Monroe Doctrine

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In his message of 2 December 1823, President James Monroe articulated two principles that by the 1850s were regarded as the basis for the so‐called Monroe Doctrine. The first stipulated that the “American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power.” The second embodied Monroe's support for the newly independent Latin American republics by stating that the American and European political systems were “essentially different,” and that the United States would consider efforts by European nations “to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”

James K. Polk, in the 1840s, was the first president to invoke Monroe's message as a form of policy justification, but his conduct did not immediately set a precedent. For much of the nineteenth century the Monroe Doctrine was ignored or violated far more than it was observed. U.S. acquiescence in such developments as the British occupation of the Falkland Islands (1833), British activities in the Central American isthmus throughout the 1850s, Spain's reannexation of Santo Domingo in 1861, and France's installation of a Bourbon monarch in Mexico in the 1860s were hardly in accord with the principles of 1823.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in response to rising concerns about European imperialism coupled with a more assertive sense of American nationalism, the United States began to invoke the Monroe Doctrine more consistently. This was particularly so in 1895, when the Cleveland administration insisted, successfully, that Great Britain submit to arbitration a long‐standing boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. On that occasion Secretary of State Richard Olney formulated the first major corollary to the 1823 message by asserting that “the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.”

After the turn of the century, the United States redefined the Monroe Doctrine in ways that were also intended to justify greater U.S. activity in the Americas. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt, anxious that financial malfeasance in the nations of Central America and the Caribbean might provoke intervention by European creditor nations, announced a second major corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to the effect that no American nation could use the doctrine “as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own misdeeds against foreign nations.” In effect, this required the United States to intervene in the affairs of other American nations. Acting on this basis, the United States took over the management of the finances of the Dominican Republic (in 1907) and of Nicaragua (in 1911), and in 1915 it actually occupied the republic of Haiti.

The assumptions behind the “Roosevelt corollary,” although repudiated in the 1930s in favor of Franklin D. Roosevelt's “Good Neighbor” policy, continued to influence U.S. policy in the Americas through the 1980s. Beginning with Woodrow Wilson, U.S. presidents have sought to reconcile the regional principles of the doctrine with the increasingly global reach of their foreign policies. Worried about aggression from Nazi Germany, Franklin Roosevelt even expanded the doctrine to include both Canada and Greenland.

In the early years of the Cold War after 1945, the United States internationalized the democratic and noninterventionist principles of the Monroe Doctrine in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, while at the same time it preserved its regional hegemony in the Americas through the framework of the Rio Pact (1947) and the Organization of American States (1948). The concern to keep communism out of the Americas subsequently led to U.S. intervention in various forms in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1973), and Grenada (1983), as well as to active involvement in the insurgencies in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s. In each case the United States either overthrew, or attempted to overthrow, left‐wing regimes in order to replace them with dictatorial governments whose members supported U.S. priorities. Critics argued that these repressive governments violated the principles that Monroe had proclaimed in 1823.

The most serious crisis of the Monroe Doctrine occurred in Communist Cuba in 1962. As early as 1960, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev openly proclaimed that the Monroe Doctrine was dead. Two years later, Khrushchev installed intermediate‐range missiles on the island to protect Fidel Castro's regime. Throughout the ensuing Cuban Missile Crisis, which was eventually resolved by the removal of the missiles, President John F. Kennedy did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine in defense of his actions, but concern for its traditions was never far from his mind.

With the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the disappearance of any regional threats to the security of the United States in the western hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine might be fairly regarded as moribund, if not entirely dead. The doctrine was never accepted as valid international law by any European nation, and it would be inaccurate to say that it saved Latin America from any form of recolonization. Nor did the doctrine ever receive much support in Latin America; indeed, to the extent that the United States invoked it in the twentieth century, it became increasingly unpopular there as a symbol of an overbearing Yankee supremacy. The true significance of the Monroe Doctrine, however, has always depended on circumstances.

[See also Caribbean and Latin America, U.S. Military Involvement in the; Dominican Republic, U.S. Military Involvement in the; El Salvador, U.S. Military Involvement in; Nicaragua, U.S. Military Involvement in.]

Bibliography

• Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, 1941; rev. ed. 1955.
• Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine 1945–1993, 1994

A principle of U.S. policy, originated by President James Monroe during his time in office (1817-25), that any intervention by external powers in the politics of the Americas is a potentially hostile act against the United States. The principle arose partly from a conflict with Russia over the northwest coast of North America, and partly from the fear that reactionary European states would attempt to take over the Latin American countries that had become independent from Spain.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

Originally promulgated by United States President James Monroe in 1823 as a warning to European powers that any expansionist activity by them anywhere in the Americas would be construed as a threat to the United States. Extended by Theodore Roosevelt and repeatedly used to justify US intervention in the affairs of Latin American countries.

— David Mervin

In his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe stated, “The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.”

Monroe was responding to Russian claims to the Oregon Territory and to an attempt by the Russian-American Trading Company to exclude U.S. ships from the waters near its trading post in Spanish California. In October 1823 Russian czar Alexander I sent a letter to his allies in the Holy Alliance—France, Spain, and Austria—in which he observed that newly independent Latin American nations had set up republics contrary to the European “political system.” He called for allied European governments to join in overthrowing those republics and replacing them with monarchies. Monroe warned in his message, “We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power” as other than an unfriendly act. Monroe added, “It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness.”

Monroe based the right of the United States to protest against European intervention upon the practice of the United States to keep out of all entangling alliances in Europe. He disclaimed any intention of interfering in Latin American internal affairs, and he pledged not to interfere with existing colonies or dependencies of any European power.

Monroe decided to make his statements after strong pressure from Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. In 1822 the United States had recognized several Latin American states and exchanged ministers with them. In 1823 the restored Spanish monarch Ferdinand VII called for an international conference to consider the claims to independence made by these states. On August 20, 1823, the British foreign minister, George Canning, proposed to Richard Rush, the U.S. minister in London, that the United States and Great Britain join in a declaration that the two nations were opposed to intervention in American affairs by European powers. President Monroe at first agreed to Canning's proposal, with the strong endorsement of former Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, but Adams proposed that the United States issue its own declaration. He had a strong influence on Monroe's eventual decision and the language of his message to Congress.

The Monroe Doctrine, combined with the support of the British navy, put an end to all plans for intervention in Latin America by European powers. By 1824 the United States negotiated with Russia a treaty by which Russia withdrew any territorial claims on the Oregon Territory, and in 1867 the U.S. acquisition of Alaska ended Russian colonization in North America.

The French fared no better: although they successfully intervened in Argentina in 1840, their attempt to establish a sphere of influence in Mexico met with failure. During the U.S. Civil War, French troops established the Austrian Maximilian as emperor of Mexico. The United States protested, and after the Civil War ended 50,000 U.S. troops were posted near the Mexican border, and Mexican troops loyal to the Mexican rebel Benito Juarez pressured the French to withdraw. Maximilian was killed by a Mexican firing squad at Quertaro in 1867.

The Monroe Doctrine was extended in 1905 by Secretary of State Richard Olney, who asserted that existing European colonies in the Americas were “unnatural and inexpedient,” that “the United States is practically the sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” He further argued that to disregard the Monroe Doctrine would be a violation of international law, that it would require arbitration between European colonies and Latin American nations, and that refusal to adhere to the Monroe Doctrine would be grounds for war. The Roosevelt Corollary, named for President Theodore Roosevelt, stated that the United States would not permit other nations to collect debts in this hemisphere but would do what it could to collect them itself.

The Olney and Roosevelt corollaries were highly unpopular in Latin America. They were eventually revoked by the State Department in 1928 in a memorandum that stated that the United States would no longer take military action on behalf of other nations to collect debts owed by Latin American nations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt instituted a Good Neighbor Policy. By the Montevideo Treaty of 1933 and the Buenos Aires Protocol of 1936, the United States renounced the right of intervention in Latin American affairs.

During World War II the Monroe Doctrine was “pan-Americanized” so that all nations in the hemisphere would participate. The Latin nations and the United States met in Panama in 1939 to sign the “Resolution on the Transfer of Sovereignty of Geographic Regions of the Americas Held by Non-American States,” a long title for a simple agreement to prevent European possessions from falling into the hands of the Axis nations–Germany, Italy, and Japan. During the cold war the United States intervened in Latin American affairs to reduce what it perceived to be communist influence in the hemisphere. In 1954 President Dwight Eisenhower ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to back Colonel Castillo Armas in an invasion to eliminate the leftist government of Gautemala headed by Jacobo Arbenz. After Fidel Castro established a pro-Soviet regime in Cuba in 1959, Soviet military advisers, combat troops, airplanes, and offensive missiles were brought to the island. President John F. Kennedy used the Monroe Doctrine during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as one of the justifications for imposing a quarantine on that nation until the Soviet Union removed its offensive weapons from Cuba. On October 23, 1962, the Organization of American States gave the United States a mandate to use force if necessary in compelling their removal.

See also Adams, John Quincy; Cuban Missile Crisis; Kennedy, John F.; Monroe, James

Sources

• Ernest R. May, The Making of the Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).
• Dexter Perkins, Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963)

Four years after the ratification of the Adams-Onís Transcontinental Treaty, President James Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine in a message to Congress in December 1823. While few countries paid much attention to its pronouncement, the doctrine captured the American belief that the New and Old Worlds greatly differed and that the United States had a special role to play. It presaged Manifest Destiny, and, as the years passed, the Monroe Doctrine increasingly became a tenet of American foreign policy, although its international acceptance and significance is still debated.

In the aftermath of the French Revolution (1787– 1799) and the Napoleonic Wars (1805–1814), conservative European powers—Russia, Prussia, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, England—sought to prop up the old monarchies and stamp out revolution. The result, in 1813, was the Quadruple Alliance, which France joined after Louis XVIII returned to Paris.

At this time, Spanish America was throwing off its imperial yoke. Inspiring nationalists like Simón Bolívar, José San Martín, and Bernardo O'Higgins led their respective peoples to independence. The situation then became very complicated. At first, the U.S. government welcomed these independence movements, hoping to establish commercial ties and open new markets for American goods. France then invaded Spain and acted, at least initially, as if it would seek to reestablish Spain's former colonial empire in the Americas. There were even rumors that Spain would cede Cuba to France for its help in reestablishing Spain's empire in the New World! The British also had cause to oppose any reestablishment of Spain's empire, because Great Britain had moved to a concept of maintaining an informal empire—based on trade and avoiding the costs of a more formal empire, which included stationing of troops and maintaining of bases—in Latin America, China, and elsewhere. Britain therefore wanted to economically exploit these newly independent lands.

So the British foreign minister, George Canning, suggested that the United States stand against such foreign intervention in the Americas, and with much input from the American Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, Monroe worked out his doctrine. To be sure, Monroe's warning against European intervention in the Americas only had force, if it had any force, because of British naval power and behind-the-scenes support. Still, the American people enthusiastically received the message, although it had little practical influence at the time.

Over the years, the Monroe Doctrine became a tenet of American foreign policy, and there were additions by later presidents. On 2 December 1845, President James K. Polk reiterated the principles of Monroe in his condemnation of the intrigues of Great Britain and France in seeking to prevent the annexation of Texas to the United States and in contesting with Great Britain over the vast Oregon Territory ("54′40″ or fight!"). And, on 29 April 1848, Polk declared that an English or Spanish protectorate over the Mexican Yucatan would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine principles and could compel the United States to assume control over that area. Polk thus made the doctrine the basis for expansion, although ultimately he took no such action. During the American Civil War (1861–1865), France tried to establish an empire in Mexico under Austrian Archduke Maximilian. As the North's victory became assured, the U.S. secretary of state used this power to rebuff the French and helped cause France to withdraw its troops; the regime in Mexico collapsed.

One of the more dramatic extensions of the doctrine was President Grover Cleveland's assertion that its principles compelled Great Britain to arbitrate a boundary dispute with Venezuela over the limitations of British Guiana. Cleveland's views produced a diplomatic crisis, but British moderation helped bring about a peaceful solution. And, later, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded upon Cleveland's views to produce the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The joint intervention of Great Britain, Germany, and Italy against Venezuela looking to recover unpaid loans upset many in the United States. President Roosevelt on the one hand believed that such bills needed to be paid, but did not want foreign intervention to compel timely repayment. So he moved to the position that the United States must assume a measure of control over more unruly Latin American states to prevent European action. Although Senate approval of this corollary was delayed for three years until 1907, Roosevelt produced a view that seemingly justified frequent American interventions in Caribbean affairs, which certainly smacked of imperialism and "White Man's Burden," and did not burnish the image of the United States with its southern neighbors.

During the two decades following World War I (1914–1918), a change took place. Increasing resentment against American interference in the affairs of the republics of Latin America helped bring about the liquidations of U.S. interventions in Santo Domingo in 1924 and in Haiti in 1934. The intervention in Nicaragua begun in Calvin Coolidge's presidency was relatively short-lived. President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave proof of this retreat from an expansive view of the Monroe Doctrine by pledging against armed intervention, and by signing a treaty not to intervene in the internal and external affairs of various Latin American countries at the seventh Pan-American Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 1933.

The Monroe Doctrine never obtained a true international status. At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, President Woodrow Wilson, to win over domestic opponents to his cherished League of Nations covenant, incorporated into the language of the document an article declaring that nothing therein affected the validity of a regional understanding such as the Monroe Doctrine. It was not clear that this either met with European support or placated more nationalistic supporters of Monroe's principles in the United States.

In more modern times, the Monroe Doctrine has undergone change. The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, called to strengthen arrangements for collective security in the Western Hemisphere during World War II (1939–1945) and to discuss problems resulting from Argentina's neutrality against the Axis powers, met in February 1945. Participants adopted the Act of Chapultepec, which broadened the Monroe Doctrine with the principle that an attack on any country of the hemisphere would be viewed as an act of aggression against all countries of the hemisphere. The act also had a provision for negotiation of a defense treaty among American states after the war. Meeting at Petrópolis, out-side Rio de Janeiro, from 15 August through 2 September 1947, the United States and nineteen Latin American republics (Canada was a member of the British Commonwealth and did not directly participate) drew up the so-called Rio Pact, a permanent defensive military alliance that legally sanctioned the principle from the Act of Chapultepec and foreshadowed the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization two years later.

The United States would justify its action in Guatemala in 1954, its continuing opposition to Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba, and its intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 with the view that communism as a movement was foreign to the Americas. This provided the basis for intervention reaching back as far as the Monroe Doctrine and as recent as the Rio Pact.

In the end, the Monroe Doctrine as an international policy has only been as effective as the United States' power to support it.

Bibliography

Dozer, Donald Marquand, ed. The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Significance. rev. ed. Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1976.

Merk, Frederick. The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843–1849. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.

Perkins, Dexter. A History of the Monroe Doctrine. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963.

Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994.

Revolutions in Spain's South American colonies had been occurring during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. When an alliance of Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia helped restore the monarchy of Spain in the early 1820s, there was concern in Great Britain and in the United States that the alliance would also help Spain to maintain its colonies in the Americas. In 1823, England's foreign minister proposed that the United States and England issue a joint statement against European intervention in the affairs of the Americas.

President James Monroe, influenced by John Quincy Adams, his secretary of state, decided instead to assert American independence in foreign policy. In his Annual Message to Congress in December 1823, Monroe declared that the United States would regard any interference in the internal affairs of the Americans as an unfriendly act.

Greeted with enthusiasm by Americans, what became known as the Monroe Doctrine went largely unnoticed internationally. Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine was a sign of the emergence of the United States as an international power and proved to be one of the most significant and enduring statements of American foreign policy. Several subsequent presidents cited the Monroe Doctrine to explain their actions to confront foreign intervention in the Americas.

The Monroe Doctrine defined the U.S. position on international affairs involving nations in the Americas and former colonial holdings of European powers. In his seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe unveiled his plan for United States foreign policy. The United States government acknowledged the sovereignty of independent nations in the Americas, and declared the Americas closed to future colonization. The policy further stated that the United States would not be a party to European conflicts. The policy took decades to come to full fruition, receiving the name "Monroe Doctrine" in 1853. During the nineteenth century, the policy was tested during the Mexican-American and the Spanish-American Wars, though it was only directly invoked in the latter.

The Napoleonic Wars in Europe in the first decades of the nineteenth century stirred nationalist sentiment in both the Old and the New World. As European nations devoted increasing resources to combating Napoleon's invading armies, they politically neglected their colonial holdings abroad. Nationalists in Latin America supported taking up arms against European colonial powers and establishing independent nations. Between 1815 and 1823, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile gained their independence and established republics. These fledgling nations needed, and sought, political recognition from larger, more influential nations. Knowing that they could not rely on the monarchist nations of Europe to support break-away democracies, the new American republics sought recognition from the United States.

In the United States, the European Napoleonic Wars spawned the War of 1812. British troops burned the U.S. capitol, but U.S. forces succeeded in routing British troops long enough to force a cease-fire and peace treaty. This second defeat of British forces more firmly established the United States as a thriving, independent nation, able to compete with European rivals. However, most members of the United States government sought to keep the nation out of European rivalries. When the revolutions in South America yielded new republics, the United States was left in a precarious position, caught between European and American interests.

A rumor circulated in diplomatic circles that the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia was set to intervene on behalf of Spain in the colonial rebellions. In 1823, France invited Spain to restore the Bourbon monarchy with a promise of further aid against insurgent republics in the Americas. The monarchist alliance angered Great Britain, who was politically torn between the need to defend the principles of monarchist government, and keep the French from regaining strongholds in the Americas and the Caribbean.

British foreign minister George Canning lobbied the United States government to form an Anglo-American alliance to oppose the intervention of France or the Holy Alliance in Latin America. Many in the United States government supported the diplomatic move, but President Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, were suspicious of the British plan. Adams advocated issuing a unilateral declaration, warning all European powers to refrain from joining colonial wars in which they had no direct involvement.

Monroe heeded Adams counsel. In a yearly speech, Monroe issued a statement proclaiming that any efforts to extend European political power in the Americas would be considered a threat to the security of the United States. Though the doctrine stated that the United States would refrain from participation in European conflicts, it left open the possibility for U.S. involvement in the Americas. Monroe counted on Britain to receive the statement as compromise, and recognize its mutual benefit. Indeed, the doctrine eventually worked largely because of backing from Britain.

The Monroe Doctrine was formally invoked seventy-five years later at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. The United States cited Spain's continued involvement in Cuba as a threat to U.S. property and interests. The United States won the conflict against Spain, and in the years following the war, the United States acted to prevent European nations from collecting debts from defaulting Latin American nations and former colonial holdings. When the Dominican Republic was bankrupt in 1904, United States President Theodore Roosevelt issued the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, stating that the United States could preemptively act to ward off European aggression in the Americas.

Further Reading

Electronic

The Avalon Project at Yale University. The Monroe Doctrine, 1823. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/Monroe.htm> (April 2003).

— ADRIENNE WILMOTH LERNER

The Founding Fathers of the United States of America sought to establish a foreign policy that was compatible with the surge of nationalism that engulfed the new country during its first century of independence. The Monroe Doctrine, proposed by President James Monroe in 1823, contributed to the formation of such a policy.

Certain events in 1821 prompted the creation of the doctrine. An insurrection in the colonies under Spanish rule in Latin America resulted in freedom for the colonies, but several European nations threatened to intervene on Spain's behalf and restore the former colonies to Spanish domination. Both the United States and Great Britain saw the advantages of trade with the new Latin American nations and feared further European interference in future disputes. As a result, British Foreign Secretary George Canning approached the U.S. emissary in London, Richard Rush, with a proposal for the formation of a dual alliance to protect the interests of the two countries. According to Canning's plan, the United States and Great Britain would oppose any intervention in the Spanish colonies by any European country except Spain.

President Monroe was agreeable to the terms of Canning's proposition, as were Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and former Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, however, presented an alternative view. Adams believed that Britain's interests in Latin America were sufficiently strong to encourage Britain's defense of those nations whether or not the United States agreed to Canning's proposal. Adams favored the development of a U.S. policy without alliance with Britain.

On December 2, 1823, Monroe presented the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, which Adams had helped to develop. The doctrine contained four significant elements: the American continents were to be regarded as independent, with no further settlement by European nations; the nations of the Western Hemisphere were deemed republics, as opposed to the European system of monarchies; European intervention in the affairs of nations of the Western Hemisphere was prohibited and would be viewed as a threat to the security of the United States; and, conversely the United States promised to refrain from involvement in European affairs.

On December 23, 1823, in his annual message to Congress, President James Monroe made a statement on foreign policy that came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. At that time the United States feared that Russia intended to establish colonies in Alaska and, more importantly, that the continental European states would intervene in Central and South America to help Spain recover its former colonies, which had won their independence in a series of wars in the early nineteenth century.

President Monroe announced that North and South America were closed to colonization, that the United States would not become involved in European wars or colonial wars in the Americas, and, most importantly, that any intervention by a European power in the independent states of the Western Hemisphere would be viewed by the United States as an unfriendly act against the United States.

Later presidents reiterated the Monroe Doctrine. In the early twentieth century, it was extended to justify U.S. intervention in the states of Latin America.

Monroe Doctrine

Fellow citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives:

Many important subjects will claim your attention during the present session, of which I shall endeavor to give, in aid of your deliberations, a just idea in this communication. I undertake this duty with diffidence, from the vast extent of the interests on which I have to treat and of their great importance to every portion of our Union. I enter on it with zeal from a thorough conviction that there never was a period since the establishment of our revolution when, regarding the condition of the civilized world and its bearing on us, there was greater necessity for devotion in the public servants to their respective duties, or for virtue, patriotism, and union in our constituents.

Meeting in you a new Congress, I deem it proper to present this view of public affairs in greater detail than might otherwise be necessary. I do it, however, with peculiar satisfaction, from a knowledge that in this respect I shall comply more fully with the sound principles of our government. The people being with us exclusively the sovereign, it is indispensable that full information be laid before them on all important subjects, to enable them to exercise that high power with complete effect. If kept in the dark, they must be incompetent to it. We are all liable to error, and those who are engaged in the management of public affairs are more subject to excitement and to be led astray by their particular interests and passions than the great body of our constituents, who, living at home in the pursuit of their ordinary avocations, are calm but deeply interested spectators of events and of the conduct of those who are parties to them. To the people every department of the government and every individual in each are responsible, and the more full their information the better they can judge of the wisdom of the policy pursued and of the conduct of each in regard to it. From their dispassionate judgment much aid may always be obtained, while their approbation will form the greatest incentive and most gratifying reward for virtuous actions and the dread of their censure the best security against the abuse of their confidence. Their interests in all vital questions are the same, and the bond, by sentiment as well as by interest, will be proportionably strengthened as they are better informed of the real state of public affairs, especially in difficult conjunctures. It is by such knowledge that local prejudices and jealousies are surmounted, and that a national policy, extending its fostering care and protection to all the great interests of our Union, is formed and steadily adhered to… .

At the proposal of the Russian imperial government, made through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by his imperial Majesty to the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers… .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

A statement of foreign policy issued by President James Monroe in 1823, declaring that the United States would not tolerate intervention by European nations in the affairs of nations in the Americas. Monroe also promised that the United States would not interfere with European colonies already established or with governments in Europe.

U.S. President James Monroe.

Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, author of the Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine was a United States policy that was introduced on December 2, 1823, which said that further efforts by European governments to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas would be viewed by the United States of America as acts of aggression requiring US intervention.^[1] The Monroe Doctrine asserted that the Western Hemisphere was not to be further colonized by European countries, and that the United States would not interfere with existing European colonies nor in the internal concerns of European countries. The Doctrine was issued at the time when many Latin American countries were on the verge of becoming independent from Spain, and the United States, reflecting concerns echoed by Great Britain, hoped to avoid having any European power take Spain's colonies.^[2] However, the immediate provocation was the Russian Ukase of 1821 asserting rights to the Northwest and forbidding non-Russian ships from approaching the coast.^[3][4]

US President James Monroe first stated the doctrine during his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress. It became a defining moment in the foreign policy of the United States and one of its longest-standing tenets, invoked by U.S. presidents, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, John F. Kennedy, and others.

The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (added during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt) was invoked to intervene militarily in Latin America to stop the spread of European influence^[5].

It would have been nearly impossible for Monroe to envision that its intent and impact would persist with minor variations for almost two centuries. Its primary objective was to free the newly independent colonies of Latin America from European intervention and control. The doctrine advocated that the New World and the Old World were to remain distinctly separate spheres of influence, for they were comprised of entirely separate and independent nations.^[6]

President Monroe claimed the United States of America, although only a fledgling nation at the time, would not interfere in European wars or internal dealings, and in turn, expected Europe to stay out of the affairs of the New World. The Western Hemisphere was never to be colonized again and any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be perceived as a direct threat to the U.S.^[7]. This quid pro quo was presumptuous on its face, yet has stood the test of time.^{[citation needed]}

The formalized document known as the Monroe Doctrine essentially served to inform the powers of the Old World that the Americas were no longer open to European colonization, and that any effort to extend European political influence into the New World would be considered by the United States "as dangerous to our peace and safety." Basically, the doctrine warned the European powers “to leave America for the Americans.” It also created a sphere of influence that would grow stronger with the addition of the Roosevelt Corollary.

Because the U.S. lacked both a credible navy and army at the time, the doctrine was largely disregarded internationally.^[6] However, the Doctrine met with tacit British approval, and the Royal Navy mostly enforced it tacitly, as part of the wider Pax Britannica, which enforced the neutrality of the seas.^[8]

Contents 1 The Doctrine in the 19th Century 1.1 Latin American reactions in the 1820s 1.2 Post-Bolivar 1.3 The "Big Sister" 2 The Doctrine in the 20th Century 2.1 The "Roosevelt Corollary" 2.2 The Clark Memorandum 2.3 The Cold War 3 Recent criticisms 4 Further reading 5 References 6 Bibliography 7 External links

The Doctrine in the 19th Century

Latin American reactions in the 1820s

The reaction in Latin America to the Monroe Doctrine was undeniably upbeat. John Crow, author of The Epic of Latin America, states, “[Simon] Bolivar himself, still in the midst of his last campaign against the Spaniards, Santander in Colombia, Rivadavia in Argentina, Victoria in Mexico—leaders of the emancipation movement everywhere— received Monroe’s words with sincerest gratitude” ^[9]. Crow argues that the leaders of Latin America were realists. They knew that the President of the United States wielded very little power at the time, particularly without the backing of the British forces. Furthermore, they figured that the Monroe Doctrine was powerless if it stood alone against the Triple Alliance^[9]. While they appreciated and praised their support in the north, they knew that their future of independence was in the hands of the powerful Great Britain. In 1826, Bolivar called upon his Congress of Panama to host the first “Pan-American” meeting. In the eyes of Bolivar and his men, the Monroe Doctrine was to become nothing more than a tool of national policy. According to Crow, “It was not meant to be, and was never intended to be a charter for concerted hemispheric action”^[9].

During the first half of the nineteenth century, it was Great Britain’s preoccupation with exerting its power on the rest of the world that led it to decide to support the Monroe Doctrine. At the time, South America as a whole constituted a much larger market for British goods than the United States. Crow argues that it was ultimately the support of Great Britain, not the Monroe Doctrine, which protected the sovereignty of Latin America’s newly independent nations^[9].

Post-Bolivar

In 1836, the United States government objected to Britain's alliance with the newly created Republic of Texas on the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. On December 2, 1845, U.S. President James Polk announced to Congress that the principle of the Monroe Doctrine should be strictly enforced and that the United States should aggressively expand into the West, often termed as Manifest Destiny.

In 1842, U.S. President John Tyler applied the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaii, told Britain not to interfere there, and begin the process of annexing Hawaii to the United States.

In 1852, some politicians used the principle of the Monroe Doctrine to argue for forcefully removing the Spanish from Cuba. In 1898, following the Spanish-American War, the United States obtained Puerto Rico and the Philippines from Spain and began an occupation of Cuba that lasted until 1902.

The doctrine's authors, chiefly future-President and then secretary-of-state John Quincy Adams, saw it as a proclamation by the United States of moral opposition to colonialism, but it has subsequently been re-interpreted and applied in a variety of instances. President Theodore Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts. This interpretation, intended to forestall intervention by European powers that had lent money to those countries, has been termed the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.^[10]

In 1863, French forces under Napoleon III invaded and conquered Mexico, giving the country to Austrian-born Emperor Maximilian. Americans proclaimed this as a violation of "The Doctrine," but were unable to intervene due to the American Civil War. This marked the first time the Monroe Doctrine was widely referred to as a "Doctrine." After the civil war came to an end, the U.S. brought troops down to the Rio Grande in hopes of pressuring the French government to end its occupation. Mexican nationalists eventually captured the Emperor and executed him, reasserting Mexico's independence.

In the 1870s, President Ulysses S. Grant and his Secretary of State Hamilton Fish endeavored to replace European influence in Latin America with that of the United States. Part of their efforts involved expanding the Monroe Doctrine by stating "hereafter no territory on this continent [referring to Central and South America] shall be regarded as subject to transfer to a European power."^[11]

President Grover Cleveland through his Secretary of State, Richard Olney cited the Doctrine in 1895, threatening strong action against the United Kingdom if the British failed to arbitrate their dispute with Venezuela. In a July 20, 1895 note to Britain, Olney stated, “The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.”^[12] British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury took strong exception to the American language. The United States objected to a British proposal for a joint meeting to clarify the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. Historian George Herring wrote that by failing to pursue the issue further the British “tacitly conceded the U. S. definition of the Monroe Doctrine and its hegemony in the hemisphere.”^[13]

The Drago Doctrine was announced on December 29, 1902 by the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Luis María Drago. Drago set forth the policy that no European power could use force against an American nation to collect debt. President Theodore Roosevelt rejected this as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, declaring "We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself" ^[14]

In the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, President John F. Kennedy cited the Monroe Doctrine as a basis for America's "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation with the Soviet Union that had embarked on a provocative campaign to install ballistic missiles on Cuban soil.^[15]

The "Big Sister"

The "Big Sister" policy was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine formulated by James Gillespie Blaine in the 1880s that aimed to rally Latin American nations behind US leadership and to open their markets to US traders. Blaine served as Secretary of State in 1881 in the cabinet of President James Garfield and again from 1889 to 1892 in the cabinet of President Benjamin Harrison. As a part of the policy, Blaine arranged and lead the First International Conference of American States in 1889.^[16]

The Doctrine in the 20th Century

The "Roosevelt Corollary"

Main article: Roosevelt Corollary

As the United States emerged as a world superpower, the Monroe Doctrine came to define a recognized sphere of control that few dared to challenge.^[6] In 1904, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, added the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted the right of the United States to intervene in Latin America in cases of “flagrant and chronic wrongdoing by a Latin American Nation”^[5]. This was the most significant amendment to the original doctrine and was widely opposed by critics, who argued that the Monroe Doctrine was originally meant to stop European influence in the Western Hemisphere^[6]. This amendment was designed to preclude violation of the doctrine by European powers that would ultimately argue that the independent nations were “mismanaged or unruly”.^[6]

Critics^[who?], however, argued that the Corollary simply asserted U.S. domination in that area, essentially making them a "hemispheric policeman."^{[citation needed]} To this day, it is hard to argue that the Western Hemisphere is not entirely a United States sphere of influence.^[6]

The Clark Memorandum

In 1928, the Clark Memorandum was released, concluding that the United States need not invoke the Monroe Doctrine as a defense of its interventions in Latin America. The Memorandum argued that the United States had a self-evident right of self-defense, and that this was all that was needed to justify certain actions. The policy was announced to the public in 1930.

In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles invoked the Monroe Doctrine at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, denouncing the intervention of Soviet Communism in Guatemala. This was used to justify Operation PBSUCCESS. U.S. President John F. Kennedy said at an August 29, 1962 news conference:

The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western Hemisphere, and that is why we oppose what is happening in Cuba today. That is why we have cut off our trade. That is why we worked in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist menace in Cuba. That is why we will continue to give a good deal of our effort and attention to it.^[17]

The Cold War

During the Cold War, the Monroe Doctrine was applied to Latin America by the framers of U.S. foreign policy. When the Cuban Revolution established a socialist regime with ties to the Soviet Union, after trying to establish fruitful relations with the U.S., it was argued that the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine should be again invoked, this time to prevent the further spreading of Soviet-backed Communism in Latin America.^{[citation needed]} During the Cold War, the United States thus often provided intelligence and military aid to Latin and South American governments that claimed or appeared to be threatened by Communist subversion. This, in turn, led to some domestic controversy within the United States, especially among some members of the left who argued that the Communist threat and Soviet influence in Latin America was greatly exaggerated.^[who?]

The debate over this new spirit of the Monroe Doctrine came to a head in the 1980s, as part of the Iran-Contra affair. Among other things, it was revealed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been covertly training "Contra" guerrilla soldiers in Honduras in an attempt to destabilize and overthrow the Sandinista revolutionary government of Nicaragua and its President, Daniel Ortega. CIA director Robert Gates vigorously defended the Contra operation, arguing that avoiding U.S. intervention in Nicaragua would be "totally to abandon the Monroe doctrine".^{[citation needed]} In a case brought before the International Court of Justice by Nicaragua, however, the court ruled that the United States had exercised "unlawful use of force." The U.S. ignored the verdict. The Carter and Reagan administrations embroiled themselves in the Salvadoran Civil War, again citing the Monroe Doctrine as justification. The conflict was marked by large scale human rights abuses and the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Óscar Romero by right-wing death squads.^{[citation needed]} The Monroe Doctrine was also cited during the U.S. intervention in Guatemala and the invasion of Grenada. Critics of the Reagan administration's support for Britain in the Falklands War charge that the U.S. ignored the Monroe Doctrine in that instance. However, the Falklands were not a seceding colony but a British protectorate attacked by Argentina.

Recent criticisms

Critics of the Monroe Doctrine, such as Noam Chomsky,^[18] argue that in practice the Monroe Doctrine has functioned as a declaration of hegemony and a right of unilateral intervention over the Western Hemisphere – limited only by prudence, as in the case of British military. Chomsky points to the work of filibusters, most notably William Walker, who tried to conquer and annex various countries in Latin America.^[19]

Many Latin American popular movements have come to resent the "Monroe Doctrine", which has been summarized there in the phrase: "America for the Americans", which translates into Spanish ironically as "América para los americanos". The irony lies in the fact that the Spanish term americano is, in all Latin American countries, used to name the inhabitants of North, Central and South America. However, in English, the term American is related almost exclusively to the nationals of the United States, although this was not always the case. Thus, while "America for the Americans" sounds very much like a call to share a common destiny, it becomes apparent that it could really imply: "America (the two continents) for the United States". At the turn of the 21st century, popular resentment in Latin America gave rise to a series of left of center leaders who questioned Washington's sincerity.

Further reading

• Samuel Flagg Bemis. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy. 1949.
• Donald Dozer. The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Significance. New York: Knopf, 1965.
• Leonard Axel Lawson. The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, Columbia University, 1922.
• Ernest R. May. The Making of the Monroe Doctrine. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.
• Mellander, Gustavo A.(1971) The United States in Panamanian Politics: The Intriguing Formative Years. Daville,Ill.:Interstate Publishers. OCLC 138568.
• Mellander, Gustavo A.; Nelly Maldonado Mellander (1999). Charles Edward Magoon: The Panama Years. Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Editorial Plaza Mayor. ISBN 1563281554. OCLC 42970390.
• Frederick Merk. The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843-1849. New York: Knopf, 1966.
• Gretchen Murphy. Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire. Duke University Press, 2005. Examines the cultural context of the doctrine.
• Dexter Perkins. The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826. 3 vols. 1927.
• (it) Nico Perrone. Il manifesto dell'imperialismo americano nelle borse di Londra e Parigi, in Belfagor (an Italian review), 1977, iii. Examines the reactions of the European stock exchange markets.
• Joel S. Poetker. The Monroe Doctrine. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc, 1967.
• Gaddis Smith. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994. Argues that the Monroe Doctrine became irrelevant after the end of the Cold War.
• Grahame, Leopold. "The Latin American View of the Monroe Dotrine." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 57-62. A view of what Latin America thinks of the Monroe Doctrine, according to an American. Interesting, viewed somewhat skewed.

References

1. ^ Rodrigue Tremblay. "The New American Empire (pp 133-134)". http://books.google.com/books?id=LzaDM-f9e08C&pg=PA296&dq=noam+chomsky+hegemony+or+survival+monroe+doctrine#PPA133,M1. Retrieved 2008-12-20. 
2. ^ Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776, (2008) pp. 153-155
3. ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=gwP8bQsT908C&pg=PT267&lpg=PT267
4. ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=FL_G_WdsCX0C&pg=PA136&lpg=PA136
5. ^ ^{a b} Theodore Roosevelt (1904-12-06). "State of the Union Address". TeachingAmericanHistory.org. http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1311. Retrieved 2008-12-20. 
6. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Encyclopaedia Britannica, inc. "Volume 8". New Encyclopædia Britannica, Fifteenth Ed.. pp. 269. ISBN 1593392923. 
7. ^ Richardson, James D. (2004-02-01). "A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume 2, part 1: James Monroe". Project Gutemberg. http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/10919. Retrieved 2008-12-20. 
8. ^ Hobson, Rolf. "Imperialism at Sea, Volume 163, page: 63 - further citations in footnotes". Brill Academic Publishers Inc.. http://books.google.com/books?id=sbo3f1VmDFoC&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=pax+britannica+neutrality+seas&source=bl&ots=Z4wFMbujP5&sig=mwBVM8Id4G5K1rwR489jzi1punM&hl=en&ei=S53TSqCkEpCUtgey2oDiCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=pax%20britannica%20neutrality%20seas&f=false. Retrieved 2009-10-12. 
9. ^ ^{a b c d} John A. Crow. "Areil and Caliban". The Epic of Latin America, Fourth Ed.. pp. 676. ISBN 0520077237. 
10. ^ Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776, (2008) p. 371
11. ^ Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776, (2008) p. 259
12. ^ Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776, (2008) p. 307
13. ^ Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776, (2008) pp. 307-308
14. ^ Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776, (2008) p. 370
15. ^ “The Durable Doctrine”, Time Magazine (September 21, 1962), [1] accessed July 15, 2009.
16. ^ Lens, Sidney; Howard Zinn (2003). illustrated. ed. The forging of the American empire: from the revolution to Vietnam, a history of U.S. imperialism. Human Security Series. Pluto Press. pp. 464. ISBN 0745321003. http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=qvLfIHqkOOAC&pg=PA161&dq=%22Big+sister+policy%22+%22latin+america%22+blaine&client=firefox-a#v=onepage&q=%22Big%20sister%20policy%22%20%22latin%20america%22%20blaine&f=false. 
17. ^ News Conference 42 from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Museum & Library
18. ^ Noam Chomsky. "Hegemony Or Survival". pp. 63-64. http://books.google.com/books?id=tzAC75P9sscC&pg=PA64&dq=noam+chomsky+hegemony+or+survival+doctrine+declaration+of+hegemony#PPA63,M1. Retrieved 2008-12-20. 
19. ^ Noam Chomsky. "Assessing Humanitarian Intent". The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, 1999. pp. 41. ISBN 0745316336. 

Bibliography

• America.gov on Monroe Doctrine – most of the material (as of this writing on 2-Dec-2002) was copied from this public domain source.
• The Encyclopedia Britannica 15th Edition:1974 and The Columbia Encyclopedia Sixth Edition:2008
• “Monroe Doctrine.” The New Encyclopedia Britannica (volume 8) 15th Edition: 1993.

External links

Wikisource has original text related to this article: Monroe Doctrine

• Monroe Doctrine and related resources at the Library of Congress
• Selected text from Monroe's December 2, 1823 speech

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