Generally involving large units, either simulated (command-post exercises, CPXs) or real (field-training exercises, FTXs), military exercises have evolved over the years as a means of training and evaluating personnel and of testing current procedures and new ideas.
Simulated combat had formed part of military training for centuries, and the Roman army owed part of its success to its realistic training. But with the rise of professional staffs and conscript armies during the late 19th century, large-scale exercises developed in most European countries as a means of enabling commanders and staffs to gain practical experience commanding large units and as the culminating point in the annual training cycle. They were usually scheduled after the harvest, when access to land was eased and reservists, if required, could be called up with the minimum of disruption. Imperial Germany began the trend with an exercise that took place once a year in the autumn (called the Kaisermanöver) that pitted two army corps (each of two divisions) against one another. The Kaisermanöver was organized and directed by the members of the general staff and was usually attended by the kaiser and foreign military observers. These annual manoeuvres provided the only opportunity units would have of operating together as a corps, giving valuable experience to higher commanders and troops alike. They could be gruelling affairs. For instance, during the 1912 manoeuvres, the IV Army Corps marched 65 miles (105 km) in 41 hours and fought a ‘battle’ at the end. At the conclusion of the exercise, the CGS would give a critique which examined the conduct of both parties, noted successes and failures, and drew lessons for distribution to the rest of the army. The manoeuvres could be crucial for an officer's career. Good performances were rewarded and poor performances could often prove detrimental to the prospect of promotion. However, there was often a tendency to stage-manage exercises so that the desired result was obtained. In the German case manoeuvres often culminated in the kaiser taking personal command and deciding the day with a cavalry charge.
The spread of enclosure and complaints from civilians encouraged many armies to procure land on which at least some of their exercises could take place, though often they combined a clash on the exercise area with cross-country movement to reach it. In 1857 the French army bought land just north of Châlons-sur-Marne (now Châlons-en-Champagne) and from 1857 to 1868 a full corps of several infantry divisions and a cavalry division spent the summer there. The British army trained on a far smaller area at Aldershot, and later bought land on Salisbury Plain. The acquisition of land for military training accelerated into the 20th century, with ‘emergency’ puchases during wartime tending to remain in military hands. With the end of the Cold War western armies have come under growing pressure to divest themselves of training areas, encouraging the utilization of unproductive terrain elsewhere: the British army, for instance, makes extensive use of a vast tract of land near Suffield in Canada.
Today, military exercises are generally less formal and less regular, but serve similar functions—partly because, since the end of the Cold War, real operations are more frequent. Exercises are divided into two broad groupings. Command-post exercises involve only commanders and their staffs and simulate combat between two large-size forces. Field-training exercises, on the other hand, involve commanders and their troops training under realistic conditions and often comprise ‘force-on-force’ actions similar to the Kaisermanöver of imperial Germany. Exercises today often have the added function of serving a diplomatic role. Training involving forces from different states can work as a means of promoting contact and goodwill between nations. For instance, multinational exercises between NATO troops and former Warsaw Pact armies serve to diffuse the tensions which had arisen between the nations during the long Cold War. Further, exercises can be used to demonstrate power in a region, either by co-operating with a particular country or by proving the capability for deployment. Occasionally, these can result in conflict. For example, in 1986, a carrier battle group of the US navy undertook exercises in the Gulf of Sirte off the coast of Libya, ostensibly to demonstrate that the USA rejected Libya's territorial claim to the entire Gulf. These operations prompted a Libyan response and resulted in the downing of several Libyan aircraft, the sinking of several Libyan missile ships, and the withdrawal of Libyan claims to the Gulf.
— Robert Foley
