Miranda v. Arizona

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(1966) U.S. Supreme Court decision that specified a code of conduct for police during interrogations of criminal suspects. Miranda established that the police are required to inform arrested persons that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them, and that they have the right to an attorney. The case involved a claim by the plaintiff that the state of Arizona, by obtaining a confession from him without having informed him of his right to have a lawyer present, had violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment regarding self-incrimination. The 5-to-4 decision shocked the law-enforcement community; several later decisions limited the scope of the Miranda safeguards. See also rights of the accused.

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384 U.S. 436 (1966), argued 28 Feb. 1966, decided 13 June 1966 by vote of 5 to 4; Warren for the Court, Clark, Harlan, White, and Stewart in dissent. The Warren Court's revolution in American criminal procedure reached its high point (or, depending on one's perspective, its low point) on 13 June 1966. That day the Court handed down its opinion in Miranda, the most famous, and most bitterly criticized, confession case in the nation's history. To some, Miranda symbolized the legal system's determination to treat even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspect with dignity and respect. But to others, especially those who attributed rising crime rates to the softness of judges, the case became a target of abuse.

Background

Prior to the decision in Miranda, the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal case was governed by the due process “voluntariness” or “totality of the circumstances” test. Under this approach, the courts decided on a case‐by‐case basis whether the will of the person who confessed had been “broken” or “over‐borne” or whether the confession had been voluntary. But it soon became clear that these terms were not being used as tools of analysis, but as mere conclusions. When a court concluded that the “totality” of a suspect's treatment had not been too bad (e.g., although the police had exerted considerable pressure and used some trickery, they had given the suspect a sandwich and permitted him to have a normal night's sleep), it called the resulting confession “voluntary.” On the other hand, when a court concluded that police methods were too offensive or too heavy‐handed (in consideration of such factors as the suspect's youth, poor education, or low intelligence), it labeled the resulting confession “involuntary” or “coerced” (see Coerced Confessions).

The vagueness and unpredictability of the voluntariness test, its application (or manipulation) by lower courts so as to validate confessions of doubtful constitutionality, and the inability of the Supreme Court, because of its heavy workload, to review more than one or two state confession cases a year, led a growing number of the justices to search for a more meaningful and more manageable alternative approach. Miranda was the culmination of these efforts.

Facts of the Case

Ernesto Miranda, an indigent twenty‐three‐year‐old who had not completed the ninth grade, was arrested at his home and taken directly to a Phoenix, Arizona, police station. There, after being identified by the victim of a rape‐kidnapping, he was taken to an “interrogation room,” where he was questioned about the crimes. At first, Miranda maintained his innocence, but after two hours of questioning, the police emerged from the room with a signed written confession of guilt. At his trial, the written confession was admitted into evidence and Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape.

Whether Miranda had been told that anything he said could be used against him was unclear. But the police admitted—and this was to prove fatal for the prosecution—that neither before nor during the questioning had Miranda been advised of his right to consult with an attorney before answering any questions or his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation (see Counsel, Right to).

Miranda's confession plainly would have been admissible under the voluntariness test. His questioning had been quite mild compared to the objectionable police methods that had rendered a resulting confession involuntary or coerced in previous cases. But the confession was obtained from Miranda under circumstances that did not satisfy the new constitutional standards the Court was to promulgate in this very case.

A remarkable feature of the American history of confessions law is that until the mid‐1960s the privilege against self‐incrimination (the Fifth Amendment provision that no person “shall be compelled … to be a witness against himself”) did not apply to the proceedings in the interrogation room or to in‐custody police interrogation.

One reason for this situation was that the privilege was not deemed applicable to the states until 1964 and by that time a large body of law pertaining to involuntary or coerced state confessions had developed (see Incorporation Doctrine). Moreover, and more important, the prevailing pre‐Miranda view was that “compelling” someone to testify against him‐ or herself meant legal compulsion. Since a suspect was threatened neither with perjury for testifying falsely nor contempt for refusing to testify at all, it could not be said, ran the argument, that a person undergoing police interrogation was being “compelled” to be “a witness against himself” within the meaning of the privilege—even though under such circumstances a person is likely to assume or to be led by the police to believe that there are legal (or extralegal) sanctions for “refusing to cooperate.” Since the police had no lawful authority to make a suspect answer their questions (although, prior to Miranda, the police did not have to tell a person that), there was no legal obligation to answer to which a privilege in the technical sense could apply.

Although this reasoning seems quite strained, it prevailed as long as it did probably because of a widely held view that questioning a suspect without advising him of his rights was “indispensable” to law‐enforcement work. Moreover, the invisibility of police interrogation made it easy for society to be complacent about what really took place in the interrogation room.

On the eve of Miranda, however, there was reason to think that the self‐incrimination clause would finally apply to the police station. In Malloy v. Hogan (1964), which did not involve a confession, the Court not only held the privilege against self‐incrimination fully applicable to the states, but also stated by way of dictum (see Obiter Dictum) that the admissibility of a confession in a state or federal court should be controlled by the Fifth Amendment privilege. The confession rules and the privilege had become intertwined in Malloy—and they would be fused in Miranda.

Decision

There are three parts to the Miranda decision:

First, the Fiffh Amendment privilege is available outside of court proceedings and other formal proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings from being compelled to incriminate themselves. Thus, the privilege applies to informal compulsion exerted by law‐enforcement officers during “custodial interrogation,” that is, questioning initiated by the police after a person has been taken into custody.

Second, “[A]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described in the [standard police interrogation manuals] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak” (p. 461). Because the custodial interrogation environment “carries its own badge of intimidation” that is “at odds” with the privilege, “[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,” no statement obtained from a person under these circumstances is admissible (pp. 457–458).

Third, the Constitution does not require adherence to any particular system for dispelling the coercion of custodial interrogation. However, unless the government utilizes other procedures that are at least as effective, in order for a statement to be admissible, a suspect must be given the now familiar four‐fold Miranda warning (set forth below) before being subjected to custodial interrogation and must effectively waive his or her rights before any questioning.

According to Miranda, advising a suspect that he has a right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him is not sufficient to assure that the suspect's right to choose between silence and speech will remain unfettered throughout the interrogation process. Therefore, a suspect must also be told of her right to counsel, either retained or (if she is indigent) appointed.

Although the warnings need not be given in the exact form described in the Miranda opinion—indeed, they are not described exactly the same way throughout the opinion—the substance of each of the following four warnings must be effectively given: (1) You have the right to remain silent; (2) anything you say can and will be used against you; (3) you have the right to talk to a lawyer before being questioned and to have him or her present when you are being questioned; and (4) if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for you before any questioning if you so desire.

Miranda has been widely criticized as a case that tilted the balance heavily in favor of criminal suspects. However, as the Court noted in Moran v. Burbine (1986), the decision “embodies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's interests” (p. 433, n. 4).

Miranda does not require that a person taken into custody first consult with a lawyer or actually have a lawyer present in order for his or her waiver of constitutional rights to be valid. The decision's weakness (or saving grace, depending on one's viewpoint) is that it permits those subjected to the inherent pressures of police custody to “waive” their rights without actually obtaining the guidance of counsel. That waiver, at least in theory, must be “knowing” and “voluntary.”

Miranda allows the police to conduct “general‐on‐the‐scene questioning” without providing the warnings. It also allows the police to interview a suspect in his home or office without advising him of his rights, provided the questioning takes place in a context that does not restrict the person's freedom to terminate the meeting.

Moreover, Miranda leaves the police free to hear and act on “volunteered” statements even though the “volunteer” has been taken into custody and neither knows nor is informed of his or her rights. “Custody” alone does not call for the Miranda warnings. It is the impact on the suspect of the interplay between police interrogation and police custody that makes “custodial police interrogation” so corrosive and calls for “adequate protective devices” (Illinois v. Perkins, 1990).

Even when warnings and the waiver of rights are required, Miranda permits the police to give the warnings and to obtain waivers without the presence of any disinterested observer and without any tape recording of the proceedings. (This is so even when a tape recording is readily available.)

Whether the promptings of conscience or the desire to get the matter over with usually override the impact of the warnings, or whether the police too often mumble or undermine the warnings, almost all empirical studies indicate that in the quarter century since Miranda was decided, custodial suspects have continued to make incriminating statements with great frequency. This might not have been the case if a tape recording of police warnings and the suspect's response were required whenever feasible. There is little doubt that it would not have been the case if Miranda had required that a suspect first consult with a lawyer or actually have a lawyer present in order for his or her waiver of rights to be effective.

Concerns about Miranda's Future

For supporters of Miranda, an ominous note was struck in Michigan v. Tucker (1974), in which the Court, speaking through Justice William *Rehnquist, viewed the Miranda warnings as “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” but only “prophylactic standards” designed to “safeguard” or to “provide practical reinforcement” for the privilege against self‐incrimination (p. 444). A decade later, first in New York v. Quarles (1984), recognizing a “public safety” exception to Miranda, and then in Oregon v. Elstad (1985), indicating that the prosecution may make considerable derivative use of Miranda violations, the Court reiterated Tucker’s way of looking at, and thinking about, Miranda. Both Quarles and Elstad underscored the distinction between statements that are actually “coerced” or “compelled” and those obtained merely in violation of Miranda’s “prophylactic rules.”

Since the Supreme Court has no supervisory power over state criminal justice and if Miranda violations are not constitutional violations, where did the Warren Court get the authority to impose the new confession doctrine on the states? If a confession obtained in violation of Miranda does not violate the self‐incrimination clause unless “actually coerced,” why are the states not free to admit all confessions not the product of actual coercion? Tucker and its progeny thus may have prepared the way for the eventual overruling of Miranda.

Nevertheless, it would be surprising if the Court did overrule Miranda. The Court is well aware of Miranda’s rather limited scope—indeed, a number of commentators have forcefully argued that it does not go far enough. The Court is also cognizant of the many studies indicating that the decision has had no significant adverse impact on law enforcement. Despite their initial reaction of dismay, the police seem to have adjusted to Miranda fairly well. Under these circumstances, the Court is probably willing to “live with” a case that has become part of the American culture, especially if it continues to view the decision as a serious effort to strike a proper balance between the need for police questioning and the need to protect a suspect against impermissible police pressure.

The Reaffirmation of Miranda

In Dickerson v. United States (2000), the Court struck down a federal statute purporting to abolish Miranda and to reinstate the pre‐Miranda “voluntariness” or “totality of the circumstances” test for the admissibility of confessions in federal cases. Speaking for a 7‐to‐2 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist removed any doubt that “Miranda is a constitutional decision” and thus a decision that “may not be in effect overrruled by an Act of Congress” (p. 432).

Nor did the Court see any good reason to overrule Miranda on its own: “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our natural culture. [While] we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, we do not believe that this has happened to the Miranda decision. If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief” (pp. 443–444).

What may be said about the cases that had encouraged critics of the Warren Court to believe that some day the Court would overrule Miranda, cases such Tucker, Quarles, and Estad? Oddly, although these cases seemed to be based on the premise that Miranda was not a constitutional decision, the Dickerson Court had nothing negative to say about them. The reason may be that the exceptions to Miranda carved out by these cases are going to remain in place.

A conference on the meaning of Dickerson manifested a strong consensus among the eleven criminal procedure experts who contributed articles to the symposium that the majority opinion in Dickerson was a compromise opinion designed to obtain the largest majority possible on the narrow question of Miranda’s continued vitality. There also seemed to be a consensus that what Dickerson reaffirmed was not the Miranda doctrine that burst on the scene in 1966, but Miranda with all the limitations and exceptions it had acquired since 1966 “frozen in time.”

Bibliography

• Liva Baker, Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics (1983).
• Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, Vanderbilt Law Review 38 (November 1985): 1417–1476.
• Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions (1980).
• Stephen Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, University of Chicago Law Review 54 (Spring 1987): 435–461

— Yale Kamisar

• 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
• Vote: 5–4
• For the Court: Warren
• Dissenting: Clark, Harlan, White, and Stewart

In 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested for kidnapping and attacking a young woman near Phoenix. The woman identified him at the police station and the police questioned him for two hours. No one told him that he had the right to refuse to answer questions or to see a lawyer. Miranda confessed. He was tried and convicted on the basis of his confession.

Miranda appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court. His lawyer claimed the police violated Miranda's 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The 5th Amendment says, “No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

Arizona's lawyers argued that Miranda could have asked for a lawyer at any time during questioning. He had not done so. They also said no one had forced him to confess. Because he had given his confession voluntarily, the prosecution could use it in court.

The Issue

Does the 5th Amendment require the police to inform suspects of their right to remain silent and that anything they say can be held against them? Could the police use evidence obtained without such warnings in court?

Opinion of the Court

The Court struck down Miranda's conviction, ruling that the 5th Amendment requires police to inform suspects in their custody that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say can be held against them, and that they have a right to consult a lawyer. The police must give these warnings, the Court said, before any questioning of a suspect can take place. A defendant can then voluntarily waive these rights.

The Court added that if a suspect wants to remain silent or to contact a lawyer, police interrogation must stop until the suspect is ready to talk again or a lawyer is present. The prosecution cannot use any confessions obtained in violation of this rule in court.

Chief Justice Earl Warren argued that the U.S. system of justice is based on the idea that an individual is innocent until proved guilty. The government, he claimed, must produce evidence against an accused person. It cannot resort to forcing suspects to prove themselves guilty.

Dissent

In a strong dissent, Justice John Harlan argued: “It's obviously going to mean the disappearance of confessions as a legitimate tool of law enforcement.” He concluded, “[T]he thrust of the new rule is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all.”

Significance

The Miranda decision was controversial. Many law enforcement officials complained the decision “handcuffed the police.” However, in 1986, in Moran v. Burbine, the Court referred to the Miranda case as a decision that “embodies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's interests.”

Ever since the Miranda decision, police have carried cards that they use to read suspects their rights. This message has become known as the Miranda warnings, which consist of four points: the right to remain silent, the reminder that anything said by the suspect can be used against him, the right to a lawyer, and the reminder that a lawyer will be provided free if the suspect cannot afford to hire one.

The Court reaffirmed, by a 7-to-2 vote, the Miranda rights of suspects in Dickerson v. United States (2000). At issue was a 1968 federal law that held it was not always necessary to read Miranda warnings to suspects before they confessed voluntarily to crimes. In striking down this statute, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in his opinion for the Court, said, “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.” The police must continue to give the Miranda warnings or risk having a suspect's confession excluded as evidence against him.

See also Counsel, right to; Rights of the accused

Sources

• Liva Baker, Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics (New York: Atheneum, 1983)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). One of the core concerns of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of coerced confessions. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court codified this concern by prescribing rules for police interrogation. Specifically, any person who is in custody must be warned, before questioning begins, that: "he has the right to remain silent," "anything he says can be used against him in a court of law," "he has the right to an attorney," and he may consult with his attorney at any time. Only if the individual "knowingly and intelligently" waives these rights—a waiver that may be with drawn at any stage of questioning—may his statements be used against him.

The 5–4 Miranda ruling has always been controversial. Critics contend that these rules hamstring law enforcement, despite Ernesto Miranda's conviction at a retrial where his confession was excluded. The Court created numerous exceptions to the Miranda rules, and Congress attempted to overturn them in a rarely used provision of the 1968 Crime Control Act. The Supreme Court struck down that provision in United States v. Dickerson (2000), saying that the Miranda rules "have become part of our national culture."

Bibliography

Brooks, Peter. Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Leo, Richard A., and George C. Thomas III, eds. The Miranda Debate: Law, Justice, and Policing. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998.

White, Welsh S. Miranda's Waning Protections: Police Interrogation Practices after Dickerson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Click here to see full case study.

Miranda v. Arizona was a landmark decision, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), in the field of criminal procedure. In Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court declared a set of specific rights for criminal defendants. The Miranda warning, named after Ernesto Miranda, one of the petitioners in the case, is a list of rights that a law enforcement officer must read to anyone arrested for a criminal act.

Before the High Court's decision in Miranda, the law governing custodial interrogation of criminal suspects varied from state to state. In many states statements made by criminal defendants who were in custody and under interrogation by law enforcement officials were admissible at trial, even though the defendants had not been advised of their legal rights. If the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements indicated that the suspect made the statements voluntarily, it did not matter that officers had not apprised the suspect of his legal rights.

The totality of the circumstances rule was effective even if a defendant was in custody. Generally a defendant was considered in custody if she was not free to leave the presence of law enforcement officers. The basic legal rights for criminal defendants subjected to custodial interrogation included the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the right to an attorney, this latter right established by the Court two years earlier in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).

The Miranda case involved four criminal defendants. Each of the defendants was appealing a conviction based in part on the failure of law enforcement officers to advise him, prior to custodial interrogation, of his right to an attorney or his right to remain silent.

Ernesto Miranda, the first defendant listed in the case, was arrested on March 18, 1963, at his home in Arizona and taken to a Phoenix police station. At the station witnesses identified Miranda as a rapist. Police then brought Miranda to an interrogation room where he was questioned by two police officers.

The officers did not tell Miranda that he had a right to an attorney, and Miranda confessed to the crime in two hours. Miranda wrote a confession on a piece of paper and signed the paper. At the top of the paper was a typed statement saying that Miranda had made the confession voluntarily and with full knowledge of his legal rights. Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping in an Arizona state court. The circumstances involving the other three defendants were similar, all three confessing after a period of custodial interrogation without the assistance of legal counsel.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals from all four defendants, joining the appeals into a single review. A divided Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's decision against one of the defendants and reversed the guilty verdicts against Miranda and the other two.

The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, began with a review of police interrogation activities and a detailed formulation of new rules for law enforcement personnel.

The opening of the Miranda majority opinion set a grave tone:

The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

The Court described in detail the unfairness and coercion used by some law enforcement officers engaged in interrogation. The majority also took note of deceptive practices in interrogation. For example, officers would put a suspect in a lineup and tell her that she had been identified as a suspect in the instant crime as well as other crimes even though no such identifications had taken place. The suspect would confess to the instant crime to avoid being prosecuted for the fictitious crimes. The majority noted that these examples were exceptions, but it also stated that they were sufficiently widespread to warrant concern.

The Court then outlined the now-familiar procedures that law enforcement officers would have to follow thereafter. They would have to tell persons in custody that they have the right to remain silent, that they have the right to an attorney, that if they cannot afford an attorney the court will appoint an attorney, and that anything they say can be used in a criminal prosecution.

Ultimately, the Court held that statements made by a criminal suspect in custody would not be admissible at trial unless the suspect had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his legal rights after being apprised of the various legal rights and after being given an opportunity to exercise those rights. The majority assured the law enforcement community that it did not intend to hamper criminal investigations and prosecutions. The Court pointed out that interrogations were still a perfectly legitimate investigative tool, that questioning a suspect without advising the suspect of legal rights before taking the suspect into custody was still legitimate, and that volunteered statements were likewise legitimate.

Justice Tom Clark dissented to the deci- sions with respect to all defendants except the one whose conviction was upheld. According to Clark, the Court should continue to accept the totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a defendant's statements or confession were made voluntarily. Clark concluded that only the defendant whose conviction was upheld gave a confession that was not voluntary.

Justices John M. Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron R. White dissented in all the cases. In an opinion authored by Harlan, the dissent argued that the majority had exaggerated the evils of normal police questioning. According to Harlan, "Society has always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark moments of the law."

Another dissent by White argued that the majority had gone too far in imposing such procedural requirements on the law enforcement community. White predicted that the new procedures would prevent the early release of the truly innocent because they discourage statements that would quickly explain a situation. According to White, the procedures were "a deliberate calculus to prevent interrogations, to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of guilty and to increase the number of trials." "I have no desire whatsoever," wrote White, "to share the responsibility for any such impact on the present criminal process."

The Miranda case was remarkable in at least two ways. The opinion mandated important procedural changes that had to be followed by each and every law enforcement official across the country. In addition, the majority opinion's survey of interrogation tactics sent a rare notice to the law enforcement community that the Court was aware of, and would not tolerate, abuse in interrogation.

In recent years the Miranda holding has been pared down by the High Court. In 1985 the Court held that if a defendant makes an incriminating statement without the Miranda warning and then later receives the Miranda warning and confesses, the confession should not be excluded from trial (Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 [1985]).

In Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993), the Court held that a prisoner could not base a habeas corpus petition on the failure of law enforcement to give Miranda rights before interrogation. In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1990), the Court held that the Miranda warning is not required when a suspect who is unaware that she is speaking to a law enforcement officer gives a voluntary statement.

In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986), the Court appeared to return to the totality of the circumstances test. In Moran, a lawyer representing a criminal suspect, Brian Burbine, called the police station while Burbine was in custody. The lawyer was told that Burbine would not be questioned until the next day. In fact, Burbine was questioned that day, and he confessed, without requesting the lawyer and after being told his Miranda rights. According to the Court, the conduct of the police fell "short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the States." Although law enforcement had not given Burbine a full opportunity to exercise his right to an attorney, a 6-3 majority of the Court concluded that, on the facts of the case, the incriminating statements were made voluntarily and that excluding them was therefore not required.

See: Criminal Law; Due Process of Law; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; Right to Counsel.

A decision by the United States Supreme Court concerning the rights of persons in police custody. In the case of Miranda versus Arizona, in 1966, the Court ruled that, before questioning by the police, suspects must be informed that they have the right to remain silent and the right to consult an attorney, and that anything they say may be used against them in court. The Miranda ruling protects a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Miranda warning, a written statement of these rights, is normally recited by a police officer before interrogating the suspect in police custody.

Miranda v. Arizona
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 28 – March 1, 1966 Decided June 13, 1966
Full case name	Miranda v. State of Arizona; Westover v. United States; Vignera v. State of New York; State of California v. Stewart
Citations	384 U.S. 436 (more) 86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2817; 10 A.L.R.3d 974
Prior history	Defendant . Superior Ct.; affirmed, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965); cert. granted, 382 U.S. 925 (1965)
Subsequent history	Retrial on remand, defendant convicted, Ariz. Superior Ct.; affirmed, 450 P.2d 364 (Ariz. 1969); rehearing denied, Ariz. Supreme Ct. March 11, 1969; cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969)
Argument	Oral argument
Holding
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to advise a suspect interrogated in custody of his rights to remain silent and to obtain an attorney. Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice Earl Warren Associate Justices Hugo Black · William O. Douglas Tom C. Clark · John M. Harlan II William J. Brennan, Jr. · Potter Stewart Byron White · Abe Fortas
Case opinions
Majority	Warren, joined by Black, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas
Concur/dissent	Clark
Dissent	Harlan, joined by Stewart, White
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. V, Fourteenth Amendment

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark 5–4 decision of the United States Supreme Court. The Court held that both inculpatory and exculpatory statements made in response to interrogation by a defendant in police custody will be admissible at trial only if the prosecution can show that the defendant was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right against self-incrimination prior to questioning by police, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived them. This had a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda rights part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. The Supreme Court decided Miranda with three other consolidated cases: Westover v. United States, Vignera v. New York, and California v. Stewart.

The Miranda warning (often abbreviated to "Miranda") is the name of the formal warning that is required to be given by police in the United States to criminal suspects in police custody (or in a custodial situation) before they are interrogated, in accordance with the Miranda ruling. Its purpose is to ensure the accused is aware of, and reminded of, these rights under the U.S. Constitution, and that they know they can invoke them at any time during the interview.

As of the U.S. Supreme Court decision Berghuis v. Thompkins (June 1, 2010), criminal suspects who are aware of their right to silence and to an attorney, but choose not to "unambiguously" invoke them, may find any subsequent voluntary statements treated as an implied waiver of their rights, and which may be used in evidence.

Contents 1 Background 1.1 Legal aid movement 1.2 Arrest and conviction 2 Opinion of the Supreme Court 2.1 Clark's concurrence in part, dissent in part 2.2 Harlan's dissent 2.3 White's dissent 3 Subsequent developments 4 See also 5 References 6 Further reading 7 External links

Background

Legal aid movement

During the 1960s, a movement which provided defendants with legal aid emerged from the collective efforts of various bar associations.

In the civil realm, it led to the creation of the Legal Services Corporation under the Great Society program of President Lyndon Baines Johnson. Escobedo v. Illinois, a case which closely foreshadowed Miranda, provided for the presence of counsel during police interrogation. This concept extended to a concern over police interrogation practices, which were considered by many to be barbaric and unjust. Coercive interrogation tactics were known in period slang as the "third degree".

Arrest and conviction

Ernesto Arturo Miranda was arrested based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an 18-year-old woman 10 days earlier.^[1] After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me."^[2] However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to counsel, and he was not advised of his right to remain silent or that his statements would be used against him during the interrogation before being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession he had already given orally. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should be excluded. Moore's objection was overruled and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Moore filed Miranda's appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court claiming that Miranda's confession was not fully voluntary and should not have been admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the confession in State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965). In affirming, the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request an attorney.^[3]

Opinion of the Supreme Court

Chief Justice Earl Warren, a former prosecutor, delivered the opinion of the Court, ruling that due to the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police (Warren cited several police training manuals which had not been provided in the arguments), no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect had been made aware of his/her rights and the suspect had then waived them:

The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.^[4]

Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned. The Court also made clear what had to happen if the suspect chose to exercise his or her rights:

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.

Justice Brennan's comments on the Miranda decision.

Although the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had urged the Supreme Court to require the mandatory presence of a "station-house" lawyer at all police interrogations, Warren refused to go that far, or to even include a suggestion that immediately demanding a lawyer would be in the suspect's best interest.

Warren pointed to the existing practice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the rules of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, both of which required notifying a suspect of his right to remain silent; the FBI warning included notice of the right to counsel.

However, the dissenting justices thought that the suggested warnings would ultimately lead to such a drastic effect—they apparently believed that once warned, suspects would always demand attorneys and deny the police the ability to seek confessions and accordingly accused the majority of overreacting to the problem of coercive interrogations.

Clark's concurrence in part, dissent in part

In a separate concurrence in part, dissent in part, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the Warren Court went "too far too fast". Instead, Justice Clark would use the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated by Justice Goldberg in Haynes v. Washington. Under this test, the court would:

consider in each case whether the police officer prior to custodial interrogation added the warning that the suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation and, further, that a court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary.

Harlan's dissent

In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote that "nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities." Harlan closed his remarks by quoting former Justice Robert H. Jackson: "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added."

White's dissent

Justice Byron White took issue with the court announcing a new constitutional right when it had no "factual and textual bases" in the constitution or previous opinions of the court for the rule announced in the opinion. He stated: "The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment." Nor did Justice White believe it had any basis in English common law.

White further warned of the dire consequences of the majority opinion:

I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility for any such impact on the present criminal process. In some unknown number of cases, the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity.

Subsequent developments

Miranda was retried, and this time the prosecution did not use the confession but called witnesses and used other evidence. Miranda was convicted in 1967 and sentenced to serve 20 to 30 years. He was paroled in 1972. After his release, he returned to his old neighborhood and made a modest living autographing police officers' "Miranda cards" (containing the text of the warning, for reading to arrestees). He was stabbed to death during an argument in a bar on January 31, 1976.^[5]

Another three defendants whose cases had been tied in with Miranda's — an armed robber, a stick-up-man, and a bank robber — either made plea bargains to lesser charges or were found guilty again despite the exclusion of their confessions.^[6] Others, such as Jose Suarez, who had confessed to killing his wife and five young children, stabbing them more than a hundred times, were released. Confession rates fell sharply.^[7]

Following the Miranda decision, the nation's police departments were required to inform arrested persons of their rights under the ruling, termed a Miranda warning.

The Miranda decision was widely criticized when it came down, as many felt it was unfair to inform suspected criminals of their rights, as outlined in the decision. President Richard Nixon and other conservatives denounced Miranda for undermining the efficiency of the police, and argued the ruling would contribute to an increase in crime. Nixon, upon becoming President, promised to appoint judges who would be "strict constructionists" and who would exercise judicial restraint. Many supporters of law enforcement were angered by the decision's negative view of police officers. The federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purported to overrule Miranda for federal criminal cases and restore the "totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to Miranda.^[7] The validity of this provision of the law, which is still codified at 18 U.S. Code 3501, was not ruled on for another 30 years because the Justice Department never attempted to rely on it to support the introduction of a confession into evidence at any criminal trial. Miranda was undermined by several subsequent decisions which seemed to grant several exceptions to the "Miranda warnings," undermining its claim to be a necessary corollary of the Fifth Amendment.

Since it is usually required that the suspect be asked if they understand their rights, courts have also ruled that any subsequent waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Many American police departments have pre-printed Miranda waiver forms which a suspect must sign and date (after hearing and reading the warnings again) if an interrogation is to occur.

But the words "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" mean only that the suspect reasonably appears to understand what they are doing, and is not being coerced into signing the waiver; the Court ruled in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) that it is irrelevant whether the suspect may actually have been insane at the time.

A confession obtained in violation of the Miranda standards may nonetheless be used for purposes of impeaching the defendant's testimony: that is, if the defendant takes the stand at trial and the prosecution wishes to introduce the defendant's confession as a prior inconsistent statement to attack the defendant's credibility, the Miranda holding will not prohibit this (see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).

A "spontaneous" statement made by a defendant while in custody, even though the defendant has not been given the Miranda warnings or has invoked the right to counsel and a lawyer is not yet present, is admissible in evidence, as long as the statement was not given in response to police questioning or other conduct by the police likely to produce an incriminating response (see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)).

There is also a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before questioning: for example, if the defendant is in possession of information regarding the location of an unattended gun or there are other similar exigent circumstances which require protection of the public, the defendant may be questioned without warning and his responses, though incriminating, will be admissible in evidence (see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)). In 2009 the California Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Richard Allen Davis, finding that the public safety exception applied despite the fact that 64 days had passed from the disappearance of the girl later found to be murdered.^[8]

A number of empirical studies by both supporters and opponents of Miranda have concluded that the giving of Miranda warnings has little effect on whether a suspect agrees to speak to the police without an attorney. However, Miranda's opponents, notably law professor Paul Cassell, argued that letting go 3 or 4% of criminal suspects (who would be prosecuted otherwise but for defective Miranda warnings, or acting on defective waivers by defendants) is still too high a price to pay.

Miranda survived a strong challenge in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), where the validity of Congress's overruling of Miranda was tested. At issue was whether the Miranda warnings were actually compelled by the U.S. Constitution, or were rather merely measures enacted as a matter of judicial policy.

Dickerson reached the Court under a bizarre set of circumstances. Although the Justice Department under President Clinton had treated Miranda as valid, the Supreme Court was forced to grant certiorari to prevent a circuit split after the 4th Circuit (on its own initiative) took up Professor Cassell's suggestion and ruled that Congress had overruled Miranda with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The Solicitor General refused to defend the constitutionality of the Act, so the Court invited Professor Cassell to argue against the validity of Miranda.^{[citation needed]}

In Dickerson, the Court held 7–2 that "the warnings have become part of our national culture," speaking through Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Miranda warnings were not constitutionally required, citing a panoply of cases that demonstrated a majority of the then-current court, counting himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, "[were] on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution."

Over time, interrogators began to think of techniques to honor the "letter" but not the "spirit" of Miranda. In the case of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court halted one of the more controversial practices. Missouri police were deliberately withholding Miranda warnings and questioning suspects until they obtained confessions, then giving the warnings, getting waivers, and getting confessions again. Justice Souter wrote for the plurality: "Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute."^[9]

United States v. Garibay points out another important matter in regards to expansion of the Miranda v. Arizona ruling. Mr. Garibay was arrested and never received his warnings. They failed to receive a waiver of these rights as well. Mr. Garibay was a man that barely spoke English and clearly showed a lack of understanding. "“…the agent admitted that he had to rephrase questions when the defendant appeared confused”^[10] The court ruled that the waiver of rights was not valid due to the defendant’s lack of I.Q. and English language skills. The court investigated many facets of his waiver and discovered that Mr. Garibay was missing all of those items that they were looking for. He never signed a waiver, he only received his warnings verbally, and in English, and no interpreter was provided although there were ones available. The lack of translated Miranda warnings adds another twist to the Miranda v. Arizona case.

Berghuis v. Thompkins is a ruling where the Supreme Court held that a suspect "ambiguous or equivocal" statement or no statements do not mean that police must end an interrogation.

See also

• Berghuis v. Thompkins,
• Berkemer v. McCarty
• Escobedo v. Illinois
• List of criminal competencies
• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 384
• Miranda warning
• Schmerber v. California

References

1. ^ Miranda also matched the description given by a robbery victim of the perpetrator in a robbery several months earlier. He was simultaneously interrogated about both of these crimes, confessed to both, but was not asked to and did not write down his confession to the robbery. He was separately tried and convicted of the robbery and sentenced to 20 to 25 years imprisonment. This crime, trial, and sentence is separate from the rape-kidnapping case appealed to the Supreme Court.
2. ^ Michael S. Lief and H. Mitchell Caldwell "'You Have the Right to Remain Silent,'" American Heritage, Aug./Sept. 2006.
3. ^ Miranda's oral confession in the robbery case was also appealed and the Arizona Supreme Court likewise affirmed the trial court's decision to admit it in State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 716. This case was not part of the appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
4. ^ Syllabus to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona, holding 1.(d).
5. ^ "Miranda Slain; Main Figure in Landmark Suspects' Rights Case". The New York Times. February 1, 1976. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10E15FD3558177B8EDDA80894DA405B868BF1D3. Retrieved May 12, 2010. 
6. ^ "The Law: Catching Up with Miranda". Time. March 3, 1967. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843458,00.html. Retrieved November 7, 2011. 
7. ^ ^{a b} "Cite Miranda And Go Free". Sarasota Journal: p. 7. 31 May 1968. http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=mDIjAAAAIBAJ&pg=4156%2C4467268. 
8. ^ People vs. Davis, S056425
9. ^ "Missouri v. Seibert, section VI". http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/editedcases/misvsei.html. Retrieved 2010-05-07.  Hosted by Duke Law
10. ^ Einesman,F:"Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and Diversity".Page 41, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 1999

Further reading

• Baker, Liva (1983). Miranda: Crime, law, and politics. New York: Atheneum. ISBN 0689112408. 
• Soltero, Carlos R. (2006). "Miranda v. Arizona (1966) and the rights of the criminally accused". Latinos and American Law: Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. pp. 61–74. ISBN 0292714114. 
• Levy, Leonard W. (1986) [1969]. Origins of the Fifth Amendment (Reprint ed.). New York: Macmillan. ISBN 0029195802. 
• Stuart, Gary L. (2004). Miranda: The Story of America's Right to Remain Silent. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press. ISBN 0816523134. 
• law.uga.edu

External links

Wikisource has original text related to this article: Miranda v. Arizona

• Text of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) is available from: Justia · Findlaw · Cornell LII

• Oral arguments from Oyez.org
• Article from Common Sense Americanism on decision

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