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Peace of Westphalia |
Bibliography
See C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (1938).
Gale Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World:
Peace of Westphalia |
The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which ended the Thirty Years' War, are known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia. The main obstacles to a general peace in Germany after 1635 were the ambitions of France and Sweden and changing military fortunes. Sweden wanted territorial and financial compensation while France, under the cardinals (Richelieu to 1642, Mazarin thereafter), envisaged something altogether more ambitious that involved a considerable reduction in both Spanish and Austrian Habsburg power. In addition, matters were complicated by the individual ambitions of various German princes and separate negotiations between the Spanish and the Dutch. Ultimately, 176 plenipotentiaries representing 196 rulers attended the peace negotiations.
Despite these problems, talks began in 1643 at Münster and Osnabrück, the two cities specified for negotiations by the Franco-Swedish Treaty of 1641. France, Spain, and the other Catholic participants were based at Münster, Sweden and her allies at Osnabrück. Although Emperor Ferdinand III (ruled 1637–1657) initially delayed negotiations, the collapse of his military position in 1645 forced him to undertake serious discussions in 1646. However, that a settlement was not reached until the autumn of 1648 was largely due to Mazarin rather than the emperor. In fact, the war only really came to an end at that time because of France's inability to carry it on.
Negotiations
With so many participants and so many conflicting interests, it is hard to discern any pattern of negotiation, but the aims of the major participants can be identified. The emperor clearly wanted a full and final peace settlement. Because his situation was desperate, he was prepared to make far-reaching religious and territorial concessions if necessary. Mazarin's wish for a universal peace was scuttled by the collapse of negotiations with Spain in 1646. The Spanish preferred to work out a deal with the Dutch (achieved in January 1647, ratified at Münster in January 1648) and keep fighting. As far as Germany was concerned, France wanted to destroy the emperor's influence by strengthening the autonomy of the individual princes and by replacing the existing imperial institutions with a French-led federation. However, these plans were unpopular with the German princes, who valued the Holy Roman Empire and preferred an emperor limited in authority to dominance by France and Sweden. Count Maximilian von Trauttsmannsdorf, the imperial envoy, had little difficulty in resisting these French demands. French demands for most of Alsace and parts of Lorraine, on the other hand, were quite modest because France mainly wanted Spanish territory. Mazarin was able to obtain Habsburg domains in Alsace in return for 1.2 million thalers in a deal with the emperor in September 1646.
The Swedes were prepared to compromise because Queen Christina was eager for a quick settlement. In any event her erstwhile allies, the French, did not want to see Sweden become too powerful. Accordingly, Mazarin decided to build up Brandenburg as a counterweight to Swedish power, and in February 1647 the Swedish envoys were persuaded to agree to a partition of Pomerania with the elector. Trauttmannsdorf was able to exploit this tension between the allies in other ways, too. For instance, Sweden demanded religious toleration within the Habsburg lands, for the Bohemians in particular. Knowing that the French had little sympathy for Bohemian Protestants, and would not support Sweden on this issue, the emperor resisted this demand quite firmly.
As far as religion was concerned, matters of territory and allegiance had been addressed in the Peace of Prague and at the Diet of Regensburg, but the status of Calvinism and secularized lands still had to be resolved. Although the delegates were divided according to confessional lines, even within the same denomination there was no agreement. However, because the Protestants proved to be more united overall, the final agreement on religious issues reached in March 1648 was more favorable to them.
Final agreement was postponed because Mazarin, unnerved by Spain's deal with the Dutch (which he had tried to sabotage), decided to increase French demands. This rekindled the war, though with the onset of civil unrest in France in the summer of 1648 (the Fronde), Mazarin reluctantly changed his tune and by August was convinced of "our need to make peace at the earliest opportunity." Consequently, he dropped his extra demands and agreed to a settlement (though the emperor did agree not to aid his Spanish cousin).
Terms
The Peace of Westphalia was signed simultaneously at Münster and Osnabrück on 24 October 1648 and consisted of 128 clauses. The main parts can be summarized as follows:
Assessment
An overall assessment is not easy to make. By and large the treaties defused those problems largely responsible for the war. Although confessional loyalties remained important, the age of religious wars was over in Germany. The religious settlement proved to be realistic and lasting, though the pope, Innocent X (reigned 1644–1655), was unambiguous in his condemnation. Whether or not this was the "last religious war," as some claim, and whether or not religion ceased to be so important in political and international affairs after this war, are moot points.
As far as the political settlement is concerned, the peace was remarkably conservative and legalistic. It was intended more as a restatement of old rights than as anything new. Much that had been a matter of fact or common practice, such as the autonomy of the princes, was now de jure (legal). Of course, that is not to say there were no innovations—the creation of an eighth electorate was new, the first extension of the number of imperial electors since 1356—but established custom and legal rights were usually preferred.
Within the empire, Saxony, Bavaria, and Brandenburg had all grown in size and importance. The tendency was toward fully sovereign independent states. However, these larger states were still not a match for the emperor, who among other things retained the prestige of precedence. Ferdinand III undoubtedly lost power—for instance, he lost the right to levy taxes outside his homelands and to declare war without the consent of the diet—but he remained the foremost prince in Germany. Moreover, many of the smaller states were too small to exploit the rights and liberties they had been granted; they preferred the security of the Holy Roman Empire. They relied on the emperor and were happy to seek his protection, particularly now that he could not be a predator. For these reasons Franco-Swedish attempts to destroy imperial institutions had been resisted. After 1648 the imperial bureaucracy became more cumbersome and made Habsburg control less practical; however, recent research is beginning to question the idea that Westphalia fixed the empire's constitution in its final form. It is now thought to have been more adaptable to change, and, in fact, imperial policy continued to be decided by the emperor.
The emperor himself was now very much strengthened within his hereditary territories: both religious and political opposition in Bohemia and Austria had been crushed and the hereditary lands were now ruled as a single unit. Accordingly, the emperor was in a far better position than he had held in 1618. Of course, compared with the dizzy heights of 1629 there had been reverses—Ferdinand III had undoubtedly lost the last part of the war—but he managed to retain some of his father's early successes. Given his dire military situation at the end, the final settlement was not completely unfavorable to him; he had, in fact, gotten off quite lightly. The failure of many Habsburg objectives during the war, together with the (allegedly) improved position of the princes following the Westphalian settlement, used to be taken as evidence for the general decline in imperial power and as an explanation for the emperor's apparent growing concentration on purely dynastic interests. However, scholars are beginning to call this reasoning into question, although this debate has just started. The Holy Roman Empire was far from moribund after 1648. It not only survived but revived during the long reign of Leopold I (ruled 1658–1705).
Despite huge expenditures and much effort, France had achieved little. Mazarin failed to reduce the power of the emperor significantly, and he failed to increase French influence in Germany to any degree. Some historians gloss over this by suggesting that Mazarin laid the foundations for future success by obtaining territory with ill-defined jurisdictions over adjacent lands. Still others praise him for excluding Spain from the settlement, but this was not the case, because Spain had not wanted to be part of the treaty anyway. Mazarin himself was clearly disappointed with the peace; he wanted the war to continue. The real reason for the hurried nature of the settlement was the collapse of governmental authority and the outbreak of civil disorder in France itself, events for which Mazarin must, to some extent, take the blame. As far as Sweden was concerned, Queen Christina's desire for a quick settlement did undoubtedly lessen her country's chances of a satisfactory outcome, but compared with, say, Swedish aims in 1630 or the difficult times between 1634 and 1638, the outcome was highly satisfactory. Sweden was now more secure, although it could be argued that Christina had simply extended her responsibilities and given herself more problems The Peace of Westphalia created a loose framework for religious and political coexistence in Germany that stood the test of time remarkably well, though after 1648 Germany was further away than ever from economic and political unity (if that was a desirable, or even desired, outcome). Clearly, whether or not the Thirty Years' War retarded German development is itself a moot point. Political divisions were perpetuated and, religiously, Germany was divided roughly into a Protestant north and a Catholic south (although Münster and Cologne in the north and Württemberg in the south were major exceptions). In the process Protestantism had survived and the Counter-Reformation had been checked.
The Peace of Westphalia was actually innovative in many ways. It was the first pan-European peace congress, and there was a genuine attempt to resolve a multitude of disputes in the hope that there would be a general settlement and lasting peace. Most experts believe it was a success.
Bibliography
Asch, Ronald G. The Thirty Years' War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618–1648. New York and London, 1997. An up-to-date survey of the war of manageable length that keeps the focus on Germany. See Chapter 5 for the peace.
Croxton, Derek. Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643–1648. Selinsgrove, Pa., and London, 1999. This restores Mazarin to a central role.
Croxton, Derek, and Anuschka Tischer. The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary. Westport, Conn., 2002. This has over 300 detailed entries.
Darby, Graham. The Thirty Years' War. London, 2001. A concise introduction to the conflict; a good place to start. See Chapter 6.
Parker, Geoffrey, ed. The Thirty Years' War. 2nd ed. London and New York, 1997. Currently the definitive work on the war, with a full set of notes and a comprehensive bibliography that lists all the essential works in German. For Westphalia, see especially the bibliographical essay, pp. 266–268.
Symcox, G., ed. War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism, 1618–1763. New York, 1973. The terms of the peace are summarized in English on pp. 39–62.
—GRAHAM DARBY
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| Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster | |
|---|---|
| Ratification of the Peace of Münster
(Gerard ter Borch, Münster, 1648) |
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| Type | Peace treaty |
| Drafted | 1646-1648 |
| Signed | 15 May - 24 October 1648 |
| Location | Osnabrück and Münster, Westphalia, modern-day Germany |
| Parties | 109 |
The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 in Osnabrück and Münster. These treaties ended the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648) between Spain and the Dutch Republic, with Spain formally recognizing the independence of the Dutch Republic.
The Peace of Westphalia treaties involved the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III, of the House of Habsburg, the Kingdoms of Spain, France, Sweden, the Dutch Republic, the Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, and sovereigns of the free imperial cities and can be denoted by two major events.
The treaties resulted from the big diplomatic congress,[4][5] thereby initiating a new system of political order in central Europe, later called Westphalian sovereignty, based upon the concept of a sovereign state governed by a sovereign. In the event, the treaties’ regulations became integral to the constitutional law of the Holy Roman Empire.
The treaties did not restore the peace throughout Europe, however. France and Spain remained at war for the next eleven years, making peace only in the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659.
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Contents
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Peace negotiations between France and the Habsburgs, provided by the Holy Roman Emperor and the Spanish King, were to be started in Cologne in 1636. These negotiations were blocked by France.
Cardinal Richelieu of France desired the inclusion of all its allies, whether sovereign or a state within the Holy Roman Empire. In Hamburg and Lübeck, Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire negotiated the Treaty of Hamburg. This was done with the intervention of Richelieu.
The Holy Roman Empire and Sweden declared the preparations of Cologne and the Treaty of Hamburg to be preliminaries of an overall peace agreement. This larger agreement was to be negotiated in Westphalia, in the neighbouring cities of Münster and Osnabrück. Both cities were to be maintained as neutral and demilitarized zones for the negotiations. Münster was, since its re-Catholization in 1535, a strictly mono-denominational community. It housed the Chapter of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster. Only Roman Catholic worship was permitted. No places of worship were provided for Calvinists and Lutherans.
Osnabrück was a bidenominational Lutheran and Catholic city, with two Lutheran and two Catholic churches for its mostly Lutheran burghers and exclusively Lutheran city council and the Catholic Chapter of the Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück with pertaining other clergy and also other Catholic inhabitants. In the years of 1628-1633 Osnabrück had been subjected by troops of the Catholic League and the Catholic Prince-Bishop Franz Wilhelm, Count of Wartenberg, imposed the Counter-Reformation onto the city with many Lutheran burgher families being exiled. While under following Swedish occupation Osnabrücks's Catholics were not expelled, but the city severely suffered from Swedish war contributions. Therefore Osnabrück hoped for a great relief becoming neutralised and demilitarised.
Both cities strove for more autonomy, aspiring to become Free Imperial Cities, so they welcomed the neutrality imposed by the peace negotiations, and the prohibition of all political influence by the warring parties including their overlords, the prince-bishops.
Since Lutheran Sweden preferred Osnabrück as a conference venue, its peace negotiations with the Empire, including the allies of both sides, took place in Osnabrück. The Empire and its opponent France, including the allies of each, as well as the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands and its opponent Spain (and their respective allies) negotiated in Münster.[6]
The peace negotiations had no exact beginning and ending, because the participating total of 109 delegations never met in a plenary session, but dropped in between 1643 and 1646 and left between 1647 and 1649. Between January 1646 and July 1647 probably the largest number of diplomats were present. Delegations had been sent by 16 European states, sixty-six Imperial States, representing the interests of a total of 140 involved Imperial States, and 27 interest groups, representing the interests of a variety of a total of 38 groups.[7]
The power taken by Ferdinand III in contravention of the Holy Roman Empire's constitution was stripped and returned to the rulers of the Imperial States. This rectification allowed the rulers of the Imperial States to independently decide their religious worship. Protestants and Catholics were redefined as equal before the law, and Calvinism was given legal recognition.[9][10]
The Holy See was very displeased at the settlement, with Pope Innocent X in Zelo Domus Dei reportedly calling it "null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time".[11]
The main tenets of the Peace of Westphalia were:
There were also territorial adjustments:
The 1648 Treaty of Osnabrück, part of the Peace of Westphalia, specified three types of worship, "domestic devotion", public religious services "exercitium religionis publicum", and '"exercitium religionis privatum," and tolerated communal worship by minority faiths in clandestine churches or as private, family or individual devotions.[17]
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