The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also known as the Tokyo Trials, the Tokyo War
Crimes Tribunal or simply as the Tribunal, was convened to try the leaders
of the Empire of Japan for three types of crimes: "Class A" (crimes against peace), "Class B" (war crimes), and "Class C"
(crimes against humanity), committed during World
War II. The first refers to their joint conspiracy to start and wage the war, and the latter two refer to atrocities
including the Nanking Massacre. War crimes charges against more junior personnel were
dealt with separately, in other cities throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
The tribunal convened on May 3, 1946, and was adjourned on
November 12, 1948.
Twenty-five Japanese military and political leaders were charged with Class A crimes, and more than 5,700 Japanese nationals
were charged with Class B and C crimes, mostly over prisoner abuse. The crimes perpetrated by Japanese troops and authorities in
the occupation of Korea and China, particularly Manchuria
(Manchukuo), were not part of the proceeding. China held 13 tribunals of its own, resulting in
504 convictions and 149 executions.
The Japanese Emperor Hirohito, and all members of the imperial family such as
Prince Asaka, were not prosecuted for any alleged involvement in any of the
three categories of crimes. As many as 50 suspects, such as Nobusuke Kishi, who later
became Prime Minister, and Yoshisuke Aikawa, head of the zaibatsu Nissan, and future leader of the Chuseiren, were
charged but released without ever being brought to trial in 1947 and 1948.
Creation of the court
The legal basis for the trial was established by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (CIMTFE) that was proclaimed on 19 January 1946. CIMTFE set down the laws and procedures by which the IMTFE trials were to be conducted, including the types
of crimes. On 25 April 1946 in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the CIMTFE the
original Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with
amendments were promulgated. [1][2][3]
A panel of eleven judges presided over the IMTFE, one each from victorious Allied powers
(United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Republic of China, the Netherlands, Provisional Government of the
French Republic, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, British India, and the Philippines).
Prosecutors
Judges
Charges
| Count |
Offense |
| 1 |
As leaders, organisers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to wage
wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law. |
| 27 |
Waging unprovoked war against China. |
| 29 |
Waging aggressive war against the United States. |
| 31 |
Waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth. |
| 32 |
Waging aggressive war against the Netherlands. |
| 33 |
Waging aggressive war against France (Indochina). |
| 35,36 |
Waging aggressive war against the USSR. |
| 54 |
Ordered, authorised, and permitted inhumane treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and others. |
| 55 |
Deliberately and recklessly disregarded their duty to take adequate steps to prevent atrocities. |
Specific Documents of Evidence
In April 2007, historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi and the Center
for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility supplied specific documents about war crimes committed by the
Japanese during the war. These exposed documents were used in 1948 sentences during the tribunal. The documents concern the issue
of "Comfort Women" who were women forced to work in the brothels that serviced soldiers
and other men during the years of World War II. Document No. 5330 precisely mentioned the forced use of women for sexual use
during the war. Quotes from this document include: "The Tokeitai (Special Naval Police) had
ordered to keep the brothels supplied with women; to this end they arrested women on the streets and after enforced medical
examination placed them in the brothels." Other text in the document includes: "Women who had had relations with Japanese were
forced into the brothels, which were surrounded by barbed wire. They were only allowed on the streets with special permission."
[4]
Sentences
Wide view of the Tribunal, depicting the bench of judges in the background, and prisoners on trial in the right foreground.
There were 28 defendants tried, mostly military and political leaders. Two defendants (Matsuoka Yosuke and Nagano Osami) died of natural causes during
the trial. Okawa Shumei had a nervous breakdown during the trial and was removed. One of
the erratic things he did was, hitting the bald head of the former prime minister Hideki
Tojo, shouting "Inder! Kommen Sie!" (Come, Indian!) in German, and the list goes on. Therefore, the presiding judge Sir
William Webb (The President of the tribunal) concluded that he was mentally ill and dropped
the case against him. From the beginning of the tribunal, he was saying that the court is a farce and not even worthy of calling
it a legal court. Therefore, some people still believe that he was faking his madness in order to be released.
Seven others were sentenced to death by hanging for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. They were executed at Sugamo
Prison in Ikebukuro on December 23,
1948:
- General Doihara Kenji, spy (later Air Force commander)
- Baron Hirota Koki, foreign minister
- General Itagaki Seishiro, war minister
- General Kimura Heitaro, commander, Burma Expeditionary Force
- General Matsui Iwane, commander, Shanghai Expeditionary Force and Central China Area
Army
- General Muto Akira, commander, Philippines Expeditionary Force
- General Tojo Hideki, commander, Kwantung Army (later prime minister)
Sixteen more were sentenced to life imprisonment. Three (Koiso, Shiratori, and Umezu) died in prison, while the other thirteen
were paroled in 1955:
- General Araki Sadao, war minister
- Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, major instigator of the second Sino-Japanese War
- Field Marshal Hata Shunroku, war minister
- Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, prime minister
- Hoshino Naoki, Chief Cabinet Secretary
- Kaya Okinori, opium dealer to the Chinese
- Marquis Kido Kōichi, Lord
Keeper of the Privy Seal
- General Koiso Kuniaki, governor of Korea, later prime minister
- General Minami Jiro, commander, Kwantung Army
- Admiral Oka Takasumi, naval minister
- General Oshima Hiroshi, ambassador to Germany
- General Sato Kenryo, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau
- Admiral Shimada Shigetaro, naval minister
- Shiratori Toshio, ambassador to Italy
- General Suzuki Teiichi, president of the Cabinet Planning Board
- General Umezu Yoshijiro, war minister
Two defendants received finite sentences. Foreign minister Togo Shigenori was
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and died in prison in 1949. Foreign minister Shigemitsu Mamoru was sentenced to 7 years but was paroled in 1950 and
went on to serve as foreign minister again in Prime Minister Ichirō Hatoyama's
cabinet.
Subsidiary and related trials
According to Japanese tabulation, 5,700 Japanese individuals were indicted for Class B and Class C war crimes. Of this number,
984 were initially condemned to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were
acquitted and 279 were never brought to trial or not sentenced. The number of death sentences by country is the following :
Holland 236, Great Britain 223, Australia 153, China 149, USA 140 France 26 and Philippines 17. [5]
The Khabarovsk War Crime Trials held by the Soviets tried and found
guilty some members of Japan's bacteriological and chemical warfare unit (Unit 731). However
those who surrendered to the Americans were never brought to trial as General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers,
secretly granted immunity to the physicians of Unit 731 in exchange for providing America with their research on biological weapons.
In 1981, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published an article by John W. Powell detailing Unit 731 experiments and germ
warfare open-air tests on civilian populations. It was printed with a statement by judge B. V. A. Röling, the last surviving
member of the Tokyo Tribunal. Röling wrote that "As one of the judges in the International Military Tribunal, it is a bitter
experience for me to be informed now that centrally ordered Japanese war criminality of the most disgusting kind was kept secret
from the Court by the U.S. government." [6]
Criticism
The IMTFE shared many of the same criticisms as the Nuremberg Trials, including the
ex post facto nature of the IMTFE. The critics are divided between those who argue
that the trial was the victor's justice and those for whom the trial was essentially a legal procedure to exonerate the imperial
family from criminal responsibility.
It is also argued by some, such as Solis Horowitz, that IMTFE had an American bias, because unlike the Nuremberg Trials, there was only a single prosecution team, which was led by Joseph B. Keenan, an American, although the members of the tribunal represented eleven different Allied
countries. [7]
The IMTFE had less official support than the Nuremberg Trials. For example, Chief
Prosecutor Joe Keenan, a former US assistant attorney general, had a much lower position than Nuremberg's Robert H. Jackson, a justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Dissenting opinion and Victor's Justice
Justice Radhabinod Pal, the Indian justice at the IMTFE, argued that the exclusion of
Western colonialism and the use of the atom bomb by the United States from the list of
crimes, and judges from the vanquished nations on the bench, signified the "failure of the Tribunal to provide anything other
than the opportunity for the victors to retaliate." [8] In this he was not alone among Indian jurists of the time, one prominent Calcutta barrister
writing that the Tribunal was little more than "a sword in a wig".
Pal's objections were also substantive: he found that the entire prosecution case, that there was a conspiracy to commit an
act of aggressive war, which would include the brutalization and subjugation of conquered nations, weak. About the
Rape of Nanking in particular, he said, after acknowledging the brutality of the
incident ( and that the "evidence was overwhelming" that "atrocities were perpetrated by the members of the Japanese armed forces
against the civilian population... and prisoners of war"), that there was nothing to show that it was the "product of government
policy", and thus that the officials of the Japanese government were directly responsible. Indeed, he said, there is "no
evidence, testimonial or circumstantial, concomitant, prospectant, restrospectant, that would in any way lead to the inference
that the government in any way permitted the commission of such offenses." [8]
In any case, he added, conspiracy to wage aggressive war was not illegal in 1937, or at any point since. [8]
A procedure to exonerate the imperial family
Many historians criticize the work made by Douglas MacArthur and his staff to
exonerate Emperor Showa and all members of the imperial family implicated in the war such as
prince Chichibu, prince Takeda, prince Asaka, prince Higashikuni and prince
Hiroyasu Fushimi [9].
As soon as 26 November 1945, MacArthur confirmed to admiral Mitsumasa Yonai that the
emperor's abdication would not be necessary. [10] Before
the war crimes trials actually convened, SCAP, the IPS and shôwa officials worked behind the scenes not only to prevent the
imperial family being indicted, but also to slant the testimony of the defendants to ensure that no one implicated the Emperor.
High officials in court circles and the shôwa government collaborated with allied GHQ in compiling lists of prospective war
criminals, while the individuals arrested as Class A suspects and incarcerated in Sugamo
prison solemnly vowed to protect their sovereign against any possible taint of war responsibility. [11]
According to Herbert Bix, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers "immediately on landing in
Japan went to work to protect Hirohito from the role he had played during and at the end of the war" and "allowed the major
criminal suspects to coordinate their stories so that the Emperor would be spared from indictment." [12]
Bix also argues that "MacArthur's truly extraordinary measures to save Hirohito from trial
as a war criminal had a lasting and profoundly distorting impact on Japanese understanding of the lost war" and "months before
the Tokyo tribunal commenced, MacArthur's highest subordinates were working to attribute ultimate responsibility for Pearl Harbor
to Hideki Tojo." [13] According to the written report of Shûichi Mizota, the interpreter of admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Fellers met the two men at his office on March 6 1946 and told Yonai that : "it
would be most convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us that the Emperor is completely blameless. I think the forthcoming
trials offer the best opportunity to do that. Tôjô, in particular, should be made to bear all responsibility at this trial.
[14]
For John Dower, "This successful campaign to absolve the Emperor of war responsibility knew no bounds. Hirohito was not merely
presented as being innocent of any formal acts that might make him culpable to indictment as a war criminal. He was turned into
an almost saintly figure who did not even bear moral responsibility for the war", "With the full support of MacArthur's
headquarters, the prosecution functioned, in effect, as a defense team for the emperor." [15] and "Even Japanese activists who endorse the ideals of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
charters, and who have labored to document and publicize the atrocities of the shôwa regime, cannot defend the American decision
to exonerate the emperor of war responsibility and then, in the chill of the Cold war, release and soon afterwards openly embrace
accused right-winged war criminals like the later prime minister Nobusuke Kishi. [16]
Three judges wrote an obiter dictum about the criminal responsibility of Hirohito.
Judge in chief Webb declared that "No ruler can commit the crime of launching aggressive war and then validly claim to be excused
for doing so because his life would otherwise have been in danger...It will remain that the men who advised the commission of a
crime, if it be one, are in no worse position than the man who directs the crime be committed." [17]
Judge Henri Bernard of France concluded that Japan's declaration of war "had a principal author who escaped all prosecution
and of whom in any case the present Defendants could only be considered as accomplices."[18]
For judge B. V. A. Röling however, nothing objectable could be found in the Emperor's immunity and five defendants, Kido,
Hata, Hirota, Shigemitsu and Tôgô should have been acquitted.
60th anniversary
In a survey of 3,000 Japanese conducted in 2006 by Asahi News as the 60th anniversary
approached, 70% of those questioned were unaware of the details of the trials, a figure that rose to 90% for those in the 20-29
age group. Some 76% of the people polled, however, recognized a certain degree of aggression on Japan's part during the war,
while only 7% believed it was a war strictly for self-defense. [1]
See also
References
Movie adaptation
- In 2006, Chinese director Gao Qunshu made a movie about the trial [2], [3]
Books
- Bass, Gary Jonathan. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Trials. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000.
- Bix, Herbert. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
- Brackman, Arnold C. The Other Nuremberg: the Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. New York: William Morrow and
Company, 1987.
- Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: New Press, 1999.
- Frank, Richard
B. (1999). Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin Books.
- Holmes, Linda Goetz (2001). Unjust Enrichment: How
Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs. Mechanicsburg, PA, USA: Stackpole Books.
- Horowitz, Solis. "The Tokyo Trial" International Conciliation 465 (Nov 1950), 473-584.
- Lael, Richard L. (1982). The Yamashita Precedent:
War Crimes and Command Responsibility. Wilmington, Del, USA: Scholarly Resources.
- Maga, Timothy P. (2001). Judgment at Tokyo: The
Japanese War Crimes Trials. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0-8131-2177-9.
- Minear, Richard H. (1971). Victor's Justice: The
Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
- Piccigallo, Philip R. (1979). The Japanese on
Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951. Austin, Texas, USA: University of Texas Press.
- Rees, Laurence (2001). Horror in the East: Japan and
the Atrocities of World War II. Boston: Da Capo Press.
- Sherman, Christine (2001). War Crimes:
International Military Tribunal. Turner Publishing Company. ISBN 1563117282.
Web
Notes
- ^ Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
- ^ Within documents relating to the IMTFE it is also referred to as the
Charter
- ^ Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 25 April 1946
- ^ http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070418a5.html
- ^ John Dower, Embracing defeat, 1999, p.447
- ^ Daniel Barenblatt, A plague upon humanity, Harper Collins, 2004,
p.222.
- ^ Horowitz, Solis. (1950). "The Tokio Trial".
International Conciliation 465 (Nov): 473-584.
- ^ a b c "The Tokyo Judgment
and the Rape of Nanking", by Timothy Brook, The Journal of Asian Studies, August 2001.
- ^ John Dower, Embracing defeat, W.W. Norton, 1999, Herbert Bix,
Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, Perennial, 2001
- ^ Dower, ibid. p.323
- ^ Dower, ibid. p.325
- ^ Bix, ibid., p.583
- ^ Bix, ibid. p585
- ^ Kumao Toyoda, Sensô saiban yoroku, Taiseisha Kabushiki Kaisha,
1986, p.170-172, Bix, ibid. p.584.
- ^ Dower, ibid., p.326
- ^ Dower, ibid. p.562
- ^ Röling and Ruter, The Tokyo judgement : The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, volume 1, p.478
- ^ ibid. p.496
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