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| Political Biography: Pierre Laval |
(b. Châteldon, 28 June 1883; d. 15 Oct. 1945) French; Prime Minister 1930, 1935, head of government of the French state 1940, 1942 – 4 Pierre Laval was a classic example of the poor boy who makes good and turns bad. Born in the small town of Châteldon (Puy-de-Dôme), the son of a barkeeper, he was a brilliant schoolboy and managed by hard work to obtain a law degree. Like many of his kind, he decided to make his fortune as a lawyer in Paris and built up a reputation defending radical trade unionists who had fallen foul of the police authorities. His early political sympathies were with the Socialist Party of Jaurès and he became in rapid succession deputy and mayor of the working-class suburb of Aubervilliers, north of Paris. After the First World War, he began a journey away from the left which led him to swap his parliamentary seat for the more conservative Orne, to start representing companies rather than trade unionists, to build up a business empire based on provincial newspapers, and to buy the château in his home town. He held a number of ministerial portfolios in the late 1920s and in 1930 was briefly Prime Minister. His political skills, like those of his mentor
Laval played no part in the events which led Pétain to seek an armistice with Hitler in June 1940. Once Pétain's intention to proceed to a constitutional revolution became clear, however, he rushed to Vichy to be at his side and his political skills played a decisive role in the French Parliament's decision to vote itself out of existence. When Pétain appointed himself head of the French state, Laval became his Prime Minister. He plunged into the task of establishing good relations with the Nazi Occupier and pledged himself to a policy of collaboration, Laval was indifferent to the reactionary fantasies of the ideologues of the État Français; they, like Pétain, regarded him with a mixture of contempt and fear. In December 1940 he was sacked and briefly detained in a coup organized by Pétain's inner court. His career was saved by the correct belief of the Germans that he was the best defender of the cause of collaboration. Relations with Pétain were patched up and by 1942 he was back in office as the official number two of the regime. It was now that he committed the acts which would eventually destroy him. Convinced both of his indispensability and of the necessity for ever closer collaboration, he co-operated with the Germans in the deportation of the Jews and introduced the hated system of industrial conscription which sent thousands of French workers to German factories in return for a small number of prisoners of war. His government introduced ever more repressive measures against members of the Resistance and underwrote the terror campaign carried out by Joseph Darnand. As the last remnants of Vichy's authority crumbled in the face of the liberating armies, Laval strove to protect his future (it is amazing he thought he had one) by unsuccessfully trying to persuade the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Herriot, to recall the National Assembly which had been dissolved in 1940. Deported with the rest of the Vichy crew to Germany, he refused, like Pétain, to take any part in the fantasy "governments of national liberation" set up by the Nazis. At the end of the war, he managed to flee to Franco's Spain, where he sought exile. Franco, however, handed him over to the French authorities who put him on trial for treason. At his and Pétain's trial, he tried to argue that collaboration had been designed to protect French soil and French lives. After a trial which brought no credit on the French judicial system, he was found guilty of treason and condemned to death. On the day of his execution, he tried to commit suicide by poison, was brought back to life by the prison guards, taken out, and shot. He was still wearing the tricolour sash which was the symbol of his office of mayor of Aubervilliers.
Laval remains to this day an outcast figure in France and no serious attempts have been made to rehabilitate him. His unattractive personal appearance and politican's cunning made him a convenient scapegoat, after his execution, for the error of others. Yet if he cannot be regarded as Vichy's evil genius, his responsibility for some of the worst cruelties of the Occupation, and his enthusiasm for a German victory, are beyond question. A belief that Nazi Germany was the only way to prevent the Bolshevization of France is one part of the answer, sheer lust for office another. But perhaps the principal motivation was his belief that he alone could strike a deal with Hitler. Laval prided himself on his realism and on his peasant's ability to negotiate a good bargain. It was a misplaced pride and one which cost him, and France, very dear.
| Biography: Pierre Laval |
The French politician Pierre Laval (1883-1945) served as chief minister in the World War II Vichy regime. He was later tried for treason and executed.
Pierre Laval was born on June 28, 1883, the son of a café owner at Châteldon. Financing his legal education by tutoring, he entered politics on the extreme left. After earning a reputation as a labor lawyer, he was sent to Parliament in 1914 as a Socialist deputy by the working-class voters of Aubervilliers. During World War I Laval first demonstrated the extreme ideological flexibility that marked his entire career. Aligned for 2 years with Joseph Caillaux, who advocated a negotiated peace with Germany, Laval was known as a defeatist. Sensing that Caillaux's views were increasingly unpopular, Laval adeptly switched sides in 1917. Soon he clamored for the return to power of the ultranationalist Georges Clemenceau, who became prime minister in November 1917 and immediately jailed Caillaux.
Laval was momentarily damaged politically by his association with Caillaux and was defeated for reelection in 1919. The next 5 years he spent amassing a substantial fortune in legal practice, journalism, and other business interests. Officially remaining a Socialist and an admirer of Lenin in the early 1920s, he abandoned his party shortly before the elections of 1924 and reentered the Chamber as an independent leftist.
Premier and Foreign Minister
In 1926 Laval was elected to the Senate and continued his movement to the right. Often a minister in the late 1920s, he became premier for the first time in January 1931. Brought down after a year in office over a question of fiscal policy, he served as prime minister once more from June 1935 to January 1936.
Before 1940 Laval had his greatest impact on French foreign policy. Four times foreign minister during 1932-1936, he steadfastly sought accommodation with Mussolini's Italy against resurgent Germany. Coauthor of the abortive Hoare-Laval Agreement, which was meant to appease Mussolini at the expense of Abyssinia, he was overthrown when the British Cabinet repudiated the arrangement. For the rest of his life Laval hated the British and was determined to exact his revenge. Realizing that a united Franco-Italian front against Germany had been rendered impossible by the British action, he did an about-face and began to urge the necessity of reaching an understanding with Hitler. France, Laval argued, could not survive the ordeal of another war.
Vichy Regime
Out of office after 1936, Laval in 1939 was an advocate of peace at any price. After the fall of France in June 1940, he joined the government of Marshal Philippe Pétain as the chief minister. Instrumental in securing parliamentary ratification of the armistice terms and the granting of full constituent powers to Pétain, Laval during the last 6 months of 1940 urged that France must accept the fact of German victory and through collaboration find its rightful place in Hitler's "New Order." Considered far too willing to collaborate by his fellow ministers, he was ousted from power in a palace revolt on Dec. 13, 1940.
Laval remained out of office until April 1942, when Berlin pressured Pétain into restoring him to power. The Germans rightly calculated that they could obtain from him greater supplies of French workers than they were getting from his predecessor, Adm. J. F. Darlan. Engaged massively against the Soviet Union, the Germans also knew that a frankly collaborationist regime in France under Laval guaranteed their security in the west. Laval responded by accentuating his collaborationism and said that he "hoped for a German victory to avoid the Bolshevization of Europe."
Realizing in the summer of 1944 that the end was near, Laval sought to call a national assembly at Paris to deal with the new situation. Intended to save his own skin as well, the maneuver was too little too late, and in the middle of the month he was ignominiously carried off in the baggage of the retreating Germans. Escaping his captors, he was found by the Americans in Austria and handed over to the French.
Laval's trial for treason by the provisional government of Charles De Gaulle began at Paris on Oct. 4, 1945. Even for a political trial it was a shabby affair: irregular, mismanaged, and - embarrassed by Laval's clever and effective defense - cut short by the government. Laval was convicted and sentenced to death, and Charles De Gaulle personally refused him a new trial. Nearly escaping Gaullist justice by swallowing poison, Laval was revived by a team of frantic doctors and a few hours later was executed by firing squad, on Oct. 15, 1945.
Pierre Laval is one of the most intensely controversial figures in recent French history. His detractors portray him as the archvillain of wartime France who sold his countrymen to the Nazis. His admirers claim he is the unsung hero who single-handedly kept French losses to a minimum after April 1942 by playing a double game with the Germans. There may be partial truth in both views. In any case, although so closely identified with the Vichy regime, Laval loathed the cultist idolatry of Pétain and scorned the high-flown emptiness of the National Revolution. Instead he had an instrumental view of French national interest and, because he was convinced of the finality of German victory, that necessarily meant collaboration. That in the end he miscalculated may then be due to the fact that the politics he had learned in the sovereign Third Republic were irrelevant to the satellite status of France after June 1940. From this perspective Laval may be seen as much the prisoner of his own narrow political opportunism as he was the captive of his German sponsors.
Further Reading
Laval states his own case in The Diary of Pierre Laval (1948). There is no good study of him in any language. The best short biographies are David Thomson, Two Frenchmen: Pierre Laval and Charles De Gaulle (1951), and Hubert Cole, Laval: A Biography (1963), both of which are sympathetic without being apologetic. There is an interesting psychoanalytic treatment of the man in David Abrahamsen, Men, Mind and Power (1945). Laval's son-in-law, René de Chambrun, collected several hundred sworn statements from French, German, and American witnesses in France during the German Occupation (3 vols., 1958-1959), intending to present a favorable view of the Vichy regime in general and of Laval in particular. Recommended for general historical background are Alexander Werth, The Twilight of France, 1933-1940 (1942); Paul Farmer, Vichy: Political Dilemma (1955); and Robert Aron, The Vichy Regime, 1940-1944 (1958).
Additional Sources
Chambrun, Rene de, Pierre Laval: traitor or patriot?, New York: Scribner, 1984.
| Holocaust: Pierre Laval |
Laval served as French prime minister from 1931 to 1932 and from 1935 to 1936. After the Nazis occupied the northern part of France in June 1940, Laval became the second in command to Philippe Petain, the French war hero who agreed to collaborate with the Nazis and set up a government in southern France. However, Petain was afraid that Laval would seize power away from him, so he fired Laval in December 1940. In spite of Petain's decision, the Nazis called for Laval to be reinstated, and in May 1942 he returned as prime minister.
Laval was more interested in being practical than in ideology. He wanted peace for France at any price---so he agreed to cooperate with the Nazis in full. He helped the Nazis arrest thousands of Jews for Deportation to their deaths, while in public, he stuck to the story that they were just being sent to labor camps in the east.
After the war, Laval was sentenced to death for collaboration and treason against France. He was executed in Paris in the fall of 1945. (For more on Vichy, see also France.)
| Columbia Encyclopedia: Pierre Laval |
Bibliography
See biography by Hubert Cole (1963); D. Thompson, Two Frenchmen: Pierre Laval and Charles de Gaulle (1951); G. Warner, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France (1968).
| Wikipedia: Pierre Laval |
| Pierre Laval | |
Laval and Pétain in Frank Capra documentary film Divide and Conquer (1943) |
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101st Prime Minister of France
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| In office 27 January 1931 – 20 February 1932 |
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| Preceded by | Théodore Steeg |
| Succeeded by | André Tardieu |
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112th Prime Minister of France
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| In office 7 June 1935 – 24 January 1936 |
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| Preceded by | Fernand Bouisson |
| Succeeded by | Albert Sarraut |
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120th Prime Minister of France
(as Vice-President of the Council) Head of State and nominal Head of Government : Philippe Pétain |
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| In office 11 July 1940 – 13 December 1940 |
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| Preceded by | Philippe Pétain |
| Succeeded by | Pierre Étienne Flandin |
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123rd Prime Minister of France
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| In office 18 April 1942 – 20 August 1944 |
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| Preceded by | François Darlan |
| Succeeded by | Charles de Gaulle |
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| Born | 28 June 1883 |
| Died | 15 October 1945 (aged 62) |
| Political party | None |
| Religion | Roman Catholic |
Pierre Laval (28 June 1883 – 15 October 1945) was a French politician. He served four times as President of the council of ministers of the Third Republic, twice consecutively. Following France's Armistice with Germany in 1940, he served twice in the Vichy Regime as head of government. After the Liberation (1945), he was arrested, found guilty of high treason, and executed by firing squad. The controversy surrounding his political activities has generated over a dozen biographies.
Laval was born 28 June 1883 at Châteldon, Puy-de-Dôme, in the northern part of Auvergne. His father worked in the village as a café proprietor, butcher, and postman, and was sufficiently well-to-do to own a few acres of vineyard and half a dozen horses. Laval never forgot, and never allowed his associates to forget, that he was essentially a son of Auvergne.
Young Pierre was first educated at the village school in Châteldon, then at the age of fifteen he was sent to a Paris lycée to take his baccalauréat. He did not complete it, and returning south to Lyon, he spent the next year reading a degree in zoology.[1] Laval joined the socialists in 1903, when he was living in Saint-Étienne (62 km southwest of Lyon). “I was never a very orthodox socialist," he explained in 1945…..By which I mean that I was never much of a Marxist. My socialism was much more a socialism of the heart than a doctrinal socialism... I was much more interested in men, their jobs, their misfortunes and their conflicts than in the digressions of the great German pontiff.”[2]
Laval returned to Paris in 1907. He was called up for military service, and after serving in the ranks, he was discharged for varicose veins. In a speech in April 1913 he declared "Barrack-based armies are incapable of the slightest effort, because they are badly-trained and, above all, badly commanded." He favoured the outright abolition of the army and its replacement by a citizens' militia.[3]
During this period Laval became familiar with the left-wing doctrines of George Sorel and Hubert Lagardelle. In 1909, choosing to forget his zoological qualifications, he turned to the law. Shortly after becoming a member of the Paris bar, he married the daughter of a Dr. Claussat and they set up a small home in Paris. Their only child, a daughter, was born in 1911. Madame Laval, although she came from a very active political family, never meddled in politics herself. She belonged to a generation, she said, which believed that a woman's place was in the home. Laval was devoted to his family, a fact that even his enemies never denied.[4]
The years immediately before the First World War in France were characterised by widespread labour unrest, and Laval made his mark by defending strikers, trade unionists, and left-wing agitators against attempts by the authorities to prosecute them. In a trade-union conference, Laval spoke forcefully:
| “ | I am a comrade among comrades, a worker among workers. I am not one of those lawyers who are mindful of their bourgeois origin even when attempting to deny it. I am not one of those high-brow attorneys who engage in academic controversies and pose as intellectuals. I am proud to be what I am. A lawyer in the service of manual laborers who are my comrades, a worker like them, I am their brother. Comrades, I am a manual lawyer.”[5] | ” |
Laval was not in the habit of setting forth his political views in writing. The only book he ever wrote was his Diary, written in a prison-cell while awaiting the foregone verdict of his post-World War II trial. It survived because his daughter, Josée de Chambrun, was able to smuggle it out page by page.[6]
In April 1914, as fear of war swept the nation, the Socialists and Radicals geared up their electoral campaign in defense of peace. Their leaders were Jean Jaurès and Joseph Caillaux. The Bloc des Gauches (Leftist bloc) denounced the law passed in July 1913 extending the compulsory military service from two to three years. The Confédération générale du travail, or CGT, sought Pierre Laval as Socialist candidate for the district of the Seine, a Parisian suburb both rural and industrial. He was victorious. The Radicals, with the support of the Socialists, held the majority in the assembly. Together they hoped to avert war. The assassinations of Archduke Francis Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 and Jaurès on 31 July 1914 shattered the hopes of the pacifists.
Pierre Laval and some 2,000 others were listed by the military in the infamous carnet B, a compilation of the potentially subversive elements who might hinder or oppose the mobilization. In name of national unity, Minister of the Interior Jean-Louis Malvy, despite pressure from the chiefs of staff, refused to have anyone apprehended.
Unlike Socialists such as Pierre Renaudel of L'Humanité or Léon Jouhaux of the CGT, Laval remained true to his pacifist's convictions during the war. He quietly chose to direct his efforts toward the material welfare of the French. In December 1915, Jean Longuet, grandson of Karl Marx, proposed to the Socialist parliamentarians that they open communications with the Socialists of other states. Longuet hoped to pressure the belligerent governments into a negotiated peace. Laval signed on, but the motion was defeated.
With all of France's resources geared for war, basic goods were often scarce or overpriced. Laval first concerned himself essentially with the well being of his constituency. Eventually he would extend his efforts to the Parisian and national scene. He was seen visiting slaughter houses with Minister Malvy. On 30 January 1917, in the national assembly he called upon Supply Minister Edouard Herriot to deal with the inadequate coal supply in Paris. Author Alfred Mallet wrote: "Herriot groaned 'If I could, I would unload the barges myself . . . '" Laval retorted "Do not add ridicule to ineptitude."
"Herriot gémit: 'Si je pouvais, j'irais décharger moi-même les péniches.' La voix rauque du jeune député de la Seine s'élève, implacable: 'N'ajoutez pas le ridicule à l'incapacité!' Mallet, Pierre Laval des Années obscures, 18-19.
The words delighted the assembly and attracted the attention of George Clemenceau. The relationship between Laval and Herriot, however, would always be strained.
As the bloody stalemate of the war only grew worse, Laval scorned the conduct of the war and the poor supply of the troops in the field. When mutinies broke out after General Robert Nivelle's disastrous offensive of April 1917 at Chemin des Dames, he spoke in defense of the mutineers. When Marcel Cachin and Marius Moutet returned from St. Petersburg in June 1917 with the invitation to an international socialist convention in Stockholm, Laval saw a chance for peace. In a lyrical address to the assembly, reported by the author Mallet, he urged the chamber to allow a delegation to go: "Yes, Stockholm, in response to the call of the Russian Revolution . . . Yes, Stockholm, for peace . . . Yes, Stockholm the polar star." The request was denied. The Alexandre Ribot government was overthrown. Paul Prudent Painlevé formed a new government that did not last long. The winds of peace, which blew for a brief moment in the spring of 1917, were overwhelmed by the discovery of a flurry of traitors, some real, some imagined, as with Malvy. Because he had refused to arrest the Frenchmen on the carnet B, Malvy now became a suspect. At this stage of the war, a traitor was anyone who did not believe in the victory or who wished for peace. Laval's "Stockholm, étoile polaire" speech had not been forgotten. Many of Laval's acquaintances, the publishers of the anarchist Bonnet rouge (Red hat), and other pacifists were arrested or interrogated. Though Laval frequented pacifist circles—it was said that he was acquainted with Leon Trotsky—the authorities did not pursue him. His status as a deputy, his overall caution, and his many friendships across the political spectrum protected him. In November 1917, Clemenceau even offered him a post in government, but the Socialist Party by then refused to enter any government. Laval toed the party line, but he questioned the wisdom of such a policy in a meeting of the Socialist members of parliament.
The war ended, a Pyrrhic victory for the whole of France, in the estimation of many observers. The north of the country was ravaged. Every town, every village, every family was affected by death or mutilation. Laval's brother, Jean, the army officer, died in the first months of the war.
1919 was an election year. A conservative tidal wave swept the Bloc National into control of the National Assembly. Despite a dynamic campaign, Pierre Laval was not reelected. The Socialists' record of pacifism, their opposition to the immensely popular Clemenceau, and the anxiety arising from the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia all contributed to the defeat of the Socialists.
Throughout France, as in much of the rest of Europe, social unrest followed conservative victories. The CGT, with a strength of 2,400,000 members, launched a general strike in 1920. The CGT's offensive petered out, however, as thousands of workers were laid off. The government sought to dissolve the CGT. Laval, with Joseph Paul-Boncour as chief counsel, assumed the defense of the union leaders. While they failed in the courtroom, Laval saved the CGT by appealing directly to the ministers of the interior and of commerce and industry, Théodore Steeg and Auguste Isaac. The CGT survived.
While his interest in improving the lot of the workers never faltered, his relations with the Socialist Party drew to an end. The last few years spent with the Socialist caucus in the chamber combined with the party's disciplinary policies eroded Laval's attachment to the Socialist cause. With the Bolshevik victory in Russia the party itself was changing; the Congress of Tours in December 1920 saw the schism of the Socialists into two ideologically competing components: the French Communist Party (SFIC later PCF), which derived its inspiration directly from Moscow, and the more moderate French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO). Laval simply let his membership lapse, not taking sides as the two factions battled over the legacy of Jean Jaurès. Ideology would never hold Laval's attention again. When, during the dark years of the occupation a variety of "right wing" doctrines came forth, he also declined to embrace any of them.
Laval's financial success possibly affected his decision to leave the Socialist movement. He may have preferred not to come to terms with the incongruity of being well-to-do and a card-carrying member of the SFIO or the PCF. He might also have simply been unwilling to waste his energy in ideological jousts. When probed about his defection, Laval declared that the party had changed at Tours, not him.32 In truth, Laval was too much of an individualist to belong to any party. He ran for the first time as an independent in the 1923 mayoral election in Aubervilliers. He believed that "a sound material independence, if not essential, gives to government officials who have it a greater political independence."
"Une indépendance matérielle assurée, si elle n'est pas indispensable, donne aux hommes de gouvernement qui la possèdent une plus grande indépendance politique." Pierre Laval, Laval Parle, 21.
In 1923 the city of Aubervilliers, in the northern suburb of Paris, needed a new mayor. As a former deputy of the circonscription (constituency), Laval was an obvious candidate for the post. To be eligible for election in that particular district, Laval purchased a piece of farmland, "Les Bergeries." Because Laval's defection from the Socialists was done with little fanfare, few were aware of it. Laval was asked in turn by the local SFIO and the Communist Party to head their respective lists.38 Laval instead chose to run under the Laval list, composed of former Socialists he convinced to leave the party and work for him. This was an independent Socialist Party of sorts that only existed in Aubervilliers. In a four-way race Laval was victorious in the second round.39
By nature Laval abhorred conflict and he promptly won over those he defeated by cultivating personal contacts. He developed a network among the humble and the well-to-do in Aubervilliers, not to mention the mayors of the neighboring towns. He was the only independent politician in the northern suburb of Paris known after the 1924 elections as the Banlieu Rouge (Red Suburb). This peculiarity allowed him to avoid getting immersed in the ideological war raging between Socialists and communists. Laval simply built friendships and earned the confidence of the voters by intelligently managing the town=s assets.40
If the SFIO resented Laval's withdrawal from the party, it was discreet about it. The Socialists needed Laval for the 1924 legislative elections. The Socialist Party in combination with the Radicals formed a national coalition known as the Cartel des Gauches. Laval headed a list of independent Socialists in the Seine. The Cartel was victorious and Laval regained a seat in the National Assembly. Leftist euphoria swept France. The first action of Laval as deputy was to bring back Joseph Caillaux, former member of the national assembly and once the shining star of the Radical Party. Clemenceau had had Caillaux arrested toward the end of the War for collusion with the enemy. He had served two years in prison and had lost his civic rights. Laval took a stand for Caillaux['s pardon. Laval, with others, was successful. In Caillaux, Laval gained an influential patron.
Laval's reward for his support of the Cartel was his appointment as Minister of Public Works in the government of Paul Painlevé in April 1925. Six months later, in pure Third Republic style, the government collapsed. Nevertheless, Laval from then on belonged to the exclusive club of former ministers from which new ministers were usually drawn. Between 1925 and 1926 Laval participated three more times in Briand governments, once as under-secretary to the premier and twice as Minister of Justice (garde des sceaux). When he first became Minister of Justice, Laval abandoned his law practice to avoid any conflict of interest. This was a sacrifice well worth making, as the Ministry of Justice was the gateway to the prime ministry.
Laval's momentum was frozen after 1926 through a reshuffling of the cartel majority orchestrated by the Radical-Socialist mayor and deputy of Lyon, Edouard Herriot.45 Founded in 1901, the Radical Party became the hinge faction of the Third Republic. Its support or defection, as Laval would experience, often meant the survival or collapse of governments. Through this latest mood swing in the national assembly, Laval was excluded from the direction of France for four years. Author Gaston Jacquemin suggested that Laval deliberately chose not to partake in a Herriot government, which he judged incapable of handling the financial crisis. The year 1926 marked the definitive break between Laval and the left. If Laval was attacked in the leftist press for his departure, he nonetheless maintained his friends on the left.
In 1927 Laval won the seat of the Senator of the Seine, in effect withdrawing from and placing himself above the political battles for ephemeral majorities in the National Assembly. He longed for a constitutional reform that would strengthen the executive branch and eliminate the political instability, the grievous flaw of the Third Republic.
On 2 March 1930 Laval returned to government as Minister of Labor in the second André Tardieu government.
André Tardieu had been the collaborator of George Clemenceau. As in all of the governments of the Third Republic from this time period, the governments relied on coalitions in the Chamber of Deputies. In this Laval government he secured the support of the Right. He served first as minister of Agriculture, took over the Interior from Laval in the Fall of 1931 and served as War Minister in January 1932. Elegant and often perceived as arrogant, he was nicknamed the "Prince of the Republic," the antithesis of the populist Laval. Yet the two got along remarkably well. Tardieu made possible the evacuation of the Rhineland, sought by Briand (May 1930). Tardieu was also the great hope of the conservatives; he hoped to be able to modernize France and to revamp the party system. Rudolph Binion Defeated Leaders, The Political Fate of Caillaux, Jouvenel and Tardieu (Morningside Heights, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 310-4. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 69. In July 1939 Tardieu became paralysed by hemiplegia. An editorialist for Gringoire, Le Temps and other papers, Tardieu could no longer speak or write and thus no longer earn a living. In 1942 Laval was able to help Tardieu materially. Laval requested to visit his ailing colleague. But Tardieu's caretakers feared it would be too emotional for their patient. Mallet who had been Laval's secretary wondered; had Tardieu not fallen ill, how Tardieu would have exerted his sway on Laval during the occupation. Mallet, Pierre Laval des années obscures, 33-34. For more on Tardieu read: Michel Junot, André Tardieu, le mirobolant (Paris: Denoël, 1996).
Tardieu and Laval knew each other from the days of Clemenceau, which developed into mutual appreciation. Tardieu needed men he could trust: his previous government collapsed a little over a week earlier because of the defection of the minister of Labor, Louis Loucheur. But, when the Radical Socialist Camille Chautemps failed to form a viable government, Tardieu was called back.
At this time, the social climate was tense. More than 150,000 textile workers were on strike, and violence was feared. As Minister of Public Works in 1925, Laval had ended the strike of the mine workers. Tardieu hoped he could do the same as Minister of Labor. Tardieu's faith was justified: the conflict was settled without bloodshed. Even Socialist politician Léon Blum, never one of Laval's allies, conceded that Laval's "intervention was skillful, opportune and decisive."[7]
Laval's greatest achievement in the Tardieu government was yet to come. Social insurance (Assurances Sociales) had been on the agenda of the legislative assembly for over ten years. It had even passed the Chamber of Deputies, but not the Senate, in 1928. Tardieu gave Laval the deadline of May 1 to get the project through. The date was chosen to stifle the usual agitation of Labor Day (it is only in the United States that Labor Day does not fall on May 1). Laval's first effort went into clarifying the muddled collection of texts. He then consulted the employer and labor organizations. The bill was one of immense complexity and Laval had to reconcile the frequently divergent views of Chamber and Senate. "Had it not been for Laval's unwearying patience," Laval's associate Tissier wrote, "an agreement would never have been achieved," [8] In two months Laval was able to present to the assembly a text which overcame the difficulties which had caused its original failure. It met the financial constraints, reduced the control of the government, and preserved the free choice of doctors and their billing freedom. The chamber and the senate passed the new law with an overwhelming majority.
When the bill had passed its final stages, Tardieu paid a glowing tribute to his minister of labour, whom he described as "displaying at every moment of the discussion as much tenacity as restraint and ingenuity."[9]
Another Tardieu achievement was the establishment of free high school education. The successes of the Tardieu government, however, did not resist the ramifications of the Oustric Affair. After the failure of the Oustric Bank, it appeared that members of the Tardieu government had improper ties to the financial institution. The scandal involved Minister of Justice Raoul Péret, and Under-Secretaries Henri Falcoz and Eugène Lautier. Though Tardieu was not involved in the wrongdoing of his ministers, on 4 December 1930, Tardieu lost his majority in the Senate. President of the Republic Gaston Doumergue called upon Louis Barthou to form a government, but Barthou failed. Doumergue turned to Laval, who fared no better. The disappointment was short-lived, however, as the following month the government formed by Théodore Steeg floundered. Doumergue renewed his offer to Laval. On 27 January 1931 he successfully formed his first government.
In the words of Léon Blum, the Socialist opposition was amazed and disappointed that the ghost of Tardieu's government reappeared within a few weeks of being defeated with Laval, "like a night bird surprised by the light" at its head. Laval's nomination as premier led to the speculation that Tardieu, the new Agriculture minister, held the real power in the Laval Government. Indisputably Laval thought highly of Tardieu, as well as of Briand, and applied policies in line with theirs. Laval, however, had his own style and certainly had not made it that far to become Tardieu's mouthpiece. While it was true that the ministers who formed the Laval government were in great part the same who had formed Tardieu governments in the past, it was, however, more a function of the composite majority Laval could find at the National Assembly than anything else. Laval—like Raymond Poincaré, Aristide Briand and Tardieu before him—had offered ministerial posts to Herriot's Radicals, but to no avail.
Although it had chosen not to be represented in the government, the support of the inescapable party of Herriot was still necessary. Laval's ace-in-the-hole was his network of friends and supporters in the chamber, the "Lavalists." Laval like Tardieu did not always see eye to eye with the deputy of Lyon. While the sometimes abrasive Tardieu was often in conflict with Herriot, Laval would attempt the delicate task of conciliating the two.
Besides the so called unmovables (inamovibles) -- Briand, André Maginot, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Paul Reynaud -- Laval brought in his own team of advisors, such old friends as Maurice Foulon, the collaborator from Aubervilliers, and Pierre Cathala, whom he knew from his days in Bayonne and who had worked in Laval's Labor ministry. Cathala began as under-secretary of the interior and would become minister of the interior in January 1932. Blaise Diagne of Senegal, the first African deputy, had joined the National Assembly at the same time as Laval in 1914. Diagne achieved another first when Laval invited him to join his cabinet as under-secretary to the colonies, making him the first Black African in a French government. Laval also called on financial experts such as Jacques Rueff, Charles Rist and Adéodat Boissard to tackle the arduous financial puzzles of the time. Germanist, André François-Poncet, was brought to the forefront first as under-secretary to the premier and then as ambassador to Germany. Laval's government even included an economist, Claude-Joseph Gignoux, at a time when economists in government services were rare. The presence of economists could be taken as an indication that Laval was concerned about the condition of France's economy.
Indeed France, in 1931, could still pretend to be unaffected by the crisis that had brought the world to its knees. Premier Laval declared upon embarking for America on 16 October 1931, "France remained healthy thanks to work and savings." Agriculture, small industry, and protectionism were the bases of France's economy. The conservative policy, some would say the "archaic" system of contained wages and limited social services, had allowed France to accumulate the largest gold reserves in the world after the United States. France still reaped the benefits of the devaluation of the franc orchestrated by Poincaré, which made French products such as automobiles very competitive on the world market. Unemployment was at least officially virtually nonexistent with only 12,000 jobless for the whole of France. Official low unemployment numbers meant no benefits for the unemployed were necessary which translated into substantial budgetary savings, further perpetuating the image of a healthy economy. While France=s good fortune was perhaps exaggerated, its economic situation was far better than that of other nations. Laval and his cabinet considered the good economy and the substantial gold reserves, as means to diplomatic ends. In this rich nation=s game it was essential that assistance should be received with gratitude and not scorn. With this master card in hand Laval left France for the first time to visit London, Berlin and Washington. He attended various conferences and focussed on several of the interlinked problems of the world economic crisis, war reparations and debts, disarmament, and the gold standard.
The Hoover Moratorium of 1931, the proposal of the American president to freeze all intergovernmental debt for a one-year period, according to author and political advisor McGeorge Bundy, was "the most significant action taken by an American president for Europe since Woodrow Wilson's administration." The reality was that the United States had enormous stakes in Germany: long-term German borrowers owed the United States private sector more than $1.25 billion; the short-term debt neared $1 billion. By comparison, the entire United States national income in 1931 was just $54 billion. To put it into perspective, authors Walter Lippmann and William O. Scroggs stated in The United States in World Affairs, An Account of American Foreign Relations, that "the American stake in Germany's government and private obligations was equal to half that of all the rest of the world combined.
The proposed moratorium would also benefit Great Britain's investment in Germany's private sector making more likely the repayment of those loans while the public indebtedness was frozen. It certainly was in Hoover's interest to offer aid to an ailing British economy in light of Great Britain's indebtedness to the United States. France, on the other hand, had a relatively small stake in Germany's private debt but a huge interest in German reparations; and payment to France would be compromised under Hoover's moratorium.
Already difficult to accept on the face of it it was further complicated by ill timing, perceived collusion between the US, Great Britain and Germany and a breach of the Young Plan. Such breach could only be approved by the National assembly and thus the survival of the Laval Government rested on the legislative body's approval of the Moratorium. Seventeen days elapsed between the proposal and the vote of confidence of the French legislators. That delay was blamed for the lack of success of the Hoover moratorium, US congress only approved it in December of that year.
The Hoover Moratorium was the opening shot to a year of personal and direct diplomacy which took Laval to London, Berlin and the United States. His optimism and can do spirit was such a contrast to his grim sounding international contemporaries that Time made him their 1931 Man of the Year.[10] While internally he was able to accomplish quite a bit is international efforts were short in results, British Premier Ramsay McDonald and Foreign Secretary Arthur Anderson preoccupied by internal political divisions and the collapse of the Pound Sterling were unable to help, Chancellor Dr. Heinrich Brüning and Foreign Minister Julius Curtius both eager for Franco-German reconciliation were under siege on all quarters, notwithstanding the horrible economy which made meeting government pay-roll a weekly miracle, the private bankruptcies and constant lay-offs had the communists on a short fuse. On the other end of the political spectrum the army was actively spying on the Brüning cabinet and feeding information to the Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten and the National Socialists, effectively freezing any overtures towards France. In the United States the conference between President Herbert Hoover and Laval was an exercise in mutual frustration. . Poor Hoover, his plan for a reduced military had been rebuffed—albeit gently. A solution to the Danzig corridor had been retracted. The concept of introducing silver as a standard for the countries that went off the gold standard was disregarded as a frivolous proposal by Laval and Albert-Buisson. Hoover thought it might have helped "Mexico, India, China and South America," but Laval dismissed the silver solution as an inflationary proposition adding that "it was cheaper to inflate paper."
"Memorandum of Conference with Laval" Stimson, Diary, 23 October 1931.
Laval did not get a security pact without which the French would never consider disarmament, nor did he obtain an endorsement for the political moratorium. The promise to match any reduction of German reparations with a decrease of the French debt was not put in the communiqué. What was stated in the joint statement was the attachment of France and the United States to the gold standard. The two governments also agreed that the Banque de France and the Federal Reserve would consult each other before the transfer of gold.464 This was welcome news after the run on American gold in the preceding weeks. In light of the financial crisis, they further agreed to review the economic situation of Germany before the Hoover moratorium ran its course.
These were no doubt meager political results. Yet what could be expected from the American president a year away from the election, contending with an overall isolationist public opinion and Congress on the one hand and a French premier reined in by the very members of his cabinet on the other? The Hoover-Laval encounter, however, had an impact. The American and French press was positively smitten with Laval. Time made Laval man of the year, an honor never bestowed on a Frenchman before, following no less than Mahatma Gandhi and preceding Franklin D. Roosevelt. A conquering Laval riding down Broadway made the cover of L'Illustration. So there it was: a diplomatic draw could also be a personal triumph.
The second Cartel des gauches (Left-Wing Cartel) was driven from power by the riots of 6 February 1934, staged by fascist, monarchist, and other far-right groups. (These groups had contacts with some conservative politicians, among whom were Laval and Philippe Pétain.) Laval became Minister of Colonies in the new right-wing Doumergue government. In October, Foreign Minister Barthou was assassinated; Laval succeeded him, holding that office until 1936.
At this time, Laval was opposed to Germany, the "hereditary enemy" of France. He pursued anti-German alliances with Benito Mussolini's Italy and Joseph Stalin's USSR. He met with Mussolini in Rome, and they signed the
In June 1935, he became Prime Minister as well.
Also in 1935, Laval's daughter Josée Marie married René de Chambrun, son of Count Aldebert de Chambrun. (De Chambrun was a descendant of the Marquis de Lafayette. René's mother, Clara Longworth de Chambrun, was the sister of Theodore Roosevelt's son-in-law.)
In October 1935, Laval and British foreign minister Samuel Hoare proposed a "realpolitik" solution to the Abyssinia crisis. When leaked to the media in December, the Hoare-Laval Pact was widely denounced as appeasement to Mussolini. Laval was forced to resign on 22 January 1936, and was driven completely out of ministerial politics.
During the years 1927–30 Laval began to accumulate the sizable personal fortune which later gave rise to charges that he had used his political position to line his own pockets. “I have always thought,” he wrote to the examining magistrate on 11 September 1945, “that a soundly-based material independence, if not indispensable, gives those statesmen who possess it a much greater political independence.” Until 1927 his principal source of income had been his fees as a lawyer and in that year they totaled 113,350 francs, according to his income tax returns. Between August 1927 and June 1930, however, he undertook large-scale investments in various enterprises, totaling 51 million francs. Not all this money was his own, it came from a group of financiers who had the backing of an investment trust, the Union Syndicale et Financière and two banks, the Comptoir Lyon Allemand and the Banque Nationale de Crédit.[12]
Two of the investments which Laval and his backers acquired were provincial newspapers, Le Moniteur de Puy-de-Dome and its associated printing works at Clermont-Ferrand, and the Lyon Républicain. The circulation of the Moniteur stood at 27,000 in 1926 before Laval took it over. By 1933, it had more than doubled to 58,250. Thereafter it fell away again and never surpassed its earlier peak. Profits varied, but over the seventeen years of his control, Laval obtained some 39 million francs in income from the paper and the printing works combined, and the renewed plant was valued at 50 million francs, which led the high court expert to say with some justification that it had been “an excellent affair for him."[13]
The victory of the Popular Front in 1936 meant that Laval had a left-wing government as a target for his media.
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During the phoney war, Laval's attitude towards the conflict reflected a cautious ambivalence. He was on record as saying although the war could have been avoided by diplomatic means; it was now up to the government to prosecute it with the utmost vigor.[14]
On 9 June 1940, the Germans were advancing on a front of more than 250 km in length across the entire width of France. As far as General Maxime Weygand was concerned, "if the Germans crossed the Seine and the Marne, it was the end."[15]
Simultaneously, Pétain was increasing the pressure upon Prime Minister Paul Reynaud to call for an armistice. During this time Laval was in Châteldon. On 10 June, in view of the German advance, the government left Paris for Tours. Weygand had informed Reynaud: "the final rupture of our lines may take place at any time." If that happened "our forces would continue to fight until their strength and resources were extinguished. But their disintegration would be no more than a matter of time."[16]
Weygand had avoided using the word armistice, but it was on the minds of all those involved. Only Reynaud was in opposition. During this time Laval had left Chåteldon for Bordeaux, where his daughter nearly convinced him of the necessity of going to the United States. Instead, it was reported that he was sending "messengers and messengers" to Pétain.[17]
As the Germans occupied Paris, Marshal Philippe Pétain was asked to form a new government. To everyone's surprise, he produced a list of his ministers, convincing proof that he had been expecting the president's summons and he had prepared for it.[18] Laval's name was on the list as Minister of Justice. When informed of his proposed appointment, Laval's temper and ambitions became apparent as he ferociously demanded of Pétain, despite the objections of more experienced men of government, that he be made Minister of Foreign Affairs. Laval realized that only through this position could he affect a reversal of alliances and bring himself to favor with the military power he at that time viewed as the inevitable victor, i.e. Nazi Germany. In opposition to Laval's wrath, dissenting voices acquiesced and Laval became Minister of Foreign Affairs. [19]
One result of these events was that Laval was later able to claim that he was not part of the government that requested the armistice. His name did not appear in the chronicles of events until June when he began to assume a more active role in criticizing the government's decision to leave France for North Africa.
Although the final terms of the armistice were harsh, the French empire was left untouched and the French government was allowed to administer the occupied as well as the unoccupied zone. The concept of “collaboration” was written into the Armistice Convention, before Laval joined the government. The French representatives who affixed their signatures to the text accepted the term.
| “ | Article III. In the occupied areas of France, the German Reich is to exercise all the rights of an occupying power. The French government promises to facilitate by all possible means the regulations relative to the exercise of this right, and to carry out these regulations with the participation of the French administration. The French government will immediately order all the French authorities and administrative services in the occupied zone to follow the regulations of the German military authorities and to collaborate with the latter in a correct manner. | ” |
When Laval was included in Petain's cabinet as minister of state, he began the work for which he would be remembered: the emulation of the totalitarian regime of Germany, the taking up of the cause of fascism, the destruction of democracy, and the dismantling of the Third Republic. [20]
In October 1940, Laval understood collaboration more or less in the same sense as Pétain. For both, to collaborate meant to give up the least possible in order to get the most.[21] Laval, in his role of go-between, was forced to be in constant touch with the German authorities, to shift ground, to be wily, to plan ahead. All this, under the circumstances, drew more attention to him than to the Marshal and made him appear to many Frenchmen as "the agent of collaboration;" to others, he was "the Germans' man."[22]
The meetings between Pétain and Hitler, and between Laval and Hitler, are often used as showing the collaboration of the French leaders and the Nazis. In fact the results of Montoire (24–26 October) were a disappointment for both sides. Hitler wanted France to declare war on the British, and the French wanted improved relations with her conqueror. Neither happened. Virtually the only concession the French obtained was the so-called 'Berlin protocol' of 16 November, which provided release of certain categories of French prisoners of war.
In November, Laval made a number of pro-German actions on his own, without consulting with his colleagues. The most notorious examples concerned turning over to the Germans the Bor copper mines and the Belgian Gold reserves. His post-war justification, apart from a denial that he acted unilaterally, was that the French were powerless to prevent the Germans from gaining something they were clearly so eager to obtain.[23]
These actions by Laval were a factor in his dismissal on 13 December, when Pétain asked all the ministers to sign a collective letter of resignation during a full cabinet meeting. Laval did so thinking it was a device to get rid of M. Belin, the Minister of Labor. He was therefore stunned when, the Marshal announced, "the resignations of MM. Laval and Ripert are accepted."[24]
That evening, Laval was arrested and driven by the police to his home in Châteldon. The following day, Pétain announced his decision to remove Laval from the government. The reason for Laval's dismissal lies in the fundamental incompatibility between him and Pétain. Laval's methods of working appeared slovenly to the Marshal's precise military mind, and he showed a marked lack of deference, instanced by his habit of blowing cigarette smoke in Pétain's face, and in doing so he aroused not only Pétain's anger, but that of his cabinet colleagues as well.[25]
If Laval had been able to obtain concessions from the Germans, even with his rude behavior, he would not have been dismissed. Since concessions were not to be given, Friday the 13th ended Laval's attempt to establish a Franco-German partnership in the new Europe.
Laval returned to Power in April 1942, as he was also to return to the cover of Time magazine (issue of 27 April). The article's introductory paragraph:
| “ | When Pierre Laval came back to power in Vichy France last week, the world felt in its bones that the war had taken some great new malevolent turn. Said Pundit Walter Lippmann: 'Hitler has brought France back into the war.' Cried a de Gaulist [sic] that sneer of the executioner—and tell yourself that for 30 years France has not shed a tear without Laval gaining by it. | ” |
The author of the article was not listed; however no doubt the material was obtained from prior associates of Laval, then living in New York and London. Their books about Laval were published in 1941 and 1942:
All three had been close associates of Laval and in their books they displayed outright contempt for Laval. The Time magazine article also quoted Pertnax, another former associate of Laval, who in 1944, wrote: The Gravediggers of France, New York: Doubleday: "In a letter Laval has said, 'I fully realize that the hangman will quickly take care of me on the day British arms triumph....' " Notwithstanding their feelings expressed in 1941 and 1942, the books written by Laval's former associates provide quality insights to Laval's life prior to 1940.
Laval had been in power for a mere two months when he was faced with the decision of providing forced workers to Germany. Germany was short of skilled labor due to its need for troop replacements on the Russian front. Unlike the other occupied countries, France was technically protected by the armistice, and her workers could not be simply rounded up and transported to Germany. However, in the occupied zone, the Germans used intimidation and control of raw materials to create unemployment and thus reasons for French laborers to volunteer to work in Germany. German officials demanded from Laval that more than 300,000 skilled workers should be immediately sent to factories in Germany. Laval stalled and then countered by offering to send one worker for the return of one French soldier being held captive in Germany. The proposal was sent to Hitler, with a compromise being reached; one prisoner of war to be repatriated for every three workers arriving in Germany.[26]
Later, when ordered to have all Jews in France be rounded up and loaded on railroad cars to be transported to Poland, Laval at first refused, then negotiated a compromise, allowing only those Jews who were not French citizens to be forfeited to the control of Germany. It has been estimated that by the end of the war the Germans had wiped out ninety per cent of the Jewish population of the other occupied countries but in France fifty per cent of the pre-war French and foreign Jewish population, with perhaps ninety per cent of the purely French Jewish population still remaining alive.[27]
More and more the insoluble dilemma of collaboration faced Laval. He had to maintain Vichy's authority to prevent Germany from installing a Quisling Government made up of French Nazis. Compromise after compromise loaded Laval with the accusation he was nothing more than an agent of Germany.
In 1943, Laval became the nominal leader of the newly-created Milice, though its actual leader was Secretary General Joseph Darnand. [28]
With the landings of Allied forces in North Africa, Germany occupied all of France. Hitler continued to ask whether the French government was prepared to fight at his side against the Anglo-Saxons, wanting Vichy to declare war against Britain. Laval and Pétain agreed to maintain a firm refusal. During this time and the D-Day landings, Laval was in a struggle between his ministers and the ultra-collaborationist ministers.
In a broadcast speech on D-Day he appealed to the nation:
| “ | You are not in the war. You must not take part in the fighting. If you do not observe this rule, if you show proof of indiscipline, you will provoke reprisals the harshness of which the government would be powerless to moderate. You would suffer, both physically and materially, and you would add to your country's misfortunes. You will refuse to heed the insidious appeals, which will be addressed to you. Those who ask you to stop work or invite you to revolt are the enemies of our country. You will refuse to aggravate the foreign war on our soil with the horror of civil war.... At this moment fraught with drama, when the war has been carried on to our territory, show by your worthy and disciplined attitude that you are thinking of France and only of her."[29] | ” |
This speech, with its theme of neutralism, was as much a criticism of the ultra-collaborationists as of the Resistance[30]
A few months later, he was arrested by the Germans and transported to Belfort. In view of the speed of the Allied advance, on 7 September, what was left of the Vichy government was moved from Belfort to the castle of Sigmaringen in Germany. By April 1945 General Patton's army was near Sigmaringen so the Vichy ministers were forced to seek their own salvation. Laval received authority to enter Spain, only to be resent to Germany after a few months. The United States authorities immediately took him and his wife into custody, and turned them over to the Free French. They were flown to Paris to be imprisoned at Fresnes, Val-de-Marne. Madam Laval was later released; Pierre Laval remained in prison to be tried as a traitor. [31]
Two trials were to be held. Although it had its faults, the Pétain trial permitted the presentation and examination of a vast amount of pertinent material. As to the second trial, a number of scholars including Robert Paxton and Geoffry Warner are of the opinion that Laval's own trial illustrated nothing but the inadequacies of the judicial system and the poisonous political atmosphere of that purge-trial era.[32][33]
Laval firmly believed that, if he could only secure a fair hearing, he would be able to convince his fellow-countrymen that he had been acting in their best interests all along. “Father-in-law wants a big trial which will illuminate everything,” René de Chambrun told Laval's lawyers: “If he is given time to prepare his defence, if he is allowed to speak, to call witnesses and to obtain from abroad the information and documents which he needs, he will confound his accusers."[34]
Laval more than suspected what would really happen. “Do you want me to tell you the set-up?” he asked one of his lawyers on 4 August. “There will be no pre-trial hearings and no trial. I will be condemned – and got rid of – before the elections.”[35]
Laval’s trial began at 1:30 p.m. on Thursday, 4 October 1945. He was charged with plotting against the security of the State and intelligence (collaboration) with the enemy. He had three defence lawyers (Jaques Baraduc, Albert Naud, and Yves-Frédéric Jaffré). None of his lawyers had ever met him before. He saw most of Jaffré, who sat with him, talked, listened and took down notes that he wanted to dictate. Baraduc, who quickly became convinced of Laval's innocence, kept contact with the Chambruns and at first shared their conviction that Laval would be acquitted or at most receive a sentence of temporary exile. Naud, who had been a member of the Resistance, believed Laval to be guilty and urged him to plead that he had made grave errors but had acted under constraint. Laval would not listen to him; he was convinced that he was innocent and could prove it. “He acted,” said Naud, “as if his career, not his life, was at stake.”[36]
All three of his lawyers declined to be in court to hear the reading of the formal charges because “We fear that the haste which has been employed to open the hearings is inspired, not by judicial preoccupations, but motivated by political considerations.” In lieu of attending the hearing they sent letters stating the shortcomings and asked to be discharged from the task of defending Laval.[37]
Their letters had no effect, and the court carried on without them.
The president of the court, Pierre Mongibeaux announced that the trial must be completed before the general election --- scheduled for 21 October.[38]
The trial proceeded with the tone being set with Mongibeaux and Mornet, the public prosecutor, unable to control constant outbursts from the jury. These occurred as increasingly heated exchanges between Mongibeaux and Laval became louder and louder.
On the third day, Laval’s three lawyers were with him as the President of the Bar Association had advised them to resume their duties.[39]
The following is from the published stenographic report of the trial.
| “ | October 6th......
Mongibeaux drew laughter from the audience when, during the course of one of his interrogations, he remarked that he did not want to assume the air of a prosecutor. LAVAL.... Monsieur le Président, you supply the questions and the answers at one and the same time. Very well, I think it would be better if we left it at that as far as the serenity and majesty of your justice are concerned. MONGIBEAUX: In your position, do you think you are assured of impunity? LAVAL: I do not think I am assured of impunity, but there is one thing which is above us all, above you and above me, and that is truth and the justice of which you ought to be the embodiment. BEDIN (a member of the jury): Justice will be done! Another member of the jury: Yes, justice will be done! MONGIBEAUX: Someone will have the last word: the high court. LAVAL: You keep it! MONGIBEAUX: You do not wish to answer any more of my questions? LAVAL: No. MONGIBEAUX: Consider carefully the attitude you are adopting. You do not wish to answer any more of my questions? LAVAL: No, Monsieur le President, not in view of your aggressive attitude and the way in which you question me. You supply the questions and the answers. MONGIBEAUX: The hearing is adjourned. Remove the accused! Members of the jury (to Laval): You're the trouble-maker! Swine! Twelve bullets! He hasn't changed! LAVAL: No, and I shan't change now. MONGIBEAUX: (standing by his chair): Please! We are not at a public meeting! LAVAL: The jury - before judging me - it's fantastic! A member of the jury: You've already been judged, and France has judged you too![40] |
” |
After the adjournment, Mongibeaux announced that the part of the interrogation dealing with the charge of plotting against the security of the state was concluded and that he now proposed to deal with the charge of intelligence (collaboration) with the enemy. “Monsieur le Président," Laval replied, "the insulting way in which you questioned me earlier and the demonstrations in which some members of the jury indulged show me that I may be the victim of a judicial crime. I do not want to be an accomplice; I prefer to remain silent." Mongibeaux thereupon called the first of the prosecution witnesses, but they had not expected to give evidence so soon and none were present. Mongibeaux therefore adjourned the hearing for the second time so that they could be located. When the court reassembled half an hour later, Laval was no longer in his place.[41]
Although Pierre-Henri Teitgen, the minister of justice in de Gaulle’s cabinet, personally appealed to Laval’s lawyers to have him attend the hearings, he declined to do so. Teitgen freely confirmed the scandalous conduct of Mongibeaux and Mornet, professing he was unable to do anything to curb them. The trial continued without the accused, ending with Laval being sentenced to death. His lawyers were turned down when they requested a re-trial.[42]
The execution was fixed for the morning of 15 October. Laval attempted to cheat the firing squad by taking poison from a phial which had been stitched inside the lining of his jacket since the war years. He did not intend, he explained in a suicide note, that French soldiers should become accomplices in a "judicial crime". The poison, however, was so old that it was ineffective, and repeated stomach-pumpings revived Laval.[43]
Laval requested his lawyers to witness his execution. He was shot shouting "Vive la France!". The whole prison shouted, "Murderers!" and "Long live Laval!"[44] He “died bravely,” de Gaulle remarked in his memoirs.[45] Laval's widow declared: “It is not the French way to try a man without letting him speak,” she told an English newspaper, “That's the way he always fought against - the German way.”[46]
The High Court, which functioned until 1949, judged 108 cases, pronouncing eight death penalties, including one on Pétain but asking that it not be carried out because of his age. Only three of the death penalties were executed: Pierre Laval, Fernand de Brinon, Vichy's Ambassador in Paris to the German authorities, and Joseph Darnand, head of the Milice. [47]
In 1951, François Martin wrote: “Six years have passed. The two principal actors of this tragedy have disappeared, one [Pétain] in the night of a captivity in which his old age reaches its end at the same time that his enemies prepare a death that will add the aureole of a legend to a career whose glory has not died. The other [Laval] fell under the bullets of a firing squad set in motion by a Court which in a flood of hate lost the power to obtain the execution of its sentence except through assassination.” [48]
A retrospective assessment of Laval is in Paul Farmer's 1955 book: Vichy - Political Delemma.
| “ | In a land like France, where public opinion is never unanimous, seldom has a man incurred such universal and unmeasured opprobrium as Laval. An outside observer would have ample warrant to presume that, since nearly forty million Frenchmen believe Laval simply sold his soul to the Germans for the sake of gaining personal political power, there is no need to bring this verdict into question.
Yet we cannot be sure this consensus proves that Laval's guilt was more obvious, or more reprehensible, than that of his accomplices. It may only mean that Laval was not a member of any faction and therefore became the foe of all. Manifestly, he earned the unremitting hatred of all those who remained loyal to the Third Republic as well as those who opposed "collaboration," whether in 1940 or not until 1944. But the fascists never regarded him as one of their own number. Though he made an alliance of sorts with Deat, he did not share Deat's convictions. He simply sought to make use of him to gain the better graces of the Nazis and to offset the antagonism of Doriot toward him. For their part, the "conservatives" detested Laval no less because he was an advocate of "broad" collaboration than because he scorned their schemes for domestic reform, which he dismissed as the mere vaporings of mossgrown reactionaries. Laval seemed, indeed, a man quite devoid of principles. He appeared to have no ambition but to hold office. Believing German hegemony to be definitive, he was willing to stoop to any indignity, provided only that the Nazis would keep him in power as their agent. Innumerable persons who knew him well have vouched that his previous record was such as to make this a plausible interpretation of his behavior after 1940. In the politics of the Third Republic, where personal opportunism was not a rare phenomenon, Laval had earned an unenviable reputation as a man as much at home in a pool of corruption and intrigue as a fish in the sea. His own defense, when the "purge" at last caught up with him, was that he had never had a thought but to cheat the Germans. He would give them unstinted verbal assurances of his good will, while conceding nothing of more practical importance than he could avoid. Considering how little he had to bargain with, he had accomplished a miracle, for which France owed him a debt of gratitude, in shielding her from the horrors that otherwise might have been her lot. He had had no more preference for Hitler, when he dealt with him, than earlier he had had for Stalin, when he negotiated the Franco-Soviet alliance of 1935. He would as soon have bargained with the Devil, he declared, if he had known how to reach him. At the time, there were not many who gave credence to this plea. Everyone remembered the speech in which he had declared, "I wish to see the victory of the Axis"; the conscription and deportation of workers; the surrender of hostages; and the ruthless measures against the Resistance. However, it is not impossible to reconcile Laval's own professions with the charges made against him. For, if he was the kind of man his enemies depict, he would have seen no harm in telling the Nazis whatever they wished to hear in order to put them in an amiable mood. What did it matter if he spat upon the Third Republic, declared his allegiance to the Fuehrer, asked French lads to work for the Germans at good wages, or even sacrificed some thousands of Communists and other troublemakers-provided France escaped the fate of Poland? After all, a woman of the town who passed a night with a German officer did not believe the flattering words she told him, nor count her fleeting favor worth the price she received. Perhaps we should think of Laval in some such terms. To give the Devil his due, we should perhaps concede that Laval made his fatal mistake when, for the first time in his life, he tried to put his talent for chicane and corruption to what he thought was the service of his fellow Frenchmen. [49] |
” |
27 January 1931 - 16 February 1932
Sous-secrétaires d'Etat. (Under-Secretaries)
A Few changes after Aristide Briand's retirement and the death of André Maginot on 7 January 1932:
(S) Sénator (D) Deputy
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