opportunity to use airmobile tactics to the fullest. The strategic scheme of maneuver for the final assault on Iraqi troops in both Kuwait and Iraq was a flanking attack from the west, known as the “left hook.” The execution of the “left hook,” deep into Iraq, confirmed the faith of military planners who believed in the centrality of helicopters for cavalry and logistical missions.

Over the years the primary criticism of helicopters has been their vulnerability to ground fire. This vulnerability was made clear, once again, when two Black Hawks were shot down in Mogadishu, Somalia almost three years after the Persian Gulf War. Though helicopters may be somewhat vulnerable to ground fire, they are still feared by opposition forces because their ability to fly along the nap of the earth makes them difficult to track via electronic methods. The enemy's frequent inability precisely to locate a helicopter via electronic means contributes to the helicopter's effectiveness and the ground troops' terror. For example, the fear of U.S. helicopters by opposition forces has been noted by implementation force (IFOR) peacekeeping soldiers who served during the Bosnian Crisis in the late 1990s.

[See also Rivalry, Interservice; Vietnam War, U.S. Air Operations in.]

Bibliography

• Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Airforce: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics, 1980.
• Eugene H. Grayson. Where do we go from here? U.S. Army Aviation Digest, March/April 1992, pp. 44–47.
• James L. Cox, The Decline of Marine Helicopter Aviation, Marine Corps Gazette, December1994, pp. 47–48.
• David S. Harvey, The Choppy World of Army Aviation, Air Force Magazine, January1994, pp. 56–60.
• Marvin Leibstone, U.S. Military Helicopter Programmes, Military Technology, June1994, pp. 53–57