Peace of Westphalia

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The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which ended the Thirty Years' War, are known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia. The main obstacles to a general peace in Germany after 1635 were the ambitions of France and Sweden and changing military fortunes. Sweden wanted territorial and financial compensation while France, under the cardinals (Richelieu to 1642, Mazarin thereafter), envisaged something altogether more ambitious that involved a considerable reduction in both Spanish and Austrian Habsburg power. In addition, matters were complicated by the individual ambitions of various German princes and separate negotiations between the Spanish and the Dutch. Ultimately, 176 plenipotentiaries representing 196 rulers attended the peace negotiations.

Despite these problems, talks began in 1643 at Münster and Osnabrück, the two cities specified for negotiations by the Franco-Swedish Treaty of 1641. France, Spain, and the other Catholic participants were based at Münster, Sweden and her allies at Osnabrück. Although Emperor Ferdinand III (ruled 1637–1657) initially delayed negotiations, the collapse of his military position in 1645 forced him to undertake serious discussions in 1646. However, that a settlement was not reached until the autumn of 1648 was largely due to Mazarin rather than the emperor. In fact, the war only really came to an end at that time because of France's inability to carry it on.

Negotiations

With so many participants and so many conflicting interests, it is hard to discern any pattern of negotiation, but the aims of the major participants can be identified. The emperor clearly wanted a full and final peace settlement. Because his situation was desperate, he was prepared to make far-reaching religious and territorial concessions if necessary. Mazarin's wish for a universal peace was scuttled by the collapse of negotiations with Spain in 1646. The Spanish preferred to work out a deal with the Dutch (achieved in January 1647, ratified at Münster in January 1648) and keep fighting. As far as Germany was concerned, France wanted to destroy the emperor's influence by strengthening the autonomy of the individual princes and by replacing the existing imperial institutions with a French-led federation. However, these plans were unpopular with the German princes, who valued the Holy Roman Empire and preferred an emperor limited in authority to dominance by France and Sweden. Count Maximilian von Trauttsmannsdorf, the imperial envoy, had little difficulty in resisting these French demands. French demands for most of Alsace and parts of Lorraine, on the other hand, were quite modest because France mainly wanted Spanish territory. Mazarin was able to obtain Habsburg domains in Alsace in return for 1.2 million thalers in a deal with the emperor in September 1646.

The Swedes were prepared to compromise because Queen Christina was eager for a quick settlement. In any event her erstwhile allies, the French, did not want to see Sweden become too powerful. Accordingly, Mazarin decided to build up Brandenburg as a counterweight to Swedish power, and in February 1647 the Swedish envoys were persuaded to agree to a partition of Pomerania with the elector. Trauttmannsdorf was able to exploit this tension between the allies in other ways, too. For instance, Sweden demanded religious toleration within the Habsburg lands, for the Bohemians in particular. Knowing that the French had little sympathy for Bohemian Protestants, and would not support Sweden on this issue, the emperor resisted this demand quite firmly.

As far as religion was concerned, matters of territory and allegiance had been addressed in the Peace of Prague and at the Diet of Regensburg, but the status of Calvinism and secularized lands still had to be resolved. Although the delegates were divided according to confessional lines, even within the same denomination there was no agreement. However, because the Protestants proved to be more united overall, the final agreement on religious issues reached in March 1648 was more favorable to them.

Final agreement was postponed because Mazarin, unnerved by Spain's deal with the Dutch (which he had tried to sabotage), decided to increase French demands. This rekindled the war, though with the onset of civil unrest in France in the summer of 1648 (the Fronde), Mazarin reluctantly changed his tune and by August was convinced of "our need to make peace at the earliest opportunity." Consequently, he dropped his extra demands and agreed to a settlement (though the emperor did agree not to aid his Spanish cousin).

Terms

The Peace of Westphalia was signed simultaneously at Münster and Osnabrück on 24 October 1648 and consisted of 128 clauses. The main parts can be summarized as follows:

1. The principle of cuius regio, eius religio ('whoever rules the territory determines the religion') was reaffirmed, but construed to relate only to public life.
2. Calvinism was finally recognized within the Confession of Augsburg and, except within the Bavarian and Austrian lands (including Bohemia), Protestant retention of all land secularized before 1624 was guaranteed.
3. In matters of religion there were to be no majority decisions made by the diet. Instead, disputes were to be settled only by compromise.
4. To all intents and purposes, the separate states of the Holy Roman Empire were recognized as sovereign members of the diet, free to control their own affairs independently of each other and of the emperor.
5. Maximilian of Bavaria (1573–1651) retained his electoral title and the Upper Palatinate.
6. A new electoral title was created for Karl Ludwig (1617–1680), the son of the former elector palatine, on his restoration to the Lower Palatinate.
7. John George of Saxony, a leading German Protestant prince who had supported Ferdinand, was confirmed in his acquisition of Lusatia (a region of eastern Germany and southwest Poland).
8. Frederick William of Brandenburg (1620–1688) acquired Cammin, Minden, and Halberstadt, along with the succession to Magdeburg.
9. The emperor's claim to hereditary rights in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia was established. The Habsburg Sundgau was surrendered to France.
10. The Peace of Westphalia confirmed Swedish control of the river mouths of the Oder, the Elbe, and Weser—virtually the entire German coast-line—by the occupation of western Pomerania, Stettin, Stralsund, Wismar, the dioceses of Bremen and Verden, and the islands of Rügen, Usedom, and Wollin. Sweden was also paid an indemnity of 5 million thalers.
11. France acquired Habsburg territory and other jurisdictions in Alsace. Other acquisitions included Pinerolo in Savoy and Breisach and Philippsburg on the right bank of the Rhine.
12. The United Provinces of the Netherlands (Dutch Republic) were declared independent of both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire (Switzerland was also acknowledged as independent of the empire).
13. No prince of the empire, not even the emperor, could ally with the Spanish monarchy.

Assessment

An overall assessment is not easy to make. By and large the treaties defused those problems largely responsible for the war. Although confessional loyalties remained important, the age of religious wars was over in Germany. The religious settlement proved to be realistic and lasting, though the pope, Innocent X (reigned 1644–1655), was unambiguous in his condemnation. Whether or not this was the "last religious war," as some claim, and whether or not religion ceased to be so important in political and international affairs after this war, are moot points.

As far as the political settlement is concerned, the peace was remarkably conservative and legalistic. It was intended more as a restatement of old rights than as anything new. Much that had been a matter of fact or common practice, such as the autonomy of the princes, was now de jure (legal). Of course, that is not to say there were no innovations—the creation of an eighth electorate was new, the first extension of the number of imperial electors since 1356—but established custom and legal rights were usually preferred.

Within the empire, Saxony, Bavaria, and Brandenburg had all grown in size and importance. The tendency was toward fully sovereign independent states. However, these larger states were still not a match for the emperor, who among other things retained the prestige of precedence. Ferdinand III undoubtedly lost power—for instance, he lost the right to levy taxes outside his homelands and to declare war without the consent of the diet—but he remained the foremost prince in Germany. Moreover, many of the smaller states were too small to exploit the rights and liberties they had been granted; they preferred the security of the Holy Roman Empire. They relied on the emperor and were happy to seek his protection, particularly now that he could not be a predator. For these reasons Franco-Swedish attempts to destroy imperial institutions had been resisted. After 1648 the imperial bureaucracy became more cumbersome and made Habsburg control less practical; however, recent research is beginning to question the idea that Westphalia fixed the empire's constitution in its final form. It is now thought to have been more adaptable to change, and, in fact, imperial policy continued to be decided by the emperor.

The emperor himself was now very much strengthened within his hereditary territories: both religious and political opposition in Bohemia and Austria had been crushed and the hereditary lands were now ruled as a single unit. Accordingly, the emperor was in a far better position than he had held in 1618. Of course, compared with the dizzy heights of 1629 there had been reverses—Ferdinand III had undoubtedly lost the last part of the war—but he managed to retain some of his father's early successes. Given his dire military situation at the end, the final settlement was not completely unfavorable to him; he had, in fact, gotten off quite lightly. The failure of many Habsburg objectives during the war, together with the (allegedly) improved position of the princes following the Westphalian settlement, used to be taken as evidence for the general decline in imperial power and as an explanation for the emperor's apparent growing concentration on purely dynastic interests. However, scholars are beginning to call this reasoning into question, although this debate has just started. The Holy Roman Empire was far from moribund after 1648. It not only survived but revived during the long reign of Leopold I (ruled 1658–1705).

Despite huge expenditures and much effort, France had achieved little. Mazarin failed to reduce the power of the emperor significantly, and he failed to increase French influence in Germany to any degree. Some historians gloss over this by suggesting that Mazarin laid the foundations for future success by obtaining territory with ill-defined jurisdictions over adjacent lands. Still others praise him for excluding Spain from the settlement, but this was not the case, because Spain had not wanted to be part of the treaty anyway. Mazarin himself was clearly disappointed with the peace; he wanted the war to continue. The real reason for the hurried nature of the settlement was the collapse of governmental authority and the outbreak of civil disorder in France itself, events for which Mazarin must, to some extent, take the blame. As far as Sweden was concerned, Queen Christina's desire for a quick settlement did undoubtedly lessen her country's chances of a satisfactory outcome, but compared with, say, Swedish aims in 1630 or the difficult times between 1634 and 1638, the outcome was highly satisfactory. Sweden was now more secure, although it could be argued that Christina had simply extended her responsibilities and given herself more problems The Peace of Westphalia created a loose framework for religious and political coexistence in Germany that stood the test of time remarkably well, though after 1648 Germany was further away than ever from economic and political unity (if that was a desirable, or even desired, outcome). Clearly, whether or not the Thirty Years' War retarded German development is itself a moot point. Political divisions were perpetuated and, religiously, Germany was divided roughly into a Protestant north and a Catholic south (although Münster and Cologne in the north and Württemberg in the south were major exceptions). In the process Protestantism had survived and the Counter-Reformation had been checked.

The Peace of Westphalia was actually innovative in many ways. It was the first pan-European peace congress, and there was a genuine attempt to resolve a multitude of disputes in the hope that there would be a general settlement and lasting peace. Most experts believe it was a success.

Bibliography

Asch, Ronald G. The Thirty Years' War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618–1648. New York and London, 1997. An up-to-date survey of the war of manageable length that keeps the focus on Germany. See Chapter 5 for the peace.

Croxton, Derek. Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643–1648. Selinsgrove, Pa., and London, 1999. This restores Mazarin to a central role.

Croxton, Derek, and Anuschka Tischer. The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary. Westport, Conn., 2002. This has over 300 detailed entries.

Darby, Graham. The Thirty Years' War. London, 2001. A concise introduction to the conflict; a good place to start. See Chapter 6.

Parker, Geoffrey, ed. The Thirty Years' War. 2nd ed. London and New York, 1997. Currently the definitive work on the war, with a full set of notes and a comprehensive bibliography that lists all the essential works in German. For Westphalia, see especially the bibliographical essay, pp. 266–268.

Symcox, G., ed. War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism, 1618–1763. New York, 1973. The terms of the peace are summarized in English on pp. 39–62.

—GRAHAM DARBY

The noun has one meaning:

Meaning #1: the peace treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648

Peace of Westphalia
Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster
Ratification of the Treaty of Münster.
Type of treaty	Peace treaty
Drafted	1646-1648
Signed Location	15 May 1648 (Osnabrück); 24 October 1648 (Münster) Osnabrück and Münster, Westphalia, modern-day Germany
Parties	109
Languages	French

v • d • e Thirty Years' War BattlesPilsen – Sablat – Wisternitz – White Mountain – Wiesloch – Wimpfen – Höchst – Fleurus – Stadtlohn – Breda – Dessau Bridge – Lutter am Barenberge – Stralsund – Wolgast – Frankfurt – Magdeburg – Werben – 1st Breitenfeld – Rain – Alte Veste – Lützen – Oldendorf – Nördlingen – Les Avins – Wittstock – Rheinfelden – Breisach – Chemnitz – Thionville – The Downs – La Marfée – Honnecourt – 2nd Breitenfeld – Rocroi – Tuttlingen – Freiburg – Jüterbog – Jankau – Hulst – Mergentheim – 2nd Nördlingen – Zusmarshausen – Lens – Prague TreatiesNikolsburg – The Hague – Franzburg – Lübeck – Stettin – Bärwalde – Fontainebleau – Prague – Wismar – Hamburg – Ulm – Westphalia

The term Peace of Westphalia denotes the two French-language peace treaties of Osnabrück (15 May 1648) and Münster (24 October 1648) that ended the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), in the Holy Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years' War (1567–1609), between Spain and the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands. The Peace of Westphalia treaties involved the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III (Habsburg), the Kingdoms of Spain, France, Sweden, the Dutch Republic and their allies, the Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, sovereigns of the Free imperial cities.

The treaties resulted from the first modern diplomatic congress, thereby initiating a new political order in central Europe, based upon the concept of a sovereign state governed by a sovereign. In the event, the treaties’ regulations became integral to the constitutional law of the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), ending the Franco–Spanish War (1635–59), is considered part of the Peace of Westphalia, with which were ended the European wars of religion, despite, a year later, Charles I’s (1625–49) beheading upon losing the English Civil War (1641–51).

Contents 1 Locations 2 Delegations 3 Results 3.1 Internal political boundaries 3.2 Tenets 4 See also 5 References 6 External links

Locations

Peace negotiations between France and the Habsburgs, provided by the Holy Roman Emperor and the Spanish King, were to be started in Cologne in 1636. These negotiations were blocked by France.

Cardinal Richelieu of France desired the inclusion of all its allies, whether sovereign or a state within the Holy Roman Empire. In Hamburg and Lübeck, Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire negotiated the Treaty of Hamburg. This was done with the intervention of Richelieu.

The Holy Roman Empire and Sweden declared the preparations of Cologne and the Treaty of Hamburg to be preliminaries of an overall peace agreement. This larger agreement was to be negotiated in Westphalia, in the neighbouring cities of Münster and Osnabrück. Both cities were to be maintained as neutral and demilitarized zones for the negotiations. Münster was, since its re-Catholization in 1535, a strictly mono-denominational community. It housed the Chapter of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster. Only Roman Catholic worship was permitted. No places of worship were provided for Calvinists and Lutherans.

Osnabrück was a bidenominational Lutheran and Catholic city, with two Lutheran and two Catholic churches for its mostly Lutheran burghers and exclusively Lutheran city council and the Catholic Chapter of the Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück with pertaining other clergy and also other Catholic inhabitants. In the years of 1628-1633 Osnabrück had been subjected by troops of the Catholic League and the Catholic Prince-Bishop Franz Wilhelm, Count of Wartenberg, imposed the Counter-Reformation onto the city with many Lutheran burgher families being exiled. While under following Swedish occupation Osnabrücks's Catholics were not expelled, but the city severely suffered from Swedish war contributions. Therefore Osnabrück hoped for a great relief becoming neutralised and demilitarised.

Both cities strove for more autonomy, aspiring to become Free Imperial Cities, so they welcomed the neutrality imposed by the peace negotiations, and the prohibition of all political influence by the warring parties including their overlords, the prince-bishops.

Since Lutheran Sweden preferred Osnabrück as a conference venue, its peace negotiations with the Empire, including the allies of both sides, took place in Osnabrück. The Empire and its opponent France, including the allies of each, as well as the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands and its opponent Spain (and their respective allies) negotiated in Münster.^[1]

Delegations

The peace negotiations had no exact beginning and ending, because the participating total of 109 delegations never met in a plenary session, but dropped in between 1643 and 1646 and left between 1647 and 1649. Between January 1646 and July 1647 probably the largest number of diplomats were present. Delegations had been sent by 16 European states, sixty-six Imperial States, representing the interests of a total of 140 involved Imperial States, and 27 interest groups, representing the interests of a variety of a total of 38 groups.^[2]

The French delegation was headed by Henri II d'Orléans, duc de Longueville and further comprised the diplomats Claude d'Avaux and Abel Servien. The Swedes plenipotentiaries sent Johan Oxenstierna, the son of chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, and Johann Adler Salvius. The head of the delegation of the Holy Roman Empire for both cities was Count Maximilian von Trautmansdorff; in Münster, his aides were Johann Ludwig von Nassau-Hadamar and Isaak Volmar (a lawyer); in Osnabrück, his team comprised Johann Maximilian von Lamberg and Reichshofrat Johann Krane, a lawyer. The Spanish delegation was headed by Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán, and besides included the diplomats and writers Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, and Bernardino de Rebolledo. The nuntius of Cologne, Fabio Chigi, and the Venetian envoy Alvise Contarini acted as mediators. Various Imperial States of the Holy Roman Empire also sent delegations. Brandenburg sent several representatives, including Vollmar and Joachim Friedrich von Blumenthal. The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands sent a delegation of eight, and Johann Rudolf Wettstein, the mayor of Basel, represented the Old Swiss Confederacy.

Results

Internal political boundaries

A simplified map of Europe after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The power taken by Ferdinand III in contravention of the Holy Roman Empire's constitution was stripped and returned to the rulers of the Imperial States. This rectification allowed the rulers of the Imperial States to independently decide their religious worship. Protestants and Catholics were redefined as equal before the law, and Calvinism was given legal recognition. Also, each of the 400 or so princes of the Holy Roman Empire were given equal authority to that of the Emperor, de-centralizing the government and effectively ending the power of the Holy Roman Empire. ^{[3] [4]}

The Holy See was very displeased at the settlement, with Pope Innocent X reportedly calling it "null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time".^[5]

Tenets

The main tenets of the Peace of Westphalia were:

• All parties would recognize the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, in which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state, the options being Catholicism, Lutheranism, and now Calvinism (the principle of cuius regio, eius religio).^{[3] [4]}
• Christians living in principalities where their denomination was not the established church were guaranteed the right to practice their faith in public during allotted hours and in private at their will. ^[3]

Holy Roman Empire in 1648.

There were also territorial adjustments:

• The independence of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Savoy, Milan, Genoa, Mantua, Tuscany, Lucca, Modena and Parma from the Empire was formally recognized; many of these territories had enjoyed de facto independence for decades.
• The majority of the Peace's terms can be attributed to the work of Cardinal Mazarin, the de facto leader of France at the time (the king, Louis XIV, being a child). Not surprisingly, France came out of the war in a far better position than any of the other participants. France won control of the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun near Lorraine, and the cities of the Décapole in Alsace (but not Strasbourg, the Bishopric of Strasbourg, or Mülhausen).
• Sweden received an indemnity of five million talers, used primarily to pay her troops.^[6] Sweden further received Western Pomerania (henceforth Swedish Pomerania), Wismar, and the Prince-Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden as hereditary fiefs, thus gaining a seat and vote in the imperial diet (Reichstag) as well as in the respective circle diets (Kreistag) of the Upper Saxon, Lower Saxon and Westphalian circles.^[7] However, the wording of the treaties was ambiguous:

• Whether or not the city of Bremen was included in Swedish Bremen-Verden remained disputed. Facing the Swedish take-over, Bremen had claimed Imperial immediacy, which was granted by the emperor and thus separated the city from the surrounding bishopric with the same name. Sweden understood that Bremen was nevertheless to be ceded to her, and started the Swedish-Bremen wars in 1653/54.^[8]
• The treaty also delegated the determination of the Swedish-Brandenburgian border in the Duchy of Pomerania to the parties. At Osnabrück, both Sweden and Brandenburg had claimed the whole duchy, which was under Swedish control since 1630 despite legal claims of Brandenburgian succession. While the parties settled for a border in 1653, the underlying conflict continued.^[9]
• The treaty ruled that the Dukes of Mecklenburg, owing their re-investiture to the Swedes, cede Wismar and the Mecklenburgian port tolls. While Sweden understood this to include the tolls of all Mecklenburgian ports, the Mecklenburgian dukes as well as the emperor understood this to refer to Wismar only.^[9]
• Wildeshausen, a petty exclave of Bremen-Verden and fragile basis for Sweden's seat in the Westphalian circle diet, was also claimed by the Bishopric of Münster.^[9]

• Bavaria retained the Palatinate's vote in the Imperial Council of Electors (which elected the Holy Roman Emperor), which it had been granted by the ban on the Elector Palatine Frederick V in 1623. The Prince Palatine, Frederick's son, was given a new, eighth electoral vote.
• The Palatinate was divided between the re-established Elector Palatine Charles Louis (son and heir of Frederick V) and Elector-Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, and thus between the Protestants and Catholics. Charles Louis obtained the Lower Palatinate, along the Rhine, while Maximilian kept the Upper Palatinate, to the north of Bavaria.
• Brandenburg-Prussia (later Prussia) received Farther Pomerania, and the Bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Kammin, and Minden.
• The succession to the United Duchies of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, who had died out in 1609, was clarified. Jülich, Berg, and Ravenstein were given to the Count Palatine of Neuburg, while Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg went to Brandenburg.
• It was agreed that the Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück would alternate between Protestant and Catholic holders, with the Protestant bishops chosen from cadets of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg.
• The independence of the city of Bremen was clarified.
• Barriers to trade and commerce erected during the war were abolished, and "a degree" of free navigation was guaranteed on the Rhine. ^[10]

See also

• Adam Adami - German diplomat in the peace negotiations
• Eighty Years' War
• List of treaties
• History of Sweden 1648-1700
• Thirty Years' War
• Westphalian sovereignty
• Peace of Münster
• Concordat of Worms
• Charter of Liberties

References

1. ^ Konrad Repgen, 'Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia: A Survey with an Examination of the Major Problems', In: 1648: War and Peace in Europe: 3 vols. (Catalogue of the 26th exhibition of the Council of Europe, on the Peace of Westphalia), Klaus Bußmann and Heinz Schilling (eds.) on behalf of the Veranstaltungsgesellschaft 350 Jahre Westfälischer Friede, Münster and Osnabrück: no publ., 1998, 'Essay Volume 1: Politics, Religion, Law and Society', pp. 355-372, here pp. 355seq.
2. ^ Konrad Repgen, 'Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia: A Survey with an Examination of the Major Problems', In: 1648: War and Peace in Europe: 3 vols. (Catalogue of the 26th exhibition of the Council of Europe, on the Peace of Westphalia), Klaus Bußmann and Heinz Schilling (eds.) on behalf of the Veranstaltungsgesellschaft 350 Jahre Westfälischer Friede, Münster and Osnabrück: no publ., 1998, 'Essay Volume 1: Politics, Religion, Law and Society', pp. 355-372, here p. 356.
3. ^ ^{a b c} Treaty of Munich 1648
4. ^ ^{a b} Barro, RJ and McCleary, RM 'Which Countries have State Religions? Page 5. http://economics.uchicago.edu/download/state_religion_03-03.pdf - URL Accessed 7 November 2006
5. ^ [World religions and democracy, Larry Jay Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Philip J. Costopoulos, 2005]
6. ^ Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 35. ISBN 3830005008. 
7. ^ Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 36. ISBN 3830005008. 
8. ^ Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 37. ISBN 3830005008. 
9. ^ ^{a b c} Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 38. ISBN 3830005008. 
10. ^ Gross, Leo (1948), "The Peace of Westphalia" The American Journal of International Law 42(1):20–41

External links

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