| Operation Shingle |
| Part of World War II |
|
|
| Combatants |
 United States,
 United Kingdom |
 Germany |
| Commanders |
Harold Alexander
Mark W. Clark
John P. Lucas
Lucian Truscott |
Albert Kesselring
Eberhard von Mackensen |
| Strength |
22 Jan 1944: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles
End May:150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns |
22 Jan 1944: 20,000 soldiers
End May: 135,000 soldiers |
| Casualties |
| Up to May 22: 29,200 combat casualties (4,400 killed, 18,000 wounded,
6,800 prisoners or missing)[1] |
Up to May 22: 27,500 (5,500 killed, 17,500 wounded, and 4,500 prisoners or
missing)[1] |
Operation Shingle (January 22, 1944), during the
Italian Campaign of World War II,
was an Allied amphibious landing against Axis forces in the area of Anzio and Nettuno, Italy. The operation was commanded by Major General John P. Lucas and was intended to outflank German forces of the
Winter Line and enable an attack on Rome. The resulting combat
is commonly called the Battle of Anzio.
Background
At the end of 1943, following the Allied invasion of Italy, Allied forces
were bogged down at the Gustav Line, a defensive line across Italy south of the
strategic objective of Rome. The terrain of central
Italy had proved ideally suited to defence, and Field Marshal
Albert Kesselring took full advantage. Several Allied proposals were made to break the
stalemate, but Winston Churchill's idea for "Operation Shingle" was initially looked
upon with disdain by General George Marshall, who was more concerned with planning a
massive Normandy invasion than listening to Churchill's ideas about amphibious
operations. Only after Churchill made a personal plea was the idea accepted by Franklin
D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin welcomed any major Allied offensive that could take
pressure off of the Eastern Front. A major attack in the south by the
U.S. Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Mark W. Clark, would draw Germany's
depleted forces away from the area around Rome and from the hills between Rome and the coast. This would make possible a surprise
landing by Fifth Army's U.S. VI Corps under the command of Maj. Gen.
John P. Lucas in the Anzio/Nettuno area, and a rapid advance into the Alban Hills to cut German communications and "threaten the rear of the German XIV
Panzer Corps" under General Fridolin von Senger und
Etterlin.
Plan
Planners argued that if Kesselring (in charge of German forces in Italy) pulled troops out of the Gustav Line to defend against the Allied assault, then Allied forces would be able to break
through the line; if Kesselring did not pull troops out of the Gustav Line, then Operation Shingle would threaten to capture Rome
and cut off the German units defending the Gustav Line. Should Germany have adequate reinforcements available to defend both Rome
and the Gustav Line, the Allies felt that the operation would nevertheless be useful in engaging forces which could otherwise be
committed on another front. The operation was officially cancelled on December 18, 1943. However, it was later reselected and executed.
General Clark did not feel he had the numbers on the southern front to exploit any breakthrough. His plan therefore was
relying on the southern offensive drawing Kesselring's reserves in and providing the Anzio force the opportunity to break inland
quickly. However, his written orders to Lucas did not really reflect this: Lucas was to "seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio...." when he was "to advance to the Alban Hills". It is likely that the
caution displayed by both Clark and Lucas was to some extent a product of Clark's experiences at the tough battle for the Salerno
beach head and Lucas' natural caution stemming from his lack of experience in battle.
Lucas did not have full confidence in either his superiors or the operational plan. A few days prior to the attack, he wrote
in his diary, "Unless we can get what we want, the operation becomes such a desperate undertaking that it should not, in my
opinion, be attempted." and "[The operation] had a strong odour of Gallipoli and
apparently the same amateur was still on the coach's bench." The "amateur" can only have referred to Winston Churchill, architect
of the disastrous Gallipoli landings of World War I and personal advocate of Shingle.
Availability of naval forces
One of the problems with the plan was the availability of landing ships. The American commanders in particular were determined
that nothing should delay the Normandy invasion and the supporting landings in southern
France. Operation Shingle would require the use of landing ships necessary for these operations. Initially Shingle was to
release these assets by January 15. However, this being deemed problematic, President
Roosevelt granted permission for the craft to remain until February 5.
Only enough tank landing ships (LSTs) to land a single division were initially
available to Shingle. Later, at Churchill's personal insistence, enough were made available to land two divisions. Allied
intelligence thought that five or six German divisions were in the area, although U.S. 5th Army intelligence severely
underestimated the German 10th Army's fighting capacity at the time, believing many of their units would be worn out after the
defensive battles fought since September.
Order of battle
- Further information: Anzio order of battle
Allied forces in this attack consisted of 5 cruisers, 24 destroyers, 238 landing craft, 62+ other
ships, 40,000 soldiers, and 5,000+ vehicles.
The attack consisted of three groups:
1. The British force ("Peter Beach"). This force attacked the coast 6 miles (10 km) north of Anzio.
2. The northwestern U.S. Force ("Yellow Beach"). This force attacked the port of Anzio. There
had been plans to use the 504th Parachute Infantry Battalion in
an airborne attack north of Anzio, however these plans were scrapped.
3. The southwestern U.S. Force ("X-Ray Beach"). This force attacked the coast 6 miles (10 km) east of Anzio.
Southern attack
-
The Fifth Army's attack on the Gustav Line began on January 16 1944, at Monte Cassino. Although the operation failed to break
through, it did succeed in part in its primary objective. General Heinrich von
Vietinghoff, commanding the Gustav Line, called for reinforcements, and Kesselring transferred the 29th and 90th
Panzergrenadier Divisions from Rome.
Battle
Initial Landings
[[Image:Cassino+Anzio1943JanFeb.jpg|thumb|350px|right|Force dispositions at Anzio and Cassino January / February 1944]] The
landings began on January 22, 1944.
Although resistance had been expected, as seen at Salerno during 1943, the initial landings
were essentially unopposed, with the exception of desultory Luftwaffe strafing runs.
By midnight, 36,000 soldiers and 3,200 vehicles had landed on the beaches. Thirteen Allied troops were killed, and 97 wounded;
about 200 Germans had been taken as POWs.[2] The 1st Division penetrated 2 miles (3 km) inland, the Rangers captured Anzio's port, the 509th PIB
captured Nettuno, and the 3rd Division penetrated 3 miles (5 km) inland.
In the first days of operations, the command of the Italian resistance
movement had a meeting with the Allied General Headquarters: it offered to guide the Allied Force in the Alban Hills territory, but the Allied Command refused the proposal.
After the landings
It is clear that Lucas's superiors expected some kind of offensive action from him. The point of the landing was to turn the
German defences on the Winter Line taking advantage of their exposed rear and hopefully panicking them into retreating northwards
past Rome. However, Lucas instead poured more men and materiel into his tiny bridgehead, and strengthened his defences.
Winston Churchill was clearly displeased with this action. "I had hoped we were hurling a wildcat into the shore, but all we
got was a stranded whale," he said.
Lucas's decision remains a controversial one. Noted military historian John Keegan wrote,
"Had Lucas risked rushing at Rome the first day, his spearheads would probably have arrived, though they would have soon been
crushed. Nevertheless he might have 'staked out claims well inland.'" However, Lucas did not have confidence in the strategic
planning of the operation. Also, he could certainly argue that his interpretation of his orders from Gen. Clark was not an
unreasonable one. With two divisions landed, and facing two or three times that many Germans, it would not have been unreasonable
for Lucas to consider the beachhead insecure. But according to Keegan, Lucas's actions "achieved the worst of both worlds,
exposing his forces to risk without imposing any on the enemy." Lucas was relieved of his command on February 23 and was replaced by General Lucian Truscott.
Response of Axis forces
Kesselring was informed of the landings at 03:00 on January 22. Although the landings came
as a surprise, Kesselring had made contingency plans to deal with possible landings at all the likely locations. All the plans
relied on his divisions each having previously organised a motorised rapid reaction unit (kampfgruppe) which could move
speedily to meet the threat and buy time for the rest of the defenses to get in place.[3] At 05:00 he ordered the kampfgruppe of 4th
Parachute Division and the Hermann Göring Division to
defend the roads leading from Anzio to the Alban Hills via Campoleone and Cisterna whilst his plans expected some 20,000 defending
troops to have arrived by the end of the first day. In addition, he requested that OKW send reinforcements, and in response to this they ordered the equivalent of more than
three divisions from France, Yugoslavia, and Germany whilst at the same time releasing to Kesselring a further three divisions in Italy which had been under
OKW's direct command.[4] Later that morning, he ordered
Generaloberst Eberhard von Mackensen
(Fourteenth Army) and Gen. von Vietinghoff (Tenth Army - Gustav Line) to send him additional reinforcements.
The German units in the immediate vicinity had in fact been dispatched to reinforce the Gustav Line only a few days earlier.
All available reserves from the southern front or on their way to it were rushed toward Anzio; these included the 3rd Panzer
Grenadier and 71st Infantry Divisions, and the bulk of the Luftwaffe's Hermann Göring Panzer Division. Kesselring initially considered that a
successful defence could not be made if the Allies launched a major attack on January 23 or
January 24. However, by the end of January 22, the lack
of aggressive action convinced him that a defence could be made. Nevertheless, few additional defenders arrived on
January 23 although the arrival on the evening of January
22 of General Alfred Schlemm and his 1st Parachute Corps headquarters brought
greater organisation and purpose to the German defensive preparations. By January 24,
however, the Germans had over 40,000 troops in prepared defensive positions.[5]
Three days after the landings, the beachhead was surrounded by a defence line consisting of three divisions: The 4th Parachute
Division to the west, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division to the center in front of Alban Hills, the Hermann Göring Panzer Division
to the east.
The Wehrmacht's 14th Army, commanded by Gen. von Mackensen, assumed control of the defence
on January 25. Elements of eight German divisions were employed in the defence line around
the beachhead, and five more divisions were on their way to the Anzio area. Kesselring ordered an attack on the beachhead for
January 28, though it was postponed to February 1.
Allied offensive
Further troop movements including the arrival of U.S. 45th Infantry
Division and U.S. 1st Armored Division, brought Allied
forces total on the beachhead to 69,000 men, 508 guns and 208 tanks by January 29, whilst the
total defending Germans had risen to 71,500.[6] Lucas
initiated a two-pronged attack on January 30. While one force was to cut Highway 7 at Cisterna before moving east into the Alban Hills, a second was to advance northeast
up the Via Anziate towards Campoleone. In heavy fighting British 1st Division made ground but failed to take Campoleone and ended
the battle in an exposed salient stretching up the Via Anzinate. On the right, two Ranger battalions made a daring covert advance
towards Cisterna in advance of the main assault, but when daylight arrived they were engaged and cut off. Of the 767 men in the
1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions, 6 returned to the Allied lines and 743 were captured.[7] The attack of the 3rd Division captured ground up to three miles deep on a
seven-mile wide front, but failed to break through or capture Cisterna.
German counterattacks
On February 3, the German forces counterattacked the Campoleone salient. They numbered
some 100,000 troops organised into two Army Corps, the 1st Parachute Corps under Schlemm and the LXXVI Panzer Corps under
Lieutenant-General Traugot Herr.[8] Once more the fighting was fierce and the Allied forces, totalling 76,400 (includuing the recently
arrived British 56th Infantry Division), gave ground and by
February 10 had been pushed out of the salient.
On February 16 the Germans launched a new offensive (Operation Fischfang) down the
line of the Via Anziate. By February 18, after desperate fighting, the Allies' Final
Beachhead Line (prepared defenses more or less on the line of the original beachhead) was under attack. However, a counterattack
using VI Corps' reserves halted the German advance, and Fischfang petered out with both sides exhausted. During
Fischfang the Germans had sustained 5,400 casualties, the Allies 3,500. Both had suffered 20,000 casualties each since the
first landings.[9]
Despite the exhausted state of the troops, Hitler insisted that 14th Army should
continue to attack. Consequently a further assault was mounted on February 29, this time on
LXXVI Panzer Corps' front around Cisterna. This push achieved little except to generate a further 2,500 casualties for the 14th
Army.[10]
Stalemate: planning for Operation Diadem
- Further information: Operation Diadem order of battle
Both sides had realised that no decisive result could be achieved until the spring and reverted to a defensive posture
involving aggressive patrolling and artillery duels whilst they worked to rebuild their fighting capabilities. In anticipation of
events in the following spring, Kesselring ordered the preparation of a new defence line, the Caesar C line, behind the line of beachhead running from the mouth of the river Tiber just south of Rome through Albano, skirting south of the Alban Hills to
Valmontone and across Italy to the Adriatic coast at Pescara, behind which 14th Army and, to their left, 10th Army might withdraw when the need arose.[11] Meanwhile, Lucian
Truscott, who had been promoted from the command of U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to replace Lucas as commander of VI Corps
on February 22, worked with his staff on the plans for a decisive attack as part of a
general offensive which General Harold Alexander,
commander of Allied forces in Italy, was planning for May and which would include a major offensive on the Gustav Line, Operation
Diadem (which was later to be called the fourth Battle of Cassino). The
Objective of the plan was that a major offensive would fully engage Kesselring's armies and remove any prospect of the Germans
withdrawing forces from Italy to use elsewhere. It was also intended to trap the bulk of the German Tenth Army between the Allied
forces advancing through the Gustav Line and VI Corps thrusting inland from Anzio.
In March U.S. 34th Infantry Division and in early May
U.S. 36th Infantry Division had arrived at Anzio whilst British
56th Infantry Division had been relieved by British 5th Infantry
Division. By late May there were some 150,000 Allied troops in the bridgehead[12] including 5 U.S. and 2 British divisions facing 5 German divisions. The German
divisions were well dug into prepared defenses but were weak in officer and NCO numbers and by the time of the late May offensive
lacked any reserves (which had all been sent south to the Gustav fighting).[13]
The Allied breakout from Anzio and advance from the Gustav Line May 1944
Despite Alexander's overall plan for Diadem requiring VI Corps to strike inland and cut Route 6, Clark asked Truscott
to prepare alternatives and be ready to switch from one to another at 48 hours' notice. Of the four scenarios prepared by
Truscott, Operation Buffalo called for an attack through Cisterna, into the gap in the hills and to cut Route 6 at
Valmontone. Operation Turtle on the other hand foresaw a main thrust to the left of the Alban Hills taking Campoleone,
Albano and on to Rome. On May 5 Alexander selected Buffalo and issued Clark with orders to
this effect.[14]
However, Clark was determined that VI Corps should strike directly for Rome as evidenced in his later writing: "We not only
wanted the honour of capturing Rome, but felt that we deserved it...Not only did we intend to become the first army to seize Rome
from the south, but we intended to see that people at home knew that it was the Fifth Army that did the job, and knew the price
that had been paid for it.".[15] He argued to Alexander
that VI Corps did not have the strength to trap the German 10th Army and Alexander, instead of making his requirements clear, was
conciliatory and gave the impression that a push on Rome was still a possibility if Buffalo ran into difficulties.[16] On May 6 Clark informed Truscott that "..the capture of Rome
is the only important objective and to be ready to execute Turtle as well as Buffalo".[17]
Truscott's planing for Buffalo was meticulous: British 5th Division and 1st Division on the left were to attack along
the coast and up the Via Anziate to pin the German's 4th Parachute, 65th Infantry and 3rd Panzergrenadier in place whilst the
U.S. 45th Infantry, 1st Armored and 3rd Infantry Divisions would launch the main assault, engaging the German 362nd and 715th
Infantry Divisions and striking towards Campoleone, Velletri and Cisterna respectively. On the
Allies' far right the 1st Special Service Force would protect the U.S. assault's
flank.[18]
Breakout
At 05:45 on May 23 1944, 1,500 Allied artillery pieces commenced
bombardment. Forty minutes later the guns paused as attacks were made by close air support and then resumed as the infantry and
armour moved forward.[19] The first day's fighting was
intense: 1st Armored Division lost 100 tanks and 3rd Infantry Division suffered 955 casualties, the highest single day figure for
any U.S. division during World War II. The Germans suffered too, with 362nd Infantry Division estimated to have lost 50% of its
fighting strength.[20]
Mackensen had been convinced that the Allies' main thrust would be up the Via Anziate, and the ferocity of the British feint
on May 23 and May 24 did nothing to pursade him otherwise.
Kesselring, however, was convinced that the Allies' intentions were to gain Route 6 and ordered the Hermann Göring Panzer
Division, resting 150 miles (240 km) away at Livorno[21], to Valmontone to hold open Route 6 for the Tenth Army, which was
retreating up this road from Cassino.[22]
In the afternoon of May 25 Cisterna finally fell to 3rd Division who had had to go house to
house winkling out the German 362nd Infantry which had refused to withdraw and, as a consequence, had virtually ceased to exist
by the end of the day. By the end of May 25, 3rd Infantry were heading into the Velletri gap near
Cori, and elements of 1st Armored had reached within 3 miles (5 km) of
Valmontone and were in contact with units of the Herman Göring Division which were just starting to arrive from Leghorn[21]. Although VI Corps had suffered over 3,300
casualties in the three days fighting, Operation Buffalo was going to plan, and Truscott was confident that a concerted
attack by 1st Armored and 3rd Infantry Divisions the next day would get his troops astride Route 6.[23]
On the evening of May 25 Truscott received new orders from Clark via his Operations Officer,
Brigadier Don Brand. These were, in effect, to implement Operation Turtle and turn the main line of attack ninety degrees
to the left. Most importantly, although the attack towards Valmontone and Route 6 would continue, 1st Armored were to withdraw to
prepare to exploit the planned breakthrough along the new line of attack leaving 3rd Division to continue towards Valmontone with
1st Special Service Force in support.[24] Clark informed
Alexander of these developments late in the morning of May 26 by which time the change of orders
was a fait accompli.[25]
At the time, Truscott was shocked, writing later "...I was dumbfounded. This was no time to drive to the north-west where the
enemy was still strong; we should pour our maximum power into the Valmontone Gap to insure the destruction of the retreating
German Army. I would not comply with the order without first talking to General Clark in person. ...[However] he was not on the
beachhead and could not be reached even by radio....such was the order that turned the main effort of the beachhead forces from
the Valmontone Gap and prevented destruction of the German Tenth Army. On the 26th the order was put into effect.".[26] He went on to write "There has never been any doubt in my
mind that had General Clark held loyally to General Alexander's instructions, had he not changed the direction of my attack to
the north-west on May 26, the strategic objectives of Anzio would have been accomplished in full. To be first in Rome was a poor
compensation for this lost opportunity".[27]
On May 26, whilst VI Corps was initiating its difficult maneuver, Kesselring threw elements of
4 divisions into the Velletri gap to stall the advance on Route 6. For four days they slugged it out against 3rd Division until
finally withdrawing on May 30, having kept Route 6 open and allowed 7 divisions from 10th Army to
withdraw and head north of Rome.[28]
On the new axis of attack little progress was made until 1st Armored were in position on May
29, when the front advanced to the main Caesar C Line defences. Nevertheless, an early breakthrough seemed unlikely until
on May 30 Major-General Fred Walker's 36th Division found a gap in the Caesar Line at the join between 1st Parachute
Corps and LXXVI Panzer Corps. Climbing the steep slopes of Monte Artemisio they threatened Velletri from the rear and obliged the
defenders to withdraw. This was a key turning point, and von Mackensen offered his resignation which Kesselring accepted.[29]
Raising the pressure further, Clark assigned U.S. II Corps which, fighting its way along the coast from the Gustav Line, had
joined up with VI Corps on May 25 to attack around the right hand side of the Alban Hills and
advance along the line of Route 6 to Rome.
On June 2 the Caesar Line collapsed under the mounting pressure, and 14th Army commenced a
fighting withdrawal through Rome. On the same day Hitler, fearing another Battle of
Stalingrad, had ordered Kesslering that there should be "no defence of Rome".[30] Over the next three days the rearguards were gradually overwhelmed, and Rome
was entered in the early hours of June 5 with Clark holding an impromptu press conference on the
steps of the Town Hall on the Capitoline Hill that morning. He ensured the event was a
strictly American affair by stationing military police at road junctions to refuse entry to the city by British military
personnel.[31]
Aftermath
Although controversy continues regarding what may have happened had General Lucas been more aggressive from the start, most
commentators agree that the initial Anzio plan was flawed, questioning whether the initial landing of just over two infantry
divisions with no supporting armour had had the strength to achieve the objective of cutting Route 6 and then holding off the
inevitable counterattacks which would come as Kesselring re-deployed his forces. What is clear is that because of Clark's change
of plan, Operation Diadem (during which U.S. 5th and British 8th Armies sustained 44,000 casualties) failed in its
objective of destroying the German 10th Army and condemned the Allies to a further year of brutal combat notably around the
Gothic Line from August 1944 to May 1945.
Churchill however, defended the Anzio operation.[32]
In his view, sufficient forces were available. He had clearly made great political efforts to procure certain resources,
especially the extra LSTs needed to deliver a second division to shore, but also
specific units useful to the attack such as U.S. 504th
Parachute Regiment. He argued that even regardless of the tactical outcome of the operation, there was immediate strategic
benefit with regard to the wider war. Following the landings, the German High Command dropped plans to transfer five of
Kesselring's best divisions to North West Europe. This gave obvious benefit with regard to the upcoming Operation Overlord.
Churchill also had to ensure the British dominated forces in Italy were contributing to the war at a time when the Russians were
suffering tremendous losses on the Eastern Front.
Noted participants
- Denis Healey was the Military Landing Officer for the British assault brigade at
Anzio.
- The current controller of BBC Radio 1 Andy Parfitt's
father, John Raymond Parfitt was part of the British force landing at Anzio. He was shot in the head and badly wounded in early
February.
- "Angelita" was the name of a little girl, a war orphan, whom Pvt. Christopher S. Hayes of the Royal Scots Fusiliers claimed to have found. Reportedly, she became the platoon mascot but was killed just a few days later. The story has variations on
which army adopted her and how she was killed, leading some to conclude that it is only a legend. Historian Carlo D'Este has
labeled it a 'myth' of the battle. Regardless, the story has come to symbolize the plight of children in war. The town of Anzio
erected a monument in Angelita's memory, unveiled in the International Year of
the Child (1979).[33]
- James Arness (born May 26, 1923 in Minneapolis, Minnesota as James Aurness) is an actor
best known for portraying Marshal Matt Dillon on the T.V. series Gunsmoke for 20 years. Arness served in the United States Army
during World War II, and was severely wounded at the Battle of Anzio, leading to a lifelong
slight limp.
See also
Notes
- ^ a b CMH Pub 100-10, p116
- ^ CMH Publication 72-19, p9
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p83
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p101
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p123
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p134
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p146
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p158
- ^ Lloyd Clark, pp175-197
- ^ Lloyd Clark, pp209-216
- ^ Lloyd Clark, pp219-220
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p281
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p271
- ^ Lloyd Clark, pp271-272
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p272
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p273
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p273
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p277
- ^ Lloyd Clark, pp281-2
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p287
- ^ a b Livorno is referred to as "Leghorn" in
contemporary Allied maps and documents
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p291
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p300
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p301
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p302
- ^ Majdalany, p256
- ^ Majdalany, p259
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p304
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p307
- ^ Lloyd Clark, p311
- ^ Lloyd Clark, pp309-319
- ^ Churchill, Winston: The Second World War, Volume 5, p436
- ^ Dodge City Globe story on Angelita. Here it is claimed she was adopted by U.S.
troops.
References
- Blumenson, Martin [1960] (2000). "Chapter 13: General Lucas at Anzio", in
Greenfield, Kent Roberts: Command
Decisions], CMH Online bookshelves. Washington: US Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-7.
- Clark, LLoyd (2006). Anzio: The Friction of War.
Italy and the Battle for Rome 1944. Headline Publishing Group, London. ISBN 978 0 7553 1420 1.
- Lamson, Maj. Roy, Jr.; Conn, Dr. Stetson (1948).
Anzio 22 January -
22 May 1944, CMH Online bookshelves: American Forces in Action Series, Washington: US Army Center of Military History.
CMH Pub 100-10.
- Laurie, Clayton D.. Anzio 1944, CMH Online
bookshelves: WWII Campaigns, Washington: US Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-19.
- Majdalany, Fred (1957). Cassino: Portrait of a
Battle. London: Longmans, Green & Co Ltd..
- Mathews, Sidney T. [1960] (2000). "Chapter 14: General Clark's Decision To Drive
on Rome", in Greenfield, Kent Roberts: Command Decisions, CMH Online bookshelves. Washington: US Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub
72-7.
- Muhm, Gerhard. German Tactics
in the Italian Campaign (English). Retrieved on 2007-07-26.
- Muhm, Gerhard (1993). La Tattica tedesca nella Campagna d'Italia, in Linea
Gotica avanposto dei Balcani, (Hrsg.), Edizioni Civitas (in Italian), Roma: Amedeo Montemaggi.
- Gliederung und Kriegstagebuck 14. Armee (From January to May 1944) (War diary
of 14th German Army Corps) (in German).
External links
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