McCulloch v. Maryland

McCulloch v. Maryland Click here for more free books!

(1819) Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that affirmed the constitutional doctrine of Congress's implied powers. The case concerned the legitimacy of the authority of a newly created national bank to control the issuance of currency by the states, including Maryland. The unanimous opinion, written by John Marshall, established that Congress possesses not only the powers expressly conferred on it by the Constitution but also the authority appropriate to the utilization of such powers, in this case the creation of such a bank. This doctrine, drawn from the "elastic clause" of Article 1, became a significant factor in the steady growth of federal powers. It also bolstered the power of judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison (1803).

For more information on McCulloch v. Maryland, visit Britannica.com.

4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819), argued 22 Feb.–3 Mar. 1819, decided 6 Mar. 1819 by vote of 7 to 0; Marshall for the Court. McCulloch was one of Chief Justice John Marshall's most important decisions, and among his most eloquent. It settled the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution and determined the distribution of powers between the federal government and the states. The specific issues involved were Congress's power to incorporate the Second Bank of the United States and the right of a state to tax an instrument of the federal government.

Background

The constitutionality of the power of Congress to charter a corporation had been the source of debate ever since Alexander Hamilton proposed the creation of the First Bank of the United States in 1791. James Madison in Congress and Thomas Jefferson in George Washington's cabinet opposed the measure as unauthorized by the Constitution. But Congress and Washington sided with Hamilton, who justified it by a loose construction of the Constitution, and Congress chartered the Bank for a twenty‐year period. In 1811 a Jeffersonian‐dominated Congress refused to renew the charter, primarily on constitutional grounds, and the First Bank quietly expired. However, following five years of inflation and economic chaos that coincided with the War of 1812, Congress, though still under Jeffersonian control, reversed itself and chartered the Second Bank of the United States in 1816. Despite this, many Jeffersonians continued to oppose the Bank. They viewed it as unconstitutional and denied its economic necessity. Several states, including Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, and Georgia, adopted laws taxing its branches. An 1818 Maryland statute imposed a tax on all banks operating in the state “not chartered by the legislature.” The Baltimore branch of the bank, headed by its cashier, James McCulloch, refused to pay the tax. The Baltimore County Court upheld the state law. This judgment was quickly affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland and was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, on a writ of error. The Supreme Court declared the Maryland tax unconstitutional and void.

Opinion of the Court

In rendering his opinion for the entire Supreme Court, Marshall first considered the question “has Congress power to incorporate a bank?” (p. 401). To answer this, he looked to the origins and nature of the federal union. The Constitution had been submitted to the people and ratified by specially elected conventions. As a consequence, “the government proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ in the name of the people” (p. 403). By asserting this, Marshall offered a nationalist alternative to the theory of the origins of the union propounded by Jeffersonians in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798–1799, which claimed that the federal government was a product of a compact of the states and had only specifically granted and limited power (see State Sovereignty and States' Rights). “The government of the Union,” Marshall argued in clear and strong terms, “ … is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit” (pp. 404–405).

Like Hamilton before him, Marshall resorted to a loose interpretation of the Constitution to justify Congress's authority to create the Second Bank of the United States. Marshall admitted that the federal government was one of enumerated powers and could only exercise those powers granted to it. But, he added, there could be no doubt “that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action” (p. 405). He observed that although the power to charter a corporation is not a specifically enumerated power, there is nothing in the Constitution that excludes it. This included the Tenth Amendment, which, unlike a predecessor provision in the Articles of Confederation, did not include the word “expressly” and therefore allowed “incidental or implied powers.” Marshall further observed that the federal government was not established by a complex legal code, excessively detailed in a vain attempt to meet every exigency. Rather, the Constitution contained only a general outline of the federal government's structure and powers, in which only its most important objects were designated while the rest of its powers were to “be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves” (p. 407). He concluded, “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” (p. 407).

From these premises about the origins and nature of the Constitution, Marshall proceeded to justify the creation of the Bank of the United States. The Constitution had delegated certain specified powers to the federal government: to lay and collect taxes (see Taxing and Spending Clause), to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to declare and conduct war (see War Powers), and to raise and support armies and navies. It was in the best interests of the nation, the chief justice observed, that Congress should have the means to exercise these delegated powers. In particular, the bank was a convenient, useful, and essential instrument in the implementation of the nation's fiscal policies. Since the Constitution had given Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the forgoing Powers,” the Bank of the United States was constitutional.

Marshall elaborated on the need for a loose and expansive interpretation of the powers of the federal government. He rejected the idea of a strict interpretation of the Constitution then espoused by states' rights Jeffersonians. Such a reading of the Constitution would make it unworkable. Marshall argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause had been included among the powers of Congress, not among its limitations, and was meant to enlarge, not reduce, the ability of Congress to execute its enumerated powers. Marshall declared:

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. (p. 421)

Impact and Reaction

The decision was controversial. Opponents of the bank remained irreconcilable. They did not view the bank primarily as an agency of the federal government. To them it was a profit‐making corporation that performed a few government services. The Second Bank had been capitalized at $35 million. Eighty percent of its stock (on which substantial dividends were paid) was in private hands, and shareholders appointed four‐fifths of the board of directors.

Critics of the decision also denounced Marshall's ringing endorsement of a broad interpretation of the power of the federal government. Most proponents of states' rights in Virginia had doubts about the bank's constitutionality, but in 1816 they had accepted the argument that it was needed to restore financial stability. Unlike the bank's opponents in several other states, the advocates of local government in Virginia never tried to tax the bank out of existence. They were troubled not that the court had upheld the constitutionality of the bank, but that it had justified loose and expansive interpretation of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson privately encouraged public opposition to the decision. John Taylor published an important book, Construction Construed (1820), denouncing the decision, and Virginia jurists Spencer Roane and William Brockenbrough wrote a series of essays for the Richmond Enquirer condemning the broad implications of the Court's ruling. Marshall personally responded to Roane in a series of anonymous newspaper articles upholding his own handiwork.

Critics of the decision also included James Madison, who as president of the United States (1809–1817) had signed the bill creating the Second Bank of the United States into law, and who generally supported most of the Supreme Court's nationalist rulings during the second decade of the nineteenth century. Despite this, he believed “that the occasion did not call for the general and abstract doctrine interwoven with the decision of the particular case.” The real danger of Marshall's decision, Madison believed, was “the high sanction given to a latitude in expounding the Constitution which seems to break down the landmarks intended by a specification of the powers of Congress, and to substitute for a definite connection between means and ends, a legislative discretion as to the former to which no practical limit can be assigned.” Among other things, the decision seemed to sanction a federal program of internal improvements. Such a program would have involved not only the building of roads, canals, and bridges, but also an assortment of educational, scientific, and literary institutions throughout the country. Both Jefferson and Madison favored such a program on policy grounds, but believed the jurisdictional problems raised by it were so complex and controversial that they could only be clarified through an amendment to the Constitution. In his McCulloch v. Maryland decision, Marshall aligned the U.S. Supreme Court with those aggressive nationalists like Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and John Quincy Adams, who argued that a constitutional amendment was not necessary since Congress already had power to enact such a program.

The Bank's victory in McCulloch v. Maryland turned out to be short‐lived. In 1828 states' rights as a political movement triumphed with the election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency. Rejecting the binding quality of McCulloch v. Maryland and building on the lingering resentment that continued toward the bank, Jackson in 1832 vetoed a bill to recharter it, on constitutional grounds. In a series of other vetoes, Jackson also effectively finished off any hope for a federal program of internal improvements. Despite this, Marshall's broad interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause as well as his view of the origins and nature of the federal union were ultimately to triumph on a more significant level. The Civil War brought an end to Jacksonian hegemony and discredited states' rights. The constitutional revolution that followed took the country in a strong nationalist direction. In the twentieth century McCulloch v. Maryland quickly became the virtually undisputed constitutional cornerstone for the federal government's broad involvement in the economy, for the New Deal and the Welfare State, and for various other social, scientific, and educational programs.

See also Commerce Power; Implied Powers; Judicial Review.

Bibliography

• Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland (1969).
• Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (1957).
• Harold J. Plous and Gordon E. Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland: Right Principle, Wrong Case, Stanford Law Review 9 (1957): 710–739.
• G. Edward White, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vols. 3–4, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–35 (1988)

— Richard E. Ellis

• 4 Wheat. 316 (1819)
• Vote: 7–0
• For the Court: Marshall

Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States in 1816 to provide a sound national currency. But the bank soon proved very unpopular in many states. Maryland passed a law that levied an extremely high tax on any bank in the state without a state charter. At the time, the Second Bank of the United States was the only bank operating in Maryland that was not chartered by the state. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States, refused to pay the tax. Maryland sued McCulloch and won in the Maryland courts.

Officials of the bank appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. They claimed the state tax interfered unconstitutionally with the federally chartered bank. Maryland argued that Congress had no power to charter the bank and that the state had the power to tax the bank.

The Issue

The Constitution did not expressly give Congress the power to charter a national bank. However, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, did grant Congress the power to “make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.” Did this “necessary and proper” clause give Congress adequate power only to do those few things indispensable for carrying out its listed, or delegated, powers? Or did it ensure that Congress could do nearly anything it wanted, such as chartering a national bank, to exercise its delegated powers?

In addition, did states have the power to tax a national bank? Was national law or state law supreme in this case?

Opinion of the Court

The Court upheld the power of Congress to create a national bank. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that the Constitution did not need to expressly authorize Congress to establish a bank. Such expressly listed congressional powers as the power to tax, to spend money, to borrow money, and to support the army and navy implied that Congress had the power to establish a bank.

At the same time, the Court ruled that the states could not tax the bank. Marshall declared that allowing states to tax part of the national government would interfere with national supremacy. “The power to tax involves the power to destroy.”

Thus, the Court established two important constitutional principles. The first, the implied powers doctrine, stated that the legal system should interpret broadly the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution to let Congress choose the means it wished to employ to carry out the powers the Constitution expressly gave it. Marshall wrote, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”

The second principle, national supremacy, forbids the states to intrude into the constitutional operations of the federal government. It reinforced the supremacy of the Constitution and federal laws over state laws that conflict with them.

Significance

The McCulloch decision has been used to support a broad construction of the Constitution that enables the federal government to apply the supreme law flexibly to meet the new problems of changing times. In the McCulloch case Chief Justice Marshall made a memorable statement, which is often quoted to support a broad interpretation of the federal government's constitutional powers: “This … is… a constitution we are expounding, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”

Today, many bills Congress passes to some extent draw their legitimacy from the necessary and proper clause and the broad construction of the Constitution exemplified in Marshall's McCulloch opinion. For example, federal laws pertaining to the regulation of airlines or broadcasting are based on the necessary and proper clause, not on express powers of Congress specified in the Constitution.

The McCulloch decision also strengthened the Court's powers of judicial review over acts of state governments. Thus, it pleased advocates of federal supremacy and infuriated supporters of state powers and rights. The vision of national supremacy under the Constitution, expressed in Chief Justice Marshall's McCulloch opinion, has prevailed in the 20th century.

See also Constitutional construction; Federalism; Implied powers

Sources

• Gerald Gunther, John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969).
• Bray Hammond, “The Bank Cases”, in Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, edited by John A. Garraty (New York: Harper & Row, 1987)

Mcculloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819), was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on 6 March 1819. Congress had incorporated the second Bank of the United States, a branch of which was established in Baltimore. The state of Maryland required all banks not chartered by the state to pay a tax on each issuance of bank notes. When James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, issued notes without paying the tax, Maryland brought suit. Two questions were at issue: first, whether Congress had power under the Constitution to establish a bank and, second, whether Maryland could impose a tax on this bank.

Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the opinion for a unanimous court upholding the power of Congress to charter a bank as a government agency and denying the power of a state to tax the agency. Marshall's discussion, broadly interpreting the powers of Congress, is still a classic statement of the Implied Powers of the federal government. Since the Constitution empowers the government to tax, borrow, and engage in war, Congress, by incorporating a bank, was creating the means to attain the goals of these powers. The chief justice phrased the basic point as follows: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." Along with this principle, Marshall expounded the notion of federal supremacy, noting that the national government, "though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action."

Having reaffirmed the principle of federal supremacy, Marshall responded to the second question, which was whether the state of Maryland could legally tax a branch of the U.S. bank located in that state. The power of the federal government to incorporate a bank had been established; the supremacy of the federal government in legal conflicts with state authority had likewise been set forth; and there was agreement that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." It followed from all of this that an admittedly legal function of the federal government could not be subjected to possible destruction by an inferior government through taxation. The state tax was void.

Bibliography

Gunther, Gerald, ed. John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969.

Kelly, Alfred H., Winfred A. Harbison, and Herman Belz. The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development. 7th ed. New York: Norton, 1991.

White, G. Edward. The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–1835. New York, 1988.

McCulloch v. Maryland is a keynote case, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), decided by the U.S. Supreme Court that established the principles that the federal government possesses broad powers to pass a number of types of laws, and that the states cannot interfere with any federal agency by imposing a direct tax upon it.

This case represents another illustrative example of the ongoing debate among the founders of the U.S. constitutional government regarding the balance of powers between the states and the federal government. The Federalists were in favor of a strong central government, whereas the Republicans wanted the states to retain most powers. Those who wrote and ratified the U.S. Constitution ultimately agreed to grant the federal government certain specific powers known as the enumerated powers—listed in the Constitution—and concluded with a general provision that permitted Congress to make all laws that are necessary and proper for the carrying out of the foregoing powers, as well as all other powers vested in the U.S. government by the Constitution. Some people were fearful that such a provision, which is called the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, was a blanket authorization for the federal government to regulate the states.

Subsequently, a series of articles—which came to be called the Federalist Papers—were published in New York newspapers. These articles defended the clause on the basis that any power only constitutes that ability to do something, and that the power to do something is the power to utilize a means of doing it. It is necessary for a legislature to have the power to make laws; therefore, the proper means of exercising that power is by making "necessary and proper" laws. The Constitution was, therefore, ratified in 1789 with the Necessary and Proper Clause.

In exercise of the power conferred by that clause, the first Congress enacted a law in 1791 that incorporated a national bank called the Bank of the United States, which operated as a private bank, took deposits of private funds, made private loans, and issued bank notes that could be used like money. In addition, wherever branches were established, it operated as a place for the federal government to deposit its funds. The legislation that incorporated the bank stated in its preamble that it would be extremely conducive to the successful operation of the national finances, would aid in the obtaining of loans for the use of the government in sudden emergencies, and would produce considerable advantages to trade and industry in general.

That bank charter was allowed to expire in 1811; however, a second Bank of the United States was incorporated in 1816 with one-fifth of its stock owned by the United States, and it became extremely unpopular. This was particularly true in the South and West, where it first overexpanded credits and then drastically limited them, thereby contributing to the failure of many state-chartered banks. A number of states attempted to keep branches of the national bank out of their states by passing laws proscribing any banks not chartered by the state or by imposing heavy taxes on them. The only bank affected by these laws was the Bank of the United States. The tremendous dispute that subsequently arose between the federal and state governments required resolution by the Supreme Court.

Maryland had one of the least stringent rules against the bank, which required that any bank or branch that was not established subject to the authority of the state must use special stamped paper for its bank notes and, in effect, pay 2 percent of the value of the notes as a tax or pay a general tax of $15,000 a year. Maryland brought suit against McCulloch, cashier of the Bank of the United States, for not paying the tax and won ajudgment for the amount of the penalties. An appeal was brought to the Supreme Court by McCulloch.

Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the majority opinion of the Court, which reversed the Maryland judgment. The Court held that the federal government has the power to do what is necessary and proper, which included the grant of authority to establish a national bank. Maryland, therefore, had no right to tax the bank, a conclusion which was based upon the theory that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." A state cannot have authority under the Constitution to destroy or tax any agency that has been properly set up by the federal government. On that basis, the law that was passed by the legislature of Maryland that imposed a tax on the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional and void.

See: Constitution of the United States; Federalism; Federalist Papers.

McCulloch v. Maryland
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 22, 1819 Decided March 6, 1819
Full case name	James McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, John James
Citations	17 U.S. 316 (more) 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316; 4 L. Ed. 579; 1819 U.S. LEXIS 320; 4 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 4491; 4 Wheat. 316; 42 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) P77,296
Prior history	Judgment for John James, Baltimore County Court; affirmed, Maryland Court of Appeals
Subsequent history	None
Holding
Although the Constitution does not specifically give Congress the power to establish a bank, it does delegate the ability to tax and spend, and a bank is a proper and suitable instrument to assist the operations of the government in the collection and disbursement of the revenue. Because federal laws have supremacy over state laws, Maryland had no power to interfere with the bank's operation by taxing it. Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.
Court membership
Chief Justice John Marshall Associate Justices Bushrod Washington · William Johnson Henry B. Livingston · Thomas Todd Gabriel Duvall · Joseph Story
Case opinions
Majority	Marshall, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18

The text of the McCulloch v. Maryland decision, handed down March 6, 1819, as recorded in the minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the Court determined the separate states could not tax the federal government.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. The state of Maryland had attempted to impede operation of a branch of the Second Bank of the United States by imposing a tax on all notes of banks not chartered in Maryland. Though the law, by its language, was generally applicable, the U.S. Bank was the only out-of-state bank then existing in Maryland, and the law is generally recognized as having specifically targeted the U.S. Bank. The Court invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause in the Constitution, which allowed the Federal government to pass laws not expressly provided for in the Constitution's list of express powers as long as those laws are in useful furtherance of the express powers.

This fundamental case established the following two principles:

1. The Constitution grants to Congress implied powers for implementing the Constitution's express powers, in order to create a functional national government.
2. State action may not impede valid constitutional exercises of power by the Federal government.

The opinion was written by Chief Justice John Marshall.

Contents 1 Background 2 Supreme Court decision 3 Later history 4 See also 5 References 6 External links

Background

On April 10, 1816, the Congress of the United States passed an act entitled "An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States" which provided for the incorporation of the Second Bank of the United States. The Bank first went into full operation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1817, the Bank opened a branch in Baltimore, Maryland, and transacted and carried on business as a branch of the Bank of the United States by issuing bank notes, discounting promissory notes, and performing other operations usual and customary for banks to do and perform. Both sides of the litigation admitted that the President, directors and company of the Bank had no authority to establish the Baltimore branch, or office of discount and deposit, other than the fact that Maryland had adopted the Constitution of the United States.

On February 11, 1818, the General Assembly of Maryland passed an act entitled, "an act to impose a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature":

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland that if any bank has established or shall, without authority from the State first had and obtained establish any branch, office of discount and deposit, or office of pay and receipt in any part of this State, it shall not be lawful for the said branch, office of discount and deposit, or office of pay and receipt to issue notes, in any manner, of any other denomination than five, ten, twenty, fifty, one hundred, five hundred and one thousand dollars, and no note shall be issued except upon stamped paper of the following denominations; that is to say, every five dollar note shall be upon a stamp of ten cents; every ten dollar note, upon a stamp of twenty cents; every twenty dollar note, upon a stamp of thirty cents; every fifty dollar note, upon a stamp of fifty cents; every one hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of one dollar; every five hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of ten dollars; and every thousand dollar note, upon a stamp of twenty dollars; which paper shall be furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, under the direction of the Governor and Council, to be paid for upon delivery; provided always that any institution of the above description may relieve itself from the operation of the provisions aforesaid by paying annually, in advance, to the Treasurer of the Western Shore, for the use of State, the sum of $15,000.

And be it enacted that the President, cashier, each of the directors and officers of every institution established or to be established as aforesaid, offending against the provisions aforesaid shall forfeit a sum of $500 for each and every offence, and every person having any agency in circulating any note aforesaid, not stamped as aforesaid directed, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding $100, every penalty aforesaid to be recovered by indictment or action of debt in the county court of the county where the offence shall be committed, one-half to the informer and the other half to the use of the State...

James McCulloch, head of the Baltimore Branch of the Second Bank of the United States, refused to pay the tax. The lawsuit was filed by John James, an informer who sought to collect one half of the fine as provided for by the statute. The case was appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals where the state of Maryland argued that "the Constitution is silent on the subject of banks." It was Maryland's contention that because the Constitution did not specifically state that the Federal Government was authorized to charter a bank, the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional. The court upheld Maryland. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court decision

The court determined that Congress had the power to charter the bank. Chief Justice Marshall, supported this conclusion with three main arguments.

1. The Court argued that the Constitution was a social contract made with the people of the United States at the Constitutional Convention. The government proceeds from the people and binds the state sovereignties. Therefore, the federal government is supreme, based on the consent of the people. Marshall declares the federal government’s overarching supremacy in his statement:

“

If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this– that the government of the Union, though limited in its power, is supreme within its sphere of action.

”

2. Congress must act under explicit or implied powers of the Constitution. Pragmatically, if all of the means for implementing the explicit powers were listed, then we would not be able to understand or embrace the document; it would not be possible to write them all down in a brief document. Although the term "bank" is not included, there are express powers in the Taxing and Spending Clause. Although not explicitly stated, Congress has the implied power to create the bank in order to implement the express powers.

3. Marshall supported the Court's opinion textually using the Necessary and Proper Clause, which permits Congress to seek an objective that is within the enumerated powers as long as it is rationally related to the objective and not forbidden by the Constitution. Marshall rejected Maryland's narrow interpretation of the clause, because many of the enumerated powers would be useless. Marshall noted that the Necessary and Proper Clause is listed within the powers of Congress, not the limitations.

For those reasons, the word "necessary" does not refer to the only way of doing something, but rather applies to various procedures for implementing all constitutionally established powers. Marshall wrote:

“

Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.

”

This principle had been established many years earlier by Alexander Hamilton:[1]

“

[A] criterion of what is constitutional, and of what is not so.... is the end, to which the measure relates as a mean. If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the national authority. There is also this further criterion which may materially assist the decision: Does the proposed measure abridge a pre-existing right of any State, or of any individual? If it does not, there is a strong presumption in favour of its constitutionality....

”

Chief Justice Marshall also determined that Maryland may not tax the bank without violating the Constitution. The Court held that Maryland violated the Constitution by taxing the bank, and therefore voided that tax. The opinion stated that Congress has implied powers that need to be related to the text of the Constitution, but need not be enumerated within the text. This case was a seminal moment in the formation of a balance between federalism, federal power, and states' powers.

Chief Justice Marshall also explained in this case that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not require that all federal laws be necessary and proper. Federal laws that are enacted directly pursuant to one of the express, enumerated powers need not comply with the Necessary and Proper Clause. As Marshall put it, this Clause "purport[s] to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted.

Later history

McCulloch v. Maryland was cited in the first substantial constitutional case presented before the High Court of Australia in D'Emden v Pedder, which dealt with similar issues in the Australian Federation; while recognizing United States law as not binding on them, nevertheless determined that the McCulloch decision provided the best guideline for the relationship between the Commonwealth federal government and the Australian States owing to strong similarities between the American and Australian federations, and specifically cited Marshall's opinion in deciding the case.

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 17
• Necessary and Proper Clause
• Daniel Webster

References

• Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1996.
• Jean Edward Smith, The Constitution American Foreign Policy, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1989.
• Karen O'Connor (professor), Larry J. Sabato, "American Government: Continuity and Change," New York, Pearson, 2006.
• Tushnet, Mark (2008). I dissent: Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 17–30. ISBN 9780807000366. 

External links

• Text of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) is available from:  · Enfacto · Findlaw · LII

• Minutes from the Court's Discussion of the Case
• Case Brief for McCulloch v. Maryland at Lawnix.com

This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have been reviewed by professional editors (see full disclaimer)