liberty

(lĭb'ər-tē)
n., pl., -ties.

1. 1. The condition of being free from restriction or control.
   2. The right and power to act, believe, or express oneself in a manner of one's own choosing.
   3. The condition of being physically and legally free from confinement, servitude, or forced labor. See synonyms at freedom.
2. Freedom from unjust or undue governmental control.
3. A right or immunity to engage in certain actions without control or interference: the liberties protected by the Bill of Rights.
4. 1. A breach or overstepping of propriety or social convention. Often used in the plural.
   2. A statement, attitude, or action not warranted by conditions or actualities: a historical novel that takes liberties with chronology.
   3. An unwarranted risk; a chance: took foolish liberties on the ski slopes.
5. A period, usually short, during which a sailor is authorized to go ashore.

idiom:

at liberty

1. Not in confinement or under constraint; free.
2. Not employed, occupied, or in use.

[Middle English liberte, from Old French, from Latin lībertās, from līber, free.]

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noun

1. The state of not being in confinement or servitude: emancipation, freedom, liberation, manumission. See free/unfree.
2. The condition of being politically free: autonomy, freedom, independence, independency, self-government, sovereignty. See dependence/independence, free/unfree.
3. Departure from normal rules or procedures: freedom, license. See restraint/unrestraint.

n

Definition: freedom
Antonyms: arrest, constraint, imprisonment, incarceration, restraint, slavery

n. shore leave granted to a sailor.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

While the protection of the liberties of the subject is one of the main aims (and boasts) of almost all constitutions, there is less consensus about what those liberties include, or when liberty (good) becomes licence (bad). The problem is to define a class of actions that lie outside the proper jurisdiction of law, i.e. those which one has a right to perform (see privacy (social), rights). The value of liberty is dependent upon that of rational self-legislation, or autonomy, in the Kantian tradition, and dependent upon the nature of the social context rather than on individual rights in collectivist political philosophies.

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While it possessed important connotations in philosophical and theological discourses, the term liberty (and its frequent cognate, freedom) conveyed primarily social and political overtones in early modern Europe. Liberty formed a central organizing principle around which myriad transformations of communal life occurred, culminating in the program of the French Revolutionaries, who placed the demand for civil and legal freedom at the forefront of their movement.

Early modern Europe inherited several different ideas of liberty that were revised, refined, and sometimes rejected entirely. The ancient republicans of Rome prized liberty as a collective good, which betokened both freedom from foreign domination and the absence of internal oppression in the form of a king. Liberty was thus connected with civic self-rule of a populist (if not quite popular) character. This republican ideal was widely disseminated among, and often endorsed by, early modern thinkers.

Christianity contributed the doctrines of freedom of the will and evangelical liberty that added a personal dimension to human freedom. Created in God's image, humanity possessed a capacity to choose between good and evil and hence to accept or to turn away from the divine will. Of course, the objects between which one chooses are not of equal worth. Rejecting God by preferring one's own desires yields dissatisfaction and unhappiness in one's earthly life as well as the misery of eternal damnation. By contrast, submitting to God properly expresses one's divinely granted freedom; it is the correct use of the will with which human begins have been endowed. At the same time, the possibility of freely renouncing self-will in favor of embracing God's law—in sum, a conversional experience—remains always open up to the very moment of one's death.

Finally, medieval Europe added a legal dimension to liberty that, in a sense, synthesized the public and the private meanings conveyed by republicanism and Christianity respectively. Under the terms of feudal law, the person designated to hold a prerogative or privilege (such as the ability to exercise forms of justice or to collect certain types of revenues) was said to possess "a liberty." Feudal liberty, in this sense, was an exclusive, independent, and nonusurpable right to the application of power over people and property, granted under fixed conditions from a superior who was deemed to be its ultimate source and guarantor. In short, liberty reflected a sphere of authority within which no one could directly intercede or interfere with the exercise of specified rights. Yet it was not wholly private. The possessor of a liberty could protect it from erosion by appeal for assistance to the lord who granted it. Someone who claimed a liberty could also be charged with its misapplication by those subjected to it, and could even be challenged to demonstrate the warrant on the basis of which it was exercised.

Religion

Although these inherited concepts of liberty continued to circulate in early modern Europe, the language of freedom proliferated and diversified in the context of the vast cultural changes that marked the period. Crucial to this development was religion. The Reformation brought not only a challenge in practice to the unity of the Christian Church, but also transformation of important theological categories. Martin Luther (1483–1546) insisted upon the unique presence of God alone in the conscience of believers, with the implication that the faithful Christian is responsible directly and immediately to God. The consequence of this teaching—while perhaps recognized only fleetingly by Luther and his followers—was that salvation did not depend upon submission to the authority of the priesthood or the church. Nor did it fall to the secular power, to whom pertained the control of bodies and behavior, to discipline the souls of subjects. Thus, whether intentionally or not, Luther opened the door to claims of public respect for "liberty of conscience," and eventually freedom of worship.

In the generation after Luther, inferences about freedom of religion were drawn out by reforming thinkers. Sébastien Castellion (1515–1563) published pseudonymously a treatise entitled De Haereticis, an sint Persequendi (1554), in response to John Calvin's (1509–1564) organization of the burning of a fellow Christian theologian for heresy at Geneva. Castellion argued that coercion is an inappropriate tool for effecting a change of religious views since Christian belief must be held with sincere conviction. Hence, clerics and magistrates must refrain from persecution of convinced Christians who cling to doctrines that do not coincide with official teachings. While Castellion does not go so far as to license broad dissemination of heterodox theology, he maintains that a Christian's duties extend to forbearance of the free and honest faith of his fellows even in the face of disagreements of understanding and interpretation.

In the seventeenth century, the theme of religious liberty became more pronounced. For instance, the Levellers in England during the 1640s made freedom to dissent from the established religion a central plank of their political program. Major figures in European philosophy weighed in on the side of freedom of religion. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) claimed a broad application for a right to liberty of thought and belief without inference from a sovereign power's (or a church's) determination of the truth or falsity of one's ideas. Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) boldly asserted that all forms of persecution (innocuous as well as harsh) of religious diversity encouraged hypocrisy and eroded social order. An erring conscience, if it be held in good faith, deserves as much protection as a correct one—a principle that Bayle extended even to atheists. John Locke (1632–1704) was unwilling to include atheism and other religious attitudes that he deemed dangerous to social trust and political obedience, but he, too, proposed liberty of conscience as justified in the case of most Christian (and perhaps some non-Christian) rites. The role of the magistrate, according to Locke, should be confined to the maintenance of public tranquillity and the defense of individual rights, rather than the care of the soul.

Pragmatic as well as principled considerations led to the acceptance of some measure of freedom of religion throughout much of Europe over the course of the early modern period. Wars of religion undermined peace and sapped public enthusiasm for persecution. The free practice of differing confessions (usually limited to Christianity, and sometimes only to reformed Christianity) became an enshrined feature of many European states by the late eighteenth century. Where this did not occur (with certain exceptions, such as in Spain and parts of the Italian peninsula), it posed a continuing source of conflict into later times, as Johannes Althusius (1557–1638) predicted it would in his Politica Methodice Digesta (1603; 3rd ed., 1614). Thus, freedom of religion constituted one of the main changes sought in France during the Revolution, as expressed in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen."

Republicanism and Liberalism

The evolving acceptance of liberty of confession paralleled changes in other European cultural, social, and political practices and attitudes. The invention of the printing press and movable type immeasurably enhanced the ability of individuals to disseminate their ideas and for a larger public to have access to the written word. Demands were heard for freedom of the press (literally and figuratively) from censorship by clerical and secular authorities alike.

Of course, the tradition of republican liberty, inspired by the Romans, had not disappeared from the intellectual landscape. From Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) and the more conventional humanists of Renaissance Italy through the thinkers and practitioners of Dutch republicanism like Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) to advocates of republican rule in England such as James Harrington (1611–1677) and Algernon Sidney (1623–1683), the praise of liberty as a distinctive feature of republican government was voiced. In the cities of Italy and of Holland, commercial vitality and strong civic loyalty, not to mention considerations of scale, rendered collective self-government a feasible option. Political practice could approach, even if never quite attain, the heights of theory.

In larger territorial states, such communally based republican liberty resonated less clearly. Indeed, republicans who spoke of their version of liberty too loudly found themselves at odds with authorities, hence Sidney's execution in England for espousal of and action upon his republican proclivities. Political liberty in more geographically extensive regimes with monarchic institutions tended to be conceived in terms of individual freedom rather than civic populism. Hence, it is at this time and place that we locate the origins of the doctrines that came to be labeled liberalism.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is generally identified as the most important direct antecedent of the modern individualist theory of liberty. In his Leviathan (1651), Hobbes ascribes to all human beings natural liberty (as well as equality) on the basis of which they are licensed to undertake whatever actions are necessary in order to preserve themselves from their fellow creatures. Hobbes believed that the exercise of such natural liberty logically leads to unceasing conflict and unremitting fear, so long as no single sovereign ruler exists to maintain peace. The exchange of chaotic natural freedom for government-imposed order requires renunciation of all freedoms that humans possess by nature (except, of course, for the sake of self-preservation itself) and voluntary submission to any dictate imposed by the sovereign. Yet, even under the terms of Hobbes's absolute sovereignty, the subject is deemed to remain at liberty to choose for himself concerning any and all matters about which the ruler has not explicitly legislated.

Locke begins his mature political theory in the Second Treatise of Government (1690) with the postulation of the divinely granted liberty of all individuals, understood in terms of the absolute right to preserve one's life and to claim the goods one requires for survival. Arguing against the patriarchal doctrine of Sir Robert Filmer (1588–1653), Locke insists that no natural basis—neither paternity nor descent—justifies the submission of one man to another. In contrast with Hobbes, Locke maintains that the condition of liberty does not represent a state of war, but instead can be maintained tranquilly because human beings are deemed sufficiently rational that they can and do generally constrain their free action under the terms of the laws of nature. Hence, should people choose to enter into formal bonds of civil society and to authorize a government in order to avoid the "inconveniences" and inefficiency of the precivil world, the only rulership worthy of consent is that which strictly upholds and protects the liberty possessed by nature. According to Locke, any government that systematically denies to its subjects the exercise of their God-given liberty (as Hobbes's sovereign would do) is tyrannical and cannot expect obedience.

While Hobbesian and Lockean lines of thought persisted into the eighteenth century alongside republican doctrines, occasional attempts were made to transcend, or at any rate to synthesize, the lessons of republicanism and nascent liberalism concerning liberty. The writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) afford an illustration of this. On the one hand, Rousseau held that Hobbes and Locke each captured an important facet of human liberty. Hobbes realized that the only way to create a truly sovereign authority—one capable of commanding the obedience of those subject to it—was the renunciation of all the liberty that one enjoyed by nature. Locke recognized that the sole reason any free person would consent to enter into a formalized social arrangement would be to protect his liberty. Hence, Rousseau concludes, the surrender of one's natural liberty must be matched by the return to each person of an amount of civil liberty (which he terms "moral liberty") that is greater than what has been given up. In other words, in a properly organized political system, every citizen enjoys more freedom than if he had remained in a precivil condition with his natural liberty intact.

From this marriage of Hobbesian and Lockean conceptions of liberty issues a set of republican conclusions. For Rousseau, sovereignty cannot be exercised by any authority external to the body of citizens whose liberty is at stake. Hence, no matter what constitutional form of government is appointed—and he contends that kingship, aristocracy, and democracy may each be appropriate, depending on the scale of the territory to be governed—it remains only the executive of the general will of the community. Freedom reposes strictly and exclusively in the communal order in which the moral liberty of each person assumes the equal moral liberty of every person, guaranteed under the terms of the law and protected by the magistrates. Hence, Rousseau's free state is guided by the collective determinations of the people about how they wish to live—a clear statement of a system of popular sovereignty.

Natural Liberty

The concept of natural liberty is also one that came to the fore in the economic doctrines of the eighteenth century. Adam Smith (1723–1790) founded his principal doctrines upon the notion of natural liberty, by which he meant simply that if every person acts freely as he sees fit in his own interests, then the welfare of the whole society will be served best. For Smith, the system of natural liberty constitutes a sort of automatic or homeostatic mechanism of self-adjustment (which he sometimes calls the "invisible hand"), so that any attempt (on the part of government or some other agent) to interfere in its operation will lead to greater inefficiency and hence less total welfare. The sources for Smith's insight about maximized individual liberty, unconstrained by coercive externalities, have been debated. Certainly, the French economic theorists known collectively as the Physiocrats may have played a role in the formulation of this idea, as may have the political theorists whose views have already been surveyed. Smith applied this discovery, however, not only to the operation of the marketplace but to all aspects of society, including its educational, religious, and judicial institutions. He narrowly confines the role of government to those functions consistent with natural liberty: foreign defense, regulation of criminal activity, and provision of "public goods" too expensive for any single segment of the private economy to undertake.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the concept of liberty had pervaded the religious, social, political, cultural, and economic dimensions of European life. Yet it remained a controversial idea for (and against) which people would continue to fight and die. Moreover, the application of principles of freedom remained in many ways incomplete. Slavery had been by no means entirely eradicated from the regions over which European nations exercised control, even if it was largely passé within Europe itself. Women occupied almost exactly the same social, political, and economic position in 1789 as in 1450, and the extent of their personal and group liberty was largely determined by their class status. Despite occasional agitation for universal manhood suffrage, such as occurred during the earliest stages of the English Civil War, the unpropertied also experienced little improvement in their effective freedom between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries. Finally, the diffusion of ideas and practices of religious liberty was limited almost entirely to Christian sects, although deists and advocates of natural religion seem generally to have been left alone; freedom to worship occupied a far more precarious position for Jews and members of other non-Christian confessions (for example, Turks) who made their way to Europe.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis, 1994.

Locke, John. A Letter concerning Toleration, in Focus. Edited by John P. Horton and Susan Mendus. London, 1991.

——. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge, U.K., 1988.

Luther, Martin, and John Calvin. Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority. Edited and translated by Harro Höpfl. Cambridge, U.K., 1991.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Basic Political Writings. Edited and translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis, 1987.

Secondary Sources

Davis, R. W. The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West. Stanford, 1995.

Fitzgibbons, Athol. Adam Smith's System of Liberty, Wealth, and Virtue: The Moral and Political Foundations of The Wealth of Nations. Oxford, 1995.

Laursen, John Christian, and Cary J. Nederman, eds. Beyond the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration before the Enlightenment. Philadelphia, 1998.

Pelczynski, Zbigniew A., and John Gray, eds. Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy. London, 1984.

Skinner, Quentin. Visions of Politics. 3 vols. Cambridge, U.K., 2002.

Van Gelderen, Martin, and Quentin Skinner, eds. Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage. 2 vols. Cambridge, U.K., 2002

—CARY J. NEDERMAN

This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.

Liberty is the concept that forms the core of all democratic principles. Yet, as a legal concept, it defies clear definition.

The modern conception of liberty as implying certain fundamental or basic rights dates back to the writings of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theorists such as Francis Hutcheson and John Locke. Hutcheson believed that all people are equal and possess certain basic rights that are conferred by natural law. Locke postulated that humans are born with an innate tendency to be reasonable and tolerant. He also believed that all individuals are entitled to liberty under the natural law that governed them before they formed societies. Locke's concept of natural law required that no one should interfere with another's life, health, liberty, or possessions. According to Locke, governments are necessary only to protect those who live within the laws of nature from those who do not. For this reason he believed that the power of government and the rule of the majority must be kept in check, and that they are best controlled by protecting and preserving individual liberties. Locke's philosophies gave rise to the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances that are the basis of U.S. government.

Limitless freedom is untenable in a peaceful and orderly society. Yet, the founders of the United States were concerned that individual liberty interests be adequately protected. Echoing Locke's natural-law theory, the Declaration of Independence states that all people have inalienable rights, including the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Similarly, the preamble to the Constitution outlines the Framers' intent to establish a government structure that ensures liberty from oppression. It reads, in part, "We the People … in Order to … secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. …" The Bill of Rights sets forth a number of specific protections of individual liberties.

Through these documents U.S. citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude. Criminal law and procedure require that a person may not be detained unlawfully and that a person accused of a crime is entitled to reasonable bail and a speedy trial. The right to be free from unlawful detention has been interpreted to mean not only that the government may not deprive a person of liberty without due process of law, but also that a citizen has a right "to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his living by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or vocation" (Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832 [1897]). State governments may not regulate individual freedom except for a legitimate public purpose and only by means that are rationally designed to achieve that purpose (seeNebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 [1934]).

The liberties guaranteed to individuals are not granted without restriction. Throughout history the Supreme Court has held that individual freedom may be restricted when necessary to advance a compelling government interest, such as public safety, national security, or the protection of the rights of others. Countless cases have litigated the parameters of justifiable government restriction. In one such case, Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983), the Court found that the content of a message delivered in a public forum may be restricted if the restriction serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Restrictions on speech in a public forum may also be upheld if the expressive activity being regulated is a type that is not entitled to full First Amendment protection, such as obscenity. If a restriction on speech deals only with the time, place, and manner of the activity, it need only serve a significant government interest and allow ample alternative channels of communication (see Perry). In that instance the law does not need to be the least restrictive alternative; it is necessary only that the government's interest would be achieved less effectively without it and the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the interest (Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 [1989]).

The Court has held that the government may infringe on a person's freedom of association by punishing membership in an organization that advocates illegal conduct if the defendant had knowledge of the group's illegal objectives and had specific intent to further them (see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S. Ct. 1469, 6 L. Ed. 2d 782 [1961]; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 81 S. Ct. 1517, 6 L. Ed. 2d 836 [1961]).

The Court has also determined that when competing liberty interests clash, the majority may not necessarily impose its belief on the minority. In School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1963), the Court held that the freedom to exercise one's religion does not extend to prayer sessions in public schools, even if the proposed prayer is nondenominational and favored by the majority. Justice Tom C. Clark, writing for the majority, emphasized that the freedom to exercise one's religion ends when it infringes on another's right to be free from state-imposed religious practices. He wrote, "While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs." The Court reaffirmed its holding that the free exercise clause does not allow the majority to impose its beliefs on the minority in Wallace v. Joffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1985).

The Court has engendered bitter and sustained controversy with its defense of privacy rights in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), which found a constitutional right to privacy that included the right to obtain anabortion. Critics of such decisions contend that such liberties are not enumerated in the Constitution and that the Court should uphold only rights found in the Constitution. But the Court has consistently held that the liberties enumerated in the Constitution are a continuum that, in the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan, "includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints … and which also recognizes … that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgement" (Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989 [1961]).

The Court justifies its findings of liberty rights that are not enumerated in the Constitution by stating that some rights are basic and fundamental, and that the government has a duty to protect those rights. It has held that the Constitution outlines a "realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter." As an example it notes that marriage is not mentioned in the Bill of Rights and that interracial marriage was illegal in many places during the nineteenth century, but that the Court has rightly found these activities to be within the liberty interests guaranteed by the Constitution.

The Court has repeatedly held that individual liberties must be protected no matter how repugnant some find the activity or individual involved. For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 28 674 (1992), the Court stated, "Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943), the Court invalidated a law mandating that all students salute the flag, and in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989), it invalidated a law prohibiting burning of the flag. In all of these cases, the Court emphasized that individuals may disagree about whether the activity is morally acceptable, but the liberty inherent in the activity may not be proscribed even if a majority of the populace thinks that it should be.

Justice Louis D. Brandeis summarized the Court's general wariness of government intrusion into liberty interests, in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927): "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free." The Court will continue to grapple with the extent to which organized society may restrict individual liberty without violating that mandate.

See: Abington School District v. Schempp; Constitution of the United States; Criminal Procedure; Freedom of Speech; Freedom of the Press; Roe v. Wade.

A cynical view of the world by Ambrose Bierce

n.

One of Imagination's most precious possessions.

    The rising People, hot and out of breath,
    Roared around the palace:  "Liberty or death!"
    "If death will do," the King said, "let me reign;
    You'll have, I'm sure, no reason to complain."
                                                      Martha Braymance

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IN BRIEF: Freedom or independence. Also: The power to do what one pleases.

Knowledge is the only fountain both of the love and the principles of human liberty. — Daniel Webster (1782-1852)

LearnThatWord.com is a free vocabulary and spelling program where you only pay for results!

sign description: Both L-hands begin crossed on the chest and move outward and away from the body.

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Quotes:

"There can be no liberty that isn't earned." - Robert R. Young

"No nation ancient or modern ever lost the liberty of freely speaking, writing, or publishing their sentiments, but forthwith lost their liberty in general and became slaves." - John P. Zenger

"If liberty has any meaning it means freedom to improve." - Philip Wylie

"Liberty has never come from government. Liberty has always come from the subjects of it. The history of liberty is a history of resistance. The history of liberty is a history of limitations of governmental power, not the increase of it." - Woodrow T. Wilson

"The shallow consider liberty a release from all law, from every constraint. The wise man sees in it, on the contrary, the potent Law of Laws." - Walt Whitman

"When liberty comes with hands dabbled in blood it is hard to shake hands with her." - Oscar Wilde

See more famous quotes about Liberty

Since the founding of America, perhaps the most fundamental ideal expressed has been that of liberty. It is found in all of the early documents of this country: The Declaration of Independence outlined “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” as the three inalienable rights of the people of this country, and the Bill of Rights was created to preserve individual liberties. Because the concept of democracy recognizes a fundamental worth of the individual, liberties are the personal freedoms to which we are entitled as human beings. Personal freedom also means freedom from government control, and all democratic governments minimize the role that government plays in lives of its people.

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For a list of words related to liberty, see:

• Philosophies, Principles, and Parties - liberty: freedom to exercise various rights, esp. choice of one’s government and individual freedoms
• Vacations and Interludes - liberty: brief, authorized absence, esp. from naval duty

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See words rhyming with "liberty."

  See crossword solutions for the clue Liberty.

This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have been reviewed by professional editors (see full disclaimer)

Dansk (Danish)
n. - frihed, landlov

idioms:

• at liberty    fri, ledig, ikke optaget, på fri fod, frigive, sætte på fri fod
• liberty of the subject    personlig frihed
• take liberties    være så fri at
• take liberties with    tage sig friheder overfor
• take the liberty of    tage sig den frihed at

Nederlands (Dutch)
vrijheid, verlof, privilege, rechtsgebied van vrije stad

Français (French)
n. - (gén, Philos, Pol) liberté, (US, Mil, Naut) permission

idioms:

• at liberty    en liberté
• liberty of the subject    liberté du sujet
• take a liberty    prendre une liberté
• take liberties    prendre des libertés avec
• take the liberty of    prendre la liberté de, se permettre de

Deutsch (German)
n. - Freiheit

idioms:

• at liberty    auf freiem Fuß, freie Hand habend
• liberty of the subject    Recht als Staatsbürger
• take a liberty    sich (Dat) Freiheiten gegen jmdn. herausnehmen (ugs)
• take liberties    mit jmdm./etwas allzu frei umgehen
• take the liberty of    sich die Freiheit nehmen etwas zu tun

Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - ελευθερία, θάρρος, υπερβολική ή τολμηρή οικειότητα

idioms:

• at liberty    ελεύθερος, εύκαιρος
• liberty of the subject    δικαιώματα των υπηκόων
• take liberties    αποκτώ υπερβολική οικειότητα
• take liberties with    παραξεθαρρεύω με
• take the liberty of    παίρνω το θάρρος να

Italiano (Italian)
libertà

idioms:

• at liberty    libero
• liberty of the subject    libertà dell'individuo
• take liberties (with)    prendersi libertà con
• take the liberty of    prendersi la libertà di

Português (Portuguese)
n. - liberdade

idioms:

• at liberty    em liberdade
• liberty of the subject    liberdade de expressão
• take liberties (with)    abusar (de), tomar liberdades
• take the liberty of    tomar a liberdade de

Русский (Russian)
свобода, бесцеремонность

idioms:

• at liberty    незанятый, находящийся на свободе
• liberty of the subject    гражданские свободы
• take liberties (with)    бесцеремонно обращаться с чем-л.
• take the liberty of    позволить себе сделать что-л.

Español (Spanish)
n. - libertad, independencia

idioms:

• at liberty    estar en libertad, estar desocupado, tener derecho, estar autorizado
• liberty of the subject    libertad del individuo
• take a liberty    tomarse la libertad de, atribuirse el derecho de
• take liberties    tomarse libertades (con), atribuirse facultades para actuar de forma poco amable
• take the liberty of    tomarse la libertad de

Svenska (Swedish)
n. - frihet

中文（简体）(Chinese (Simplified))
自由, 随意, 特权

idioms:

• at liberty    随意的, 无事
• liberty of the subject    宪法规定的国民权利
• take liberties    过于随便
• take liberties with    随意对待
• take the liberty of    冒昧地做...

中文（繁體）(Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 自由, 隨意, 特權

idioms:

• at liberty    隨意的, 無事
• liberty of the subject    憲法規定的國民權利
• take liberties    過於隨便
• take liberties with    隨意對待
• take the liberty of    冒昧地做...

한국어 (Korean)
n. - 자유 , 독립, 해방, 방자함

idioms:

• at liberty    자유로 , 해방되어, 한가하여, 제멋대로
• take liberties    특권을 가지다
• take liberties with    지나치게 친하다, 제멋대로 바꾸다, 무분별하게 다루다
• take the liberty of    무례하게 ~를 하다

日本語 (Japanese)
n. - 自由, 解放, 釈放, 上陸許可, 休日, 権利, 特権, 勝手, 勝手なふるまい

idioms:

• at liberty    自由で, 自由に…してよい, 暇で
• liberty of the subject    臣民の自由
• take liberties (with)    ～に馴れ馴れしくする
• take the liberty of    無礼な行動をとる

العربيه (Arabic)
‏(الاسم) حريه, خيار, إمتياز, تجاوز للحدود الطبيعيه مثل إجراء تخط لآداب السلوك واللياقه رفع الكلفه, إنتهاك للقواعد أو الأصول, تحريف للحقيقه‏

עברית (Hebrew)
n. - ‮חירות, חופש, חוצפה‬

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