Searle has introduced the notion of an 'indirect speech act', which in his account is meant to be, more particularly, an indirect 'illocutionary' act. Applying a conception of such illocutionary acts according to which they are (roughly) acts of saying something with the intention of communicating with an audience, he describes indirect speech acts as follows: "In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer." An account of such act, it follows, will require such things as an analysis of mutually shared background information about the conversation, as well as of rationality and linguistic conventions. In connection with indirect speech acts, Searle introduces the notions of 'primary' and 'secondary' illocutionary acts. The primary illocutionary act is the indirect one, which is not literally performed. The secondary illocutionary act is the direct one, performed in the literal utterance of the sentence (Searle 178). In the example: : (1) Speaker X: "We should leave for the show or else we'll be late." : (2) Speaker Y: "I am not ready yet." Here the primary illocutionary act is Y's rejection of X's suggestion, and the secondary illocutionary act is Y's statement that she is not ready to leave. By dividing the illocutionary act into two subparts, Searle is able to explain that we can understand two meanings from the same utterance all the while knowing which is the correct meaning to respond to. With his doctrine of indirect speech acts Searle attempts to explain how it is possible that a speaker can say something and mean it, but additionally mean something else. This would be impossible , or at least it would be an improbable case, if in such a case the hearer had no chance of figuring out what the speaker means (over and above what she says and means). Searle's solution is that the hearer can figure out what the indirect speech act is meant to be, and he gives several hints as to how this might happen. For the previous example a condensed process might look like this: : Step 1: A proposal is made by X, and Y responded by means of an illocutionary act (2). : Step 2: X assumes that Y is cooperating in the conversation, being sincere, and that she has made a statement that is relevant. : Step 3: The literal meaning of (2) is not relevant to the conversation. : Step 4: Since X assumes that Y is cooperating; there must be another meaning to (2). : Step 5: Based on mutually shared background information, X knows that they cannot leave until Y is ready. Therefore, Y has rejected X's proposition. : Step 6: X knows that Y has said something in something other than the literal meaning, and the primary illocutionary act must have been the rejection of X's proposal. Searle argues that a similar process can be applied to any indirect speech act as a model to find the primary illocutionary act (178). His proof for this argument is made by means of a series of supposed "observations" (ibid., 180-182). In order to generalize this sketch of an indirect request, Searle proposes a program for the analysis of indirect speech act performances, whatever they are. He makes the following suggestion: : Step 1: Understand the facts of the conversation. : Step 2: Assume cooperation and relevance on behalf of the participants. : Step 3: Establish factual background information pertinent to the conversation. : Step 4: Make assumptions about the conversation based on steps 1-3. : Step 5: If steps 1-4 do not yield a consequential meaning, then infer that there are two illocutionary forces at work. : Step 6: Assume the hearer has the ability to perform the act the speaker suggests. The act that the speaker is asking be performed must be something that would make sense for one to ask. For example, the hearer might have the ability to pass the salt when asked to do so by a speaker who is at the same table, but not have the ability to pass the salt to a speaker who is asking the hearer to pass the salt during a telephone conversation. : Step 7: Make inferences from steps 1-6 regarding possible primary illocutions. : Step 8: Use background information to establish the primary illocution (Searle 184). With this process, Searle concludes that he has found a method that will satisfactorily reconstruct what happens when an indirect speech act is performed. Searle (1975)[3] has set up the following classification of illocutionary speech acts: * assertives = speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition * directives = speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g. requests, commands and advice * commissives = speech acts that commit a speaker to some future action, e.g. promises and oaths * expressives = speech acts that expresses on the speaker's attitudes and emotions towards the proposition, e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks * declaratives = speech acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition of the declaration, e.g. baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty or pronouncing someone husband and wife

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