This article covers notable accidents involving nuclear devices and radioactive materials. These accidents can hurt or kill almost anything that is around it while the accident is happening. In some cases, a release of radioactive contamination occurs, but in many cases the accident involves a sealed source or the release of radioactivity is small while the direct irradiation is large. Due to government and business secrecy, it is not always possible to determine with certainty the frequency or the extent of some events in the early days of the radiation industries. Modern misadventures, accidents, and incidents, which result in injury, death, or serious environmental contamination, tend to be well documented by the International Atomic Energy Agency
Because of the different nature of the events it is best to divide the list into nuclear and radiation accidents. An example of nuclear accident might be one in which a reactor core is damaged such as in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident, while an example of a radiation accident might be some event such as a radiography accident where a worker drops the source into a river. These radiation accidents such as those involving the radiography sources often have as much or even greater ability to cause serious harm to both workers and the public than the well known nuclear accidents.
Radiation accidents are more common than nuclear accidents, and are often limited in scale. For instance at Soreq, a worker suffered a dose which was similar to one of the highest doses suffered by a worker on site at Chernobyl on day one.[citation needed] However, because the gamma source was never able to leave the 2-metre thick concrete enclosure, it was not able to harm many others.[citation needed]
The web page at the International Atomic Energy Agency, which deals with recent accidents is [2]. The safety significance of nuclear accidents can be assessed and conveyed using the International Atomic Energy Agency International Nuclear Event Scale.
Nuclear Regulatory CommissionHeadquarters and Regional staff members typically participate in four full-scale and emergency response exercises each year, selected from among the list of full-scale Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-graded exercises required of nuclear facilities. Regional staff members and selected Headquarters staff also participate in post-plume, ingestion phase response exercises. On-scene participants include the NRC licensee, and State, county, and local emergency response agencies.(http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/exercise-schedules/nrc-ex-schedule.html) This allows for Federal Interagency participation that will provide increased preparedness during the potential for an event at an operating nuclear reactor
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) collects reports of incidents occurring at regulated facilities. The agency currently (2006) uses a 4 level taxonomy to classify reported incidents:
- Notification of Unusual Event
- Alert
- Site Area Emergency
- General Emergency
Not all reportable events constitute accidents. Incidents which threaten the normal operation or security of a facility may be reportable but not result in any release of radioactivity.
The US Department of Energy uses a similar classification system for events occurring at fuel cycle plants and facilities owned by the US government which are therefore regulated by the DOE instead of the NRC.
Contents |
Lists of accidents
Criteria
In dividing up accidents to create the list nuclear accidents, the following criteria[citation needed] have been followed:
- There must be well-attested and substantial health damage, property damage or contamination for an event to be listed.
- To qualify as "civilian", the nuclear operation/material must be principally for non-military purposes, "military" accidents include all other accidents. (Main article: List of military nuclear accidents)
- For a "nuclear" accident the event should involve fissile material, fission or a reactor, all other accidents are considered radiation accidents as they involve radioactive not nuclear materials (accidents with non-radioactive X-ray and electron beam generators are also included in this class). (Main article: List of civilian radiation accidents)
- The damage must be related directly to radioactive/nuclear material, not merely (for example) at a nuclear power plant. Hypothetical examples of nonradiation/nonnuclear accidents occurring at nuclear/radiation facilities would be:
- A nuclear worker crashing his private car in the car park of a nuclear power plant into a lamp post or even a truck carrying a spent fuel cask, property damage has occurred but no release of radiation or contamination will have occurred so it is a simple road traffic accident.
- A veterinarian, while preparing a frightened dog for radiography, is bitten by the animal. While the bite is an injury which occurred while a radiation worker was at work (and was performing a task related to radiation work), the accident did not involve exposure of a human (or canine) to radiation so it is a simple dog bite.
Serious accidents
The worst nuclear accident in history is the Chernobyl disaster. Other serious nuclear and radiation accidents include the Mayak disaster, Soviet submarine K-431 accident, Soviet submarine K-19 accident, Three Mile Island accident, Costa Rica radiotherapy accident, Zaragoza radiotherapy accident, Goiania accident, Windscale fire, Church Rock Uranium Mill Spill and the SL-1 accident.
Accident types
Loss of coolant accident
Criticality accidents
A criticality accident (also sometimes referred to as an "excursion" or "power excursion") occurs when a nuclear chain reaction is accidentally allowed to occur in fissile material, such as enriched uranium or plutonium. The Chernobyl accident is an example of a criticality accident. This accident destroyed a reactor at the plant and left a large geographic area uninhabitable. In a smaller scale accident at Sarov a technician working with highly enriched uranium was irradiated while preparing an experiment involving a sphere of fissile material. The Sarov accident is interesting because the system remained critical for many days before it could be stopped, though safely located in a shielded experimental hall [3]. This is an example of a limited scope accident where only a few people can be harmed, while no release of radioactivity into the environment occurred. A criticality accident with limited off site release of both radiation (gamma and neutron) and a very small release of radioactivity occurred at Tokaimura in 1999 during the production of enriched uranium fuel [4]. Two workers died, a third was permanently injured, and 350 citizens were exposed to radiation.
Decay heat
Decay heat accidents are where the heat generated by the radioactive decay causes harm. In a large nuclear reactor, a loss of coolant accident can damage the core: for example, at Three Mile Island a recently shutdown (SCRAMed) PWR reactor was left for a length of time without cooling water. As a result the nuclear fuel was damaged, and the core partially melted. The removal of the decay heat is a significant reactor safety concern, especially shortly after shutdown. Failure to remove decay heat may cause the reactor core temperature to rise to dangerous levels and has caused nuclear accidents. The heat removal is usually achieved through several redundant and diverse systems, and the heat is often dissipated to an 'ultimate heat sink' which has a large capacity and requires no active power, though this method is typically used after decay heat has reduced to a very small value. However, the main cause of release of radioactivity in the Three Mile Island accident was a Pilot-Operated Relief Valve on the primary loop which stuck in the open position. This caused the overflow tank into which it drained to rupture and release large amounts of radioactive cooling water into the Containment Building.
Transport
Transport accidents can cause a release of radioactivity resulting in contamination or shielding to be damaged resulting in direct irradiation. In Cochabamba a defective gamma radiography set was transported in a passenger bus as cargo. The gamma source was outside the shielding, and it irradiated some bus passengers.
In the United Kingdom, it was revealed in a court case that in March 2002 a radiotherapy source was transported from Leeds to Sellafield with defective shielding. The shielding had a gap on the underside. It is thought that no human has been seriously harmed by the escaping radiation.[1]
Equipment failure
Equipment failure is one possible type of accident, recently at Białystok in Poland the electronics associated with a particle accelerator used for the treatment of cancer suffered a malfunction [5]. This then led to the overexposure of at least one patient. While the initial failure was the simple failure of a semiconductor diode, it set in motion a series of events which led to a radiation injury.
A related cause of accidents is failure of control software, as in the cases involving the Therac-25 medical radiotherapy equipment: the elimination of a hardware safety interlock in a new design model exposed a previously undetected bug in the control software, which could lead to patients receiving massive overdoses under a specific set of conditions.
Human error
Human error has been responsible for some accidents, such as when a person miscalculated the activity of a teletherapy source. This then led to patients being given the wrong dose of gamma rays. In the case of radiotherapy accidents, an underexposure is as much an accident as an overexposure as the patients may not get the full benefit of the prescribed treatment. Also, humans have made errors while attempting to service plants and equipment which has resulted in overdoses of radiation, such as the Nevvizh and Soreq irradiator accidents. In Japan two minor millennium bugs came to light [6]
In 1946 Canadian Manhattan Project physicist Louis Slotin performed a risky experiment known as "tickling the dragon's tail" [2] which involved two hemispheres of neutron-reflective beryllium being brought together around a plutonium core to bring it to criticality. Against operating procedures, the hemispheres were separated only by a screwdriver. The screwdriver slipped and set off a chain reaction criticality accident filling the room with harmful radiation and a flash of blue light (caused by excited, ionized air particles returning to their unexcited states). Slotin reflexively separated the hemispheres in reaction to the heat flash and blue light, preventing further irradiation of several co-workers present in the room. However Slotin absorbed a lethal dose of the radiation and died nine days afterwards.
Lost source
Lost source accidents[7][8] are ones in which a radioactive source is lost, stolen or abandoned. The source then might cause harm to humans or the environment. For example, see the event in Lilo where sources were left behind by the Soviet army. Another case occurred at Yanango where a radiography source was lost, also at Samut Prakarn a cobalt-60 teletherapy source was lost [9] and at Gilan in Iran a radiography source harmed a welder [10]. The best known example of this type of event is the Goiânia accident which occurred in Brazil.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has provided guides for scrap metal collectors on what a sealed source might look like.[11][12] The scrap metal industry is the one where lost sources are most likely to be found.[13]
Others
Some accidents defy classification. These accidents happen when the unexpected occurs with a radioactive source. For instance if a bird grabs a radioactive source containing radium from a window sill and then was to fly away with it, returning to its nest and then the bird dies shortly afterwards from direct irradiation then it is the case that a minor radiation accident has occurred. As the act of placing the source on a window sill by a human was the event which permitted the bird access to the source, it is unclear how such an event should be classified (if is a lost source event or a something else). Radium lost and found[14][15] describes a tale of a pig walking about with a radium source inside; this was a radium source lost from a hospital.
Also some accidents are "normal" industrial accidents which happen to involve radioactive material, for instance a runaway reaction at Tomsk (see red oil) caused radioactive material to be spread around the site.
For a list of many of the most important accidents see the International Atomic Energy Agency site [16] .
Analyses of nuclear power plant accidents
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now requires each nuclear power plant in the U.S. to have a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) performed upon it. The two types of such plants in the US (as of 2007) are boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors, and a study based on two early such PRAs was done (NUREG-1150) and released to the public. However, those early PRAs made unrealistically conservative assumptions, and the NRC is now generating a new study: SOARCA.
NRC Incident Reports
NRC Alerts
- Indian Point Unit 2 (15-Feb-2000) (NRC Information Notice 2000-09)
NRC Site Area Emergencies
- LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (20-Feb-2006) (ref NRC Event Number 42348)
- Honeywell International, Metropolis Illinois (22-Dec-2003) (ref NRC Event Number 40405)
- Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory (27-Jul-2000 and 17-Sep-2000) (ref NRC Event Number 37193 and NRC Event Number 37337)
- Idaho National Engineering & Environmental Laboratory (12-Jul-1999) (ref NRC Event Number 35915)
- Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin Tennessee (2-Apr-1996) (ref NRC Commission Paper SECY 96-076)
- Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (13-Aug-1991) (ref NRC Information Notice 91-64)
- Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 (20-Mar-1990) (ref NRC Information Notice 90-25)
- Davis-Besse (09-Jun-1985) - originally declared as an "Unusual Event" but upgraded by NRC findings (ref NRC Information Notice 85-80)
- Ginna (25-Jan-1982) (ref NRC Generic Letter GL-82008 and NRC Generic Letter GL-82011) - NUREG-0909 and NUREG-0916 both seem to be missing from the NRC web site
NRC General Emergencies
- Three Mile Island Unit 2 (28-Mar-1979)
NRC ASP Analysis Program
The NRC established the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) analysis program in 1979 in response to the Risk Assessment Review Group report (see NUREG/CR-0400, dated September 1978). The primary objective of the ASP Program is to systematically evaluate U.S. nuclear power plant operating experience to identify, document, and rank the operating events that were most likely to lead to inadequate core cooling and severe core damage (precursors), if additional failures had occurred. To identify potential precursors, NRC staff reviews plant events from licensee event reports (LERs), inspection reports, and special requests from NRC staff. The staff then analyzes any identified potential precursors by calculating a probability of an event leading to a core damage state.[3]
(ref NRC Commission Document SECY-05-0192 Attachment 2 NRC: Policy Issue Information)
A "significant precursor" is an event that leads to a conditional core damage probability (CCDP) or increase in core damage probability (CDP) that is greater than or equal to 1 × 10–3. In other words given that the precursor event has occurred, the probability that a subsequent failure will cause core damage is = 0.001.
As of 24-Oct-2005 the "significant" precursor events (i.e. the worst category) were (listed from highest probability of occurrence 1 to lowest probability of occurrence 0.1%):[4]
| Date | CDP | Plant | Prompt fatalities | Latent fatalities | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979-03-28 | 1.000 | Three Mile Island Unit 2 | 0 | ~1 | In the only civil light water reactor core damage accident to occur in the history of nuclear power, due to a combination of poor instrumentation design and operator error, along with the extremely common problem of stuck open power operated relief valves, Unit 2 at Three Mile Island suffered a loss of coolant accident compounded by operator mistakes that resulted in core damage. A loss of proper feedwater incident occurred and the reactor tripped; a stuck open power operated relief valve incident occurred (in the classical fashion); operators failed to isolate the PORV, inhibited auxiliary coolant pumps, and inhibited HP ECC due to a misinterpretation of instrument readings. Core uncovery and subsequent core damage were the inevitable consequences; after cohesive debris bed formation and consolidation (with zircalloy-induced coolant disassociation through reactive autocatalysis), operators found the gamma alarm going off, finally correctly assessed the situation and injected all available HP and LP ECC and AFW into the core at maximum rate, preventing melt-through of the RPV, though causing a FCI and subsequent deflagration event due to autocatalysis of coolant. Though no persons were immediately killed or injured, science estimates that perhaps 1 person will die before their normal age of death due to radiation-induced cancer caused by non-condensible gasses. |
| 1975-03-22 | 0.200 | Browns Ferry Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | (ref NRC IE BULLETIN NO. - 75-04A) A fire broke out in Browns Ferry Unit 1, due to highly flammable material (urethane foam) accidentally used as firestopping that burnt the data cables between the reactor and the control room. The control room's supervisory control and data acquisition equipment was cut off from the reactor, however, heroic efforts by the plant staff made the reactor safe by manually actuating reactor depressurization valves and creatively initiating residual heat removal using a quaternary system never meant to be used for cooling: the control rod drive hydraulic pumps were aligned with the condensate storage tanks and used as a last-ditch manual coolant injection system. |
| 1978-03-20 | 0.100 | Rancho Seco | 0 | 0 | (ref LER 312/78-001) A loss of proper feedwater incident led to reactor trip and subsequently operators makeing an overestimate of secondary coolant in the steam generators, leading the steam generators to dry out, in an incident that served as a near-miss precursor to the Three Mile Island accident. HP ECC injected prior to core uncovery or damage, however. |
| 1977-09-24 | 0.070 | Davis-Besse | 0 | 0 | (ref NRC LER 346/77-016) During a loss of proper feedwater incident, the power operated relief valve rapidly cycled between open and closed states, eventually leading to a stuck open power operated relief valve incident (in the classical fashion), and a consequent low water level in the steam generators, in another near-miss precursor to the Three Mile Island accident. HP ECC was injected prior to SG dryout, preventing full development of the situation. |
| 1974-05-08 | 0.020 | Turkey Point Unit 3 | 0 | 0 | (ref NRC LER 250/74-LTR) No less than three auxiliary feedwater pumps failed to start when tested while the reactor was at power, due to improper maintenance, a highly suboptimal condition that could place the reactor at risk for further failures should an unscheduled contingent evolution occur. |
| 1985-06-09 | 0.010 | Davis-Besse | 0 | 0 | Due to a loss of proper feedwater at power, combined with a stuck open power operated relief valve incident (in the classical fashion). This was compounded by operator errors in inhibiting auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators, leading to the reactor being placed in a dangerous state. However, operators rapidly realized that the PORV was stuck open, and correctly isolated it, eventually recovered auxiliary feedwater, and injected ECC at maximum rate. |
| 1978-11-27 | 0.010 | Salem Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | A transformer failure led to a Main Bus B undervolt. As such, false signals were sent to control equipment tripping the reactor, and several AFW pumps were unavailable. ECC was incorrectly injected, leading to low coolant temperature in the reactor, and consequently further ECC injection. |
| 1976-07-20 | 0.010 | Millstone Unit 2 | 0 | 0 | Due to a low voltage on offsite power (brownout), when a main circulator started, the reactor tripped due to the offsite voltage dipping below the high undervoltage setpoint and causing a Main Bus B undervolt, and subsequently loss of offsite power. Further, due to the high undervoltage setpoint, whenever a load was connected to the emergency diesel generators, the emergency diesel generators tripped due to undervolt conditions on them. As such, effective station blackout was threatened, a highly suboptimal condition that could place the reactor at risk for further failures should an unscheduled contingent evolution occur. |
| 1975-04-29 | 0.009 | Brunswick Unit 2 | 0 | 0 | A stuck open power operated relief valve incident occurred, RCIC failed inoperable, HPCI failed to run due to high water level in torus, and half of RHR failed to activate. The reactor tripped due to MSIV closure rather than the reactor operators triggering a manual trip, as they should have done. |
| 1981-04-19 | 0.007 | Brunswick Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | RHR was seriously damaged due to the failure of a baffle while the unit was in cold shutdown, while the other half of RHR was under routine maintenance. As such, decay heat could not be removed by RHR and alternate channels had to be used. |
| 2002-02-27 | 0.006 | Davis-Besse | 0 | 0 | Contractor incompetence in cleaning boric acid deposits from the reactor pressure vessel head led to extreme corrosion by leaving only a thin layer of Inconel standing between the 2400 psi pressure of the primary cooling system and the 14 psi atmospheric pressure containment. The possibility of a loss of pressure control or a LOCA was greatly elevated while this fault remained undiscovered. The reactor pressure vessel head consequently had to be replaced in toto. |
| 1991-04-03 | 0.006 | Harris Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | It was determined that HP ECC had been unavailable for at least one refueling cycle due to a series of compounded failures in ECC. This represented a suboptimal condition that could place the reactor at risk for further failures should an unscheduled contingent evolution occur. |
| 1983-02-25 | 0.005 | Salem Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | Automatic reactor trip failed in two separate circumstances several days apart. Though manual trip worked upon operator actuation, failure to automatically trip - a highly suboptimal condition - could place the reactor at risk for further failures should an unscheduled contingent evolution - such as a low reactor period incident - develop during post-critical ascension to power from cold shutdown. |
| 1981-01-02 | 0.005 | Millstone Unit 2 | 0 | 0 | Partial loss of offsite power due to operator error, along with an emergency diesel generator trip due to operator error, leading to a partial station blackout. Further operator errors caused the power operated relief valve to be opened at 2380 psi, leading to primary system blowdown into the containment building. |
| 1980-02-26 | 0.005 | Crystal River Unit 3 | 0 | 0 | Thermal-hydraulic instrumentation lost power and failed due to a short to ground. The power operated relief valve opened and stuck open (in the classical fashion), operators correctly injected HP ECC, and properly did not stop because insufficient data justified inhibiting ECC and risking PZR dryout. The PZR was pumped solid, the reactor coolant tank consequently backed up and eventually the rupture disk on it ruptured, and 43,000 gallons of primary water fell into the containment sump; this created a mess. |
| 1978-03-25 | 0.005 | Farley Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | Low water levels in a steam generator led auxiliary feedwater to be called upon to function; it did not function when called upon to function. Other ECC channels were used that worked. |
| 1977-12-11 | 0.005 | Davis-Besse | 0 | 0 | It was discovered that auxiliary feedwater was not available during a routine test due to blown fuses and a mechanical binding in the governor of the pumps, a suboptimal condition that could place the reactor at risk for further failures should an unscheduled contingent evolution occur. |
| 1975-11-05 | 0.005 | Kewaunee | 0 | 0 | Auxiliary feedwater pumps were fouled due to resin beads that migrated from the demineralizer into the condensate storage tank, and thus failed to start. Alternate channels were used to cover for this loss of auxiliary feedwater. This represented a suboptimal condition that could place the reactor at risk for further failures should an unscheduled contingent evolution occur. |
| 1974-04-07 | 0.005 | Point Beach Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | Auxiliary feedwater pumps had plugged filters and did not provide adequate flow during shutdown. |
| 1994-09-17 | 0.003 | Wolf Creek Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | Operators did not follow instructions and implemented two unpermitted simultaneous evolutions, leading to water inventory transfer from the reactor coolant system to the refueling water storage tank. Operators immediately mitigated the condition, but a temperature spike of 4oC was detected prior to the termination of the evolution. |
| 1986-06-13 | 0.003 | Catawba Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | The design basis SBLOCA occurred at the chemical and volume control system and component cooling water heat exchanger joint, due to the failure of a variable letdown orifice outlet flange due to cavitation-induced vibration. ECC injected successfully and the SBLOCA was contained within the design basis. |
| 1978-04-13 | 0.003 | Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | Loss of offsite power occurred, and one of the two emergency diesel generators failed to start. |
| 1985-05-15 | 0.002 | Hatch Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| 1984-09-21 | 0.002 | Lasalle Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| 1981-06-24 | 0.002 | Davis-Besse | 0 | 0 | Main Bus B undervolt occurred due to to maintenance error during control rod drive logic testing, and the reactor tripped. One auxiliary feedwater pump failed to start, and a main steam safety relief valve opened and stuck open (in the classical fashion). |
| 1979-05-02 | 0.002 | Oyster Creek | 0 | 0 | |
| 1977-07-12 | 0.002 | Zion Unit 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| 1986-12-27 | 0.001 | Turkey Point Unit 3 | 0 | 0 | Turbine trip occurred due to loss of governor oil pressure, reactor automatic trip failed, and manual trip had to be initiated. Consequently, a stuck open power operated relief valve incident occurred (in the classical fashion). |
| 1980-06-11 | 0.001 | St. Lucie Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| 1980-04-19 | 0.001 | Davis-Besse | 0 | 0 | Two essential electrical buses were lost, the decay heat drop line valve was shut, and air was drawn into the suction of the decay heat removal pumps, leading to the loss of decay heat removal. |
| 1979-06-03 | 0.001 | Hatch Unit 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| 1977-08-31 | 0.001 | Cooper | 0 | 0 | |
| 1971-01-12 | 0.001 | Point Beach Unit 1 | 0 | 0 | Containment sump [[power operated relief valve|power operated relief valves] were discovered to be leaky, and operators operated the valves to exercise and dislodge them. The valves opened and one remained open, even when operators commanded it to close, representing a stuck open power operated relief valve incident (in the classical fashion). |
See also
- Chernobyl compared to other radioactivity releases
- Chernobyl disaster effects
- Common mode failure
- Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group
- Fuel element failure
- Goiânia accident
- International Nuclear Events Scale
- Ionizing radiation (for a table of radiation exposures)
- List of Chernobyl-related articles
- List of crimes involving radioactive substances
- List of disasters
- List of dam failures
- List of oil spills
- List of nuclear reactors
- Nuclear debate
- Radiation
- Radioactive contamination
- Radiation poisoning
- Radioactive waste
- United States military nuclear incident terminology
- World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
References
External links
- ProgettoHumus: From Trinity Test to... List of nuclear explosions in the world
- ProgettoHumus List of all nuclear accidents in the history (updated)
- U.S. Nuclear Accidents (lutins.org) most comprehensive online list of incidents involving U.S. nuclear facilities and vessels, 1950-present
- Schema-root.org: Nuclear Power Accidents 2 topics, both with a current news feed
- US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) website with search function and electronic public reading room
- International Atomic Energy Agency website with extensive online library
- Canada's Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
- Chernobyl Children's Project International
- Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety Detailed articles on nuclear watchdog activities in the US
- World Nuclear Association: Radiation Doses Background on ionizing radiation and doses
- Canadian Centre for Occupational Health & Safety More information on radiation units and doses.
- Radiological Incidents Database Extensive, well-referenced list of radiological incidents
- A Review of Criticality Accidents (Los Alamos report, 2000 edition — PDF)
- Nuclear Files.org List of nuclear accidents
- Annotated bibliography of military and civilian nuclear accidents from the Alsos Digital Library
- Critical Hour: Three Mile Island, The Nuclear Legacy, And National Security Online book by Albert J. Fritsch, Arthur H. Purcell, and Mary Byrd Davis (2005). Updated edition June 2006
- Annotated bibliography on civilian and Military accidents from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues
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