Peninsular war
Peninsular war (1808-14). The Iberian Peninsular war, known in Spain as the Guerra de la Independencia, formed a part of the Napoleonic wars. By late 1806, Napoleon's establishment of the Rheinbund and his defeat of Prussia had opened up new possibilities in his continuing struggle with Britain, the paymaster of his continental adversaries. Unable to overcome the Royal Navy's domination of the Channel and thus bring his military strength to bear directly against London, he was obliged to resort to other instruments of policy. Hoping to ‘conquer the sea by the power of the land’, he resolved to bring ‘Perfidious Albion’ to her knees through economic strangulation. Britain's war effort was ultimately founded on her prosperity, which, in turn, depended upon her overseas trade. Consistent with prevailing physiocratic and mercantilist thinking, Napoleon believed that the European mainland, although predominantly still at the proto-industrialization level of development and massively dependent upon agriculture, would, because of its superior resources and population, prevail in any economic competition with a comparatively tiny state which relied upon its commercial and maritime strengths. By endeavouring not so much to end as to control Britain's trade with the European continent, he hoped to induce her capitulation; without a favourable trading environment, ‘the nation of shopkeepers’ would fall victim to bankruptcy, mass unemployment, and possibly even revolution. However, any embargo on British merchandise would, Napoleon realized, have to be applied in a sufficiently uniform and enduring fashion: the entire coastline of Europe would have to be sealed off.
The Berlin Decrees of 1806 were the first in a series of sanctions against Britain's trade known collectively as the Continental System. She responded by enacting orders-in-council aimed at controlling neutral trade with the burgeoning French empire. These competing measures placed the USA, a neutral country with a substantial and lucrative export and carriage trade, and hitherto unaligned European states in an invidious position; they had to take sides in the contest between their more powerful neighbours. Thus, while Britain squabbled with the USA and attacked Denmark in 1807, the French turned their attention to Portugal, which was an important entrepôt.
Tempted by the prospect of territorial gains, Spain joined with France in occupying the almost defenceless kingdom. The Portuguese royal family and fleet, escorted by British warships, were evacuated to Brazil, but Napoleon was now able to incorporate the entire Iberian peninsula into the Continental System.
His relationship with Spain soon took a disastrous turn for the worse. He had been meddling in the political intrigues at the Bourbon court for some time, and had been gradually persuaded that the Spaniards would not object to the removal of their feeble, corrupt, and divided ruling house. On the pretext of supporting the operations in Portugal, he steadily increased his forces in Spain. In February 1808, these soldiers, with a mixture of trickery and force, wrested several key fortresses and towns from their astonished Spanish ‘allies’. Thousands more French troops then swept over the Pyrenees with impunity.
In the political turbulence that ensued, the Bourbons endeavoured to leave for the Americas, but were stopped by a riotous crowd of citizens and soldiers. An unholy alliance between a mob and disaffected aristocrats toppled the old order; the PM was deposed and King Charles IV abdicated in favour of his son, Ferdinand.
This revolution alarmed Napoleon. He was hoping to transform Spain into a modern state which would be both politically and socially compatible with France and her other vassals. Determined to oust the Bourbons altogether, he lured the quarrelsome family to Bayonne to resolve the matter. Charles, insisting that his abdication had been obtained under duress by a treacherous son, repudiated it. Ferdinand was compelled to return the crown to his father, who then quite happily surrendered it to Napoleon. The emperor, in turn, proclaimed his brother Joseph the new king of Spain.
By 6 May, the formalities for this transfer of power had been completed. However, while Napoleon could place his brother on the throne, he could not give him popular support. Tension had already been rising across Spain for some time when, on 2 May, the population of Madrid turned on the French garrison. Though suppressed as rapidly as it was savagely, this rising sparked off a general insurrection which quickly engulfed the entire country. Although its revolutionary nature horrified many civil functionaries and military commanders, and most of the ruling élite questioned the wisdom of challenging France's military might, urged on by extemporized provincial juntas, thousands of ordinary Spaniards took up arms on behalf of the captive Ferdinand, ‘El Deseado’, their fatherland, and their Catholic faith.
As the uprising spilled into neighbouring Portugal, the British glimpsed an opportunity to establish a toehold on the European continent. An expedition was duly despatched to Portugal and, on 21 August, it inflicted a sharp defeat on the occupying French forces at Vimiero. Judging the situation to be hopeless, the French commander Junot concluded the Cintra Convention with his British counterpart. In accordance with this, and the sensitivities of the Portuguese and Spaniards notwithstanding, Junot, his troops, and all their equipment (and booty) were repatriated, leaving the British in undisputed control of Portugal. Meanwhile, the French armies in Spain had sustained a still more shocking setback. Encircled at Bailén by Spanish regulars, a corps of some 20, 000 men had been compelled to surrender. This was the first defeat and capture of a French army in the field since the beginning of the Revolutionary wars. It did immense damage to the reputation for invincibility that Napoleon's legions had acquired and so panicked King Joseph that he ordered a general withdrawal to the Ebro, thus compounding the impression of a French debacle.
Infuriated, Napoleon now withdrew fresh troops from Germany and hurried across the Pyrenees to redeem the situation. Arriving in early November, he unleashed a devastating counterstroke against the astonished Spanish armies, scattering them to the winds. Madrid fell and, by mid-December, the French had reoccupied the heart of the peninsula and were preparing to march on Lisbon.
The reconquest of Portugal was prevented essentially by a timely foray mounted by a British column under Sir John Moore. Their forces' earlier successes had aroused great hopes within the British cabinet; Spain, it was believed, might follow Portugal in being completely cleared of the enemy. However, like their Spanish allies, they had not reckoned with Napoleon's reaction to developments. Moore, unaware of the strength of the hostile forces confronting him, was preparing to fall on a seemingly isolated corps around Burgos when he was alerted to the approach of Napoleon himself. Diverting his army from its march on Portugal, the emperor was seeking to get behind the redcoats, sever them from the coast, and annihilate them. He all but succeeded. Slipping away, Moore went into precipitate retreat for Corunna. Napoleon, alarmed by Austria's preparations for a renewal of the war, turned the pursuit over to Marshal Soult and hurried back to Germany. Repulsed at Corunna on 16 January 1809, Soult failed to prevent the British evacuation, but Moore was killed and his force, which comprised much of Britain's available army, had been badly mauled.
The Peninsular war, 1807-14.
(Click to enlarge)
Nevertheless, Portugal had been saved from immediate reoccupation, giving the British and the Portuguese, who completely subordinated themselves to their powerful allies throughout the war, time to prepare their defences. Soult slowly moved south, taking Oporto, while his colleague, Marshal Victor, having destroyed a Spanish army at Medellin on 28 March 1809, ventured down the Guadiana. The new British commander, Arthur Wellesley (see Wellington, Duke of), had some 23, 000 redcoats at his disposal and was having some 70, 000 Portuguese regulars and militia trained by British officers under Beresford. Despite Moore's predictions, he was confident that he could cling to Portugal; with a new war looming in Germany, Napoleon would simply not be able to spare sufficient men for a successful invasion of the kingdom.
This surmise was to prove correct. Having attacked Soult at Oporto and driven him northwards, Wellesley was free to join with the Spanish in a concentric advance on Madrid. After holding off a counterstroke by Victor at Talavera in July 1809, the British were compelled to retreat back into Portugal once Soult threatened their rear, while the Spanish armies, their efforts poorly co-ordinated, were subsequently defeated. Moreover, the Talavera campaign highlighted the importance of adequate logistical support in the barren peninsula; Wellesley's troops suffered badly because of shortcomings in this regard. As the French had already discovered to their cost, living off the land in such an inhospitable environment was rarely feasible, making their own mercurial style of warfare impracticable; once concentrated for action, large forces starved whereas small ones risked defeat. Indeed, the Peninsular conflict was to take on many of the traits of 18th-century warfare, which accentuated secure communications, adequate depots, and strong positions, notably fortresses. In fact, during the Napoleonic wars as a whole, sieges were almost unheard of outside the peninsula.
By the time that Napoleon had defeated Austria and another French invasion of Portugal seemed practicable, Wellesley, now Wellington, had prepared a series of concentric defences, the Lines of Torres Vedras, to protect Lisbon. He also had an army which was equal if not greater in size to that available to his opponent, Marshal Masséna. King Joseph had committed many of the 300, 000 troops at his disposal to seizing Andalusia rather than to the all-important mission of ejecting the British interlopers. Masséna, after reducing the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, advanced into Portugal to find that Wellington had scorched the countryside. Checked at Bussaco on 27 September 1810, he circumvented the Allies' position and resumed his advance on Lisbon only to find his path barred by the impregnable Lines.
With his men and horses dying from starvation, Masséna lingered before Lisbon from October until March, hoping to entice Wellington into attacking him. When he did not, the marshal retired on Almeida, gingerly followed by his adversary. A series of clashes along the Portuguese-Spanish frontier ensued as Masséna, and his successor Soult, together with Marshal Marmont, sought to prevent the Allies seizing the fortresses commanding Spain's northern and southern gateways, Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz respectively. However, early in 1812, Wellington succeeded in storming both of these before the French field armies could concentrate and come to their relief. Should an opportunity present itself, he was now poised to advance into the peninsula's very heart.
Just as Napoleon's attention and resources were turning to the invasion of Russia, the French position in Spain was becoming dire. True, considerable progress had been made against the insurrectionists, but, aided and encouraged by the British especially, they showed no sign of abandoning the struggle. After destroying the Tagus bridge at Almaraz so as to cut the communications between Soult's army in Andalusia and Marmont's in Leon, Wellington fell on the latter, scattering it at Salamanca. He then thrust deep into the interior, capturing Madrid and besieging Burgos. Only the arrival of Soult retrieved the situation. Burgos was relieved and, by mid-November, Wellington had retreated beyond the Huebra. However, the following May, his forces returned in overwhelming strength, took Burgos, and, on 21 June, heavily defeated Joseph at Vitoria.
Their forces in northern Spain having been pushed back to the Bidassoa, the French were also obliged to evacuate Valencia and Aragon. With Wellington investing San Sebastian and Pamplona, Soult led an ultimately futile counter-offensive to try to save the fortresses. Subsequently levered out of defensive positions on the Bidassoa, Nivelle, and Nive, his battered army was worsted again at Orthez in February 1814, and driven from Toulouse on 11 April. The tidings of Napoleon's abdication arrived hours later, bringing the campaign to its end.
Bibliography
- Lovett, G., Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain,
2 vols. (New York, 1965). - Oman, C. W. C., History of the Peninsular War,
7 vols. (Oxford, 1902-30)
— David Gates
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