Phrenology, from the Greek words for 'mind' and 'discourse', is about reading character from the shape and especially from the 'bumps' of the skull. This has also been called 'cranioscopy', 'craniology', 'zoonomy', and
'physiognomy', though the last usually refers to reading character from faces. Phrenology was popular from the middle of the 18th to the middle of the 19th centuries; its principal proponents were
Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), who was a physician in Vienna and a more than competent anatomist (he was the first to distinguish the functions of the 'white' and the 'grey' matter of the brain), and Gall's student, Johann Kaspar Spurzheim (1776–1832), who with the controversial Scottish moral philosopher George Combe (1788–1858) spread the doctrine to England and America. It had such a vogue that by 1832 there were 29 phrenological societies in Britain, and many journals in Britain and America, including the
Phrenological Journal, a quarterly edited by Combe at Edinburgh from 1823 to 1847. There was, however, much criticism, such as from the philosopher, and early proponent of associative psychology, Thomas Brown (1778–1820), and phrenology was often lampooned in verse and on the stage.
Gall claimed to have discovered his phrenological principles inductively from people (and animals) of his acquaintance who had marked character traits associated with distinctive skull shapes, or 'bumps' that could be felt with the fingers. For example, the region he numbered as 1 — Amativeness (
Instinct de la génération), at the back of the head below the inion — he identified from its heat in a hysterical widow. Just above this region is No. 2 — Philoprogenitiveness (
Amour de la progéniture) — which Gall selected as the organ for the love of children because this occipital part of the skull is prominent in women and apes, in whom the love of infants is supposedly stronger than in men. To take an intellectual example: No. 22 (Individuality), immediately above the nose, was named as the organ for recognizing external objects and for forming ideas from being large in Michelangelo and small in the Scots.
The 26 regions identified as personality organs by Gall (increased to as many as 43 by later phrenologists) were based on very few instances. Implausible excuses were made for exceptions, and for such matters as inability to distinguish the skulls of saints from those of sinners. Phrenology does, however, have considerable importance in the history of psychology and brain studies. Even its obvious failures are revealing.
Phrenology is based on the notion that mind is intimately related to physical brain function. It is thus opposed to Cartesian mind–brain dualism, and is in line with much modern neurological thinking, and with 'identity' accounts, which suppose that mind is an aspect of brain structure and function. Phrenology implies some kind of
localization of brain function, though what are thought to be localized in the brain, as read from the 'bumps', are
complete traits of ability and character, rather than
processes generating characteristics of behaviour and intellect. The implied notion of brain 'organs', such as Veneration, Wonder, Wit, Tune, Language, Memory, Vanity, Cautiousness, and so on, is misleading, because these depend on many underlying processes which, as we now know, are widely separated and in many cases never appear in the 'output' of the brain. Nevertheless, we do still speak of 'speech centres' (see
language areas in the brain), and evidence for speech in pre-human and early human skulls is sought from bumps in casts corresponding to those anatomical features associated with language in modern man.
Phrenology made psychological classifications which still survive. Spurzheim grouped human faculties in the following way:
I.
Feelings, divided into:
1. Propensities (internal impulses to certain actions).
2. Sentiments (impulses prompting emotions as well as action).
(i) Lower: those common to man and the lower animals.
(ii)Higher: those proper to man.
II.
Intellectual faculties, divided into:
1. Perceptive faculties (knowledge by observation and through language).
2. Reflective faculties (knowledge by intuition and reasoning, especially by noting comparisons).
Although the phrenologists accepted and formulated
faculty psychology, they did not contribute to brain anatomy. This, in part, was because they did not say, simply, that the larger the 'bump' the greater the characteristic. Thus Spurzheim writes, in
Phrenology: In Connexion with the Study of Physiognomy (1824), under the heading 'Of the heads of the sexes':
The body and face vary in the two sexes. Do their brains differ likewise? The talents and feelings of the male and female are commonly considered as dissimilar; indeed it is proverbially said that women feel and men think.
The majority of modern authors, however, have attributed the phenomenon to the modified education which the sexes receive. The female head is smaller than that of the male; it is commonly narrower laterally. The female cerebral fibre is slender and long rather than thick.
He continues:
Lastly, and in particular, the organs of philoprogenitiveness, of attachment, love of approbation, circumspection, secretiveness, ideality, and benevolence, are for the most part proportionately larger in the female; while in the male those of amativeness, combativeness, destructiveness, constructiveness, self-esteem, and firmness predominate.
But he then argues:
I say that the heads of men are wider than those of women, and then I state that I consider circumspection and secretiveness, whose organs lie laterally, as more generally active in the female than in the male.
They who make this objection do not understand the phrenological principle, according to which the organs which are most largely developed in every individual display the greatest energy, and take the lead of all the other powers. Now, although the female head be so commonly narrower than the male, the organs of secretiveness and circumspection are still the most prominent, and thus contribute essentially to the formation of the female character.
Spurzheim concludes that phrenologists examining innate dispositions 'do not compare the heads of the sexes together, nor even those of the same sex; they judge of every head individually, and form conclusions in regard to the dispositions generally, according as the respective faculties are developed'.
The phrenologists generally stressed innateness of faculties. Spurzheim, while admitting that the education of the girls of his time was inferior to that of boys, argues that 'girls are more commonly instructed in drawing, painting, and music than boys', and often spend much time at these occupations; 'nevertheless, no woman has hitherto produced such works as those of Handel, Mozart, Haydn, Titian, Rubens, Paul Veronese, Canova, and so many others'. He adds: 'The female sex appears to greater advantage in actions which result from feeling.' Now this argument depends on the assumption of faculty psychology, that skills such as painting are developed simply by practising that particular skill. But it is possible that other, and perhaps traditionally male, activities transfer knowledge and abilities to give males an advantage even for skills such as painting which are frequently practised by girls. This possibility could hardly have been considered by proponents of a faculty psychology based on localized organs of behaviour and personality.
Phrenology seemed to give promise of objective assessments and judgements of people; it was even proposed to select Members of Parliament from candidates having propitious bumps. It was suggested, as a joke, by the distinguished editor of
Blackwood's Magazine and professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh, John Wilson ('Christopher North'), that children's heads should be moulded — to accentuate their good qualities and remove evil. The suggestion was taken up by several practising phrenologists.
With the advent of experiments in which small regions of brain were removed, by careful operations pioneered by the French physiologist
Pierre Flourens, and by electrical stimulation with fine wires, electrodes, pioneered by Gustav Theodor Fritsch (1838–97) and Julius Eduard Hitzig (1838–1907) on the 'motor cortex' of dogs (1870), it at last became obvious that functions are localized, but that localized functions are not simply related to behavioural skills, or to mental attributes or abilities. However, although this became clear to many physiologists towards the end of the 19th century, it was resisted by some, and especially by the members of the
Gestalt school of psychology, who held that the brain works holistically, with perception given by perceived objects represented 'isomorphically' as brain traces like pictures, so that circles are represented by circular traces, houses by house-shaped traces, and so on. This was a rejection of functionally interacting processes of analysis and of inference-generating perceptions, in favour of notions more like those of the phrenologists. And such ideas die hard. One might say that the current interest in 'cerebral dominance', with the left hemisphere of the cortex supposedly 'analytic' (responsible for skills such as arithmetic and logical thinking) and the right hemisphere 'synthetic' or 'analogue' (responsible for intuitive and artistic skills), is the dying kick of phrenology. (See
split-brain and the mind.) Physiological experiments on localizing functions give very different functional maps from those of the phrenologists (Figs. 1 and 2) and are highly revealing and of great use in brain surgery; yet they too are subject to logical difficulties of interpretation. For ablation especially, there are difficulties in inferring from loss, or change in behaviour, what the missing region does in the normal intact brain. It is extremely difficult to isolate functions in interactive systems, and in systems where parts can take over the functions of other parts when these are overloaded or damaged. Moreover, it is logically necessary to appreciate what the functions are before they can be named or localized. Physiological functions are not units of behaviour, and so are not to be discovered simply from observation. What is required is an adequate theoretical understanding — an adequate conceptual model — of brain function, which is something very different from the localized mental faculties of the phrenologists.
Recently, however, the brain has been seen to be organized in 'modules' carrying out complex functions, such as face recognition (Fodor 1983). This is something of a return to phrenological ideas.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 2. The regions identified as personality organs, according to the classification of Gall, with additions by Spurzheim and Combe, were: 1. Amativeness
2. Philoprogenitiveness
3. Concentrativeness
4. Adhesiveness
5. Combativeness
6. Destructiveness
6a. Alimentiveness
7. Secretiveness
8. Acquisitiveness
9. Constructiveness
10. Self-esteem
11. Love of approbation
12. Cautiousness
13. Benevolence
14. Veneration
15. Conscientiousness
16. Firmness
17. Hope
18. Wonder
19. Ideality
20. Wit
21. Imitation
22. Individuality
23. Form
24. Size
25. Weight
26. Colour
27. Locality
28. Number
29. Order
30. Eventuality
31. Time
32. Tune
33. Language
34. Comparison
35. Causality
(Published 1987) — Richard L. Gregory
Bibliography- Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind.
- Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond Modularity.
- Van Wyhe, J. (2004). Phrenology and the Origins of Victorian Scientific Naturalism.