New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

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376 U.S. 254 (1964), argued 6 Jan. 1964, decided 9 Mar. 1964 by vote of 9 to 0; Brennan for the Court, black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurring. In this case, the Supreme Court for the first time considered the extent to which the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and the press limits the award of damages in a libel action brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of the city of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel action against four black clergymen and The New York Times alleging that he had been libeled by statements in a full‐page advertisement that was carried in the Times. The advertisement, which was entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices,” described the civil rights movement in the South and concluded with an appeal for funds.

It was uncontroverted that several statements contained in the text of the advertisement were inaccurate. For example, the advertisement stated that students protesting racial segregation sang “My Country, 'Tis of Thee” on the steps of the Alabama State Capitol, but they had actually sung “The Star‐Spangled Banner”; it also said that several students were expelled from school for leading that protest, but they were actually expelled for demanding service at a segregated lunch counter in the Montgomery County Court‐house on another day; finally, the advertisement claimed that “the entire student body” of Alabama State College protested the expulsions, but only a majority of the students, not the “entire” student body, had protested the expulsions.

The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that these statements were libelous per se, that falsity and malice were presumed, and that general and punitive damages could be awarded without direct proof of pecuniary loss. Under these instructions, the jury returned a judgment for Sullivan in the amount of $500,000 against each of the defendants.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule of law applied by the Alabama court violated the First Amendment. At the outset, the Court confronted its own past declarations to the effect that libelous utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942) and that they are not constitutionally protected speech (Beauharnais v. Illinois, 1952). In rejecting these prior declarations, the Court explained that, like “the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations”; to the contrary, libel “must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment” (p. 269).

Turning to the task of articulating these standards, Justice William J. Brennan observed in an oft‐quoted passage that “we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide‐open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” (p. 270). Drawing upon history, the Court analogized the civil law of libel, as applied by the Alabama court, to the Sedition Act of 1798, which had been invalidated “in the court of history” because of the restraint it “imposed upon criticism of government and public officials” (p. 276).

The essential difficulty, Brennan explained, was that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” and even false statements must therefore “be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need … to survive’” (pp. 271–272). Thus, the Alabama rule of law could not be “saved by its allowance of the defense of truth,” for a “rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions” would lead to intolerable “self‐censorship.” Indeed, under such a rule, “would‐be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.” Such a rule, the Court concluded, “dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate” (pp. 278–279).

With these considerations in mind, the Court held that public officials may not recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating to their official conduct unless they can prove actual malice; “that the statement was made with … knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not” (pp. 279–280).

New York Times revolutionized the law of libel and, equally importantly, it signaled a critical shift in our general First Amendment jurisprudence. New York Times abandoned the traditional approach, which concentrated solely on whether libel was “protected” or “unprotected” speech, and embraced a more speech‐protective analysis, which focused on the danger that actions for libel might deter expression that lies at the very heart of First Amendment concern. By fashioning its First Amendment standards in light of these “chilling” effects, the Court took an important step toward a more sensitive, less formulaic mode of analysis, a mode of analysis that is the hallmark of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.

Perhaps the most important question remaining after New York Times was whether the privilege it recognized governed only libel actions involving the official conduct of public officials or whether it extended to other persons. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967) and Associated Press v. Walker (1967), the Court, in a sharply divided set of opinions, extended the New York Times holding from public officials to figures such as movie stars, athletes, industrialists, and other individuals who, though they are not officials, are nonetheless well known to the public. In reaching this result, the Court rejected the argument that New York Times was premised on, and thus limited by, the analogy to seditious libel. Rather, the Court reasoned that New York Times rested on a profound national commitment to uninhibited, robust, and wide‐open debate on public issues. The Court therefore concluded that libelous utterances concerning public figures, like libelous utterances concerning public officials, must be governed by the New York Times privilege.

Several years later, however, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), the Court, again sharply divided, recognized an important limitation on the scope of New York Times, holding that it did not extend to libel actions brought by private individuals, even where the defamatory statement related to a matter of “public concern.” The Court explained that, unlike public officials and public figures, private individuals are usually unable to rebut the libel effectively and they usually have not gone out of their way to seek the public's attention. The Court reasoned that, because private individuals are more vulnerable to injury and more deserving of recovery than either public officials or public figures, they may recover damages for libel merely by showing that the publisher or broadcaster had acted negligently in disseminating the defamatory material.

New York Times and its progeny have been criticized as both overprotective and under‐protective of free expression. Some critics maintain that New York Times failed adequately to protect the press because its “reckless disregard” standard implicitly authorized highly intrusive inquiries into the thought processes of reporters and editors and because it failed to preclude large and potentially “chilling” damage awards whenever a jury would find that the press has acted with “reckless disregard.” These critics, echoing the views expressed by Justices Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and Arthur Goldberg in their concurring opinions in New York Times, argue that the press should have absolute protection against actions for libel. Other critics maintain that New York Times gave too much protection to the press and failed to protect the innocent victims of libel. These critics fault New York Times for denying innocent victims reasonable compensation for the harm they suffer and for preventing such victims from obtaining a judicial declaration of falsity, which would at least set the record straight.

Several proposals have been offered in recent years in an effort to “cure” these “deficiencies.” The most intriguing of these proposals calls for the creation of a new civil action in which the alleged victim of a defamatory falsehood could sue for a judicial declaration of falsity upon waiving the right to sue for damages. The theory is that such an action would reduce litigation costs and enable the victims of libel to vindicate their reputations without intruding into the editorial process or threatening the press with potentially devastating damage awards. Although this approach would avoid some of the problems identified with New York Times, it would effectively empower the judiciary to decide on a case‐by‐case basis whether specific statements made by the press are “true” or “false.” It is questionable whether such a relationship between the judiciary and the press would comport with the underlying theory and assumptions of the First Amendment.

New York Times cannot be fully understood without recognizing that it was driven not only by concerns about free expression but also by the unique historical circumstances in which it arose. New York Times was, in short, a product of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Like other devices designed to obstruct the civil rights movement, the libel judgment against the New York Times and the African‐American clergymen named in the advertisement was designed to dampen the drive for civil rights. After all, if this Alabama jury's massive damage award could be sustained on the basis of such minor inaccuracies, then no person or institution would be free to challenge racial segregation in the South. New York Times, one of most important decisions in the history of the First Amendment, was thus not only a triumph for free expression, it was a triumph for civil rights and racial equality as well.

Bibliography

• David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel, California Law Review 74 (1986): 847–888.
• Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on ‘The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,’ Supreme Court Review (1964): 191–221.
• Rodney A. Smolla, Suing the Press (1986)

— Geoffrey R. Stone

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• 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
• Vote: 9–0
• For the Court: Brenan

On March 29, 1960, the New York Times printed a full-page advertisement paid for by two black civil rights organizations. L. B. Sullivan, an elected city commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, read the advertisement and decided to bring a libel suit against the New York Times and the sponsors of the advertisement. Libel is the act of slandering, or hurting a person's reputation by saying negative things about him that are untrue or misleading.

Sullivan was upset about the advertisement because it described civil rights activities in southern states, including Alabama, and appealed for donations of money to support the programs of the ad's two sponsors. The ad also included an eight-line description of events in Montgomery, Alabama, that criticized the city police for abuses against black demonstrators. Sullivan's name was not mentioned, but he was offended because he was in charge of the Montgomery police department. So he claimed that false and exaggerated charges against the city police were slanders against him in his role as police commissioner.

State courts in Alabama decided in favor of Sullivan. Sullivan proved that there were several errors about details, but not main points, in the advertisement. The state courts concluded that he had been libeled and awarded him $500,000 in damages. The New York Times appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Issue

L. B. Sullivan argued that the advertisement in this case was libelous because it contained untrue statements. He claimed that the Constitution does not protect speech that is false or misleading about the actions of a person. The New York Times argued that the libel law of Alabama, which permitted restrictions on untrue speech, was an infringement on 1st Amendment freedoms to express criticisms of public officials. To what extent do constitutional protections of free speech limit a state government's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a government official against his critics?

Opinion of the Court

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court. Justice William Brennan argued that the Alabama libel law threatened 1st Amendment freedoms of speech and press by “raising… the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism.” Brennan said that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”

Brennan maintained that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate.” Therefore, even false statements about public officials must be protected if citizens and the media are to act effectively as critics of their government. Therefore, the Court concluded, public officials may not be awarded damages for defamatory statements about their official conduct merely because the statements are false. Rather, the offended public official must prove actual malice. That is, he must demonstrate that “the statement was made with… knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”

Significance

This decision has made it very difficult for public officials to bring libel actions against the media. As a result, freedom of expression about the actions of government has been greatly expanded. The media have been encouraged to play the role of watchdog and exposer of questionable or improper actions by public officials, such as corrupt or foolish behavior.

See also Freedom of speech and press

Sources

• Anthony Lewis, “Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment” (New York: Random House, 1991). The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times (New York: Bantam, 1971).
• S. J. Unger, “The Papers and the Papers: An Account of the Legal and Political Battles over the Pentagon Papers” (New York: Dutton, 1972)

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to New York Times Company v. Sullivan, libelous speech—speech that defames or slanders—was regarded as a form of personal assault unprotected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Courts assumed that libelous speech injured, and merely "more speech" was an inadequate remedy, since the truth rarely catches the lie. Thus, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Supreme Court ruled that libel was outside the scope of First Amendment protection because it was "no essential part in the exposition of ideas, " and in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Court concluded that libelous statements regarding a group were also unprotected.

In Times v. Sullivan, a watershed case in the history of the law of libel and a free press, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Thus, for the first time since the adoption of the Constitution, the Supreme Court granted the press constitutional protection when sued for damages by public officials because of criticism relating to their official conduct. In Times v. Sullivan, L. B. Sullivan, a police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, sued the New York Times and four African American clergymen because of statements contained in a full-page fund-raising advertisement printed in the Times. The advertisement, which did not mention Sullivan by name, contained charges, some inaccurate, of police brutality and harassment aimed at civil rights protesters on the Alabama State College campus in 1960. Similar to many states, Alabama made a publisher strictly liable for defamatory falsehoods, and the state recognized no privilege for good-faith mistakes of fact. The jury granted Sullivan a $500,000 damage award which the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. Although the outcome was in accord with Alabama law, many interpreted it to mean that the South was prepared to use the state law of libel to punish and stifle the civil rights movement.

In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court stated that there existed a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, " and that such debate may well include "sharp attacks on government and public officials." The Court observed that erroneous statements are inevitable in a free debate and that they must be protected if a free press is to have the "breathing space" it requires to survive. The Court noted that although the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798, which imposed criminal penalties upon those who criticized the government or public officials, was never tested in court, "the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." Because civil damage awards may be as inhibiting of free expression as the criminal sanction, the "central meaning" of the First Amendment requires that the amendment limit the potential devastating reach of a civil libel judgment. Accordingly, the Court ruled that a public official seeking a damage judgment because of a libelous statement critical of his official conduct could only prevail by proving, through clear and convincing evidence, "that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."

The Supreme Court's decision in Times v. Sullivan has sparked many debates that still continue over its meaning and application. The Court's "actual malice" standard defies sound summary except for emphasizing that the term "actual malice" as used by the Court should not be confused with the concept of common-law malice that requires evidence of ill will or bias. Subsequent judicial decisions have parsed the meaning of who is a public official, what constitutes official as opposed to private conduct, who is a public figure, and to what extent the underlying meaning of Times v. Sullivan undermines a person's right to keep personal information private.

It is difficult to gauge, and perhaps difficult to exaggerate, the impact of Times v. Sullivan on protecting the mass media from damages arising out of defamation claims. Many criticize this development and point to mass-media abuses that allegedly needlessly injure individuals, erode civil discourse, and deter individuals from entering public life out of fear of having their reputations tarnished. Others applaud the development as essential to a vigorous and robust public discourse that strengthens the democratic process by providing the governed with critical information about the governors and their policies.

Bibliography

Epstein, Richard. "Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?" 53 University of Chicago Law Review 782 (1986).

Lewis, Anthony. Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment. New York: Random House, 1991.

Click here to see full case study.

A landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964), extended the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech to libel cases brought by public officials. The Supreme Court sought to encourage public debate by changing the rules involving libel that had previously been the province of state law and state courts.

New York Times v. Sullivan grew out of events occurring during the 1960s civil rights movement in Alabama. In 1960 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil rights leaders conducted protests against segregation in Montgomery, Alabama. Their efforts met fierce resistance from Montgomery public officials. Civil rights leaders placed a full-page advertisement in the New York Times seeking contributions for civil rights causes in the South. Signed by sixty-four prominent leaders in public affairs, religion, trade unions, and the performing arts, the advertisement, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," stated that thousands of southern African American students were engaging in nonviolent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity. The ad went on to charge that these demonstrations had been met with a "wave of terror" by state and local governments. Alleged events that backed up this charge were described, but no particular public official was named.

L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner responsible for supervising the city police department, filed a libel suit against four African American clergyman and the New York Times in Alabama state court. Sullivan alleged that the advertisement implicitly libeled him. Libel is a civil tort and consists of injuring someone's reputation by reporting falsehoods about that person.

At trial Sullivan proved that the advertisement contained a number of minor inaccuracies about described incidents. The jury had to determine whether the statements in the advertisement were "of and concerning" Commissioner Sullivan. The judge instructed the jury that under Alabama law, the statements were libelous, falsity and malice were presumed, and damages could be awarded without direct proof of financial loss. The jury concluded that the statements did concern Sullivan and awarded him $500,000 for injuries to his reputation and profession.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule of law applied by Alabama violated the First Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in his majority opinion, placed the legal issues in the context of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Brennan maintained that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be protected if freedom of expression is to have the "breathing space" it needs to survive.

The advertisement was squarely a public expression and protest and fell within constitutional protection. Neither the allegedly defamatory content of the ad, nor the falsity of some of its factual statements, nor the negligence of anyone in preparing or publishing it forfeited this protection. Brennan dismissed the idea that courts were free to conclude that libelous statements were made "of and concerning" a particular person when the statements on their face did not make even an oblique reference to the individual. Brennan stated that there is "no legal alchemy" by which a court constitutionally can establish that "an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible for those operations."

Brennan then set out the rule that reshaped libel law. A public official could recover in a libel action only if and when a court found that the libelous statement about the official was made with " ‘actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." As long as the press has an "absence of malice," public officials are barred from recovering damages for the publication of false statements about them.

In separate concurring opinions, Justices Hugo L. Black and William O. Douglas differed with Justice Brennan over whether the press should ever be held liable in defamation of public officials. They concluded that the First Amendment provided an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public duty. Anything less than absolute immunity encourages "deadly danger" to a free press by state libel laws that harass, punish, and ultimately destroy critics.

In the years since New York Times, some critics have argued that Black and Douglas were right. The "reckless disregard" requirement has allowed highly intrusive inquiries into the reportorial and editorial processes of the mass media. In addition, the "chilling effect" of libel suits has not been diminished because of the case. If a jury finds reckless disregard, it can award enormous damage awards against the press.

Other critics of the decision believe it affords too much protection to the press. Public officials unfairly libeled by the press rarely file libel suits because of the difficulty of proving actual malice. This prevents them from establishing in a court of law the falsity of the statements at issue.

See: Freedom of Speech; Freedom of the Press; Libel and Slander; Public Figure.

The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 6, 1964 Decided March 9, 1964
Full case name	The New York Times Company v. L. B. Sullivan
Citations	376 U.S. 254 (more) 84 S. Ct. 710; 11 L. Ed. 2d 686; 1964 U.S. LEXIS 1655; 95 A.L.R.2d 1412; 1 Media L. Rep. 1527
Prior history	Judgment for plaintiff, Circuit Court, Montgomery County, Alabama; motion for new trial denied, Circuit Court, Montgomery County; affirmed, 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962); certiorari granted, 371 U.S. 946 (1963)
Holding
The First Amendment, as applied through the Fourteenth, protected a newspaper from being sued for libel in state court for making false defamatory statements about the official conduct of a public official, because the statements were not made with knowing or reckless disregard for the truth. Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice Earl Warren Associate Justices Hugo Black · William O. Douglas Tom C. Clark · John M. Harlan II William J. Brennan, Jr. · Potter Stewart Byron White · Arthur Goldberg
Case opinions
Majority	Brennan, joined by Warren, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, White
Concurrence	Black, joined by Douglas
Concurrence	Goldberg, joined by Douglas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV

Wikisource has original text related to this article: New York Times v. Sullivan

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),^[1] was a United States Supreme Court case which established the actual malice standard which has to be met before press reports about public officials or public figures can be considered to be defamation and libel^[2]; and hence allowed free reporting of the civil rights campaigns in the southern United States. It is one of the key decisions supporting the freedom of the press. The actual malice standard requires that the plaintiff in a defamation or libel case prove that the publisher of the statement in question knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Because of the extremely high burden of proof on the plaintiff, and the difficulty in proving essentially what is inside a person's head, such cases—when they involve public figures—rarely prevail.

Before this decision there were nearly US$300 million in libel actions outstanding against news organizations from the Southern states and these had caused many publications to exercise great caution when reporting on civil rights, for fear that they might be held accountable for libel. After The New York Times prevailed in this case, news organizations were free to report the widespread disorder and civil rights infringements. The Times maintained that the case against it was brought to intimidate news organizations and prevent them from reporting illegal actions of public employees in the South as they attempted to continue to support segregation.

Contents 1 Background of the case 2 The court's decision 2.1 Actual malice 3 International comparisons 4 Later developments 5 See also 6 Notes 7 Further reading 8 External links

Background of the case

On March 29, 1960, the New York Times carried a full-page advertisement titled "Heed Their Rising Voices",^[3] which solicited funds to defend Martin Luther King, Jr. against an Alabama perjury indictment. The advertisement described actions against civil rights protesters, some of them inaccurately, some of which involved the police force of Montgomery, Alabama. Referring to the Alabama State Police, the advertisement stated that "They have arrested [ Martin Luther King, Jr. ] seven times..."^[4] However, at that point he had only been arrested four times. Although the Montgomery Public Safety commissioner, L. B. Sullivan, was not named in the advertisement, the inaccurate criticism of the actions by the police were considered as defamation against him as well by virtue of his position and duty to supervise the police department.

Alabama law denied a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action brought on account of a publication concerning their official conduct unless they first make a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply, so Sullivan sent such a request.^[1] The Times did not publish a retraction in response to the demand. Instead it wrote a letter^{[citation needed]} stating, among other things, that "we ... are somewhat puzzled as to how you think the statements in any way reflect on you," and "you might, if you desire, let us know in what respect you claim that the statements in the advertisement reflect on you".^[1] Sullivan did not respond but instead filed this suit a few days later. He also sued four black ministers mentioned in the ad, specifically Ralph Abernathy, S.S. Seay, Sr., Fred Shuttlesworth, and Joseph Lowery. Sullivan won $500,000 in an Alabama court judgment.^{[citation needed]}

The Times did, however, subsequently publish a retraction of the advertisement upon the demand of Governor John Patterson of Alabama, who asserted that the publication charged him with "grave misconduct and ... improper actions and omissions as Governor of Alabama and ex-officio chairman of the State Board of Education of Alabama."^[1] When asked to explain why there had been a retraction for the Governor but not for Sullivan, the Secretary of the Times testified: "We did that because we didn't want anything that was published by the Times to be a reflection on the State of Alabama and the Governor was, as far as we could see, the embodiment of the State of Alabama and the proper representative of the state and, furthermore, we had by that time learned more of the actual facts which the ad purported to recite and, finally, the ad did refer to the action of the state authorities and the Board of Education presumably of which the Governor is the ex-officio chairman...." On the other hand, he testified that he did not think that "any of the language in there referred to Mr. Sullivan."^[1]

The court's decision

The Court ruled for the Times, 9-0^[5]. The rule of law applied by the Alabama courts was found constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. The decision further held that under the proper safeguards the evidence presented in this case is constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for Sullivan.

Actual malice

The Court held that a public official suing for defamation must prove that the statement in question was made with actual malice, which in this context refers to knowledge or reckless lack of investigation, rather than the ordinary meaning of malicious intent. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black explained that "'[m]alice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment."

The term "malice" was not newly invented for the case, but came from existing libel law. In many jurisdictions, including Alabama (where the case arose), proof of "actual malice" (actual knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for the truth) was required in order for punitive damages to be awarded, or for other increased penalties. Since proof of the writer's malicious intentions is hard to provide, proof that the writer knowingly published a falsehood was generally accepted as proof of malice, under the assumption that only a malicious person would knowingly publish a falsehood. In Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95 (1930), similarly, the court said: "The plaintiff alleges that this criticism of him and of his work was not fair and was not honest; it was published with actual malice, ill will and spite. If he establishes this allegation, he has made out a cause of action. No comment or criticism, otherwise libelous, is fair or just comment on a matter of public interest if it be made through actual ill will and malice." (p. 106)

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court adopted the term "actual malice" and gave it constitutional significance, at the same time defining it in terms of the proof which had previously been usual.

International comparisons

The rule that somebody alleging defamation should have to prove untruth, rather than that the defendant should have to prove the truth of a statement stood as a departure from the previous common law. In England, the development was specifically rejected in Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd^[6] and it was also rejected in Canada in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto^[7] and more recently in Grant v. Torstar Corp.^[8] However in Australia, the outcome of the case was followed in Theophanous v. The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd.^[9]

Later developments

• Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) held that public figures who are not public officials may still sue news organizations if they disseminate information about them which is recklessly gathered and unchecked.
• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974): Actual malice not necessary for defamation of private person if negligence is present
• Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988): Extending standard to intentional infliction of emotional distress
• Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990): Existing law is sufficient to protect free speech without recognizing opinion privilege against libel claims.
• Westmoreland v. CBS (1982): Reaffirmed New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 376

Notes

1. ^ ^{a b c d e} New York Times v. Sullivan, United States Supreme Court, March 9, 1964 (376 U.S. 254). http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/comm/free_speech/nytvsullivan.html
2. ^ Buescher, John. "The 4th Estate as the 4th Branch." Teachinghistory.org, accessed 2 September 2011].
3. ^ Heed Their Rising Voices Advertisement, courtesy of the National Archives
4. ^ http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0376_0254_ZO.html"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan". http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0376_0254_ZO.html. 
5. ^ http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_39
6. ^ Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534
7. ^ Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 1130
8. ^ Grant v. Torstar Corp. [2009] 2009 SCC 61
9. ^ Theophanous v. The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104

Further reading

• Burnett, Nicholas F. (2003). "New York Times v. Sullivan". In Parker, Richard A. (ed.). Free Speech on Trial: Communication Perspectives on Landmark Supreme Court Decisions. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. pp. 116–129. ISBN 081731301X. 
• Lewis, Anthony (1991). Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment. New York: Random House. ISBN 039458774X. 
• Fireside, Harvey (1999). New York Times V. Sullivan: Affirming Freedom of the Press. Berkeley Heights, NJ: Enslow Publishers, Inc.. ISBN 978-0766010857. 
• Lithwick, Dahlia (2007-07-17). "Target Practice: Justice Scalia sets his sights on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan". Slate. http://www.slate.com/id/2170309/fr/flyout. 
• Watson, John C. (2002). "Times v. Sullivan: Landmark or Land Mine on the Road to Ethical Journalism?". Journal of Mass Media Ethics 17 (1): 3–19. doi:10.1207/S15327728JMME1701_02. 

External links

• Text of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) is available from: Justia · Findlaw · U of Wisconsin · BC

• OYEZ – New York Times v. Sullivan
• Booknotes interview with Anthony Lewis on Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment, October 20, 1991.

v d e United States First Amendment case law   Establishment Clause Public funding Everson v. Board of Education (1947) • McCollum v. Board of Education (1948) • Walz v. Tax Commission (1970) • Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) • Marsh v. Chambers (1983) • Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (1994) • Agostini v. Felton (1997) • Mitchell v. Helms (2000) • Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) • Locke v. Davey (2004) Public displays Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) • County of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989) • McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky (2005) • Van Orden v. Perry (2005) School prayer Zorach v. Clauson (1952) • Engel v. Vitale (1962) • School District of Abington Township v. Schempp (1963) • Stone v. Graham (1980) • Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) • Lee v. Weisman (1992) • Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe (2000) • Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004) Creationism Epperson v. Arkansas (1968) • Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) • Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District (M.D. Pa. 2005)   Free Exercise Clause Reynolds v. United States (1879) • Davis v. Beason (1890) • Braunfeld v. Brown (1961) • Torcaso v. Watkins (1961) • Sherbert v. Verner (1963) • Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) • Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1981) • Bob Jones University v. United States (1983) • Goldman v. Weinberger (1986) • Employment Division v. Smith (1990) • Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) • City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) • Watchtower Society v. Village of Stratton (2002) • Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005) • Gonzales v. UDV (2006)   Freedom of speech Sedition and imminent danger Alien and Sedition Acts (1798) • Schenck v. United States (1919) • Abrams v. United States (1919) • Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten (S.D.N.Y. 1917) • Gitlow v. New York (1925) • Whitney v. California (1927) • Dennis v. United States (1951) • Yates v. United States (1957) • Bond v. Floyd (1966) • Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) • Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) • Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb (1974) Fighting words and the heckler's veto Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) • Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) • Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) • Feiner v. New York (1951) • Gregory v. Chicago (1969) • National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie (1977) • R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) • Snyder v. Phelps (2011) Freedom of assembly and public forums Hague v. CIO (1939) • Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) • Martin v. Struthers (1943) • Niemotko v. Maryland (1951) • Cox v. Louisiana (1965) • Brown v. Louisiana (1966) • Adderley v. Florida (1966) • Carroll v. Princess Anne County (1968) • Coates v. Cincinnati (1971) • Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971) • Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) • Hill v. Colorado (2000) Symbolic speech United States v. O'Brien (1968) • Cohen v. California (1971) • Smith v. Goguen (1974) • Texas v. Johnson (1989) • United States v. Eichman (1990) Compelled speech Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) • West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) • Wooley v. Maynard (1977) • Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth (2000) • Davenport v. Washington Education Association (2007) School speech Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) • Board of Education v. Pico (1982) • Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) • Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988) • Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995) • Morse v. Frederick (2007) Obscenity Rosen v. United States (1896) • United States v. One Book Called Ulysses (S.D.N.Y. 1933) • Roth v. United States (1957) • One, Inc. v. Olesen (1958) • Marcus v. Search Warrant (1961) • MANual Enterprises v. Day (1962) • Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) • Quantity of Books v. Kansas (1964) • Freedman v. Maryland (1965) • Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966) • Redrup v. New York (1967) • Ginsberg v. New York (1968) • Stanley v. Georgia (1969) • United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs (1971) • Kois v. Wisconsin (1972) • Miller v. California (1973) • Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973) • United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film (1973) • Jenkins v. Georgia (1974) • New York v. Ferber (1982) • American Booksellers v. Hudnut (7th Cir., 1985) • Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986) • Osborne v. Ohio (1990) • United States v. X-Citement Video (1994) • Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) • United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group (2000) • Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) • Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2002) • Nitke v. Gonzales (S.D.N.Y., 2005) • United States v. Williams (2008) • FCC v. Fox Television Stations (2009 case) (2009) • American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Strickland (6th Cir., 2009) • United States v. Kilbride (9th Cir., 2009) • United States v. Stevens (2010) Public employees Garner v. Board of Public Works (1951) • Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) • Connick v. Myers (1983) • Rankin v. McPherson (1987) • Waters v. Churchill (1994) • Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) • Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011) Hatch Act and similar laws Ex parte Curtis (1882) • United Public Workers v. Mitchell (1947) • United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers (1973) • Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) Commercial speech Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942) • Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (1973) • Bigelow v. Commonwealth of Virginia (1974) • Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976) • Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (1977) • Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro (1977) • Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980) • Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (1980) • Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California (1986) • San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee (1987) • 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996) Campaign finance and political speech Buckley v. Valeo (1976) • First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) • Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (1981) • California Medical Association v. FEC (1981) • Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee (1982) • FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (1985) • FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (1986) • Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) • McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995) • Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (1996) • Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (2000) • FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (2001) • McConnell v. FEC (2003) • FEC v. Beaumont (2003) • Randall v. Sorrell (2006) • FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007) • Davis v. FEC (2008) • Citizens United v. FEC (2010) • Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett. (2011)   Freedom of the press Prior restraints and censorship Near v. Minnesota (1931) • Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938) • Hannegan v. Esquire (1946) • New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) • Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974) • Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976) Taxation and privileges Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) • Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) • Minneapolis Star Tribune Company v. Commissioner (1983) Defamation New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) • Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967) • Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) • Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) • Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) • McDonald v. Smith (1985) • Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) • Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) Broadcast media Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969) • FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) • Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1994) • Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001)   Freedom of association NAACP v. Alabama (1958) • Baggett v. Bullitt (1964) • In re Primus (1978) • Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) • Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995) • Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)

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