Intuitionistic logic, or constructivist logic, is the symbolic logic
system originally developed by Arend Heyting to provide a formal basis for
Brouwer's programme of intuitionism.
The system preserves justification, rather than truth, across transformations yielding derived propositions. From a practical point of view, there is also a
strong motivation for using intuitionistic logic, since it has the existence property, making it also suitable for other forms of mathematical constructivism.
Syntax
The syntax of formulæ of intuitionistic logic is similar to propositional logic or first-order logic. The
difference is that many tautologies of these classical logics can no longer be proven
within intuitionistic logic. Examples include not only the law of excluded middle
P ∨ ¬P, but also Peirce's Law ((P → Q) → P) → P,
and even double negation elimination. In classical logic, both P →
¬¬P and also ¬¬P → P are theorems. In intuitionistic logic, only the former is a theorem: Double negation
can be introduced, but it cannot be eliminated.
The observation that many classically valid tautologies are not theorems of intuitionistic logic leads to the idea of
weakening the proof theory of classical logic.
Axiomatization
The inference rule is modus ponens, and axioms are:
- THEN-1: φ → (χ → φ)
- THEN-2: (φ → (χ → ψ)) → ((φ → χ) → (φ → ψ))
- AND-1: φ ∧ χ → φ
- AND-2: φ ∧ χ → χ
- AND-3: φ → (χ → (φ ∧ χ))
- OR-1: φ → φ ∨ χ
- OR-2: χ → φ ∨ χ
- OR-3: (φ → ψ) → ((χ → ψ) → (φ ∨ χ → ψ))
- NOT-1: (φ → χ) → ((φ → ¬χ) → ¬ φ)
- NOT-2: φ → (¬φ → χ)
To make this a system of first-order predicate logic, the rule of
generalization is added, along with the axioms:
- PRED-1: (∀x Z(x)) → Z(t)
- PRED-2: Z(t) → (∃x Z(x))
- PRED-3: (∀x (W → Z(x))) → (W → ∀x Z(x))
- PRED-4: (∀x (Z(x) → W)) → (∃x Z(x) → W)
Interdefinability of operators
In classical propositional logic, it is possible to take one of conjunction,
disjunction, or implication as
primitive, and define the other two in terms of it together with negation, such as in
Łukasiewicz's three axioms of propositional
logic. It is even possible to define all four in terms of a sole sufficient
operator such as the Peirce arrow (NOR) or Sheffer
stroke (NAND). Similarly, in classical first-order logic, one of the quantifiers can be defined in terms of the other and
negation.
These are fundamentally consequences of the law of bivalence, which makes all
such connectives merely boolean functions. The law of bivalence does not hold in
intuitionistic logic, only the law of non-contradiction. As a result none of the
connectives can be dispensed with, and the above axioms are all necessary. Most of the classical identities are only theorems of
inuitionistic logic in one direction, although some are theorems in both directions. They are as follows:
Conjunction versus disjunction:
Conjunction versus implication:
Disjunction versus implication:
Universal versus existential quantification:
So, for example, "a or b" is a stronger statement than "if not a, then b", whereas these are classicaly interchangeable. On
the other hand, "neither a nor b" is equivalent to "not a, and also not b".
Sequent calculus
-
Main article: sequent calculus
Gentzen discovered that a simple restriction of his system LK (his sequent calculus
for classical logic) results in a system which is sound and complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. He called this system
LJ.
Semantics
The semantics are rather more complicated than for the classical case. A model theory can be given by Heyting algebras or, equivalently, by Kripke semantics.
Heyting algebra semantics
In classical logic, we often discuss the truth values that a formula can take. The
values are usually chosen as the members of a Boolean algebra. The meet and
join operations in the Boolean algebra are identified with the ∧ and ∨ logical connectives, so that the value of a formula of the
form A ∧ B is the meet of the value of A and the value of B in the Boolean algebra. Then we have the
useful theorem that a formula is a valid sentence of classical logic if and only if its value is 1 for every valuation---that is, for any assignment of values to its variables.
A corresponding theorem is true for intuitionistic logic, but instead of assigning each formula a value from a Boolean
algebra, one uses values from a Heyting algebra, of which Boolean algebras are a special
case. A formula is valid in intuitionistic logic if and only if it receives the value of the top element for any valuation on any
Heyting algebra.
It can be shown that to recognize valid formulas, it is sufficient to consider a single Heyting algebra whose elements are the
open sets of the real plane R². In this algebra, the ∧ and ∨ operations correspond to set intersection and union, and the
value assigned to a formula A→B is (AC ∪ B)o, the interior of the union of the value of B and the complement of the value of A. The bottom element ø is the empty set, and the top element
is the entire plane R². Negation is as usual defined as ¬A = A→ø, so the value of ¬A reduces to
ACo, the interior of the complement of the value of A. With these assignments,
intuitionistically valid formulas are precisely those that are assigned the value of the entire plane.
For example, the formula ¬(A ∧ ¬A) is valid, because no matter what set X is chosen as the value of the
formula A, the value of ¬(A ∧ ¬A) can be shown to be the entire plane:
- Value(¬(A ∧ ¬A)) =
- (Value(A ∧ ¬A))Co =
- (Value(A) ∩ Value(¬A))Co =
- (X ∩ (Value(A))Co)Co =
- (X ∩ XCo)Co
A theorem of topology tells us that XCo is a subset of
XC, so the intersection is empty, leaving:
- øCo = (R2)o = R2
So the valuation of this formula is true, and indeed the formula is valid.
But the law of the excluded middle, A∨¬A, can be shown to be invalid by letting the value of A be
{y : y > 0 }. Then the value of ¬A is the interior of {y : y ≤ 0 }, which is
{y : y < 0 }, and the value of the formula is the union of {y : y > 0 } and
{y : y < 0 }, which is {y : y ≠ 0 }, not the entire plane.
The infinite Heyting algebra described above gives a true valuation to all intuitionistically valid formulas, regardless of
what values are assigned to the variables in a formula. Conversely, for every invalid formula, there is an assignment of values
from this algebra to the variables that yields a false valuation for the formula. It can be shown that no finite Heyting algebra
has this property.
Kripke semantics
-
Building upon his work on semantics of modal logic, Saul
Kripke created another semantics for intuitionistic logic, known as Kripke semantics or relational semantics
[1].
See also
Notes
- ^ Intuitionistic
Logic. Written by Joan Moschovakis.
Published in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
References
- Van Dalen, Dirk, 2001, "Intuitionistic Logic," in Goble, Lou, ed., The Blackwell Guide to
Philosophical Logic. Blackwell.
- Morten H. Sørensen, Pawel Urzyczyn, 2006, Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomorphism (chapter 2: "Intuitionistic
Logic"). Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics vol. 149, Elsevier.
External links
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