obiter dictum

n., pl., obiter dicta.

1. Law. An opinion voiced by a judge that has only incidental bearing on the case in question and is therefore not binding. Also called dictum.
2. An incidental remark or observation; a passing comment.

[Latin, something said in passing : obiter, in passing + dictum, something said, from neuter past participle of dīcere, to say.]

(OB-i-tuhr DIK-tuhm)

noun, plural obiter dicta
1. A passing comment.
2. An observation or opinion by a judge that is incidental to the case in question, and not binding as a precedent.

Etymology
From Latin, literally, saying by the way

Usage
"'Abstract Expressionism was being deployed as a cold war weapon,' (Frances Stonor) Saunders jauntily asserts. ... Obiter dicta like Saunders's pronouncement above highlight her irreducible problem." — Josef Joffe; America's Secret Weapon; New York Times Book Review; Apr 23, 2000.

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noun

An expression of fact or opinion: comment, note, observation, remark. See words.

(Lat., “said in passing”; often simply dictum [pl. dicta], occasionally obiter) is an assertion in an opinion that is not necessary to the result but is merely the gratuitous opinion of the judge. The distinction between holdings and dicta is often difficult to discern, especially in modern cases.

— William M. Wiecek

obiter dicta, the Latin phrase (‘things said in passing’) sometimes used to refer to the table‐talk or incidental remarks made by a writer or other person, of the kind recalled in biographies.

In writing an opinion, justices of the Supreme Court or judges of a lower court sometimes make statements that are not necessary to the legal reasoning of the decision in the case. Such a statement is called obiter dictum, which is Latin for “said in passing.” Occasionally, obiter dicta (the plural of the term) have become important in the development of constitutional law. Justice Edward T. Sanford, for example, made a statement in passing (obiter dictum) in Gitlow v. New York (1925) that greatly influenced the incorporation of 1st Amendment free speech and press rights under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Justice Sanford wrote, “[W]e may act to assume that freedom of speech and of the press … are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”

Justice Sanford's statement was not part of his reasoning in the decision of this case. Nevertheless, it soon influenced decisions of the Court in two important cases: Near v. Minnesota and Stromberg v. California (both 1931), which applied the 1st Amendment freedoms of speech (Stromberg) and the press (Near) to the states through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.

See also Gitlow v. New York; Near v. Minnesota; Stromberg v. California

This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.

[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.

See: court opinion.

A thing said incidentally; an unofficial expression of opinion.

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