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Malayan Communist Party

 
Wikipedia: Malayan Communist Party
Malaysia

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The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), officially known as the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), was founded in 1930 and laid down its arms in 1989. It is most famous for its role in the Malayan Emergency.

Contents

History

Formation

Communism was first introduced into South-East Asia by Dutch radicals, and given impetus by the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1922 the CCP opened an clandestine office in Singapore which sowed the seed for the South Seas Communist Party (or Nanyang Communist Party). This party was mainly active in the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China [1] In Singapore its work centred on the trades unions. After their 1925 uprising failed, many Indonesian Communist took refuge in Singapore, and engaged in political work there under the auspices of the Third Communist International.[2]

In April 1930 the South Seas Communist Party was dissolved and was replaced by the Communist Party of Malaya.[3] While its primary responsibility was Malaya and Singapore, the party was also active in Thailand and the Dutch East Indies, which did not then have their own Communist parties.

Growth

The party operated as an illegal organisation under British colonial rule. In June 1931, many party leaders were arrested after a Comintern courier was intercepted by the police, sending the party into disarray. Information extracted from the courier indicated at this point there were 1,500 members and 10,000 sympathesisers.[4]

Despite this setback, the MCP gained influenced in the trade union movement and organised several strikes, mostly notably at the Batu Arang coal mine in 1935. They also set up workers' committees at some workplaces. These committees, and the strikes, were promptly crushed by troops and police. Many ethnic Chinese strikers were deported to China, where they were often executed by the Guomindang Governmment as Communists.[5] [6]

After Japan invaded China in 1937, there was a rapprochement between the Malayan Guomindang and Communists, paralleling that in China. Under the wing of the Guomindang, the MCP was able to operate more easily. Anti-Japanese sentiment among Malayan Chinese gave the party with a great opportunity to recruit members and raise funds under the banner of defence of China.[7]

At this time, the party was infilitrated by an apparent British agent, Lai Teck, who became Secretary-General in April 1939. Despite this severe security breach, the Party continued to operate effectively. By mid-1939 it claimed about 40,000 members, about half in Singapore.

Structure

The MCP was headed by a Central Executive Committee of twelve to fifteen members. About six of these were appointed to the Political Bureau (Politburo) which ran the party when the C.E.C was not in session. Each State had State Central Executive Committee and was in turn subdivided into several Districts. The smallest unit of organisation was the Party cell, which typically consisted of the members from one workplace or village. Large Party Congresses were held on an occasional basis.

World War II

On December 8, 1941, the Japanese Empire invaded Malaya. The British colonial authorities now accepted the MCP's standing offer of military co-operation. On 15 December, all left-wing political prisoners were released.

From 20 December the British military began to train party members in guerilla warfare at the hastily established 101st Special Training School (101st STS) in Singapore. About 165 MCP membeers were trained before the British defences collapsed. These fighters, scantily armed and equipped by the hard-pressed British, hurriedly dispersed and attempted to harass the occupying army.

Just before Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, the party began organise armed resistance in the state of Johore. Soon four armed groups, which became known as 'Regiments', were formed, with 101st STS trainees serving as nuclei. In March this force was dubbed the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and began sabotage and ambushes against the Japanese. The Japanese responded with reprisals against Chinese civilians. These reprisals, coupled with increasing economic hardship, caused large numbers of Malayan Chinese to flee the cities. They became squatters at the forest margins, where they became the main source of recruits, food, and other assistance for the MPAJA. The MPAJA consolidated this support by providing protection.

O'Ballance estimates that in mid-1942 the regimental strengths were about 100 in the first Regiment, 160 in the 2nd, 360 in the 3rd, and 250 in the 4th.[8] At this time a 5th, 6th, and 7th Regiment were formed. This army, which included women, was conceived as both a military and political force, along Maoist lines.

When Singapore fell, Lai Teck was arrested by the Japanese and became their agent. On 1 September 1942, acting on his information, the Japanese launched a dawn raid on a secret conference of more than 100 MCP and MPAJA leaders at the Batu Caves just north of Kuala Lumpur, killing most. The loss of personnel forced the MPAJA to abandon its political commissar system, and the military commanders became the heads of the regiments.[9] Following this setback the MPAJA avoided engagements and concentrated on consolidation, amassing 4,500 soldiers by Spring 1943.[10]

From May 1943, British commandos from Force 136 infilitrated Malaya and made contact with the guerillas. Early in 1944 an agreement was reached whereby the MPAJA would accept some direction from the Allied South East Asia Command (SEAC) and the Allies would give the MPAJA weapons and supplies. It was not until he spring of 1945, however, that significant amounts of material began to arrive by air drop.[11]

The War's Aftermath

Japan's surrender on 16 August 1945 caught the combatants in Malaya by surprise. The first British contingent of reoccupation troops did not arrive until September 3; Singapore was reoccupied only on the 8th. The Japanese garrison withdrew from the countryside,leaving a power vacuum that was filled by the MPAJA. In many places, especially Chinese areas, they were greeted as heroes as they emerged from the forest.

The British recognised the MPAJA's authority, paying its soldiers for the role in the reoccupation. The guerillas, meanwhile, seized Japanese arms and recruited freely, forming an 8th Regiment and lifting their armed strength over 6,000.[12] At the same time they launched reprisals against collaborators in the Malay police force and the civilian population [12] and began to forcibly raise funds.[13]

Many in the rank and file advocated revolution.[14] The cautious approach favoured Lai Teck and a majority of the leadership prevailed, however, a decision which was later viewed as a major missed opportunity.[15]

On 12 September the British Military Administration (BMA) was installed at Kuala Lumpur.[15] Later that year MPAJA reluctantly agreed to disband. Weapons were handed in at ceremonies where the wartime role of the army was praised. [16] Six thousand eight-hundred soldiers were officially disbanded, but a proportion of weapons were withheld, particularly handguns.[17] The party was still not legal but able to operate without repression.

The MCP adopted a 'National Front' policy, building a broad coalition to work for national independence within legal means. Due to bad economic conditions, the BMA was immediately faced with strikes and demonstrations in which the Communists played an active part. Several were put down by armed force and leaders banished. The MCP also exerted influence through parliamentary parties such as the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) and the Malay Nationalist Party (MNU)[18].

In 1946, amid a discontent with the leadership's cautious line, an investigation commenced into rumors of Lai Teck's treachery.[19] Before he could be questioned in March 1947, Lai Teck fled the country with party funds.[20] Badly shaken, the Central Executive Committee kept the defection secret for a year while they struggled to come to terms with it. [21] The 26-year-old Chin Peng was chosen as the new Secretary General. A senior officer in the MPAJA 5th Regiment in Perak, he had been the party's principal liaison with Force 136. The party's stance became more resolutely anti-British.

Malayan Emergency

Amid a rising atmosphere of tension, government outlawed the burgeoning trade union federations on 12 June 1948. Then on 16 June they declared a state of emergency after three European planters were murdered in [Perak]] state. The police were given sweeping powers of arrest, and punishments including the death penalty could be administered without an ordinary trial.

In the two weeks following hundreds of MCP members were arrested, and the party was declared illegal on 23 July. Party militants regrouped in the jungle as the Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army (MPABA), many ex-MPAJA personnel. The initial commander, Lau Yew, was killed in action in 16 July. Chin Peng narrowly escaped arrested and rejoined his comrades with difficulty.

The guerrillas began to stage raids on isolated police posts, plantations, and mines. Their medium-term goal was to established 'Liberated Areas' in remote regions. The first raids were made by companies of about 200. Most were unsuccessful because the companies were unwieldy and the MPABA was not yet well organised and trained.[22]

During this period the MCP also engaged in intimidation, including assassination, of civilians with the aim of coercing material aid, information, and silence. This policy contributed to a loss in popular support and was repudiated by the C.E.C in September 1951.

On 1 February 1949 the MPABA changed its name to 'Malayan Peoples' Liberation Army' (MPLA) and The party began to campaign for a Peoples' Democratic Republic of Malaya, in which Singapore was to be included.[23]

The MPLA had a General Headquarters controlled by a Central Military Committee which consisted of the politburo and some of the MPLA's regimental commanders and political officers. The most influential members of the politburo were Chin Peng, Yeung Kwo and Lau Lee.[23] At this point the army had about 4000 soldiers, about 10% women. It was divided into ten Regiments, nine of which were predominantly Chinese and one of which was composed mostly of Malays and Indians. The latter was successfully eliminated by the British who wished to confine the insurgency to the Chinese community.[24]

A civilian organisation called the Min Yuen supported the MPLA, collecting supplies and information.[25]

The MPLA lived in jungle or forest camps similar to -- or even the same as -- to those which the MPAJA had used.[26] By mid 1950 they, with the help of the Min Yuen, had acquired uniforms. These were of either khaki or jungle green British pattern."[27] The MPAJA and MPLA usually wore three stars on their caps, signifying the three races of Malaya.

Road or rail ambushes averaged about 17 per month from September 1949 to February 1950, and 56 per month from then until September 1950, peaking at 100 in the latter month.[28]

As early as 1949 the British had begun to forcibly relocate some of the rural peasantry, especially squatters, into guarded camps so that they could not give aid to the guerrillas. Relocation became a major component of British strategy under the Plan instituted by General Briggs in 1950 and was pursued vigorously by General Templer who headed both the military and civil branches of the administration from 1952-1954. By the mid-1950s about 500,000 people (roughly ten percent of Malaya's population) had been moved into compounds, termed by the British 'New Villages', which were surrounded by high barbed wire fences and guarded by police. Internees were allowed out to work in the surrounding fields and plantations between 7 a.m. and 4 p.m., but were searched before leaving to ensure that they carried no supplies, especially food, that could be given to the guerrillas. The MCP recognised the New Villages program as a serious threat to their ability to maintain their guerrilla army and tried to convince the peasantry not to submit to relocation. This had little effect however because if the British suspected that a peasant village would resist relocation they would surround it before dawn and then take it by surprise so that no one could slip away.

To add to this, in June 1951 a more general food-control program called 'Operation Starvation' was instituted. In 'food restricted areas', eating was only permitted at home: cafes and restaurants were closed and people were not permitted to take food with them to work. Shop keepers had to keep strict account of all food sold and canned goods had to be punctured at time of sale to necessitate their being used promptly.[29]

Besides relocation, another form of movement control called 'regroupment' was used. Regroupment consisted in concentrating the dwellings of workers who lived at their place of employment, usually a mine or estate, in one part of the property, surrounding it with barbed wire and guarding it with special constables. It was similar to relocation except that the distance moved was generally less and the heads of the househlods kept their existing employment. About 650,000 people were regrouped in this manner.

In addition to these legal measures, it was fairly common, especially in the early years of the war, for the police or military simply to burn down villages that they believed were supporting the guerrillas. This was done, for instance to Kachau, Selangor, on 2 November 1948; the workers' residences at the Sungei Remok estate, Batu Kali, Selangor, on 12 December 1948; and to 144 of the houses of Hilam Kiang, Johore, on 19 January 1949. Government correspondence from the period reproduced in Short indicates that the practice was widespread; but also the cause of some internal disagreement: the army tending to favour burning, some civil officials counselling restraint.[30]

As a military strategy, the restrictive measures described above—taken to divorce the MCP from their sources of supply in the general population—were highly successful. By 1953 the MPLA was often short of food.[31] Recruitment began to be a problem. The MPLA's numerical strength, steady at 4,000 to 5,000 members since early in the war, began to fall: according to O'Ballance, at the end of 1953 it was just under 4,000; in June 1955 it was 3,000; at the end of 1956, 2,000; mid-1958, 1000; July 1961, 500. (More recent research tends to give higher numbers for the MPLA. Anthony Short writes that 5,000 guerrillas were on the Special Branch wanted lists at the end of 1953, and that the actual number of armed guerrillas at that time was probably about 6,000. Army figures reproduced in Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, suggest a guerrilla strength of about 3,500 in 1957.[32])

During the first four years of the war (June 1948 - June 1952) the MPLA had lost 3,149 killed, 915 captured, 752 surrendered, and 1,643 wounded (government figures; the wounded is an estimate): It had lost about 6,500 soldiers but been able to replenish itself through recruitment. The figures for the full twelve years of the war (June 1948 - July 1960) are 6,710 killed, 1,287 captured, 2,702 surrendered, 2,810 wounded. The rate of government predation was actually less after 1952; but the MPLA's numbers nevertheless dwindled.

By about 1952, faced with supply problems and less than the hoped for military success—Malaya's mine and plantation economy had not been crippled and no liberated areas had been established—the MCP began reducing its guerrilla attacks and focussing more on retrenchment and survival. It renewed its efforts at working through the trade unions and political parties.[33] The MPLA began planting large gardens in the jungle to feed itself; the British responded with aerial herbicide spraying.

The MPLA began to increasingly rely on Malaya's aboriginal population for support. O'Ballance states that Malaya had about 50,000 aborigines and about half of them initially supported the MPLA. (Others have set the number of aborigines at 100,000.) The MCP had established good relations with the aborigines. Even before World War Two some MCP cadres had traded with them; during the War they grew closer, allied at times in struggle versus the Japanese. The Party took the aborigines seriously, establishing Asal clubs as meeting places and for raising the aborigines' material level. This was in contrast to the colonial authorities who, before the aborigines became problematic by aiding the MPLA, barely noticed them and in fact had no definite idea of their numbers; their estimate of fifty- or a hundred- thousand was arrived at in a hurry early in the 'Emergency' years. It was symptomatic of the difference in attitude between the MCP and the colonialists toward the aborigines that the MCP called them Asal -- 'Origin' -- while the government called them by a conventional term, sakai, which means 'slave' and was, understandably, a cause of resentment. The government's approach early in the Emergency to the aborigines was to intern them in New Village-like camps, but the shock of this treatment was so great that hundreds died; also it left the deep forest entirely to the MPLA and eliminated the possibility for the government of using some of the aborigines as informants: for these reasons the aborigine internment program was discontinued and the government adopted instead a strategy of cultivating the aborigines' allegiance by offering them material incentives and of building forts to establish a government presence—whether protective or intimidating can be debated—in aborigine territory. If an aborigine garden plot was believed to be supplying food to the guerrillas, the Royal Air Force (RAF) would be called in with bombs and defoliants. By the mid-1950s a significant number of aborigines did begin to actively assist the government. The aborigines were extremely valuable allies for either side because of their jungle skills.[34]

In mid 1955 a letter was received at the offices of the United Planters' Association of Malaya, purporting to be from the 'Supreme Command Headquarters of the Malayan Liberation Army', and calling for peace talks, which it suggested include Malaya's political parties and various other associations. The government did not think that a negotiated peace would be to its advantage, however, and rejected the proposal.

In July 1955 Malaya's first general elections took place. As a result Prince (Tunku) Abdul Rahman became Malaya's parliamentary leader ('Chief Minister').[35] One of his first acts was to declare a partial amnesty "enabling insurgents to surrender and receive free pardons, the only exception being those who had committed criminal acts."[36] The amnesty remained in place until 8 February 1956 but resulted in only 73 surrenders.[37]

On 24 September 1955 Chin Peng sent a letter from Klian Intan, Perak, near the Thailand border, to Tunku Abdul Rahman and other members of the government, saying that the MCP was willing to send an envoy to negotiate peace. This was accepted and on 17 October two government representatives, Too Joon Hing, an Assistant Minister of Education, and I.S. Wylie, the Deputy Commissioner of the Federation police, met Chin Peng and another member of the MCP Central Executive Committee at Klian Intan. According to O'Ballance, "Despite the almost complete picture pieced together by the Special Branch of the Federation Police of the MCP, the MRLA and the Min Yuen, their personnel and suspected locations, this was the first time that the exact whereabouts of Chen Ping (sic) had been pinpointed with any degree of certainty. He was a skillful, elusive and experienced guerilla leader."[38] The meeting was not overly successful, its only positive result being that further meetings were arranged. These took place on November 17 and 29, at Klian Intan. They in turn paved the way for meetings between Chin Peng and Tunku Abdul Rahman that would take place in late December in the village of Baling, about 20 miles from the Thailand border. On 22 December the Security Forces were ordered to cease fire for ten days in a 400 square mile (1000 km²) area in Northern Perak and Kedah where the meeting was to be held.

On 24 December the MCP advocated in letters to Malayan newspapers a new 'Eight Point Program' which called for an end to the Emergency Regulations, a cessation of hostilities, reform of Malaya's political system, democratic rights, support for world peace, and attention to other matters including education, health, welfare, and industrial production.[39]

The Baling meeting was held on 28 and 29 December 1955. Representing the Government were Tunku Abdul Rahman, David Marshall, Chief Minister of Singapore, and Sir Chen Lock Tan, leader of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). For the MCP were Chin Peng and two other C.E.C. members, Chen Tian and Abdul Rashid bin Maidin. Chin Peng wanted legal recognition of the MCP and essentially a return to the status quo ante bellum[40]. The Government demanded the dissolution of the MCP and the talks broke down over that point.

The MCP went back to the jungle and hostilities recommenced. However, the slow decline of the guerrilla army continued.

In March or April 1956 Chin Peng sent a letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman offering to resume negotiations. This was rejected by Rahman in a broadcast on 2 April. Chin Peng's offer was repeated over the air from Radio Peking but no negotiations resulted.

In April 1957 Hor Lung, a Politburo member who had been in charge of the Southern region of the MPLA since 1953, surrendered to the security forces as the result of a bribe. The amount was not disclosed but was thought to be $496,000 Malayan (£ 55,000).[41] By this time the government was offering very large rewards to communists who turned informant.

For simply giving vital information to the police a person could earn in a few minutes as much as he could ever hope to make in a lifetime of rubber-tapping -- or far more, if as a result [a high ranking Communist was arrested].[42]

By July 1957, about 30,000 square miles (approximately 78,000 km²) out of Malaya's total area of 50,850 square miles (approximately 130,000 km²) had been declared by the government as 'White Areas' -- areas where the MPLA had essentially been eliminated and the Emergency Regulations withdrawn.[43] In August 1957, Kuala Lumpur and district were declared 'White'. By mid 1958 the MPLA existed mainly in Perak and the Southern part of Johore.[44]

On 31 August 1957 Malaya became nominally independent from Britain. Tunku Abdul Rahman became Prime Minister of the new country. The post of Director of Operations against the insurrection remained in place and continued to be filled by a British General. Lieutennant-General Archibald Cassels was appointed to that post.

On 4 October 1957 Chin Peng sent a pamphlet to newspapers and news agencies in Singapore, proposing an end to the war and pledging MCP support for the government if the MCP was given the status of a legal political party. On 12 October and 19 December, 1957, Chin Peng wrote to Tunku Abdul Rahman requesting peace talks. The Tunku's response to both of these letters was that he would not meet Chin Peng unless the MCP first agreed to surrender. In such a case the only possible purpose of the meeting would be to discuss surrender terms. Since the MCP was not willing to surrender—it had been proposing a mutual agreemant to stop fighting—there was no meeting.

By early 1959 the MPLA had lost its positions in Southern Malaya and was active only around the Thailand border.

On 31 July 1960 the government formally declared that the 'Emergency' was over. However, Emergency restrictions remained in place in the area near the Thailand border. A Border Security Council was formed to administer Emergency Regulations in parts of the four border States, Perlis, Kedah, Perak, and Kelantan.

Post-1960 Period

In the mid 1960s the U.S. State Department estimated the party membership to be approximately 2000.[45]

The Communist guerrilla force, with a strength of about 500, continued to subsist on either side of the Thailand border. Meanwhile Chin Peng and other cadre in China had limited contact with the jungle bases. From 1969 they launched a radio station in Hunan called "Suara Revolusi Malaya" (Voice of the Malayan Revolution), broadcasting to supporters in Malaysia and Singapore. This was shut down in 1981 at the request of Deng Xiao Ping.[46]

Also in 1969 there began a surge in armed struggle associated with the intensification of the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution in China. In 1970, however, the bases in Thailand were convulsed by the trials and executions of supposed spies. Two breakaway factions formed which condemned the purge. Chin Peng subsequently denied involvement and rehabilitated his accused comrades.[47]

The MCP laid down its arms in 1989. On December 2 at the town of Had Yai in Southern Thailand, Chin Peng, Rashid Maidin, and Abdullah C. D. met with representatives of the Malaysian and Thailand governments. Separate peace agreements were signed between the MCP and both governments.

MCP manifestos

From time to time the MCP released policy statements or manifestos to the public. Below is Wikipedia's initial attempt to list them:

  • 1940. Manifesto calling for expulsion of British imperialism.[48]
  • February 1943. Anti-Japanese Programme (nine points).[48]
  • 27 August 1945. Eight Point Manifesto. Generally moderate; the only demands objected to by the British were those for an elected assembly and a wide franchise. It "expressed the hope" (Cheah's words) that the British would consider granting self-government to Malaya.[49]
  • 7 November 1945. MCP put six proposals to the BMA. At least one of them went beyond the 27 August points: a demand for self government. This included asking that Malaya be allowed to control its own national defense and foreign relations. Other demands were for less government interference with freedom of speech, publication and assembly, increases of wages, and an end to restrictions on trade, travel and transportation.[50]

MCP newspapers

  • Charn Yew Pau (‘Combattants' Friend’). Published for the MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades.
  • MCP Review. Was active in at least May 1948, when it carried a feature on the 'Peasants Struggle in Perak'.
  • Min Pao. Published in Seremban. It was closed by the government in 1946.
  • Min Sheng Pau. Has been called the 'voice of the MCP'. It was Malaya's largest Chinese-language daily newspaper. In early June 1948 it tried to move its printing machinery and newsprint into the jungle. It was the MCP's largest financial asset on the peninsula. Its editor, Liew Yit Fan, was arrested 9 June 1948 for sedition.
  • Sin Min Chu ('New Democracy'). Founded late 1945 or early 1946.[51]

Prominent members

  • Chin Peng. Secretary-General 1947 - present.
  • Lai Teck (Loi Tak). Secretary-General 1939 - 1947. British and Japanese triple agent.
  • Wahi Annuar (Anwar). Took to the forests at the beginning of the emergency. Was a leader in the MPLA 10th Regiment. Surrendered in February 1950.[52]
  • R. G. Balan. Was in MPAJA. Attended Empire Communist Conference in London. Organised the Perak Rubber Labourers Union after his return from the Conference (circa 1948). It was a rival to John Emmanuel's government-sponsored faction of the Perak Estates Employees Union. Balan's union was very active from the beginning of 1948 until the emergency was declared. Balan was arrested 30 or 31 May 1948.
  • Abdullah C. D. May also have been in Malay Nationalist Party (MNP). Went into the jungle when the emergency was instituted. One of the three MCP signatories at Haad Yi, 1989.
  • Eng Min Chin (Ms). Member of Perak State organisation. In November 1945 she defended Lai Teck against rumors of disloyalty.
  • S. A. Ganapathy. Before World War Two he was a member of the Indian Communist Party, Malaya. During the period of Japanese rule he joined the Indian National Army (INA). While in the INA he resumed his Communist affiliation and late in the War was arrested by the Japanese for Communist propagandising. After the War he became President of the Pan Malayan General Labour Union (PMGLU), and President of the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU). At the beginning of the emergency he joined the guerrilla. He was arrested in May 1949 and hanged for possession of a pistol.
  • Yeong Kuo. Head of the Organisation Committee around 1946. Member of the Central Standing Committee (State C.E.C.?) from Selangor. Played a large role in the investigation against Lai Teck.[53]
  • Lau Mah. Aliases: Ah Chung, Chin Wei Seong. Secretary of MPAJA 5th Regiment, Perak, in at least 1945. Member of the MCP Central Executive Committee. Killed by security forces in Perak, December 1949.[54]
  • Lau Yew (Liu Yau). Probably the MCP's most skilled military commander. Chairman of the Central Military Committee of the MPAJA. President of the MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association. Head of the MPABA. Killed by government forces in Selangor, 16 July 1948.
  • Lee Soong (Lee Siong). MCP representative at the Calcutta Youth Conference, 1948.
  • Liew Yit Fan. Political Secretary of MPAJA 2nd Regiment. 'Open' representative of MCP in mid 1947. Editor of Min Sheng Pao, largest Chinese-language newspaper in the Federation. Arrested 9 June 1948 for sedition.[55]
  • Lin Ah Liang. Head of the Singapore branch of the MCP in at least 1946.
  • Abdul Rashid bin Maidin (Rashid Maidin). Attended the 'Empire' communist conference in London. May have met Ahmad Boestemam in May and early June 1948 to plan an insurrection to begin in 1950. Arrested at the beginning of the emergency but sprung from a camp in Malacca. One of the three MCP signatories at Haad Yi, 1989.
  • Soon Kwong. General Secretary of the Selangor MPAJU. He was arrested on 12 October 1945 and charged with extortion committed 10 September 1945. His arrest, and to a lesser extent that of several MPAJA and MPAJU officials before that, prompted a large anti-government demonstration.
  • Wu Tian Wang. MCP representative on the British-convoked Singapore Advisory Council, 1945.
  • Eu Chooi Yip: A brilliant graduate of Raffles College, he was the key leader of MCP (Singapore). Was the superior of "The Plen" (Fang Chuang Pi)

Bibliography

  • Edgar O'Ballance Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960. London: 1966. This book by Major O'Ballance, strongly British in sympathy, was intended partly as a reference work for anti-communist military planners. It is one of the earlier works on the war; some facts and figures in it may have been superseded by more recent research.
  • Kernial Singh Sandhu, "The Saga of the 'Squatter' in Malaya", Journal of South East Asian History, 1964.
  • Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya. London, 1975, Frederick Muller.
  • Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya.
  • Chin Peng, My Side of History.

References

  1. ^ O'Ballance, p.20.
  2. ^ According to O"Ballance, p.21.
  3. ^ O'Ballance, p.23.
  4. ^ O'Ballance p.24
  5. ^ O'Ballance p 25
  6. ^ O'Ballance, p 25.
  7. ^ O,Ballance, p 28.
  8. ^ P. 44.
  9. ^ O'Ballance, p 49.
  10. ^ O'Ballance, p 50.
  11. ^ Cheah,pp 74, 5; Short, p 24.
  12. ^ a b O'Ballance, p 61.
  13. ^ See Cheah, pp 252, 253, 261, 262.
  14. ^ O'Ballance, pp 62, 3.
  15. ^ a b O'Ballance, p 63.
  16. ^ O'Ballance, p. 65.
  17. ^ Shortp 36.
  18. ^ Cheah, p248.
  19. ^ Short, p. 39.
  20. ^ Short, p 39
  21. ^ O'Ballance, p 73, Short,p 41.
  22. ^ O'Ballance, pp 93, 114.
  23. ^ a b O'Ballance, p 89.
  24. ^ O'Ballance, p 100; Short, pp 208, 209.
  25. ^ O'Ballance, p 92.
  26. ^ P 104.
  27. ^ O'Ballance, pp 105, 6.
  28. ^ Short, pp 206, 211, 12(Short, p 211.)
  29. ^ O'Ballance, pp 112, 121. In the New Villages, pople were not allowed to have food in their individual dwellings; everybody ate at a central, supervised, mess hall.
  30. ^ Short, pp 110, 153,4 163-8.
  31. ^ O'Ballance, p 136.
  32. ^ Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, p 350. Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, p 55.
  33. ^ O'Ballance, pp 112, 113, 140, 141.
  34. ^ Sandhu, pp 166, 7.
  35. ^ O'Ballance, p 150.
  36. ^ O'Ballance's words (p 150); he does not explain why someone who had not committed any criminal act would need a pardon. The use of the word 'insurgents', though common, is also curious: the MPLA was not 'surging in' from anywhere; it was a locally assembled army, comprised almost entirely of malayan residents.
  37. ^ O'Ballance, p 154.
  38. ^ P 152.
  39. ^ O'Ballance. An MCP policy statement preparatory to Baling was also published by NCNA (Peking), 6 January 1956. The demands in it were very moderate; for instance it proposed that the Malay Sultans retain their full rights and privileges.
  40. ^ 'State of affairs before the war'.
  41. ^ O'Ballance, p 160.
  42. ^ O'Ballance.
  43. ^ O'Ballance, p 158.
  44. ^ O'Ballance, p 161.
  45. ^ Benjamin, Roger W.; Kautsky, John H.. Communism and Economic Development, in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 1. (Mar., 1968), pp. 122.
  46. ^ Chin Peng, My Side of History, pp 450, 457-460.
  47. ^ Chin Peng, My Side of History, pp 466-469,499.
  48. ^ a b Short, p 23.
  49. ^ Cheah, pp 242, 3; O'Ballance, pp 67, 153.
  50. ^ Cheah, p 243.
  51. ^ Cheah, p 244.
  52. ^ Short, p 209.
  53. ^ Short, p 39.
  54. ^ Short, p 206.
  55. ^ Short, p 60.

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