(Sanskrit). The ‘Middle School’, a system of Buddhist philosophy founded by Nāgārjuna in the 2nd century ce which has been extremely influential within the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism (a follower of the school is known as a Madhyamika). The school claims to be faithful to the spirit of the Buddha's original teachings, which advocate a middle course between extreme practices and theories of all kinds (see madhyamā-pratipad). It applies this principle to philosophical theories concerning the nature of phenomena. Thus the assertions that ‘things exist’ or that ‘things do not exist’ would be extreme views and should be rejected. The truth, it is thought, lies somewhere in between and is to be arrived at through a process of dialectic in the course of which opposing positions are revealed as self-negating. The adoption of any one position, it was argued, could immediately be challenged by taking up its opposite. The Madhyamaka therefore adopted a strategy of attacking opponent's views rather than advancing claims of its own (which is not to deny that they might none the less hold their own philosophical views). Chief among the views they attacked was the theory of dharmas. This had been evolved in the Abhidharma tradition as a solution to philosophical difficulties arising out of problems concerning causation, temporality, and personal identity. The scholastic solution was to posit a theory of instantaneous serial continuity according to which phenomena (dharmas) constantly replicate themselves in a momentary sequence of change (dharma-kṣanikatvā). Thus reality was conceived of as cinematic, like a filmstrip in which one frame constantly gives way to the next: each moment is substantially existent in its own right, and collectively they produce the illusion of stability and continuity. The Madhyamaka challenged this notion of the substantial reality of dharmas, arguing that if things truly existed in this way, and were possessed of a real nature or ‘self-essence’ (svabhāva), it would contradict the Buddha's teaching on selflessness (anātman) and, moreover, render change impossible. What already substantially exists, they argued, would not need to be produced; and what does not substantially exist already could never come into being from a state of non-existence. Thus real existence cannot be predicated of dharmas, but neither can non-existence since they clearly enjoy a mode of being of some kind. The conclusion of the Madhyamaka was that the true nature of phenomena can only be described as an ‘emptiness’ or ‘voidness’ (dharma-śūnyatā), and that this emptiness of self-nature is synonymous with the doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratītya-samutpāda) taught by the Buddha. This reasoning is set out in Nāgārjuna's terse Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā, the root text of the system.
There were important implications in Madhyamaka metaphysics for Buddhist soteriology. Since emptiness is the true nature of what exists, there can be no ontological basis for the differentiation between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. Any difference which exists, it was argued, must be an epistemological one resulting from ignorance (avidyā) and misconception. Accordingly, the Madhyamaka posits ‘two levels of truth’, the level of Ultimate Truth (paramārtha-satya), i.e. the perception of emptiness of the true nature of phenomena (in other words, the view of the enlightened), and the level of ‘relative or veiled truth’ (saṃvṛti-satya), i.e. the misconception of dharmas as possessing a substantial self-existent nature (in other words, the view of the unenlightened).
After Nāgārjuna the work of the school was carried forward by his disciple Āryadeva. After the time of Āryadeva, in middle period Madhyamaka (6th-7th century ce), a division arose leading to the formation of two branches of the Madhyamaka; the Svātantrika, led by Bhāvaviveka, and the Prāsaṇgika, championed by Candrakīrti, which adhered to the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna. The Madhyamaka system was transmitted from India to Tibet and east Asia, where it flourished as arguably the most influential school of Mahāyāna philosophy. In China it is known as San-lun (the ‘three treatises’ school). Due to certain potentially nihilistic trends implicit in Madhyamaka doctrines the school was criticized vehemently, both within the Buddhist fold by the Yogācāra school as well as by many non-Buddhists. Late period Madhyamaka is marked by a convergence with and synthesis of concepts drawn from the Yogācāra and Buddhist pramāṇa schools as can be seen in the work of scholars such as Śāntarakṣita.
Madhyamaka
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Madhyamaka (Sanskrit: माध्यमक, Mādhyamaka, traditional Chinese: 中觀宗, Pinyin: Zhōngguānzōng; also known as Śunyavada) is a Buddhist Mahāyāna tradition systematized by Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna may have arrived at his positions from a desire to achieve a consistent exegesis of the Buddha's doctrine as recorded in the Nikayas. In the eyes of Nāgārjuna the Buddha was not merely a forerunner, but the very founder of the Mādhyamaka system.[1] The tradition and its subsidiaries are called "Mādhyamaka;" those who follow it are called "Mādhyamikas."
According to the Mādhyamikas, all phenomena are empty of "self nature" or "essence" (Sanskrit: Svabhāva), meaning that they have no intrinsic, independent reality apart from the causes and conditions from which they arise.
Mādhyamaka is the rejection of two extreme philosophies, and therefore represents the "middle way" between eternalism—the view that something is eternal and unchanging—and nihilism. Nihilism here means the assertion that all things are intrinsically already destroyed or rendered nonexistent. This is nihilism in the sense of Indian philosophy, and may differ somewhat from Western philosophical nihilism.
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Prajnaparamita
Mādhyamaka is a source of methods for approaching prajnaparamita, or "perfection of wisdom", the sixth of the Six Perfections of the bodhisattva path. The term is used as the collective title of key Mahāyāna sutras. This is also often explained in Mahayana hagiography as the teaching on shunyata that occurred at Vulture Peak, Raj Gir, and has been categorized as the Second Turning of the Wheel of Dharma.
Modern adherents
Not all Mahāyāna Schools necessarily adhere to the Mādhyamaka view or approach, but Tibetan Buddhist and Zen traditions adhere to a form of Mādhyamaka, though they have differences in method. The present day schools of Tendai, Sanron and the Mahā-Mādhyamaka are also heirs to the Mādhyamaka tradition.
Tibetan categories
There is currently no historical evidence that the Mādhyamikas divided themselves into distinct schools, but later Tibetan scholars—in particular Tibetan translator Patsap Nyima Drak in the 11th century—categorized views into distinct "schools".
According to the Tibetan view, subdivisions of Madhyamaka are:
- Prāsaṅgika
- Svātantrika
- The later Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka synthesis, sometimes rendered Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Mādhyamaka
It is important to note that while these different tenet systems were discussed, it is debated to what degree individual writers in Indian and Tibetan discussion held each of these views and if they held a view generally or only in particular instances.
Both Prasangikas and Svatantrikas cited material in the agamas in support of their arguments.[2]
Prasangika
The only technique avowed by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamaka is to show by prasaṅga (or reductio ad absurdum) that any positive assertion (such as "asti" or "nāsti", "it is", or "it is not") or view regarding phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional (saṃvṛti or lokavyavahāra). No position therefore constitutes the ultimate truth (paramārtha), including the views and statements made by the Prāsaṅgikas themselves, which are held to be solely for the purpose of defeating all views. The Prāsaṅgikas also identify this to be the message of the Buddha who, as Nāgārjuna put it, taught the Dharma for the purpose of refuting all views.
Buddhapalita and Candrakirti are noted as the main proponents of this approach. Tibetan teacher Longchen Rabjam noted in the 14th century that Candrakirti favored the prasaṅga approach when specifically discussing the analysis for ultimacy, but otherwise he made positive assertions. His central text, Madhyamakavatara, is structured as a description of the paths and results of practice, which is made up of positive assertions. Therefore, even those most attributed to the Prāsaṅgika view make positive assertions when discussing a path of practice but use prasaṅga specifically when analyzing for ultimate truth.[3]
Svātantrika
The Svātantrika Mādhyamaka differs from the Prāsaṅgika in a few key ways. Conventional phenomena are understood to exist conventionally without existing ultimately. In this way they can make positive or "autonomous" assertions using syllogistic logic, and their name comes from this quality of autonomous statements. Svatantrika in Sanskrit refers to autonomy and was translated back into Sanskrit from the equivalent Tibetan term. They also draw a distinction between the final ultimate truth and approximate or enumerative ultimates that describe the ultimate but are not the true ultimate.[3]
Bhavaviveka is the first person to whom this view is attributed, as they are laid out in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna and his critiques of Buddhapalita.
Ju Mipham explained that using positive assertions in logical debate may serve a useful purpose, either while debating with non-Buddhist schools or to move a student from a coarser to a more subtle view. Similarly, discussing an approximate ultimate helps students who have difficulty using only prasaṅga methods move closer to the understanding of the true ultimate. Ju Mipham felt that the ultimate non-enumerated truth of the Svatantrika was no different from the ultimate truth of the Prāsaṅgika. He felt the only difference between them was with respect to how they discussed conventional truth and their approach to presenting a path.[3] Gelug teachers, however, have instead criticized the Svatantrika approach as not delivering students to the same point as the Prāsaṅgika approach.
Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Mādhyamaka
A Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka synthesis was posited by Shantarakshita in the 8th century and may have been common at Nalanda University at that time. Like the Prāsaṅgika, this view approaches ultimate truth through the prasaṅga method, yet when speaking of conventional reality they may make autonomous statements like the earlier Svātantrika and Yogācāra approaches.
This was different from the earlier Svatantrika in that the conventional truth was described in terms of the theory of consciousness-only instead of the tenets of Svatantrika, though neither was used to analyze for ultimate truth.
For example, they may assert that all phenomena are nothing but the 'play of mind' and hence empty of concrete existence—and that mind is in turn empty of defining characteristics. But in doing so, they're careful to point out that any such example would be an approximate ultimate and not the true ultimate. By making such autonomous statements, Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka is often mistaken as a Svātantrika or Yogācāra view, even though a Prāsaṅgika approach was used in analysis.[4] This view is thus a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.
Interdependence
The Madhyamaka concept of emptiness is often explained through the related concept of interdependence. This is in contrast to independence, that phenomena arise of their own accord, independent of causes and conditions. Although a common way to think about emptiness, it is a conceptual way of talking about it—to lead a student closer to the non-conceptual wisdom of the ultimate truth—and it would not withstand analysis as an ultimate view. In the first chapter of the Mulmadhyamakakarika, Nagarjuna provides arguments that even causes and conditions are empty of inherent existence or essence. This analogy, however, connects the conclusion of the Middle Way tenets with the codependent origination teachings of the first turning.
The analogy to interdependence is considered helpful for students, and is presented in the famous ninth chapter of Shantideva's Bodhicharyavatara, as well as by modern writers like Thich Nhat Hanh who, in The Heart of Understanding, discusses the Heart Sutra in terms of interdependence.
In this analogy, there is no first or ultimate cause for anything that occurs. Instead, all things are dependent on innumerable causes and conditions that are themselves dependent on innumerable causes and conditions. The interdependence of all phenomena, including the self, is a helpful way to undermine mistaken views about inherence, or that one's self is inherently existent. It is also a helpful way to discuss Mahayana teachings on motivation, compassion, and ethics. The comparison to interdependence has produced recent discussion comparing Mahayana ethics to environmental ethics.
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In themselves, from their side, things are free of imputation, even though there is really nothing at all that can be said from their side. This dynamic philosophical tension—a tension between the Madhyamika accounts of the limits of what can be coherently said and its analytical ostension of what can't be said without paradox but must be understood—must constantly be borne in mind in reading the text. It is not an incoherent mysticism, but it is a logical tightrope act at the very limits of language and metaphysics. |
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—Jay L. Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, p. 102 |
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See also
- Schools of Buddhism
- Yogacara
- Prasangika
- Svatantrika
- Yogacara-Madhyamaka[clarification needed]
- Nagarjuna
- Chandrakirti
- Madhyamaka-avatara (Entering the Middle Way)
- Prasannapada (Clear Words) : A commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika
- Consciousness-only
- Mentalism
- Materialism
- Two Truths Doctrine
- Buddha-nature
- Tathagata
References
- ^ Christian Lindtner, Master of Wisdom. Dharma Publishing 1997, page 324.
- ^ Richard Gombrich, How Buddhism began: the conditioned genesis of the early teachings. Continuum International Publishing Group, 1996, pages 27-28.
- ^ a b c Shantarakshita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp.131-141
- ^ Shantarakshita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp. 117-122
- Keenan, John P. (1993). Yogācarā. pp. 203-212 published in Yoshinori, Takeuchi; with Van Bragt, Jan; Heisig, James W.; O'Leary, Joseph S.; Swanson, Paul L.(1993). Buddhist Spirituality: Indian, Southeast Asian, Tibetan, and Early Chinese. New York, USA: The Crossroad Publishing Company. ISBN 0-8245-1277-4
- Ringu Tulku: The Rimé (Ris-med) movement of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great
- Shantarakshita and Ju Mipham (2005) The Adornment of the Middle Way Padmakara Translation ISBN 1-59030-241-9
External links
- Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Middle Way
- Glossary of Buddhist Terms see: Madhyamika (Tib. u ma)
- Glossary of Buddhist Terms see: Emptiness of Self: or the Rangtong View., Emptiness of Other: or the Shentong View.
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