The iron law of oligarchy is a political theory, first developed by the German
syndicalist sociologist Robert Michels in his 1911 book, Political
Parties. It states that all forms of organization, regardless of how
democratic or autocratic they may be at the start, will
eventually and inevitably develop into oligarchies. The reasons for this are the technical
indispensability of leadership, the tendency of the leaders to organize themselves and to consolidate their interests; the
gratitude of the led towards the leaders, and the general immobility and passivity of the masses.
History
Robert Michels was disturbed to find that, paradoxically, the socialist parties of Europe, despite their
democratic ideology and provisions for mass participation,
seemed to be dominated by their leaders, just like the traditional conservative
parties.
Studying political parties, he concluded that the problem lay in the very nature of
organizations. Modern democracy allowed the formation of organizations such as political
parties, but as such organizations grew in complexity, they paradoxically became less and less democratic. Michels formulated the
"Iron Law of Oligarchy": "Who says organization, says oligarchy."[1][2]
At the time Michels formulated his Law, he was an anarcho-syndicalist.[2] He later became an important ideologue of
Mussolini's fascist regime in Italy.
The reasons
Michels stressed several factors that underlie the "Iron Law of Oligarchy." Leach summarized them briefly as: "Bureaucracy
happens. If bureaucracy happens, power rises. Power corrupts."[2]
Any large organization, Michels pointed out, is faced with problems of coordination that can be solved only by creating a
bureaucracy. A bureaucracy, by design, is hierarchically organized to achieve
efficiency — many decisions have to be made daily that cannot efficiently be made by
large numbers of people. The effective functioning of an organization therefore requires the concentration of much power in the
hands of a few. Those few, in turn - the oligarchy - will then use all means necessary to preserve and further increase their
power.[2][1]
This process is further compounded as delegation is necessary in any large organization,
as thousands - sometimes even hundreds of thousands - of members cannot make decisions using participatory democracy; this has been dictated by the lack of technological means that would allow large number of people to meet and debate, and also the issues related
to the crowd psychology as Michels argued people feel the need to be led. The
delegation however leads to specialization: the development of bases of knowledge,
skills, and resources among a leadership, which further serves to alienate the leadership from the 'mass and rank' and entrenches
the leadership in office.
Bureaucratization and specialization are the
driving processes behind the Law. These create a specialized group of administrators in a hierarchical organization. Which, in turn, leads to the rationalization and routinization of
authority and decision-making, a process first and
perhaps best described by Max Weber, and to a lesser and more cynical extent, by the
Peter Principle.
The organizational characteristics that promote oligarchy are reinforced by certain characteristics of both leaders and
members of organizations. People achieve leadership positions precisely because they have
unusual political skill; they are adept at getting their way and persuading others of the correctness of their views (see
charismatic authority). Once they hold high office, their power and prestige is
further increased. Leaders have access to, and control over, information and facilities that are not available to the
rank-and-file. They control the information that flows down the channels of communication. Leaders are also strongly motivated to
persuade the organization of the rightness of their views, and they use all of their skills, power and authority to do
so.[1]
By design of the organization, rank and file are less informed than their "superiors." Finally, from birth, people are taught
to obey those in positions of authority. Therefore the rank and file tend to look to leaders for policy directives and are
generally prepared to allow leaders to exercise their judgment on most matters.
Leaders also have control over very powerful negative and positive sanctions to promote the behavior that they desire. They
have the power to grant or deny raises, assign workloads, fire, demote and — that most gratifying of all sanctions — the power to
promote. Most important, they tend to promote junior officials who share their opinions, with the result that the oligarchy
becomes self-perpetuating. Therefore the very nature of large-scale organization makes oligarchy within these organizations
inevitable. Bureaucracy, by design, promotes the centralization of power in the hands of those at the top of the
organization.[1]
The consequences
The "iron law of oligarchy" states that all forms of organization, regardless of how
democratic or autocratic they may be at the start, will
eventually and inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies, thus making true democracy practically and theoretically impossible, especially in large groups and complex organizations. The
relative structural fluidity in a small-scale democracy succumbs to "social viscosity" in a large-scale organization. According to the "iron law," democracy and large-scale
organization are incompatible.
Examples and exceptions
An example that Michels used in his book was Germany's Social Democratic Party.[2]
The size and complexity of a group or organization is important to the Iron Law as well. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Green Party of
Germany made a conscious effort to try and break the Iron Law.[1] Anyone could be or
could remove a party official. There were no permanent offices or officers. Even the smallest, most routine decisions could be
put up for discussion and to a vote. When the party was small, these anti-oligarchic measures enjoyed some success. But as the
organization grew larger and the party became more successful, the need to effectively compete in elections, raise funds, run large rallies and demonstrations
and work with other political parties once elected, led the Greens to adapt more conventional structures and practices.
One of the most known exceptions to the iron law of oligarchy was the now defunct International Typographical Union, described by Seymour Martin Lipset in his 1956 book, Union
Democracy.[3]
Criticism
Critics have challenged iron law and its underlying assumptions. Orthodox Marxists dispute
whether increasing bureaucracy means increased power for the bureaucrats. Others questioned whether power 'corrupts' and
leadership becomes unaccountable to the masses. Others in turn claimed that small organizations with little bureaucracy should be
able to avoid the iron law, which Michels claimed is unavoidable for all organizations.[2]
References
- Robert Michels und das eherne Gesetz der Oligarchie by Gustav Wagner in "Wer wählt, hat seine Stimme abgegeben"
Graswurzel Revolution pp. 28
Further reading
- Michels, Robert. 1915. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy.
Translated into English by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. New York:
The Free Press. From the 1911 German source.
External links
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