Madhyamaka

Mādhyamaka (Sanskrit: मध्यमक, Mādhyamaka, Chinese: 中觀派; pinyin: Zhōngguān Pài; also known as Śunyavada) refers primarily to a Mahāyāna Buddhist school of philosophy^[1] founded by Nagarjuna. According to Madhyamaka all phenomena are empty of "substance" or "essence" (Sanskrit: svabhāva) because they are dependently co-arisen. Likewise it is because they are dependently co-arisen that they have no intrinsic, independent reality of their own.

Origins and development

Nagarjuna

The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nagarjuna, though it may have existed earlier.^[2]

Abhidhamma

The Madhyamaka school is regarded as a reaction against the development of the Abhidhamma, especially the Sarvastivadin. In the abhidhamma, the understanding of anatman is developed by analysing phenomena into single dhammas, "each with an inherent 'own-nature'".^[3] By doing so, the Abhidhamma analysis constituted independent existing 'things', contrary to the Buddha's teachings on the middle way.

Prajnaparamita

The critique against this substantialist thinking is also worded in the Prajnaparamita sutras, which originated from the first century AD on.^[4] According to tradition, Nagarjuna retrieved the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra from the realm of nāgas, though actual reference to Mahayana sutras seems to be scarce in his works.^[5][6] Nevertheless, traditionally Mādhyamaka is regarded as a source of methods for approaching prajnaparamita, or "perfection of wisdom".

The term prajnaparamita is used as the collective title of the rajnaparamita sutras, of which the Diamond Sutra is the best known. The perfection of wisdom is the sixth of the Six Perfections of the bodhisattva path, and the third part of the Threefold Training.

According to Mahayana hagiography the prajnaparamita sutras contain the teachings on śūnyatā that were delivered at Vulture Peak (Raj Gir). Those teachings have been categorized as the Second Turning of the Wheel of Dharma.

Nagarjuna

Nagarjuna's intention was not to establish an ontology or epistemology, but to free the Buddhist soteriology from essential notions which obscured the Buddhist Middle Way:^[7]

In particular, the many forms of reasoning for ascertaining suchness that were set forth are only for the sake of clarifying the path of liberation for the fortunate, not for the sake of becoming intent on debate.^[8]

Nagarjuna sought to return to the Buddha's teachings on non-essentialism:^[9]

Nagarjuna's main contention is that it was not the intention of the Buddha to set out a list of 'ultimate' principles or elements which in some metaphysical sense 'exist', still less to define their 'own-beings', by implication immutable. He opposed therefore the general tendency of abhidharma discussion to hypostatise certain philosophical concepts, to superimpose netaphysical constructions on the real universe which did not correspond to them.^[2]

His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is best known work. It is a "detailed and careful analysis of most of the important discourses included in the Nikayas and the agamas, especially those of the Atthakavagga of the Sutta-nipata.^[10] In this work,

Utilizing the Buddha's theory of "dependent arising"(pratitya-samutpada), Nagarjuna demonstrated the futility of [...] metaphysical speculations. His method of dealing with such metaphysics is referred to as "middle way" (madhyama pratipad). It is the middle way that avoided the substantialism of the Sarvastivadins as well as the nominalism of the Sautrantikas.^[11]

Nagarjuna insisted that...

[A]ll experienced phenomena are empty (sunya). This did not mean that they are not experienced and, therefore, non-existent; only that they are devoid of a permanent and eternal substance (svabhava). Since they are experienced, they are not mere names (prajnapti).^[11]

Even nirvana is an empty concept:

If nirvana is something causally unconditioned, a reality that does not arise or pass away, then there is no way for us to get there. If it is conditioned, then it too will pass away, like every other conditioned thing.^[12]

"Clarity and peace" are reached when we let go of attachment to conceptual thinking, and the unrest which accompanies this attachment to conceptual thinking.^[12]

Nagarjuna opposed speculative opinions by deducing "from the opponent's position a 'necessary consequence' (prasanga) which shows the absurdity of the position and the self-contradiction inherent in it".^[13]

Aryadeva

Nagarjuna's pupil Aryadeva (3rd century CE) emphasized the Bodhisattva-ideal. His works are regarded as a supplement to Nagarjuna's^[14], on which he commented.^[15] Aryadeva also confuted the theories of non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools.^[15]

Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka

Buddhapālita (470–550) was a strong supporter of the prasangika approach.^[16] He opposed Bhavyaviveka (ca.500–ca.578), who argued for the use of syllogisms "to set one's own doctrinal stance".^[17] Bhavyaviveka was influenced by the Yogacara school.

The opposing approaches of Buddhapālita and Bhavyaviveka led to a split of Madhyamaka in two schools, the Prasaṅgika and the Svātantrika.

Candrakirti

Candrakīrti (600–c. 650) wrote the Prasannapadā (Clear Words), a highly influential commentary on the Mulamdhyamakakarika. This commentary is central in the understanding of Madhyamaka in Tibetan Buddhism.

Shantideva

Shantideva (end 7th century – first half 8th century) is well known for his Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life. He united "a deep religiousness and joy of exposure together with the unquestioned Madhyamaka orthodoxy".^[18]

Schools

There is currently no evidence that the historical Mādhyamikas divided themselves into distinct schools, but later Tibetan scholars—in particular the 11th-century Tibetan translator Patsap Nyima Drak—did categorize their views. According to the Tibetan view, the subdivisions of Mādhyamaka are:

• Prasaṅgika
• Svātantrika
• The later Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka synthesis, sometimes rendered Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Mādhyamaka

While these different systems of tenets were discussed, it is not certain to what degree individual writers in Indian and Tibetan discussion held each of these views and if they held a view generally or only in particular instances.

Both Prasangikas and Svatantrikas cited material in the āgamas in support of their arguments.^[19]

Prasangika

The central technique avowed by Prasaṅgika Mādhyamaka is to show by prasaṅga (or reductio ad absurdum) that any positive assertion (such as "asti" or "nāsti", "it is", or "it is not") or view regarding phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional (saṃvṛti or lokavyavahāra).

The Prasangika hold that it is not necessary for the proponent and opponent to use the same kind of valid cognition to establish a common subject; indeed it is possible to change the view of an opponent through an reductio argument.

Buddhapalita and Candrakirti are noted as the main proponents of this approach. Tibetan teacher Longchen Rabjam noted in the 14th century that Candrakirti favored the prasaṅga approach when specifically discussing the analysis for ultimacy, but otherwise he made positive assertions. His central text, Madhyamakavatāra, is structured as a description of the paths and results of practice, which is made up of positive assertions. Therefore, even those most attributed to the Prāsaṅgika view make positive assertions when discussing a path of practice but use prasaṅga specifically when analyzing for ultimate truth.^[20]

Svātantrika

The Svātantrika Mādhyamaka differs from the Prāsaṅgika in a few key ways. Conventional phenomena are understood to have a conventional essential existence, but without an ultimately existing essence. In this way they believe they are able to make positive or "autonomous" assertions using syllogistic logic because they are able to share a subject that is established as appearing in common - the proponent and opponent use the same kind of valid cognition to establish it; the name comes from this quality of being able to use autonomous arguments in debate. Svatantrika in Sanskrit refers to autonomy and was translated back into Sanskrit from the equivalent Tibetan term.^[20]

Bhavaviveka is the first person to whom this view is attributed, as they are laid out in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna and his critiques of Buddhapalita.

Ju Mipham explained that using positive assertions in logical debate may serve a useful purpose, either while debating with non-Buddhist schools or to move a student from a coarser to a more subtle view. Similarly, discussing an approximate ultimate helps students who have difficulty using only prasaṅga methods move closer to the understanding of the true ultimate. Ju Mipham felt that the ultimate non-enumerated truth of the Svatantrika was no different from the ultimate truth of the Prāsaṅgika. He felt the only difference between them was with respect to how they discussed conventional truth and their approach to presenting a path.^[20]

Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Mādhyamaka

A Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka synthesis was posited by Shantarakshita in the 8th century and may have been common at Nalanda University at that time. Like the Prāsaṅgika, this view approaches ultimate truth through the prasaṅga method, yet when speaking of conventional reality they may make autonomous statements like the earlier Svātantrika and Yogācāra approaches.

This was different from the earlier Svatantrika in that the conventional truth was described in terms of the theory of consciousness-only instead of the tenets of Svatantrika, though neither was used to analyze for ultimate truth.

For example, they may assert that all phenomena are nothing but the "play of mind" and hence empty of concrete existence—and that mind is in turn empty of defining characteristics. But in doing so, they're careful to point out that any such example would be an approximate ultimate and not the true ultimate. By making such autonomous statements, Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka is often mistaken as a Svātantrika or Yogācāra view, even though a Prāsaṅgika approach was used in analysis.^[21] This view is thus a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.

Concepts

Madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. This creates a tension, since it does have to use concepts to convey its teachings:

This dynamic philosophical tension—a tension between the Madhyamika accounts of the limits of what can be coherently said and its analytical ostension of what cannot be said without paradox but must be understood—must constantly be borne in mind in reading the text. It is not an incoherent mysticism, but it is a logical tightrope act at the very limits of language and metaphysics.^[22]

Svabhava - essence

In Chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Nagarjuna centers on the words svabhava ^[a], parabhava^[b], bhava ^[c] and abhava^[d]:

Nagarjuna's critique of the notion of own-nature^[e] (Mk. ch. 15) argues that anything which arises according to conditions, as all phenomena do, can have no inherent nature, for what is is depends on what conditions it. Moreover, if there is nothing with own-nature, there can be nothing with 'other-nature' (para-bhava), i.e. something which is dependent for its existence and nature on something else which has own-nature. Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other-nature, there cannot be anything with a true, substantial existent nature (bhava). If there is no true existent, then there can be no non-existent (abhava).^[3]

In chapter 15 of the Mulamdhyamakakarika, "Nagarjuna is playing on the word 'thing'".^{[web 1][f]} Nagarjuna uses the ambivalence inherent in the term svabhava:

[T]he word "svabhava" can be interpreted in two different ways. It can be rendered either as identity [...] or as causal independence.^[29]

This ambiguity is easily lost in translation:

When one reads Nagarjuna's argument in Sanskrit, it is not immediately obvious that the argument has taken advantage of an ambiguity in the key term. But when one tries to translate his argument into some other language, such as English or Tibetan, one finds that it is almost impossible to translate his argument in a way that makes sense in translation. This is because the terms in the language of translation do not have precisely the same range of ambiguities as the words in the original Sanskrit. In English, we are forced to disambiguate, and in disambiguating, we end up spoiling the apparent integrity of the argument.^[29]

The doctrine of dependent arising cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance".^[27] Nagarjuna refutes "the commentarial doctrine of the 'own-being' of principles as contrary to the Tripitaka":^[23]

Nagarjuna had no objection to the Abhidhamma formulation of causal relations so long as the relata are not regarded as having a unique nature or substance (svabhava).^[24]

The rejection of inherent existence does not imply that there is no existence at all.^[26] What it does mean is that there is no "unique nature or substance (svabhava)"^[24] in the "things" we perceive. This may not necessarily be in contrast to the Abhidhamma point of view, given the ambivalence in the terms used bu Nagarjuna:

What Nagarjuna is saying is that no being has is a fixed and permanent nature. What the abhidarmikas maintained was that everything has features that distinguish it from other things.^[30][g]

Essentialism and nihilism

What remains is the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism:^[27]

The object of the critique is to show that the eternalist view is untenable and further to show that the 'own-being' theory adopted by some Buddhists did not really differ, when its implications were strictly worked out, from the eternalist theory of Brahmanism (theory of an eternal 'soul' and other eternal 'substances'.^[26]

These two views are considered to be the two extreme views:

1. Essentialism^[32] or eternalism (sastavadava)^[26] - a belief that things inherently exist and are therefore efficacious objects of craving and clinging;^[32]
2. Nihilism^[32] or annihilationism (ucchedavada)^[26] - views that lead one to believe that there is no need to be responsible for one's actions. Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering.^[32]

Madhyamaka represents the middle way" between them.

Two truths

Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth, absolute and relative, to make clear that it does make sense to speak of existence. Absolutely seen, there are no "things". Relatively seen, there do exist concrete objects which we are aware of.

According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material and intellectual.^[33]

Insight into the emptiness of "things' is part of developing wisdom, seeing things as they are. Conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. Buddhapalita says:

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.

—Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2^[34]

Understanding in Buddhist tradition

Although not all Mahāyāna schools adhere to the Mādhyamaka view or approach, Mādhyamaka forms the basis for Mahayana, giving rise to the historically later Yogacara.

The Tibetan and Zen traditions have adopted Mādhyamaka with differences in lineage. The present day schools of Tendai, Sanron, and the Mahā-Mādhyamaka are also heirs to the Mādhyamaka tradition (cf. East Asian Mādhyamaka).

Tibetan Buddhism

Gelug

The Gelupga school was founded by Je Tsongkhapa in the 14th century. He emphasized compassion and insight into emptiness.

In his Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa comments on the Mulamdhyamakakarika.^[35] According to Tsongkhapa, Nagarjuna uses the term svabhava to refer to sunyata as the nature of reality^[36]:

Their nature of emptiness is their reality nature.^[37]

This is in line with the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra:

Subhuti, since the five aggregates are without nature, they have a nature of emptiness.^[37]

Tsongkhapa's understanding is derived from Candrakirti's interpretation^[38], who states that conventionally there are entities with distinguishing characteristics, but ultimately those qualities are not independent essences. But since this emptiness is true for everything that exists, this emptiness may also be regarded as an essence, though not in the sense of an independent essence. Candrakirti formulates a final negation by stating that even the denial of svabhava implies ...

...that either oneself or one's audience is not entirely free from the belief in svabhava. Therefore, ultimate truth, truth as it is for those who are free from misknowledge, cannot be expressed by assering either the existence or nonexistende of svahbava.^[39]

Jonangpa

Dolpopa, the founder of the Jonangpa school, called his synthesis the Great Middle Way.^[40] He regarded the tathagatagarbha to be the true emptiness. This view was opposed by Tsonghkhapa. ^[41]

Western Buddhism

Thich Nhat Hanh

Thich Nhat Hanh explains the Madhyamaka concept of emptiness through the related concept of interdependence. In this analogy, there is no first or ultimate cause for anything that occurs. Instead, all things are dependent on innumerable causes and conditions that are themselves dependent on innumerable causes and conditions. The interdependence of all phenomena, including the self, is a helpful way to undermine mistaken views about inherence, or that one's self is inherently existent. It is also a helpful way to discuss Mahayana teachings on motivation, compassion, and ethics. The comparison to interdependence has produced recent discussion comparing Mahayana ethics to environmental ethics.^[42]

Understanding in modern scholarship

Western scholarship has given a broad variety of interpretations of Madhyamaka:

Over the past half-century the doctrine of the Madhyamaka school, and in particular that of Nāgārjuna has been variously described as nihilism, monism, irrationalism, misology, agnosticism, scepticism, criticism, dialectic, mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, relativism, nominalism, and linguistic analysis with therapeutic value.^[43]

Garfield likewise rephrases Ruegg:

"Modern interpreters differ among themselves about the correct way to read it as least as much as canonical intepreters. Nagarjuna has been read as an idealist (Murti 1960), a nihilist (Wood 1994), a skeptic (Garfield 1995), a pragmatist (Kalupahana 1986), and as a mystic (Streng 1967). He has been regarded as a critic of logic (Inada 1970), as a defender of classical logic (Hayes 1994), and as a pioneer of paraconsistent logic (Garfield and Priest 2003)".^[44]

These interpreattions "reflect almost as much about the viewpoints of the scholars involved as do they reflect the content of Nāgārjuna's concepts".^[45]

Most recent western scholarship (Garfield^[46], Napper^[47], Hopkins^[48], Huntington, and others) have, after investigation, tended to adopt one or another of the Gelugpa collegiate interpretations of Madhyamaka.

Kalupahana

Kalupahana's interpretation sees Madhyamaka, along with Yogacara, as an antidote against essentialist biases in Mahayana Buddhist thought.^[49][50]

Hayes

Richard P. Hayes is critical of the works of Nagarjuna:

Nagarjuna’s writings had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy. Despite his apparent attempts to discredit some of the most fundamental concepts of abhidharma, abhidharma continued to flourish for centuries, without any appreciable attempt on the part of abhidharmikas to defend their methods of analysis against Nagarjuna’s criticisms.^[51]

According to Hayes, Nagarjuna makes use of two different possible meanings of the word svabhava, and uses those two meanings to make statements which are not logical.^[52] In doing so, Hayes regards Nagarjuna...

[A] relatively primitive thinker whose mistakes in reasoning were eventually uncovered as the knowledge of logic in India became more sophisticated in subsequent centuries.^[53]

Magee

William Magee strongly disagrees with Hayes. He points out the influence of Nagarjuna in Tibetan Buddhism, and refers to Tsonghkhapa's interpretation of Nagarjuna to argue that

Hayes is misidentifying Nagarjuna's intended meaning of svabhava. In contradistinction to Hayes' belief that Nagarjuna speaks equivocably of an identity anture and a causally independent, non-existent nature, Dzong-ka-ba feels that in chapter XV.1-2 Nagarjuna uses the term svabhava to refer to an existent emptiness nature.^[54]

According to Magee, both Candrakirti and Dzong-ka-ba "see Nagarjuna as consistently referring to emptiness with the word svabhava".^[55]

See also

Notes

References

Web references

Sources

External links

• Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Middle Way
• thezensite: articles on Nagarjuna
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Madhyamaka
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nagarjuna