- See also: Israeli-Palestinian
conflict
The Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or
Declaration of Principles (DOP) was a milestone in Israeli-Palestinian relations.
It was the first direct, face-to-face agreement between Israel and Palestinians. It was the first time that the Palestinians publicly acknowledged Israel's right to
exist. It was also a framework for the future relations between Israel and the anticipated State of Palestine, when all
outstanding final status issues between the two states would be addressed and resolved.
The Accords were finalized in Oslo, Norway on August 20, 1993, and subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in
Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993, with Mahmoud Abbas signing for the Palestine Liberation Organization and Shimon
Peres signing for the State of Israel. It was witnessed by Warren Christopher for the United States and Andrei Kozyrev
for Russia, in the presence of US President Bill Clinton
and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with the PLO's Chairman Yasser Arafat.
The Oslo Accords were a framework for the future relations between the two parties. The Accords provided for the creation of a
Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority had responsibility for
the administration of the territory under its control. It also called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the
Gaza Strip and West Bank.
It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be
negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements in the area,
security and borders were deliberately left to be decided at a later stage. Interim self-government was to be granted in
phases.
Support for the Accords, of the concessions made and the process have not been free from criticism. Repeated public posturing
of all sides has discredited the process, not to mention putting into question the possibility of achieving peace, at least in
the short-term. The momentum towards peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians as demonstrated by the signing of the
Oslo Accords has been seriously jolted with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in
2000.
Further strain was put on the process after Hamas came into power as a result of the
2006 Palestinian elections. Although offering Israel a number of
longterm ceasefires and accepting the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, Hamas has repeatedly refused to officially recognise
Israel[1], to renounce violence
or accept some agreements previously made by the Palestinian Authority, claiming it is being held to an unfair standard and
illuminated the fact that Israel has neither recognized a Palestinian state, renounced violence or lived up to all pledges it has
made during previous negotiations. Hamas has even renounced the Oslo Accords themselves, while at the same time claiming the
benefits gained by the Palestinians from the Accords.
Background
From the Rhodes conference in 1949 [2] to the
Madrid Conference of 1991[3] there were many failed attempts for a settlement to bring about a lasting peace. However, what made
the Oslo’s negotiations different was the decision to hold direct, face to face talks, between Israel and the PLO.
A renewal for the Israeli-Palestinian quest for peace began at the end of the Cold War, and
it was no coincidence; as the United States would now try to take the lead in international affairs and marshal the strength of
the international community behind its renewed diplomacy.
Also, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, optimism was high, as Francis Fukuyama wrote in an article, titled "the end of history". Hope was that the end of the Cold
war had heralded the beginning of a new international order. President George H. W.
Bush in a speech on 11 September 1990 spoke of a "rare opportunity" to move toward a
"New world order" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north and south,
can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the new world is struggling to be born." [4] [5]
Despite that the hope of a New World Order was short-lived; for Israelis the optimism of the moment appealed to them, as some
had become tired of the constant violence of the Intifada (1987), and started to look at realizing the economic benefits in the
new global economy and many were willing to take risks for peace.[6]
Furthermore, the Gulf War (1990-1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value
of territory had been overstated, and that indeed the Iraq Invasion of Kuwait,
psychologically, reduced the sense of security of both Israelis and Palestinians.[7] Also the Gulf War had shown that a supreme air force and superior technology was more important than
territory in winning a war.
As a result of these and other factors, as much as sixty percent of Israelis supported the Oslo accords when it was first
presented. [8]
For the Palestine Liberation Organization, the deterioration of the Soviet Union starting in 1989 presented them with the loss
of their most important diplomatic patron along with a failing relationship between Moscow and Arafat.
Another event which pushed the PLO to the accords was the fall out from the Gulf War, which was the cutting off of financial
assistance from the Arab Gulf states as a result of Arafat taking a pro-Iraqi stand. This culminated with the PLO not being
invited to the Madrid Conference of October 1991 at which Israel discussed peace with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian
Arabs who were not associated with the PLO. The talks leading to the agreement were initially held in London, and was originally planned to be held in Zagreb, but then
later moved to Oslo. Main architects behind the plan were Johan Jørgen Holst (the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs), Terje Rød-Larsen and Mona Juul. The negotiations were reportedly
conducted in total secrecy.
Principles of the Accords
In essence, the accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza
Strip and West Bank and affirmed a Palestinian right of self-government within those
areas through the creation of a Palestinian Authority. Palestinian rule
would last for a five year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than May
1996). Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements in the
area, security and borders were deliberately excluded from the Accords and left to be decided. The interim self-government was to
be granted in phases. Until a final status accord was established, West Bank and Gaza would be divided into three zones:
- Area A - full control of the Palestinian Authority.
- Area B - Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control.
- Area C - full Israeli control, except over Palestinian civilians. These areas were Israeli settlements and "security zones."
Together with the principles the two groups signed Letters of Mutual Recognition - The Israeli
government recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism, violence and its
desire for the destruction of Israel.
The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, an elected
Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years,
leading to a permanent settlement based on Resolution 242 and Resolution 338, an integral part of the whole peace process.
In order that the Palestinians should govern themselves according to democratic principles, free and general political
elections would be held for the Council.
Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for issues that would be negotiated
in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit.
The five-year transitional period would commence with the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Permanent status
negotiations would begin as soon as possible between Israel and the Palestinians. The negotiations would cover remaining issues,
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and
other issues of common interest.
There would be a transfer of authority from the IDF to the authorized Palestinians, concerning education and culture, health,
social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.
The Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel would continue to carry the responsibility for defending
against external threats.
An Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee would be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative
manner the programs identified in the protocols.
A redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would take place.
The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to the Declaration of
Principles and the Agreed Minutes pertaining to it, should be regarded as part of it.
Annexes of the accords
Annex 1: Conditions of Elections
Election agreements, system of elections, rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for
the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station. (Source: Reference.com)
Annex 2: Withdrawal of Israeli forces
An agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include
comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. Internal
security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding
Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming
from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
- A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
- Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
- Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
- Arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: Gaza - Egypt; and Jericho - Jordan.
Annex 3: Economic cooperation
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for economic cooperation, focusing, among other
things, on the following:
- Cooperation in the field of water.
- Cooperation in the field of electricity.
- Cooperation in the field of energy.
- Cooperation in the field of finance.
- Cooperation in the field of transport and communications.
- Cooperation in the field of trade and commerce.
- Cooperation in the field of industry.
- Cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and
- Cooperation in social welfare issues.
- An environmental protection plan.
- Cooperation in the field of communication and media.
Annex 4: Regional development
The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the
region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7.
Agreed minutes of the accords
Minute A: General understandings
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians through the Declaration of Principles prior to the
inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in the agreed minutes
below.
Minute B: Specific understandings
Article IV: Council's jurisdiction
It was to be understood that: Jurisdiction of the Council would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues
that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
Article VI (2): Transferring authority
It was agreed that the transfer of authority would be as follows: The Palestinians would inform the Israelis of the names of
the authorized Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that would be transferred to the
Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare,
direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.
Article VII (2): Cooperation
The Interim Agreement would also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.
Article VII (5): Israel's powers
The withdrawal of the military government would not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not
transferred to the Council.
Article VIII: Police
It was understood that the Interim Agreement would include arrangements for cooperation and coordination. It was also agreed
that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police would be accomplished in a phased manner.
Article X: Designating officials
It was agreed that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as
members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee which would reach decisions by agreement.
Annex II: Israel's continuing responsibilities
It was understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel would continue to be responsible for external security,
and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians would be allowed to
continue using roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.
The acceptance of the accords by both parties
The accords aroused in both parties, the Israeli and the Palestinian, a wave of hope for an end to the conflict, but skeptics
abounded everywhere.
In Israel, a strong debate over the accords took place; the left wing supported them, while the right wing opposed them. After
a two day discussion in the Knesset on the government proclamation in the issue of the accord
and the exchange of the letters, on September 23 1993 a vote
of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained.
The Palestinian reactions to the accords were not homogeneous, either. The Fatah accepted the
accords, but the Hamas, the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, which were known as the "refusal organizations", objected to the accords since those groups completely denounce
Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state.
On both sides there were fears of the other side's intentions. Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were entering into a
tactical peace agreement, and that they were not sincere at all to reach peace and coexistence with Israel, but see it as part of
the Ten Point Program (which is called in Israel Tokhnit
HaSHlavim or Torat HaSHlavim). For evidence they brought statements of Arafat's in Palestinian forums in which he
compared the accord to the Hudaibiya agreement that Muhammad signed with the sons of the tribe of Quraish. Those statements would
then be understood as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords in accordance with historical-religious precedent, with no
intention of honoring it.
After the signing of the agreements Israeli settlement expansion accelerated to five times its original rate,[9] leading to frustration amongst many Palestinians and a general
distrust of the accords and of Israeli intentions. The Israeli's trust in the accords was undermined by the fact, according to
the Israeli goveernment, that after the signing of the accords the terrorist attacks against Israel did not cease and even
intensified,[10] which some explained as an attempt by the
terror organizations to thwart the peace process. Others believed that the Palestinian Authority had no interest in ceasing these
attacks and was instead endorsing them. As evidence they showed that when violence flared up in September 1996, Palestinian
police turned their guns on the Israelis in clashes which left 61 Arabs and 15 Israeli soldiers dead.[11] Important sections of the Israeli public opposed the process; notably, the
Jewish settlers feared that it would lead to them losing their homes.
Criticisms of the Oslo Accords
The Oslo Accords may appear not to have considered factors that would have externally influenced its interpretations. For
example, the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre is often blamed for
destabilizing the Palestinians' trust in the process. Also, the expansion of the settlements and blockades which caused the deterioration of economic conditions caused frustration
and a corresponding drop in support for the accord and those who stood behind its ratification.
Some academics have argued that the principles of the Oslo Accord simply cannot be accepted by both parties as it could serve
only to separate further still the Israelis and Palestinians: both of whom believe they have a valid claim to the land they are
fighting over, by creating a superior one over an inferior other.
There have been suggested alternatives to boundary setting and creating principles that divide the Israeli and Palestinians.
One alternative that has the potential to be accepted by both parties is to rethink the principles of the Oslo Accord and move a
peace process towards the creation of a bi-national state that promotes co-existence rather than to continuing to divide. An
argument for this as a possible way of reconciliation is that neither side can wholly justify a claim for homogeneity. Palestine
has a varied history of occupancy, such as the Canaanites, Hittites and Ammonites in ancient times.[12] Also, some
Israeli and Palestinian thinkers have previously argued for a bi-national state as a more attractive alternative to
separatism.[13]
Subsequent negotiations
In addition to the first accord, namely the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government, other more specific
accords are often informally also known as "Oslo":
Oslo 2
Additional agreements
Additional Israeli-Palestinian documents related to the Oslo Accords are:
- Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization
letters of recognition, (September 9, 1993),
- Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29, 1994,
- 1994 Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (May 4 1994),
- 1994 Washington Declaration (July 25 1994),
- Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the
PLO (29 August 1994),
- Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Cairo on August 27, 1995
- Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron
(January 15/January 17 1997)
- Wye River Memorandum (October 23
1998)
- Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (September 4, 1999)
Loss of credibility
Since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Oslo Accords are viewed with increasing
disfavor by both the Palestinian and Israeli public. In May 2000, seven years after the Oslo Accords and five months before the
start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a survey by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research
at the University of Tel Aviv found that: 39% of all Israelis supported the Accords
and that 32% believed that the Accords would result in peace in the next few years. [14]. By contrast, the May 2004 survey found that 26% of all Israelis supported the
Accords and 18% believed that the Accords would result in peace in the next few years. Many Palestinians believed that the Oslo
Accords had turned the PLO leadership into a tool of the Israeli state in suppressing their own people. While benefiting a small
elite, the conditions of most Palestinians worsened. This was seen as one of the causes for the al-Aqsa Intifada.
Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties
References
- ^ Dershowitz,
Alan. The Case for Israel. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003. p. 3.
- ^ http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/isegarm.html
- ^ http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_madrid_desc.php
- ^ http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm
- ^ http://www.constitution.org/col/cuddy_nwo.htm
- ^ The Israel-Palestine Conflict, James L. Gelvin
- ^ the gulf conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and war in the new world order,
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh
- ^ The Israel-Palestine Conflict, James L. Gelvin
- ^ K Surin "The Night Can Sweat With Terror as Before: Afterthoughts' in South
Atlantic Quarterly, Fall 2003. Vol. 102, Iss 4, p902
- ^ Death Toll Since Oslo is 50% Greater than During the Intifada (online copy), Government Press
Office, Office of the Prime Minister of Israel, published September 11, 1998
- ^ http://christianactionforisrael.org/medigest/apr97/palsarmy.html
- ^ R. Garaudy ‘The Case of Israel’ London, Shorouk International. p 32.
- ^ Edward Said, ‘Truth & Reconciliation’, Al-Ahram Weekly, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/412/op2.htm
- ^ Statistics on
Israeli support of the Oslo Accords by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research
- Bregman, Ahron Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America.
- Clinton, Bill (2005). My Life. Vintage. ISBN 1-4000-3003-X.
- Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002.
See also
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