Emperor Shōwa (昭和天皇, Shōwa Tennō?) (April 29, 1901 – January 7, 1989) was the 124th emperor of Japan
according to the traditional order of succession, reigning from December 25 1926 until his death in 1989. In the Western World, he is most known by the
name he had while he was alive, Hirohito.
The word Shōwa is the name of the era that corresponded with the emperor's
reign, and was made the emperor's own name upon his death, the name by which he is now
exclusively referred to in Japan[1]. Although he was and
continues to be known outside of Japan by his personal name, Hirohito (裕仁, Hirohito?), in Japan use of
an emperor's personal name is considered overly familiar or derogatory.[2] His reign was the longest of any historical Japanese emperor, and he oversaw many significant changes
to Japanese society.
Early life
A younger Emperor Showa and his wife Nagako Kumi, later
Empress Kōjun
Born in the Aoyama Palace in Tokyo, Hirohito was the first son of Crown Prince Yoshihito (the future Emperor Taishō) and Crown
Princess Sadako (the future Empress Teimei). His childhood title was Prince Michi
(迪宮, Michi no miya?). He became heir
apparent upon the death of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, on July 30, 1912. His formal investiture as crown prince took place on
November 2, 1916.
He attended the boy's department of Gakushuin Peers School from 1908 to 1914 and then a
special institute for the crown prince (Tōgū-gogakumonsho) from 1914 to 1921. On November
29, 1921, he became regent of Japan, in place of his ailing father. In 1921, Prince Regent Hirohito took a six month tour of Europe, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands and
Belgium. By doing this he became the first Japanese crown prince to travel abroad. When he
returned, he was named prince regent when his father retired of mental illness.
He married his distant cousin Princess Nagako Kuni (the future Empress Kōjun), the
eldest daughter of Prince Kuni Kuniyoshi, on January
26, 1924. They had two sons and five daughters:
- Princess Shigeko, childhood appellation Teru no miya (照宮成子 teru no miya shigeko), 9 December 1925–23 July 1961; m. October 10 1943 Prince Higashikuni Morihiro (May 6 1916 —
February 1 1969), the eldest son of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko and his wife, Princess Toshiko, the eighth daughter of Emperor Meiji; lost status as imperial family members, October 14,
1947;
- Princess Sachiko, childhood appellation Hisa no miya (久宮祐子 hisa no miya sachiko), 10 September 1927–8 March 1928;
- Princess Kazuko, childhood appellation Taka no miya (孝宮和子 taka no miya kazuko), 30 September 1929–28 May 1989; m. May 5, 1950 Takatsukasa Toshimichi (August 26 1923 — January 27 1966), eldest son of
Nobusuke [peer]; and adopted a son Naotake.
- Princess Atsuko, childhood appellation Yori no miya (順宮厚子 yori no miya
atsuko), b. 7 March 1931; m. October 10 1952 Ikeda Takamasa (b. October
21 1927), eldest son of former Marquis Nobumasa Ikeda;
- Crown Prince Akihito, childhood appellation Tsugu no miya (継宮明仁 tsugu no
miya akihito) became the present Emperor of Japan, b. 23 December 1933; m. April 10
1959 Shōda Michiko (the present Empress of Japan,
b. October 20 1934), elder daughter of Shōda Hidesaburo, former
president and chairman of Nisshin Flour Milling Company;
- Prince Masahito, childhood appellation Yoshi no miya (義宮正仁 yoshi no
miya masahito), b. 28 November 1935, titled Prince
Hitachi (常陸宮 hitachi no miya) since 1 October 1964;
m. October 30 1964 Tsugaru Hanako (b. July 19 1940), fourth daughter of former Count Tsugaru Yoshitaka;
- Princess Takako, childhood appellation Suga no miya (清宮貴子 suga no
miya takako), b. 3 March 1939; m. March 3 1960 Shimazu Hisanaga, son of former Count Shimazu Hisanori and has a son
Yoshihisa.
The daughters who lived to adulthood left the imperial family as a result of the American reforms of the Japanese imperial
household in October 1947 (in the case of Princess Higashikuni) or under the terms of the Imperial Household Law at the moment of their subsequent marriages (in the cases of Princesses
Kazuko, Atsuko, and Takako).
Accession
On December 25, 1926, Hirohito assumed the throne upon the
death of his father Yoshihito. The Taishō era ceased at once and a new era, the
Shōwa era (Enlightened Peace), was proclaimed. The deceased emperor was posthumously
renamed Emperor Taishō a few days later. Following Japanese custom, the new emperor was
never referred to by his given name, but rather was referred to simply as "His Majesty
the Emperor" (天皇陛下, tennō heika?), which may be
shortened to "His Majesty" (陛下, heika?). In writing, the
emperor was also referred to formally as "The Reigning Emperor" (今上天皇, kinjō
tennō?).
Early reign
The first part of Emperor Shōwa's reign as sovereign (between 1926 and 1945) took place against a background of increasing military power within the government, through both legal and
extralegal means. The Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy had held veto power over the formation of
cabinets since 1900, and between 1921 and 1944 there were no fewer than 64 incidents of political violence.
One notable case was the assassination of moderate Prime Minister
Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932, which marked the end of any real
civilian control of the military. This was followed by an attempted
military coup in February 1936, the February
26 incident, mounted by junior Army officers of the Kōdōha faction who had
the sympathy of many high-ranking officers including Prince Chichibu (Yasuhito), one of
the emperor's brothers. This revolt was occasioned by a loss of ground by the militarist faction in Diet elections. The coup resulted in the murder of a number of high government and Army officials, and was
put down with Emperor Shōwa angrily assuming a major role in confronting them.
When Chief Aide-de-camp Shigeru Honjō informed him of the revolt, the emperor immediately ordered that it be put down and
referred to the officers as rebels (bōto). Shortly thereafter, he ordered Army minister Yoshiyuki Kawashima to suppress the
rebels within one hour, and he asked reports from Honjō every thirty minutes. The next day, when told by Honjō that little
progress was being made by the high command in quashing the rebels, the emperor told him "I Myself, will lead the Konoe Division
and subdue them." This he was not forced to do but the rebellion was suppressed following his orders on February 29.[3]
Still, from the 1930s on, the military clique held almost all political power in Japan, and pursued policies that eventually
led Japan to fight the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and World War II.
The Sino-Japanese War and World War II
The problem of imperial responsibility
Many people from countries once part of the Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere see Emperor Shōwa as the mastermind behind the atrocities committed by the imperial forces in the
Second Sino-Japanese War and in World War II. Some feel that he, some members of the imperial family such as his brother
Prince Chichibu, his cousins Prince
Takeda and Prince Fushimi, and his uncles Prince Kan'in, Prince Asaka, and
Prince Higashikuni, should have been tried for war crimes. Because of this, many Asians residing in countries that were subject to Japanese invasion, as well
as others in nations that fought Japan retain a hostile attitude towards the Japanese
imperial family.
The central question is how much real control the emperor had over the Japanese military during the two wars. Officially, the
imperial constitution, adopted under Emperor Meiji, gave full power to the emperor.
Article 4 prescribed that "The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and
exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution" while, according to article 6 "The Emperor gives
sanction to laws and orders them to be promulgated and executed" and article 11, "The Emperor has the supreme command of
the Army and the Navy." The emperor was thus the leader of the Imperial
General Headquarters.
However, the view promoted by both the Japanese Imperial Palace and the American occupation forces immediately after World War
II had Emperor Shōwa as a powerless figurehead behaving strictly according to
protocol, while remaining at a distance from the decision-making processes.
Many historians such as Akira Fujiwara (Shōwa Tennō no Jū-go Nen Sensō, 1991) and Peter Wetzler (Hirohito and
War, 1998), based on the primary sources and the monumental work of Shirō Hara,[4] have produced evidence suggesting that the emperor worked through intermediaries to exercise a great
deal of control over the military and was neither bellicose nor a pacifist, but an opportunist who governed in a pluralistic
decision-making process. American historian Herbert Bix argues that Emperor Shōwa may
even have been the prime mover of most of the events of the two wars. Historians such as Bix, Fujiwara, Wetzler, and Akira Yamada
recognize that the post-war view focusing on imperial conferences misses the importance of numerous "behind the chrysanthemum
curtain" meetings where the real decisions were made between the emperor, his chiefs of staff, and the cabinet.
Primary sources, such as the "Sugiyama memo" and the diaries of Kido and Konoe, describe in detail the informal meetings
Emperor Shōwa had with his chiefs of staff and ministers (For example, Prince Fumimaro
Konoe had a very good firsthand view of the surrender events). These documents show that the emperor was kept informed of
all main military operations and that he frequently questioned his senior staff and asked for changes.
Entering World War II
Prior to what is formally known as "World War II," Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and the rest of China in 1937 (the Second Sino-Japanese War). The primary sources reveal that Emperor Shōwa never really had any
objection to the invasion of China in 1937, which was recommended to him by his chiefs of staff and prime minister
Fumimaro Konoe. His main concern seems to have been the possibility of an attack by the
Soviets in the north and his questions to his chief of staff Prince Kan'in and
minister of the army Hajime Sugiyama were mostly about the time it could take to crush
the Chinese resistance.
According to Akira Fujiwara, the emperor even personally ratified the proposition of his army to remove the constraints of
international law on the treatment of Chinese prisoners on August 5.[5] Moreover, the works of Yoshiaki Yoshimi
and Seiya Matsuno show that he authorized by specific orders (rinsanmei) the use of chemical weapons against the Chinese.[6] For example, during the invasion of Wuhan, from August to October 1938, the emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions,[7] despite the resolution adopted by the League of Nations on May 14 condemning the use of toxic gas by the
Japanese Army.
During World War II, ostensibly under Emperor Shōwa's leadership, Japan formed
alliances with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, forming the Axis Powers. The emperor, who had a
predilection for England, was reluctant to form this alliance. In July 1939, he even had a bad
quarrel on this subject with one of his brothers, Prince Chichibu, who was visiting him
three times a week to support the treaty, and reprimanded the army minister Seishiro
Itagaki,[8] but he finally gave his consent after
the success of the Wehrmacht in Europe.
On September 4, 1941, the Japanese Cabinet met to consider
the war plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, and decided that:
| “ |
Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defence and self-preservation, will complete
preparations for war ... [and is] ... resolved to go to war with the United States,
Great Britain and the Netherlands if necessary. Our
Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby
endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of
October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the
United States, Britain and the Netherlands. |
” |
The "objectives" to be obtained were clearly defined: a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia, no increase in US or British military forces in
the region, and cooperation by the West "in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire."
On September 5, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of the decision to the
emperor, just one day in advance of the Imperial Conference at which it would be formally implemented. On this evening, Emperor
Shōwa had a meeting with chief of staff of the army Sugiyama, chief of staff of the navy Osami
Nagano and Konoe. The emperor then questioned Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with the Occident. As
Sugiyama answered positively, the emperor scolded him:
| “ |
—At the time of the Shina [China] incident, the army told me that we could make Chiang
surrender after three months but you still can't beat him even today! Sugiyama, you were minister at the time.
—China is a vast area with many ways in and ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties.
—You say the interior of China is huge; isn't the Pacific Ocean even bigger than China? Didn't I caution you each time about
those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me?[9] |
” |
Chief of Naval General Staff Admiral Nagano, a former Navy Minister and vastly experienced, later told a trusted colleague, "I
have never seen the emperor reprimand us in such a manner, his face turning red and raising his voice."
According to the traditional view, Emperor Shōwa was deeply concerned by the decision to place "war preparations first and
diplomatic negotiations second," and he announced his intention to break with tradition. At the Imperial Conference on the
following day, he directly questioned the chiefs of the Army and Navy general staffs, a quite unprecedented action.
Nevertheless, all speakers at the Imperial Conference were united in favour of war rather than diplomacy. Baron
Yoshimichi Hara, President of the Imperial Council and the emperor's representative,
then questioned them closely, producing replies to the effect that war would only be considered as a last resort from some, and
silence from others.
At this point, the sovereign astonished all present by addressing the conference personally, and in breaking the tradition of
Imperial silence left his advisors "struck with awe." (Prime Minister Konoe's description of the event.) Emperor Shōwa stressed
the need for peaceful resolution of international problems, expressed regret at his ministers' failure to respond to Baron Hara's
probings, and recited a poem written by his grandfather, Emperor Meiji which, he said, he had read "over and over again":
| “ |
Methinks all the people of the world are brethren, then.
Why are the waves and the wind so unsettled nowadays? |
” |
Recovering from their shock, the ministers hastened to express their profound wish to explore all possible peaceful avenues.
The emperor's presentation was in line with his practical role as leader of the Shinto
religion.
At this time, Army Imperial Headquarters was continually communicating with the Imperial household in detail about the
military situation. On October 8, Sugiyama signed a 47 page report to the emperor (sōjōan)
outlining in minute detail plans for the advance in Southeast Asia and, on the third week, gave him a 51 page document,
"Materials in Reply to the Throne," about an operational outlook on the war.[10]
As the war preparations continued, however, Konoe found himself more and more isolated and gave his demission on
October 16. He justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita :
| “ |
Of course His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war.
When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me : You were worried about
it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much. Thus, gradually, he began to lead toward war. And the next time I met him, he
leaned even more toward. In short, I felt the emperor was telling me : my prime minister does not understand military
matters, I know much more. In short, the emperor had absorbed the view of the army and navy high commands.[11] |
” |
The army and the navy recommended at this point the candidacy of prince
Higashikuni, one of the emperor's uncles. According to the Shōwa "Monologue," written after the war, the emperor then said
that if the war were to begin while a member of the imperial house was prime minister, the imperial house would have to carry the
responsibility and this he opposed.[12]
He thus chose the hard-line General Hideki Tōjō, who was known for his devotion to the
imperial institution and asked him to make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the imperial conferences. On
November 2, Tōjō, Sugiyama and Nagano reported to the emperor that the review of eleven
points had been in vain. Emperor Shōwa gave his consent to the war and then asked: "Are you going to provide justification for
the war?"[13]
On November 3, Nagano explained in detail the Pearl Harbor attack plan to the
emperor.[14] On November
5, Emperor Shōwa approved in imperial conference the operations plan for a war against the Occident and had many meetings
with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month. On December 1, an imperial conference
finally sanctioned the "War against the United States, England and Holland." On December 8
(December 7 in Hawaii) 1941, in simultaneous attacks, Japanese
forces struck at the US Fleet in Pearl Harbor and began the invasion of
Malaysia. From this point, there was no turning back.
With the nation now fully committed to the war, Emperor Shōwa took a keen interest in military progress and sought to boost
morale. According to Akira Yamada and Akira Fujiwara, the emperor even made major interventions in some military operations. For
example, he pressed Sugiyama four times, on January 13 and 21 and February 9 and 26, to
increase troop strength and launch an attack of Bataan. On February
9, March 19 and May 29, he ordered the Army Chief of
staff to examine the possibilities for an attack on Chungking which led to operation
Gogo.[15]
As the tide of war gradually began to turn (around late 1942 and early 1943), some people argue that the flow of information to the palace gradually began to bear less and less relation
to reality, while others suggest that the emperor worked closely with Prime Minister Tōjō, continued to be well and accurately
briefed by the military, and knew Japan's military position precisely right up to the point of surrender. The chief of staff of
the General Affairs section of the Prime Minister's office, Shuichi Inada, remarked to Tōjō's private secretary, Sadao
Akamatsu:
| “ |
There has never been a cabinet in which the prime minister, and all the ministers,
reported so often to the throne. In order to effect the essence of genuine direct imperial rule and to relieve the concerns of
the emperor, the ministers reported to the throne matters within the scope of their responsibilities as per the prime minister's
directives... In times of intense activities, typed drafts were presented to the emperor with corrections in red. First draft,
second draft, final draft and so forth, came as deliberations progressed one after the other and were sanctioned accordingly by
the emperor.[16] |
” |
In the first six months of war, all the major engagements had been victories. However, as the tide turned in the summer of
1942 with the battle of Midway and the landing of the American forces on
Guadalcanal and Tulagi in August, the Emperor
immediately recognized the potential danger and pushed the navy and the army for greater efforts. When informed in August 1943 by
Sugiyama that the American advance through the Solomon
islands could not be stopped, he asked his chief of staff to consider other places to attack : "When and where on are
you ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?"[17] On August 24, he reprimanded Nagano
for the defeat of Bela Bela and on September 11, he ordered Sugiyama to work with the Navy to
implement better military preparation and give adequate supply to soldiers fighting in Rabaul.[18]
Throughout the following years, the sequence of drawn and then decisively lost engagements was also reported to the public as
a series of great victories. Only gradually did it become apparent to the people in the home islands that the situation was very
grim. U.S. air raids on the cities of Japan starting in 1944 made a mockery of the unending tales
of victory. Later that year, with the downfall of Hideki Tōjō's government, two other prime ministers were appointed to continue
the war effort, Kuniaki Koiso and Kantaro
Suzuki—again, with the formal approval of the emperor. Both were unsuccessful and Japan was nearing defeat.
Last days of the war

In early 1945, in the wake of the loss of Leyte,
Emperor Shōwa began a series of individual meetings with senior government officials to consider the progress of the war. All but
one advised continuing. The exception was ex-Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who feared a communist revolution even more than defeat and urged a negotiated surrender. According to some accounts, the
emperor apparently took the view that peace was essential, but that the armed forces would have to engineer a conspicuous
military victory somewhere in order to provide a stronger bargaining position. With each passing week this became less likely. In
April the Soviet Union issued notice that it would not renew its neutrality agreement.
Japan's ally Germany surrendered in early May 1945. In June, the
cabinet reassessed the war strategy, only to decide more firmly than ever on a fight to the last man. This was officially
affirmed at a brief Imperial Council meeting, to which the emperor listened in stone-faced silence.
The following day, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal
Kōichi Kido prepared a draft document which summarised the hopeless military situation and
proposed a negotiated settlement. According to some sources,[attribution needed] the emperor privately approved of
it and authorised Kido to circulate it discreetly amongst the less hawkish cabinet members; others suggest that the emperor was
indecisive, and that the delay cost many tens of thousands of Japanese and Allied lives. Extremists in Japan were also calling
for a death-before-dishonor mass suicide, modeled on the "47 Ronin" incident. By
mid-June the cabinet had agreed to approach the Soviet Union to act as a mediator, though not before the bargaining position had
been improved by a repulse of the coming Allied invasion of mainland Japan.
On June 22, the emperor met his ministers, saying "I desire that concrete plans to end the
war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts be made to implement them." The attempt to negotiate a
peace via the Soviet Union came to nothing. There was always the threat that extremists would carry out a coup or foment other
violence. The Allies were determined not to settle for anything short of unconditional
surrender, and as late as July 1945 the Japanese government council, the Big Six, considered
that option and recommended one to three conditions, beginning with a guarantee of the emperor's continued position in
Japanese society.
On August 9 1945, following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet declaration of war,
Emperor Shōwa told Kido to "quickly control the situation" because "the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities
against us."[19] On August
10, the cabinet drafted an "Imperial Rescript ending the War" following the
emperor's indications that the declaration did not compromise any demand which prejudiced the prerogatives of His Majesty as a
Sovereign Ruler.
On August 12, the emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of
his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the
kokutai (national polity) could not be preserved. The emperor simply replied "of
course."[20] On August
14, the Suzuki government notified the Allies that it had accepted the Potsdam
Declaration. On August 15, a recording of the emperor's surrender speech was broadcast over the radio signifying the unconditional surrender of Japan's military
forces (known as Gyokuon-hōsō).
Objecting to the surrender, die-hard army fanatics attempted a coup d'etat by conducting
a full military assault and takeover of the Imperial Palace. The physical recording of the surrender speech was hidden and
preserved overnight, and the coup was quickly crushed on the emperor's order. The surrender speech noted that "the war situation
has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage" and ordered the Japanese to "endure the unendurable" in surrender. It was the
first time the public had heard the emperor's voice. He was purposely vague, because the emperor of Japan was not regarded merely
as a human saying "We surrender to the Americans," but rather, was viewed as the sacred symbol, embodiment, and leader of Japan,
and as such this required a more vague tone that preserved this mystique. Indeed, the formal, stilted Japanese used by the
emperor in the speech was not readily understood by many common Japanese. According to historian Richard Storry in A History
of Modern Japan, the emperor typically used "a form of language familiar only to the well-educated" and to the more
traditional samurai families. The most important immediate result of this surrender was that
food relief shipments could be arranged within weeks, where otherwise the urban population of Japan was in danger of mass
starvation similar to Germany and Central Europe after World War I. He was the only leader
of the Axis Powers to remain alive and in office following the end of the Second World War.
Post-war reign
General MacArthur and The Emperor
As the Emperor chose his uncle Prince Higashikuni as prime minister to
assist the occupation, there were attempts by numerous leaders, among them President Harry S. Truman, to have him put on
trial for alleged war crimes. Many members of the imperial family such as princes Chichibu,
Takamatsu and Higashikuni pressured the emperor to abdicate so one of the princes could serve as regent until Crown Prince
Akihito came of age.[21]
On February 27, 1946, the emperor's youngest brother,
Prince Mikasa (Takahito), even stood up in the privy council and indirectly urged the
emperor to step down and accept responsibility for Japan's defeat. According to Minister of Welfare Ashida's diary, "Everyone
seemed to ponder Mikasa's words. Never have I seen His Majesty's face so pale."[22]
U.S. General Douglas MacArthur insisted that Emperor Shōwa retain the throne.
MacArthur saw him as a symbol of the continuity and cohesion of the Japanese people. Many historians criticize this decision to
exonerate the Emperor and all members of the imperial family implicated in the war such as Prince Chichibu, Prince Asaka, Prince Higashikuni and Prince Hiroyasu
Fushimi from criminal prosecutions[23] Before the
war crimes trials actually convened, the SCAP, the
IPS and Shōwa officials worked behind the scenes not only to prevent the imperial family
from being indicted, but also to slant the testimony of the defendants to ensure that no one implicated the Emperor. High
officials in court circles and the Shōwa government collaborated with Allied GHQ in compiling lists of prospective war criminals,
while the individuals arrested as Class A suspects and incarcerated in Sugamo prison
solemnly vowed to protect their sovereign against any possible taint of war responsibility.[24] Thus, "months before the Tokyo tribunal commenced, MacArthur's highest subordinates were working
to attribute ultimate responsibility for Pearl Harbor to Hideki Tōjō"[25] by allowing "the
major criminal suspects to coordinate their stories so that the Emperor would be spared from indictment."[26] According to John Dower, "This successful campaign to absolve the Emperor
of war responsibility knew no bounds. Hirohito was not merely presented as being innocent of any formal acts that might make him
culpable to indictment as a war criminal. He was turned into an almost saintly figure who did not even bear moral responsibility
for the war."[27] According to Bix, "MacArthur's truly
extraordinary measures to save Hirohito from trial as a war criminal had a lasting and profoundly distorting impact on Japanese
understanding of the lost war."[28]
The Emperor was not put on trial, but he was forced [29] to explicitly reject (in the Ningen-sengen
(人間宣言, Ningen-sengen?)) the traditional
claim that the emperor of Japan was an akitsumikami, an incarnate divinity. [30] There is however consensus amongst authors such as Dower and Bix that Hirohito
never rejected the claim that he was a descendant of Amaterasu. Immediately after the Imperial
Rescript usually regarded as a repudiation of divinity, he asked the occupation authorities for permission to worship the Sun
Goddess. Some have seen this as an implicit reaffirmation of the claim to divine status; others have seen it as simply an
expression of the emperor's personal religious beliefs, with no political or social implications. In any case, the "renunciation
of divinity" was noted more by foreigners than by Japanese, and seems to have been intended for the consumption of the
former.
Although the emperor had supposedly rejected claims to divine status, his public position was deliberately left vague, partly
because General MacArthur thought him likely to be a useful partner to get the Japanese to accept the occupation, and partly due
to behind-the-scenes maneuverings by Shigeru Yoshida to thwart attempts to cast him as a
European-style monarch.
While Emperor Shōwa was usually seen abroad as a head of state, there is still a broad
dispute about whether he became a common citizen or retained special status related to his religious offices and participations
in Shinto and Buddhist calendar rituals. Many scholars claim that today's tennō (usually translated