Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
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Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company
This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.
The case Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1928, established the principle in tort law that one who is negligent is liable only for the harm or the injury that is foreseeable and not for every injury that follows from his or her negligence.
The unique facts of the case created a need for a new application of the generally accepted theory that negligence is the absence of care, according to the circumstances. Mrs. Palsgraf was standing on a railroad platform when she was injured by falling scales. The scales toppled as the result of a shock of an explosion caused by an accident that occurred at the other end of the platform, "many feet away" from Palsgraf.
The accident involved a passenger with a package who was running to catch a departing train. As the passenger jumped to board the train, two railroad employees, one on the train and the other on the platform, reached for and pushed (respectively) him so he would not fall off it. The employees' help caused the passenger to drop the package. The package wrapped in newspaper contained fireworks that exploded upon hitting the tracks. The resulting explosion caused the scales to fall, striking Palsgraf. She sued the railroad for the conduct of its employees that led the passenger to drop his package of fireworks.
Both the trial court and the intermediate appellate court awarded judgment to the plaintiff, Palsgraf. The Court of Appeals decision, written by Benjamin Cardozo, reversed the judgment. Cardozo stated that negligence is wrongful "because the eye of vigilance perceives the risk of danger … The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is to another or others within the range of apprehension." Given this principle, Cardozo reasoned that "Here, by concession, there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage throughout the station."
The dissenting opinion offered that "Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others … Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not confined to those who might probably be hurt." It viewed the concept of proximate cause as "practical politics," not based on logic. Although it must be "… something without which the event would not happen," proximate cause means "that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point." The foreseeable or natural results of a negligent act affect a determination of whether the act is a proximate cause of the injuries. The dissenters, therefore, reasoned "given such an explosion as here, it needed no great foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater distance from its scene than was the plaintiff."
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Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
| Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. | |||||||||||
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| Argued February 24, 1928 Decided May 29, 1928 |
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| Holding | |||||||||||
| Defendant could not be held liable for an injury that could not be reasonably foreseen. New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed and complaint dismissed. | |||||||||||
| Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo | |||||||||||
| Associate Judges Cuthbert W. Pound, William S. Andrews, Frederick Crane, Irving Lehman, Henry Kellogg, John F. O'Brien | |||||||||||
| Case opinions | |||||||||||
| Majority by: Cardozo Joined by: Pound, Lehman, Kellogg Dissent by: Andrews Joined by: Crane, O'Brien |
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), was a decision by the New York Court of Appeals (the highest state court in New York) written by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo, a leading figure in the development of American common law and later a Supreme Court justice. Palsgraf is a landmark in tort law that helped establish the concept of proximate cause, a limitation of negligence with respect to scope of liability.
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Facts
A passenger carrying a package, while hurrying to catch and board a moving Long Island Rail Road train, appeared to two of the railroad's (Defendant's) employees to be falling. The employees were guards, one of whom was located on the car, the other of whom was located on the platform. The guard on the car attempted to pull the passenger into the car and the guard on the platform attempted to push him into the car from behind. The guards' efforts to aid the passenger caused the package the passenger was holding to fall on the rails. Unbeknownst to the guards, the package, which was approximately 15 inches (38 cm) long and wrapped in newspaper, contained fireworks, and the package exploded when it hit the rails. The shock reportedly knocked down scales at the other end of the platform (although later accounts suggest that a panicking bystander may have upset the scale), which injured Mrs. Helen Palsgraf (Plaintiff). Palsgraf sued the railroad, claiming her injury resulted from negligent acts of the employee. The trial court and the intermediate appeals court found for Palsgraf (Plaintiff) by verdict from a jury, and Long Island Rail Road appealed the judgment.
Judgment
The Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York) reversed and dismissed Palsgraf's complaint, deciding that the relationship of the guard's action to Palsgraf's injury was too indirect to make him liable.
Cardozo, writing for three other judges, wrote that there was no way that the guard could have known that the package wrapped in newspaper was dangerous, and that pushing the passenger would thereby cause an explosion. The court wrote that "there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage through the station. If the guard had thrown it down knowingly and willfully, he would not have threatened the plaintiff's safety, so far as appearances could warn him." Without any perception that one's actions could harm someone, there could be no duty towards that person, and therefore no negligence for which to impose liability (duty is a matter of law to be decided by a judge; therefore, a finding that there was no duty was sufficient to overturn the jury's verdict that the defendant was liable).
The court also stated that whether the guard had acted negligently to the passenger he pushed was irrelevant for her claim, because the only negligence that a person can sue for is a wrongful act that violates their own rights. Palsgraf could not sue the guard for pushing the other passenger because that act did not violate a duty to her, as is required for liability under a negligence theory. It is not enough for a plaintiff to merely claim an injury. "If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended."
This concept of foreseeability in tort law tends to limit liability to the consequences of an act that could reasonably be foreseen rather than every single consequence that follows. Otherwise, liability could be unlimited in scope, as causes never truly cease having effects far removed in time and space (ex. the Butterfly Effect).
Dissenting opinion
The three-judge dissent, written by Judge Andrews and joined by Judges Frederick Crane and John F. O'Brien, by contrast, saw the case as a matter of proximate cause—Palsgraf's injury could be immediately traced to the wrong committed by the guard, and the fact of the wrong and the fact of the injury should be enough to find negligence (unlike duty, proximate cause is a matter of fact to be determined by a jury; therefore, the dissent would have upheld the jury's verdict for the plantiff).
The dissent took note of recent expansions in New York state tort law, that allowed children to sue for the wrongful death of a parent, and spouses for loss of consortium, arguing that these expansions were based on the fact of injury beyond the foreseen injury of the deceased, and on the needs of public policy. "What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928)
Significance
Palsgraf is standard reading for first-year tort students in law schools in many jurisdictions.[1] The American author William Gaddis credited his reading of the Palsgraf case with helping to inspire his novel A Frolic of His Own.[2]
See also
- Smith v The London and South Western Railway
Notes
- ^ [|Epstein, Richard] (2008). Cases and Materials on Torts (9th Ed. ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers. p. 519. ISBN 0-7355-6923-1.
- ^ Annotations to Frolic at williamgaddis.org.
References
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