US History Encyclopedia:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), created by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, licenses and regulates most commercial nuclear activities in the United States, including nuclear power reactors and the use of radioactive materials in industry, medicine, agriculture, and scientific research. The origins of the NRC trace back to the immediate aftermath of World War II, when its predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to establish and to operate the nation's military and civilian atomic energy programs. A new law, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, eased the government monopoly on information relating to atomic energy and for the first time allowed the use of the technology for commercial purposes.
The Nuclear Power Debate
The 1954 act assigned the AEC the dual responsibilities of promoting and regulating the commercial applications of nuclear energy. This became a major issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the AEC stood at the center of a major national controversy over nuclear power. At that time, the nuclear industry experienced a boom in which orders for nuclear power plants rapidly increased. The expansion of the industry spawned a corresponding growth in opposition to it. Environmentalists raised a series of objections to nuclear power, which led to highly publicized controversies over thermal pollution, radiation standards, radioactive waste disposal, and reactor safety. Nuclear opponents claimed that the industry and the AEC had not done enough to ensure the safe operation of nuclear plants and that the agency's statutory mandate to encourage nuclear development made it a weak and ineffective regulator. They maintained that the technology was unsafe, unreliable, and unnecessary. Nuclear supporters took sharp issue with that position; they insisted nuclear power was safe (though not risk-free) and essential to meet the energy requirements of the United States. They argued that the benefits of the technology far outweighed its risks.
The Creation of the Nrc
Both proponents and critics of nuclear power agreed that the AEC's dual responsibilities for promoting and regulating nuclear power undermined its credibility. In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act, which abolished the AEC and replaced it with the NRC and the Energy Research and Development Administration (which later became a part of the U.S. Department of Energy). The NRC began its existence in January 1975 as the national debate over nuclear power increased in volume and intensity, and within a short time, its policies and procedures became a source of controversy.
The NRC tried to cast off the legacy it inherited from the AEC by stressing that its first priority was safety, but critics were unconvinced. While the nuclear industry complained about the rising costs of building plants and the time the NRC required to review applications, anti-nuclear activists campaigned against the construction or licensing of nuclear power facilities. Several key issues surrounding the growth of nuclear power attracted widespread media attention and generated a great deal of debate. One was the effectiveness of the NRC's regulations on "safeguards, " which were designed to make certain that enriched uranium or plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons did not fall into the wrong hands. In response to fears that the expanded use of nuclear power could result in terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the NRC substantially tightened its requirements for the protection of nuclear fuel and nuclear plants from theft or attacks.
The NRC at the same time was the focal point of controversies over radiation protection standards, the export of nuclear materials to other nations, and the means for estimating the probability of a severe accident in a nuclear power plant. Reactor safety remained a subject of acrimonious dispute, which gained new prominence after a major fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plants near Decatur, Alabama, in March 1975. In the process of looking for air leaks in an area containing trays of electrical cables that operated the plants' control rooms and safety systems, a technician started a fire. He used a lighted candle to conduct the search, and the open flame ignited the insulation around the cables. The fire raged for seven hours and largely disabled the safety equipment of one of the two affected plants. Nevertheless, the plants were safely shut down without releasing radiation to the environment.
The Three Mile Island Accident
The Browns Ferry fire did not compare in severity or in the attention it commanded with the most serious crisis in the history of nuclear power in the United States. The crisis occurred at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear generating station near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 28 March 1979. As a result of a series of mechanical failures and human errors, the accident, researchers later determined, uncovered the reactor's core and melted about half of it. The immediate cause of the accident was a valve that stuck open and allowed large volumes of reactor coolant to escape. The reactor operators misread the signs of a loss-of-coolant accident and for several hours failed to take action to cool the core. Although the plant's emergency core cooling systems began to work according to design, the operating crew decided to reduce the flow from them to a trickle. Even worse, a short time later the operators turned off the large reactor coolant pumps that circulated water through the core. By the time the nature of the accident was recognized and the core was flooded with coolant, the reactor had suffered irreparable damage.
The credibility of the nuclear industry and the NRC fared almost as badly. Uncertainty about the causes of the accident, confusion regarding how to deal with it, conflicting information from government and industry experts, and contradictory appraisals of the level of danger in the days following the accident often made authorities appear deceptive, inept, or both. Press accounts fed public fears and fostered a deepening perception of a technology that was out of control.
Nevertheless, in some ways the Three Mile Island accident produced reassuring information for reactor experts about the design and operation of the safety systems in a large nuclear plant. Despite the substantial degree of core melting, the pressure vessel that held the fuel rods and the containment building that surrounded the reactor, cooling systems, and other equipment were not breached. From all indications, the amount of radioactivity released into the environment as a result of the accident was small.
Those findings were overshadowed by the unsettling disclosures from Three Mile Island. The incident focused attention on possible causes of accidents that the AEC–NRC and the nuclear industry had not considered extensively. Their working assumption had been that the most likely cause of a loss-of-coolant accident would be a break in a large pipe that fed coolant to the core. But the destruction of the core at Three Mile Island resulted not from a large pipe break but from a relatively minor mechanical failure that operator errors drastically compounded. Perhaps the most distressing revelation of Three Mile Island was that an accident so severe could occur at all. Neither the AEC–NRC nor the industry had ever claimed that a major reactor accident was impossible, despite the multiple and redundant safety features built into nuclear plants. But they had regarded it as highly unlikely, to the point of being nearly incredible. The Three Mile Island accident demonstrated vividly that serious consequences could arise from unanticipated events.
The Response to Three Mile Island
The NRC responded to the Three Mile Island accident by reexamining the adequacy of its safety requirements and by imposing new regulations to correct deficiencies. It placed greater emphasis on "human factors" in plant performance by imposing stronger requirements for training, testing, and licensing of plant operators. In cooperation with industry groups, it promoted the increased use of reactor simulators and the careful assessment of control rooms and instrumentation. The NRC also devoted more attention to other problems that had received limited consideration before Three Mile Island. They included the possible effects of small failures that could produce major consequences and the prompt evaluation of malfunctions at operating nuclear plants. The agency expanded its research programs on a number of problems the accident had highlighted. And, in light of the confusion and uncertainty over evacuation of areas surrounding the Three Mile Island plant during the accident, the NRC sought to improve emergency preparedness and planning. Those and other steps it took were intended to reduce the likelihood of a major accident and, in the event that another one occurred, to enhance the ability of the NRC, the utility, and the public to cope with it.
In the immediate aftermath of Three Mile Island, the NRC suspended granting operating licenses for plants in the pipeline until it could assess the causes of the accident. The "licensing pause" ended in 1980, and in the following nine years, the NRC granted full-power operating licenses to more than forty reactors, most of which had received construction permits in the mid-1970s. The NRC had received no new applications for construction permits since 1978, and as more plants were completed and went on line, the agency shifted its focus to regulating operating plants rather than reviewing applications for new ones.
Bibliography
Balogh, Brian. Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945–1975. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Duffy, Robert J. Nuclear Politics in America: A History and Theory of Government Regulation. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997.
Walker, J. Samuel. Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963–1971. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
———. Permissible Dose: A History of Radiation Protection in the Twentieth Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
Wellock, Thomas Raymond. Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958–1978. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998.
Winkler, Allan M. Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.