Newburgh Conspiracy

The Newburgh Conspiracy was unrest in 1783 among officers of the American Continental Army due to many officers and men of the Army not receiving pay for many years. Commander-in-Chief George Washington stopped any serious talk by appealing successfully to his officers to support the supremacy of Congress.^[1] The officers had been promised a lifetime pension of half pay; instead, Congress gave them five years full pay.

Background

With the end of the war and dissolution of the Continental Army approaching, soldiers who had long been unpaid feared that Congress would not meet previous promises concerning back pay and pensions. Congress, at the mercy of the states for all revenue, had no money and could not pay more than a fraction of the money owed. The result was that, by March 1783, some officers were talking of forcing Congress to pay what had been promised to them, with an undertone of marching on the capital. There was no plan for a coup and the movement seems to have lacked any leaders or spokesmen.

The winter of 1783 marked the end of hostilities between the young nation and Britain, but a formal peace treaty had not yet been signed. Most of the Continental Army was camped near Newburgh, New York, where they maintained a watchful eye on the British, who still occupied New York City, some sixty miles to the south; any hint that there was turmoil in the Continental Army might have induced the British to attack and re-establish control over their former colonies.

Continental officers had been promised a pension of half their pay when they were discharged. At this point, the officers organized under the leadership of General Henry Knox and sent a delegation to lobby Congress; the delegation was headed by Alexander McDougall. The officers had three demands: the Army's pay, their own pensions, and the option of commutation of those pensions into a lump-sum payment.

Actions of Congress

The officers' warning reached the Congress amid seemingly fortuitous political circumstances. Those members of Congress who supported a stronger central government, prominently Robert Morris, Gouverneur Morris, and Alexander Hamilton, saw providence in the Army's statement of discontent.^{[citation needed][2]}

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MacDougall was a New York acquaintance of Hamilton; the Congressmen later approached Knox, and John Armstrong, aide to General Horatio Gates, through Captain John Brooks, one of MacDougall's colleagues.

Robert Morris accompanied MacDougall to Congress when MacDougall lobbied that body for funds. Congress had none because the states refused to send the money they had promised. Robert counseled patience, as he attempted to secure funding for the Army. Hamilton and G. Morris encouraged both MacDougall and Knox to continue their appeals, and in a private coded letter G. Morris acknowledged the danger of threatening unknown consequences if their demands were not granted. Congress defeated proposals which would have resolved the crisis without establishing general Federal taxation: that the states assume the debt to the army, or that an impost be established but dedicated to the sole purpose of paying that debt.^[3]

The content of the Newburgh letter reveals the frustration of the Army. It states that they would refuse to disband if they were not paid, and they would refuse to fight to protect the Congress if it were attacked. Kohn (1970) argues that a coup d'etat was never seriously attempted, and would have been politically impossible in the first place. The enlisted men had much less at stake than the officers, and might not have followed any rebellion; if they had, the insurgent army, completely unsupplied, would have had to catch Congress, which the British had attempted vainly for years. Once caught, any resolution imposed on Congress would still have had to be implemented by the states.

Washington's involvement

Washington, in response to a letter from Alexander Hamilton said that while he sympathized both with the plight of his officers and men and with those in Congress, he would not use the army to threaten the civil government: a course, which Washington believed, would violate the principles of republicanism for which they had all been fighting. A small group of officers, led probably by Major John Armstrong, Jr., aide to Major General Horatio Gates, attempted to forestall Washington's intervention, viewing him as too moderate; they would have forcibly installed Gates in his place as Commander-in-Chief. They published placards, the "Newburgh Addresses," calling for a meeting on March 12. They warned that come peace Congress would ignore them as they "grow old in poverty, wretchedness and contempt."^[4]

The Newburgh Address.

Washington canceled the March 12 meeting and called his own meeting of officers on 15 March 1783. It was held in the "New Building", a 40 by 70 foot (12 by 21 m) building at the camp. After Gates opened the meeting, Washington entered the building to everyone's surprise. He asked to speak to the officers, and the stunned Gates relinquished the floor. Washington could tell by the faces of his officers, who had not been paid for quite some time, that they were quite angry and did not show the respect or deference as they had toward Washington in the past.^[5]

Washington then gave a short but impassioned speech, the Newburgh Address, counseling patience. His message was that they should oppose anyone "who wickedly attempts to open the floodgates of civil discord and deluge our rising empire in blood.".^[6] He then took a letter from his pocket from a member of Congress to read to the officers. He gazed upon it and fumbled with it without speaking. He then took a pair of reading glasses from his pocket, which were new and few of the men had seen him wear them. He then said: "Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country." This caused the men to realize that Washington had sacrificed a great deal for the Revolution, just as much as any of them. These, of course, were his fellow officers, most having worked closely with him for several years. Many of those present were moved to tears,^[7] and with this act, the conspiracy collapsed as he read the letter. He then left the room and General Henry Knox and others offered resolutions reaffirming their loyalty, which were accepted by the group.

Congress finally resolved the crisis by giving a sum equal to five years pay to each officer entitled to half-pay-for life. They received government bonds which at the time were highly speculative, but were in fact redeemed 100 cents on the dollar by the new government in 1790.^[8]

End of the war

The soldiers continued to grumble—the unrest now spread to the noncommissioned officers (sergeants and corporals). Riots occurred and mutiny threatened. Washington rejected suggestions that the Army stay in operation until the states found the money for the pay. On April 19, 1783, that the General Orders of the day announced the end of hostilities against Great Britain. Everyone agreed that a large army of 10,000 men was no longer needed; the men were very eager to go home. Congress gave each soldier three months pay, but since they had no funds Robert Morris issued a total $800,000 in personal notes to the soldiers. Over the next couple of months, much of the Continental Army was furloughed and simply faded away, effectively disbanding nearly all the soldiers. The official disbanding came in the following November, and left only a small force at West Point and several scattered frontier outposts.^[9]

The main long-term result was a strong reaffirmation of the principle of civilian control of the military, and banishing any possibility of a coup as outside the realm of republican values. It also validated Washington's stature as a leading proponent of civilian control.^[10]

See also

• Newburgh letter
• Lewis Nicola

Notes

References

• Brainard, Rick (2005). "The Man Who Saved a Revolution: The Newburgh Address". History1700s.com. http://www.history1700s.com/articles/article1145.shtml. Retrieved 2007-10-10. 
• Jensen, Merrill. The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789 (1950) pp 54–84
• Kohn, Richard H. "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat"; The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), pp. 188–220. JSTOR link. Despite the title, Kohn is doubtful that a coup d'état against Congress was ever seriously attempted.
• Kohn, Richard H. Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (1975) pp 17–39
• Robertson, John K.; Bob McDonald (May 20, 2002). "A Brief Profile of the Continental Army — The Newburgh Conspiracy". Rev War '75. http://www.revwar75.com/ob/newburgh.htm. Retrieved 2007-10-10. 
• Various (2001) [2001]. John Rhodehamel. ed. The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence. The Library of America. ISBN 1-883011-91-4. http://www.amazon.com/dp/1883011914/. Retrieved 2007-04-27. 
• Wensyel, James W. (April/May 1981). The Newburgh Conspiracy. 32. American Heritage Magazine. http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1981/3/1981_3_40.shtml. Retrieved 2007-10-10. 
• "Gilder Lehrman Collection Documents — Letter to Henry Knox, March 12, 1783". PBS. http://www.pbs.org/georgewashington/collection/war_1783mar12.html. Retrieved 2007-10-10. 

External links

• Library of Congress page on the Newburgh conspiracy