King of Prussia Frederick II 'the Great'

Frederick II ‘the Great’, King of Prussia (1713-86). The career of Frederick ‘the Great’ defies a simple appreciation, despite the attempts of Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany to appropriate his memory as a national icon. He was a cultured aesthete who loved music, architecture, and philosophy, even corresponding at length with Voltaire. Yet at the same time he was also a brutal and cynical warmonger, who dragged his kingdom through series of wars that emptied his treasury and killed a large portion of his subjects. Even his reputation as a military genius is open to question. Certainly, he won some startling victories and hung on to his conquests against the odds, but nevertheless his military system merely perfected the accepted view of the art of war, as understood by many of his contemporaries. Furthermore, when Frederick lost a battle, he tended to lose bloodily, and his record contains as many disasters as triumphs. Perhaps it is this very drama that provides the attraction that continues to fascinate military historians.

Frederick's tutelage was at the boorish armed camp of his father Frederick William's court. He inherited an efficient army and a well-organized state on his accession in 1740 and resolved to win his spurs by an unprovoked attack on Austrian-held Silesia (thus initiating the War of the Austrian Succession), surmising that the new Empress Maria Theresa would be too weak and unsure of her position to lead a convincing resistance to his naked ambition. He met the Austrian army at Mollwitz where his infantry performed sterling service but Frederick himself fled at the head of his nervy cavalry. Thereafter his performance earned him more credit, and at Chotusitz in 1742, the chagrined Prussian cavalry restored their reputation by shattering the Austrian lines in a headlong charge. During these battles Frederick displayed little, if any, military skill and was rescued by the training and bravery of his troops and the skill of his generals.

He made peace with the Treaty of Breslau in 1742 and abandoned his allies, the French, to their own devices. By 1744 the Austrians were resurgent, and it looked as if they would invade Silesia, therefore Frederick launched the second Silesian war that was destined to last until 1745. He had rebuilt his army, which now stood at 140, 000 strong, and with it he invaded Bohemia. Soon isolated and nearly surrounded by strong Austrian forces, he was obliged to undertake an arduous retreat that cost him 17, 000 deserters alone. Prince Charles of Lorraine moved to invade Silesia in 1745, and was drawn down into the plains around Hohenfriedburg, where Frederick's army managed to combine infantry and cavalry in a devastating series of feints and assaults resulting in total defeat for the Austrians, and inflicting 13, 000 casualties on them. Once more, Frederick swooped on Bohemia, but was forced to retire yet again, facing Charles of Lorraine in a strongly defended position at Soor. On 30 September 1745 Frederick rapidly assaulted the Austrian left and fought his way back into Silesia. The Austrians then attacked through Saxony, but were repulsed at Hennersdorf and Gorlitz. The final nail in the coffin was Dessau's rout of the Austrians and Saxons at Kesselsdorf on 15 December 1745. The Austrians were staggered by this series of defeats, and swiftly sought terms. A treaty was duly signed at Dresden on 25 December and based on these experiences he wrote the General Principles Of War in 1748.

Prussia's victory seemed complete: Frederick had secured important new territories, revenue, and population by force of arms. However, his nature as a cynical pragmatist who would abandon an ally at the drop of a tricorne was exposed. His plans were to come unravelled as Austria sought a rapprochement with France, and it was soon clear that the ensuing ‘Diplomatic Revolution’ would leave him dangerously exposed, especially if, as seemed likely, Russia turned hostile. Frederick faced the possibility of war on every front and prepared accordingly, increasing his army to 154, 000 strong. In a pre-emptive strike in August 1756 he attacked Saxony, as the weak link in the alliance against him, without warning, thus unleashing the agony of the Seven Years War. The Saxons dug in, and Frederick was checked until the winter, even though he had beaten Browne's Austrians at Lobositz that October. An invasion of Bohemia the following spring opened with an assault outside Prague on 6 May 1757, but the Austrians had learned some important lessons from the second Silesian war, and managed to inflict some 13, 000 casualties on the victorious Prussians, which Frederick could ill afford.

The formidable Austrian Gen Daun marched quickly to the relief of Prague, facing Frederick at Kolin on 18 June. Frederick opened with his traditional echelon attack, but the whitecoats stood firm and beat him off, inflicting another 12, 000 casualties on Frederick's army. This wastage of manpower could not go on. Prussia was a relatively small kingdom compared to Austria, France, and Russia, and was in danger of bleeding to death. To add to his troubles, while he was in Bohemia his capital Berlin was sacked by the enemy. It was then that Frederick embarked upon the campaign that put him among the great captains. He marched west and crushed a Franco-Imperial army under Soubise at Rossbach in November, then promptly turned about and shattered the Austrians at Leuthen in December 1757. This pair of stunning victories secured his borders for the time being, and established his reputation as a master at the use of internal lines.

However, his enemies were not ready to give up, and the Russians fought Frederick's army to a bloody standstill at Zorndorf on 25 August 1758. Later that year in October the Austrians under Daun surrounded Frederick's camp at Hochkirch, obliging him to fight his way out for the loss of 9, 500 men and most of his artillery. True native-born Prussians, Brandenburgers, and Pomeranians were now at a premium in Prussian service, and Frederick was increasingly forced to rely on foreign recruits, often forcibly impressed and very harshly treated, who proved unequal to the ambitious tactical designs, and the desperate defensive countermarching of their draconian master.

Eventually the Russians managed to combine their forces with the Austrians, and at Kunersdorf in August 1759, Frederick had to face their combined armies, strongly entrenched with plenty of powerful artillery and commanded by the Russian general Sultykov. The Prussians were cut down almost to a man and by nightfall only 3, 000 had escaped out of an army of over 50, 000. It was a disaster of the first order, but Daun was still wary of the ever-aggressive Frederick, with reason. A year later at Leignitz the Prussians smashed aside the Austrians before they could once again link up with the Russians and in November Frederick beat Daun again at Torgau. But Frederick's victories were becoming ever more costly: at Torgau he lost 13, 000 to the Austrians' 11, 000, and was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel when in January 1762 the Russians withdrew on the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth, which saved Frederick from almost certain ruin.

There remained the indecisive Potato War of 1778-9, so named because the soldiery spent more time scrabbling around for food than fighting. Frederick had retained Silesia, but at a cost which argues that he made war simply because he liked it. His later years were spent rebuilding his ravaged kingdom and army, and the latter became the exemplar of what ferocious drill and discipline could achieve. Its failings were to be pitilessly shown up at Jena/Auerstadt by a very much greater commander. It has been argued that Frederick's legacy of militarism infected first the Prussian and then the German character, but this is to overlook that Prussia had been a frontier state for centuries. The fighting power of the Prussians was nothing new; Frederick simply gave it a new focus.

Bibliography

• Duffy, Christopher, Frederick the Great: A Military Life (London, 1985).
• Nosworthy, Brent, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763 (New York, 1993).
• Showalter, Denis E., The Wars of Frederick the Great (Harlow, 1996)

— Toby McLeod