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Mistretta v. United States

 
US Supreme Court: Mistretta v. United States

488 U.S. 361 (1989), argued 5 Oct. 1988, decided 18 Jan. 1989 by vote of 8 to 1; Blackmun for the Court, Scalia in dissent. Federal judges have traditionally exercised considerable discretion in fixing the terms of sentences for convicted offenders. Convinced of a need for more uniformity in sentencing practices, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, creating the United States Sentencing Commission and giving it authority to establish ranges of sentences for all categories of federal offenses. The commission was established as an independent body within the judicial branch to consist of seven members appointed by the president and removable by him. At least three were required to be federal judges, selected by the president from a list of six judges recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States.

This statutory challenge to judicial autonomy, plus the unusual provisions for appointment and removal of commission members, raised separation of powers issues. However, in Mistretta the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing law in all respects. Though admitting that the commission was “an unusual hybrid in structure and authority,” Justice Harry A. Blackmun ruled that locating the commission within the judicial branch did not violate the separation of powers doctrine (p. 412). The commission was not a court nor controlled by the judiciary. Requiring three federal judges to serve on the commission along with nonjudges did not affect the integrity or independence of the judicial branch. Giving the president power to remove commission members had no effect on the tenure or compensation of Article III judges. The development of sentencing rules was an “essentially neutral endeavor” in which judicial participation was “peculiarly appropriate” (p. 407).

Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting, challenged the constitutionality of the commission. He concluded that it was a violation of Article III of the Constitution to have federal judges serve in policy‐making positions in the executive branch.

See also Appointment and Removal Power.

— C. Herman Pritchett

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Mistretta v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 5, 1988
Decided January 18, 1989
Full case name John Mistretta v. United States
Citations 488 U.S. 361 (more)
109 S. Ct. 647; 102 L. Ed. 2d 714; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 434; 57 U.S.L.W. 4102
Prior history Cert. before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Holding
The Court found the Act to be valid because although Congress cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Blackmun, joined by Rehnquist, White, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy; Brennan (all but n. 11)
Dissent Scalia

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court.

Contents

Background

John Mistretta, who sold cocaine, argued that the sentencing guidelines he was facing were unconstitutional due to a gross distribution of authority by Congress resulting in a violation of the separation of powers. Mistretta plead guilty to conspiracy to sell cocaine after the District Court denied his motion in return for a removal of two other counts. He received an eighteen month sentence. He filed a petition to the Eighth Circuit, but along with him, the Circuit Court filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court and received the writ.

Issues presented

Was the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, abolishing indeterminate criminal sentencing, establishing the U.S. Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch, and empowering seven voting members to promulgate binding sentencing guidelines for federal judges a constitutional delegation of criminal sentencing powers to an independent Sentencing Commission?

Decision

It was held that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was a constitutional delegation of powers.

Opinions: Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion. As society increases in complexity, Congress must delegate its job “under broad general directives”. The broad delegation “is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements.” Congress has three goals in mind (1) guarantee to uphold the Act passed (2) provide certainty and fairness (3) establish uniform criminal justice process. Congress specified four purposes of sentencing. (1) Reflect seriousness of offense, (2) promote respect for the law, (3) provide just punishment, (4) afford adequate deterrence, and provide defendant with needed correctional treatment. Congress set forth a guideline system to be personable for the specific case and placed 11 factors to consider when sentencing: grade of offense, aggravating circumstances, nature and degree of harm, community view, public concern, deterrent effect, current incidence. Another 11 factors were established to summarize the defendant: age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition, previous employment, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon crime for livelihood. Congress prohibited the Commission from addressing: race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status. Congress went into enumerated detail of the guidelines the Sentencing Commission more than an “intelligible principle”—the requirement for delegation of power.

Dissent

Dissenting Justice Scalia believed the sentencing commission to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by congress to another agency, because the guidelines established by the Sentencing Commission have the force of law and therefore a judge that disregards them will be reversed. Scalia noted that the guidelines were 'heavily laden (or ought to be) with value judgments and policy assessments' rather than merely technical, Scalia also disputed the assertion by majority that the sentencing commission was in the judicial branch rather than the legislative saying the commission "is not a court, does not exercise judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch,"

See also


 
 

 

Copyrights:

US Supreme Court. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright © 1992, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.  Read more
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