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(Sanskrit). The ‘Middle School’, a system of Buddhist philosophy founded by Nāgārjuna in the 2nd century ce which has been extremely influential within the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism (a follower of the school is known as a Madhyamika). The school claims to be faithful to the spirit of the Buddha's original teachings, which advocate a middle course between extreme practices and theories of all kinds (see madhyamā-pratipad). It applies this principle to philosophical theories concerning the nature of phenomena. Thus the assertions that ‘things exist’ or that ‘things do not exist’ would be extreme views and should be rejected. The truth, it is thought, lies somewhere in between and is to be arrived at through a process of dialectic in the course of which opposing positions are revealed as self-negating. The adoption of any one position, it was argued, could immediately be challenged by taking up its opposite. The Madhyamaka therefore adopted a strategy of attacking opponent's views rather than advancing claims of its own (which is not to deny that they might none the less hold their own philosophical views). Chief among the views they attacked was the theory of dharmas. This had been evolved in the Abhidharma tradition as a solution to philosophical difficulties arising out of problems concerning causation, temporality, and personal identity. The scholastic solution was to posit a theory of instantaneous serial continuity according to which phenomena (dharmas) constantly replicate themselves in a momentary sequence of change (dharma-kṣanikatvā). Thus reality was conceived of as cinematic, like a filmstrip in which one frame constantly gives way to the next: each moment is substantially existent in its own right, and collectively they produce the illusion of stability and continuity. The Madhyamaka challenged this notion of the substantial reality of dharmas, arguing that if things truly existed in this way, and were possessed of a real nature or ‘self-essence’ (svabhāva), it would contradict the Buddha's teaching on selflessness (anātman) and, moreover, render change impossible. What already substantially exists, they argued, would not need to be produced; and what does not substantially exist already could never come into being from a state of non-existence. Thus real existence cannot be predicated of dharmas, but neither can non-existence since they clearly enjoy a mode of being of some kind. The conclusion of the Madhyamaka was that the true nature of phenomena can only be described as an ‘emptiness’ or ‘voidness’ (dharma-śūnyatā), and that this emptiness of self-nature is synonymous with the doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratītya-samutpāda) taught by the Buddha. This reasoning is set out in Nāgārjuna's terse Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā, the root text of the system.

There were important implications in Madhyamaka metaphysics for Buddhist soteriology. Since emptiness is the true nature of what exists, there can be no ontological basis for the differentiation between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. Any difference which exists, it was argued, must be an epistemological one resulting from ignorance (avidyā) and misconception. Accordingly, the Madhyamaka posits ‘two levels of truth’, the level of Ultimate Truth (paramārtha-satya), i.e. the perception of emptiness of the true nature of phenomena (in other words, the view of the enlightened), and the level of ‘relative or veiled truth’ (saṃvṛti-satya), i.e. the misconception of dharmas as possessing a substantial self-existent nature (in other words, the view of the unenlightened).

After Nāgārjuna the work of the school was carried forward by his disciple Āryadeva. After the time of Āryadeva, in middle period Madhyamaka (6th-7th century ce), a division arose leading to the formation of two branches of the Madhyamaka; the Svātantrika, led by Bhāvaviveka, and the Prāsaṇgika, championed by Candrakīrti, which adhered to the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna. The Madhyamaka system was transmitted from India to Tibet and east Asia, where it flourished as arguably the most influential school of Mahāyāna philosophy. In China it is known as San-lun (the ‘three treatises’ school). Due to certain potentially nihilistic trends implicit in Madhyamaka doctrines the school was criticized vehemently, both within the Buddhist fold by the Yogācāra school as well as by many non-Buddhists. Late period Madhyamaka is marked by a convergence with and synthesis of concepts drawn from the Yogācāra and Buddhist pramāṇa schools as can be seen in the work of scholars such as Śāntarakṣita.

 
 
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Madhyamaka (Also known as Śunyavada) is a Buddhist Mahayāna tradition popularized by Nāgārjuna and Aśvaghoṣa. The school of thought and its subsidiaries are called "Madhyamaka"; those who follow it are called "Mādhyamikas."

According to the Mādhyamikas, all phenomena are empty of "self nature" or "essence" (Sanskrit: Svabhāva), meaning that they have no intrinsic, independent reality apart from the causes and conditions from which they arise.

Madhyamaka is the rejection of two extreme philosophies, and therefore represents the "middle way" between eternalism (the view that something is eternal and unchanging) and nihilism (the assertion that all things are intrinsically already destroyed or rendered nonexistent. This is nihilism in the sense of Indian philosophy, and may differ somewhat from Western philosophical nihilism).

According to Tibetan sources, Indian Madhyamaka schools were eventually divided into

  • The Svātantrika Madhyamaka, who differed from the Prāsaṅgika in that they believed conventional phenomena could exist for themselves without existing ultimately. Thus they felt that positive assertions in logical debate served a useful purpose, and did not restrict themselves to using only prasaṅga methods.
  • The Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, whose sole avowed technique is to show by prasaṅga (or Reductio Ad Absurdum) that any positive assertion (such as "asti" or "nāsti", "it is", or "it is not") made about, or view proclaimed of, phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional (saṃvṛti or lokavyavahāra). Therefore there is no position that constitutes the ultimate truth (paramārtha), including the views and statements made by the Prāsaṅgikas themselves, which are held to be solely for the purpose of defeating all views. The Prāsaṅgikas also identify this to be the message of the Buddha who, as Nāgārjuna put it, taught the Dharma for the purpose of refuting all views.
  • The Yogācāra Madhyamaka, which asserts that all phenomena are nothing but the 'play of mind' and hence empty of concrete existence, and that mind, in its turn, is empty of defining characteristics. This philosophy is thus a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.

Madhyamaka, interdependence and emptiness

The immediate implication of the essenceless of self is one of universal interdependence -- for even causes and conditions are empty of inherent existence or essence, as stated by Nagarjuna in the very first chapter of the Mulmadhyamakakarika. This means there is no first or ultimate cause for anything that occurs, essentially, all things are causally indeterminate, dependent on innumerable causes and conditions which are themselves dependent on innumerable causes and conditions. The interdependence of all phenomena, including self, is fundamental to Mahayana Buddhism, for it is the metaphysical justification for the ethic of bodhicitta (enlightenment or awakening mind) -- the selfless inclination to work for the benefit of all sentient beings for as long as time and space abide (see Shantideva's Bodhicharyavatara, a key work on Mahayana ethics, which explains this connection in the 9th chapter). This is the meaning of the expression prajnaparamita, or "perfection of wisdom", the sixth of the Six Perfections of the bodhisattva path, and the collective title of the key Mahayana sutras that Nagarjuna is interpreting in his works. This is also often explained as the teaching on shunyata that occurred at Vulture Peak, Raj Gir, and has been categorized as the Second Turning of the Wheel of Dharma. Thus when, for example, The Heart Sutra states "Form is emptiness, emptiness is form" -- the question "empty of what?" can be answered by saying "empty of inherent existence or essence." Thich Nhat Hanh, in The Heart of Understanding, explains in great detail the connections between Madhyamaka, emptiness and interdependence as related to the Heart Sutra. This is an important exegesis, as it also explores the connection between Madhyamaka philosophy and environmental ethics, an area still very much under-explored, East and West.

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Buddhism Dictionary. A Dictionary of Buddhism. Copyright © 2003, 2004 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.  Read more
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