Dictionary:

pluralism

  (plʊr'ə-lĭz'əm)

1. The condition of being multiple or plural.
2. 1. A condition in which numerous distinct ethnic, religious, or cultural groups are present and tolerated within a society.
   2. The belief that such a condition is desirable or socially beneficial.
3. Ecclesiastical. The holding by one person of two or more positions or offices, especially two or more ecclesiastical benefices, at the same time.
4. Philosophy.
   1. The doctrine that reality is composed of many ultimate substances.
   2. The belief that no single explanatory system or view of reality can account for all the phenomena of life.

1. R. Dahl (1961) used this term to denote any situation in which no particular political, cultural, ethnic, or ideological group is dominant. There is often competition between rival groups, and the state or local authority may be seen as the arbitrator. It has been asserted that this is the way that cities are run, rather than by an elite; the theory thus relates to the nature of power.

2. The term may also be used to signify the cultural diversity of a plural society.

Literally, a belief in more than one entity or a tendency to be, hold, or do more than one thing. This literal meaning is common to all the political and social applications of the word, but it has applied in contexts so varied that the uses seem like separate meanings. The most established of these is pluralism as the tendency of people to hold more than one job or benefice, most specifically in the context of the pre-Reformation Catholic Church. In the late nineteenth century, pluralism was applied to philosophical theories or systems of thought which recognized more than one ultimate principle, as opposed to those which were ‘monist’. At the same time, the word came to be applied in the United States to the view that the country could legitimately continue to be formed of distinct ethnic groups, the Jewish-Americans, Irish-Americans, and so on, rather than that all differences should dissolve into a ‘melting-pot’ (see also multiculturalism).

All of these uses have had at least a slight influence on the primary contemporary meaning in which the pluralist model of society is one in which the existence of groups is the political essence of society. Pluralists in this sense contrast with elitists because they see the membership of village and neighbourhood communities, trade unions, voluntary societies, churches, and similar organizations as being more important than distinctions between a ruling class and a class that is ruled: vertical distinctions in society are less important than horizontal.

The forerunner of this kind of pluralism was F. R. de Lammenais who edited the journal L'Avenir in France in the early nineteenth century. Lammenais attacked both the individualism and the universalism of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. The individual, he said, was ‘a mere shadow’, who could not be said to exist at all socially except in so far as he was part of one or more groups. Both Lammenais and modern pluralists, including such notable American writers as Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby, tend to believe both that society consists essentially of groups, with its political life a competition for group influence, and that this state of affairs is a good thing. Thus pluralism is often a relatively conservative doctrine, at least in relation to Marxism or radical democratic theory, which both tend to portray society as a predominance of an elite over a non-elite rather than a competition between groups.

— Lincoln Allison

For more information on pluralism, visit Britannica.com.

1970s' term defining aspects of Post-Modernism, and suggesting the drawing on various styles and motifs in eclectic compositions.

Bibliography

• Jencks (1973a)
• Papadakis (1989)
• Robins (1985)

The full bibliography for this book is available to download as a pdf file.
Download the bibliography for A Dictionary of Architecture and Landscape Architecture (PDF: 1.2MB)

The general tolerance of different kinds of thing, or more particularly of different and perhaps incommensurable descriptions of the world, none of which is deemed to be more fundamental than any of the others. Pluralism is often attributed to the later Wittgenstein, with his emphasis on different language games and forms of life. It is also a cardinal doctrine of post-structuralist literary theory, where it frequently consorts with relativism and general suspicion of a notion of ‘the truth’. Sometimes this is the relatively innocuous doctrine that there is no way of stating the unique truth or the only truth about some subject-matter; at other times it may be the more sinister doctrine that no view is true, or that all views are equally true.

Pluralism is both a doctrine and the label for a commonsense perception. As a doctrine, pluralism holds that multiplicity is a virtue in ideas and institutions; hence pluralism rejects unity as the measure of intellectual and institutional development. As a label, pluralism describes the cultural diversity and interest-group politics that characterize American life. Pluralist doctrine implies a commitment to difference often unacknowledged in uses of the label. In early-twentieth-century debates about immigration and national identity, doctrine and label converged. Their union was short-lived, however, as the cultural pluralism that emerged from these debates upheld a collectivist vision of American life anathema to liberal individuality. Over the course of the twentieth century, social scientists enlisted the term to describe a range of social and political developments. The triumph of multiculturalism at the century's end revived pluralism's association with ethnicity and culture, though few contemporary multiculturalists endorse the racial essentialism and ethnic separatism that distinguished cultural pluralism.

Early Commonsense Perceptions of Pluralism

Americans perceived the fact of pluralism long before they delineated pluralist doctrine. From colonial times, but especially after the Revolutionary War (1775–1783), American writers trumpeted the egalitarianism and religious and ethnic diversity of the New World to bemused European audiences. None exceeded in enthusiasm French immigrant farmer J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur. "What, then, is the American, this new man," Crèvecoeur demanded in Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America (1782):

"He is either an European or the descendant of an European; hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country. I could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four sons have now four wives of different nations. He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds." (pp. 69–70)

Two generations later, Herman Melville boasted in Redburn (1849) that one could not "spill a drop of American blood without spilling the blood of the whole world." (p. 238) In a similar vein, Ralph Waldo Emerson proclaimed America an "asylum of all nations" and predicted that "the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles & Cossacks, & all the European tribes,—of the Africans, & of the Polynesians" would combine on American soil to forge "a new race, a new religion, a new State, a new literature" to rival modern Europe's. (Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks, pp. 299–300) Emerson's paean to American exceptionalism was unusual in including non-Westerners in the mix; most denied the presence in the New World of slaves, Indians, and other "undesirables," elisions that suggest an enduring characteristic of pluralist discourse, namely its tendency to fix and maintain intellectual and social boundaries. But Emerson followed convention in regarding national homogeneity as a requisite of politics and culture. Neither he, Melville, nor Crèvecoeur was pluralist in the sense of wanting to preserve diversity for diversity's sake. All three regarded ethnic diversity as a defining but not enduring quality of American life. All expected pluribus to yield ineluctably to unum.

Indeed, unity was America's burden in its first century of national life. Only after the Civil War (1861–1865) did Americans possess sufficient national consciousness to abide a flirtation with genuine difference. Which is not to say that most, let alone many, Americans embraced pluralism either before or after the Civil War. The majority probably concurred with John Jay, who, in Federalist 2, counted ethnic and cultural homogeneity among the blessings Providence bestowed on the thirteen states. No asylum for European refugees, Jay's America was home to a vigorous "people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, [and] very similar in manners and customs…"(p. 38). This America seems to have little in common with that of the literary bards. But from a pluralist perspective, the product of all these visions is more or less the same: cultural homogeneity in the service of national unity; unum, though with a different face.

Two other frequently cited pluralist texts from the late eighteenth century, James Madison's Federalist 10 and Thomas Jefferson's commentary on religious toleration, similarly aimed not to promote diversity for its own sake, but to neutralize political and social divisions in the name of civic order. Witness Madison, whose reputation as a pluralist stems from his conception of republican politics as an arena of competing factions. Madison cannot be said to have valued faction in its own right. He regarded factionalism as a mortal disease conducive to overbearing majorities and corrosive of the public good. Had it been possible, Madison would have expunged faction from politics. But "the latent causes of faction" were "sown in the nature of man," he recognized, hence there could be no eradicating faction without extinguishing liberty—a remedy "worse than the disease." Rather, he would mitigate faction's toxin by delineating a model of federal republicanism designed to propel individuals out of the ruts of local self-interest and into more amplitudinous state and national coalitions. "Extend the sphere" of government, he maintained, "and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens …" (pp. 77, 84). Concern for individual and minority rights likewise motivated Jefferson's defense of religious toleration in Notes on the State of Virginia. Jefferson viewed faith as a matter of private conscience and therefore beyond government jurisdiction. States that insisted on imposing an official religion invited social discord; by contrast, states that exercised religious tolerance enjoyed unrivaled prosperity. A self-described Christian who eschewed institutional religion, Jefferson appears to have been indifferent about the long-term fate of the world's faiths. He even suggests that given peace, prosperity, and the free play of reason, belief will converge on "the true religion," a proposition anathema to pluralist doctrine (p. 256).

Toward a Doctrine of Pluralism in the Late Nineteenth Century

Arguments on behalf of pluralism drew sustenance from the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment. Where Enlightenment thinkers tended to regard the world as governed by universal laws, Romantic critics insisted that human understanding of the world differs across cultures and that these differences make life meaningful. The German philosopher J. G. Herder argued for a world composed of distinct, language-and descent-based cultures, irreproducible, incommensurable, and of fundamentally equal value. Herder regarded culture as the repository of wisdom and expression; the sine qua non of human flourishing, culture was at once the source and foundation of individual agency. Writing at the end of the eighteenth century and thus well in advance of German unification, Herder said little about how different national cultures might interact across state boundaries and nothing at all about the challenge countries such as the United States faced in forging national solidarity amid ethnic diversity. For the generation of American intellectuals who took up that challenge a century later, and who were determined to effect solidarity without sacrificing cultural diversity, Herder's anthropology was inspiring but insufficient. They wanted a theory capable of reconciling the one and the many. They believed they found that theory in the pluralism of the American philosopher William James.

James engaged the problem of pluralism in the 1870s and 1880s not to vindicate cultural diversity but to vanquish "monism" in metaphysics and epistemology. Heirs to Enlightenment rationalism, nineteenth-century monists posited a single cosmos governed by a set of universal and objective laws. By the early 1870s, James had grown disenchanted with an account of the world that did not jibe with commonsense experience. In 1896, he identified the monism/pluralism distinction as "perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy. Prima facie the world is a pluralism," James wrote; "as we find it, its unity seems to be that of any collection; and our higher thinking consists chiefly of an effort to redeem it from that first crude form." James devoted the last years of his life to elucidating this distinction. In A Pluralistic Universe, he likened pluralism's world to a "federal republic" of sensations in which:

"Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything. The word 'and' trails along after every sentence. Something always escapes. 'Ever not quite' has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere in the universe at attaining all-inclusiveness." (pp. 321–322)

James's pluralism appears at first glance to offer little aid to Progressive Era thinkers struggling with the problem of ethnic diversity. But look what happens when we inject Herder's culture into the preceding quote in place of James's amorphous "things." We get a federated republic of cultures in which cultures are with one another in many ways, but no one culture encompasses every other, or dominates over every other and from which something always escapes.

This is the move carried out by two of James's disciples at Harvard University, sociologist W. E. B. DuBois and philosopher Horace Kallen, to counter Anglo American nativism at the turn of the twentieth century. Du Bois would one day despair over the seemingly dim prospect of African Americans flourishing in America, but he insisted that the salvation of African Americans could only come in the United States. He delivered this message in two early and cogent essays, "The Conservation of Races" and "Strivings of the Negro People," both of which appeared in 1897, but of which only the latter, reissued in 1903 as chapter one of The Souls of Black Folk, garnered widespread attention. "Strivings" introduced Du Bois's potent imagery of the Veil and expressed his yearning "to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death and isolation, and to husband and use his best powers." "Conservation" posed the dilemma that underlay that aspiration, and which has confronted members of every race and ethnic group that has had to weigh the cultural cost of pledging allegiance to American institutions and, by implication, to the dominant Anglo-American minority. "What after all am I," DuBois demanded? "Am I an American or am I a Negro? Can I be both? Or is it my duty to cease to be a Negro as soon as possible and be an American?" (p. 11) According to DuBois's melding of Herder and James, there could be but one answer to this query: race was irrelevant as a function of citizenship; ethnoracial diversity was essential to national vitality.

Cultural pluralism achieved full elaboration in the work of Kallen. In the winter of 1915, Kallen published a two-part essay in The Nation entitled "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot" in which he repudiated the conventional wisdom, given new life in nativist broadsides, that cultural homogeneity was a requisite of effective politics. Not so, Kallen maintained. The nation's political principles were culturally neutral, hence in no need of cultural buttress. Kallen wanted government to do for ethnic groups what it had long done for individuals: to under-write their pursuit of happiness. The product would be a "federated republic"—a phrase borrowed from James—of wholesome ethnic groups, each contributing its respective genius to the nation. Kallen's pluralism cut against the grain of American liberalism. Rather than challenging the racist premise of Anglo American nativism, Kallen recapitulated it, making race the bulwark of selfhood at the expense of individual agency. Nativists erred, his argument went, not by conflating culture and race, but by exalting one culture above all others. Kallen's would-be allies in the battle against Anglo American nativism recoiled from the communalism, racial essentialism, and ethnic separatism this vision implied; over the course of the next few years Randolph Bourne and Alain Locke, both friends of Kallen, produced apologies for ethnic diversity markedly more mindful of the imperative of individual agency. Moreover, Kallen's cultural pluralism assumed a degree of economic and political parity between ethnic groups demonstrably absent in Progressive Era America. His defense of cultural pluralism could only have come from a member of a few select immigrant communities, among them, Jews, whose assimilation in America afforded them the luxury to address culture independent of power.

The Legacy of Cultural Pluralism in the Twentieth Century

Kallen did not coin the term "cultural pluralism" until 1924, nine years after his essay in The Nation. By 1924, the heyday of cultural pluralism had past, at least for most liberal intellectuals. The publication of Kallen's Culture and Democracy in the United States coincided with the passing of the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, restricting immigration on the basis of national origin. Together with wartime jingoism, postwar reaction, and the persecution of African Americans, the immigration legislation soured American intellectuals on the prospects of cultural differentiation as a medium of progressive reform. In the face of white, racist, cultural retrenchment, assimilation seemed a safer and more realistic means of achieving social and political integration. Kallen himself seems to have become discomfited by the essentialism and separatism undergirding cultural pluralism. He said very little about pluralism over the next three decades. When he finally returned to the subject in 1956, he appeared less confident that pluralism alone could serve as an animating source of national solidarity. A universalist ideology rooted in an increasingly conventional understanding of the so-called American creed now accompanied his cultural advocacy. In this, Kallen joined company with many Cold War liberals concerned to distinguish the United States from its totalitarian rivals. Liberals landed on culture diversity as the nation's signal characteristic: we were a pluralist country committed to liberty of groups and individuals, they totalitarian regimes devoted to eradicating diversity in the name of national aggrandizement. Later scholarship demolished the myths latent in Cold War ideology. More interesting from a pluralist perspective is Kallen's contribution to the process by which the doctrine of cultural pluralism he had helped establish came more and more to resemble the label. In the name of pluralism, America would demonstrate its openness to difference by assimilating it.

Writers still genuinely committed to cultural diversity had to reckon with this assimilationist consensus. Sociologists Robert M. MacIver and Robin M. Williams worried lest undue emphasis on group differences alienate the assimilated public on whose sympathy de facto pluralism relied. Anticipating the response of white Americans to 1960s cultural nationalism, they exhorted advocates of pluralism to eschew rhetorical provocation for political bridge building across ethnic and racial divides. Stewart G. and Mildred Wiese Cole regarded cultural diversity primarily as a problem of democratic governance. Too much separatism would breed mutual suspicion and forestall social and political cooperation, they warned; too much assimilation would erode the individual and group integrity on which political empowerment relied. Meanwhile, Gordon Allport endorsed a choice-based approach to cultural affiliation. Some members of cultural communities would inevitably perpetuate core characteristics; others would just as surely drift from the core. There was little one could do about it in any case, short of intolerable coercion.

MacIver, Williams, Allport, and the Coles exposed the tension in American liberalism between individual agency and group identity, one destined to mount in the last several decades of the twentieth century. There were many catalysts of the renewed interest in cultural diversity: the exodus in the 1950s of African Americans from the deep South; the Immigration Act of 1965, ending restrictions on immigration based on national origin; student protest against alleged U.S. imperialism around the world; the radicalization of the civil rights movement. In "black power," particularly, we can chart pluralism's continuing evolution as the means to a political, rather than cultural, end. For the point of black power, activist Stokely Carmichael insisted repeatedly to audiences disinclined to listen, was not to celebrate black culture as an end in itself, but to foster racial solidarity sufficient to galvanize African Americans into a political force capable of negotiating independently with the white political parties. Only as an independent political force, Carmichael argued, did African Americans stand a chance of addressing the structural racism and inequality that endured in the wake of vaunted civil rights victories. Every African American of voting age who assimilated into white politics decreased the likelihood of black success. Carmichael's logic was very different from the early Kallen and had different ramifications for the members of racial and ethnic groups. For the early Kallen, culture was literally the end of human aspiration; perpetuating culture is what individuals did. For Carmichael, by contrast, culture was the means to economic and political justice; race-based commitment now, choice the payoff of the promised land.

Carmichael and black power have become a symbol of much that went wrong with late-twentieth-century cultural politics. By basing his political movement on color, he merely recapitulated the racism of the enemy, thereby ensuring his own defeat. So went the argument of a host of progressive intellectuals who recognized that the gravest threat to individuality at the end of the twentieth century stemmed from economic injustice spawned by racism, yet who rejected arguments like those of Du Bois and Carmichael that only race could vanquish racism. With great cogency, starting in the 1970s scholars John Higham, Steven Steinberg, and David A. Hollinger, along with many others, have upheld choice, agency, right of exit, and revocable consent as the route beyond racism. They argue that only individuals who insist they are more than members of a single race will ever be recognized as such by a still-racist society.

Political Pluralism in the Twentieth Century

Just as reformers were becoming wary of pluralism as a tool for cultural analysis, political theorists adopted the term to describe American politics. In this, the theorists followed the lead of Arthur F. Bentley, an independent scholar whose Process of Government (1908) is credited with establishing pluralism as a concept in political analysis despite never using the term. Like Madison (whom, curiously, Bentley does not cite), Bentley set out to explain the remarkable functioning of a government be-holden to special interests. He began by revising Madison's psychology. Faction—interest, to Bentley—was not the product of some innate selfishness in mankind to be overcome by virtue; rather, interest was the mechanism by which men acted. Thus, government could not be distinguished from interest; government consisted of the ceaseless collision of interests themselves. This was no less true of despotism than of democracy, though democracy differed from despotism by promoting a broader plurality of interests. Bentley's political theory promoted an ideal of government free of exclusions. Although he acknowledged that government often seemed the province of particular ("private") interests, his insistence that "no interest group has meaning except with reference to other interest groups" led him to attribute influence to even the most dispossessed classes.

"The lowest of despised classes," he wrote, "deprived of rights to the protection of property and even life, will still be found to be a factor in the government, if only we can sweep the whole field, and measure the caste in its true degree or power, direct or represented, in its potentiality of harm to the higher castes, and in its identification with them for some important purposes, however deeply hidden from ordinary view. No slaves, not the worst abused of all, but help to form the government." (p. 271)

Writing in the 1950s and 1960s, Robert A. Dahl recapitulated and amplified Bentley's argument. Dahl's Preface to a Democratic Theory (1956) attributed the success of the American political system to the endless, decentralized interest-group haggling it encouraged. Despite its shortcomings, the system maintained "a high probability that any active and legitimate group will make itself heard effectively at some stage in the process of decision"—"no mean thing in a political system" (p. 150). Dahl's Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consensus (1967) invoked the term "pluralism" itself to describe what he had earlier hypothesized: a decentralized system of government with multiple centers of power each contested by a broad range of interests. Here, as in Bentley, were Madison's factions without the toxin.

Bibliography

Allport, Gordon W. The Nature of Prejudice. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958 [1954].

Bentley, A. F. The Process of Government. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967 [1908].

Bourne, Randolph. "Trans-National America." In War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915–1919. Edited by Carl Resak. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

Cole, Stewart G., and Mildred Wiese Cole. Minorities and the American Promise: The Conflict of Principle and Practice. New York: Harper and Bros., 1954.

Dahl, Robert A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

———. Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967.

de Crèvecoeur, J. Hector St. John. Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America. New York: Penguin Books, 1981 [1782].

Du Bois, W. E. B. "Strivings of the Negro People." Atlantic Monthly 80 (August 1897): 194–198.

———. "Conservation of Races." American Negro Academy Occasional Papers 2 (1897): 5–15.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Volume 9. Edited by Ralph H. Orth and Alfred R. Ferguson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Edited by Clinton Rossiter. New York: Mentor, 1961.

Herder, Johann Gottfried. J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture. Translated and edited by F. M. Barnard. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Higham, John. Send These to Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America. Baltimore: Atheneum, 1974.

Hollinger, David. Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism. 2d. ed. New York: Basic Books, 2000.

James William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Dover, 1956 [1897].

———. Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals. New York: Norton, 1958 [1899].

Jefferson, Thomas. "Notes on the State of Virginia." In The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Adrienne Koch and William Peden. New York: The Modern Library, 1993.

Kallen, Horace. Culture and Democracy in the United States. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1998 [1924].

Katkin, Wendy F., and Ned Landsman, eds. Beyond Pluralism: The Conception of Groups and Group Identities in America. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998.

Locke, Alain Leroy. Race Contacts and Interracial Relations. Edited by Jeffrey C. Stewart. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992 [1916].

MacIver, Robert M. Civilization and Group Relationships. New York: Institute for Religious Studies, 1945.

Melville, Herman. Redburn. New York: Penguin Books, 1986 [1849].

Sollors, Werner. Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Steinberg, Stephen. The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America. New York: Athaeneum, 1981.

Williams, Robin M., Jr. The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations. New York: Social Science Research Council Bulletin 57, 1947.

Pluralism is used, often in different ways, across a wide range of topics:

• Scientific pluralism, the view that some phenomena observed in science require multiple explanations to account for their nature
• Pluralism (political philosophy), the acknowledgment of diversity
• Pluralism (political theory), holds that political power in society does not lie with the electorate but is distributed among a wide number of groups
• Pluralism (philosophy), entirely unrelated positions in metaphysics and epistemology
• Value pluralism, the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other
• Cosmic pluralism, the belief in numerous other worlds beyond the Earth which harbour extraterrestrial life
• Religious pluralism, a loosely defined term concerning peaceful relations between different religions
• Cultural pluralism, when small groups within a larger society maintain their unique cultural identities
• Economic pluralism, the diversity of business sizes, types, and industries
• Legal pluralism, allows for moral laws that are unwritten as formal laws
• In art, the art of the current period where every style is practiced, characterizing late 20th and early 21st century Contemporary art
• In the sense of holding multiple ecclesiastical offices, see benefice
• Pluralist School, a Greek school of pre-Socratic philosophers

See also

• Global Centre for Pluralism, an international centre for research, education and exchange, based in Ottawa, Canada

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Dansk (Danish)
n. - pluralisme

Nederlands (Dutch)
pluralisme

Français (French)
n. - pluralisme

Deutsch (German)
n. - Pluralismus

Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - πολυφωνία, πλουραλισμός

Italiano (Italian)
pluralismo

Português (Portuguese)
n. - pluralismo (m)

Русский (Russian)
плюрализм

Español (Spanish)
n. - pluralismo

Svenska (Swedish)
n. - pluralism, mångfald (kulturell o åsiktsmässig)

中文（简体） (Chinese (Simplified))
兼职, 兼任, 多元论, 多重性

中文（繁體） (Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 兼職, 兼任, 多元論, 多重性

한국어 (Korean)
n. - 겸직, 복식 투표, 사회적 다원론

日本語 (Japanese)
n. - 複数性, 多元的共存, 多元論, 聖職兼任

العربيه (Arabic)
‏(الاسم) التعدديه‏

עברית (Hebrew)
n. - ‮תיאוריה המכירה ביותר מעיקרון מוחלט אחד (פילוסופיה), חלוקת השלטון בין מספר מפלגות, פלורליזם, עקרון החיים בצוותא, כהונה במשרות רבות (בעיקר בתחום הדתי), העדפת האצלת סמכויות ואוטונומיה לגופים נפרדים, אוטונומיה תרבותית לקבוצות מיעוט‬

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