Idioms beginning with power:
powers that be, the
See also corridors of power; more power to someone; staying power.
| Idioms: power |
Idioms beginning with power:
powers that be, the
See also corridors of power; more power to someone; staying power.
| 5min Related Video: Power |
| Geography Dictionary: power |
Defined as the ability to do or act, this is also seen as the influence of an individual or group upon another. Power within a society is worked out in its economic, social, and political life; capitalism is controlled by a minority who dominate the factors of production over a majority which does not. In a centrally planned economy it is the state which dominates, supposedly reflecting the will of the people. The power structure of a society is reflected in its social organization and in its economy. These in turn have their own spatial expression.
Geographies of power study the spatial distribution of power across a multiplicity of geographical scales, from the body to the globe. The mix of scales changes dynamically, as territories are continually subjected to resistance, contestation, renegotiation, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization. Themes include state formation, where power is transmitted through social channels to territorial ones, and the relationship of minority cultures and empowerment. The processes of globalization have reworked sovereignty as the ordering principle of the international political economy, creating new geographies of power; changes in the practices and understandings of property rights are changing the meaning of sovereignty, altering the differentiation of sovereignty, which shapes the international political economy. See hollowing, offshore financial centre.
| Political Dictionary: power |
The ability to make people (or things) do what they would not otherwise have done. The purpose of the modern concept of power was recognized as early as 1748, with the publication of Hume's essay, ‘Of the Original Contract’. ‘Almost all of the governments, which exist at present’, says Hume, ‘. . . have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people.’ Describing the processes of political change—migration, colonization, and military victory—Hume demands, rhetorically, ‘Is there anything discoverable in all these events, but force and violence?’
Hume's comments offer one of the first clear versions of the assumptions of a ‘modern’ age, which seeks to study politics positively, eschewing theological justifications and moral evaluations in favour of a causal assessment of how the political world works in reality. Politics is seen to be about might rather than right; indeed, in Hume, as in much social science, might is seen as creating right de facto because the seizure of power leads to the establishment of authority and the successful inculcation of belief. Power is the appropriate central concept for this world-view because, in its modern form, it is concerned with which groups or persons dominate, get their own way or are best able to pursue their own interests in societies. James March in his 1966 essay, ‘The Power of Power’, stressed that the concept ‘conveyed simultaneously overtones of the cynicism of Realpolitik, the glories of classical mechanics, the realism of elite sociology and the comforts of anthropocentric theology’. In other words the ‘power’ world-view offers the would-be social scientist an immunity from moral evaluation and theoretical speculation, and the possibility of emulating the explanatory achievements of the physicist.
Bertrand Russell defined power as ‘the production of intended effects’, but this serves better as an indication of what we want to mean when we talk about power than as a working definition. A large number of other writers have offered more complex definitions of power or paradigms of power relationships. The core of these, in respect of the expression, ‘A has power over B’ are:
(1) A has effects on B's choices and actions.
(2) A has the capacity to move B's choices and actions in ways that A intends.
(3) A has the capacity to override opposition from B.
(4) The relationship between A and B described by propositions 1, 2, and 3 is part of a social structure (not necessarily the social structure) and has a tendency to persist.
Problems with any definition include:
(1) Intentionality. If we do not include a condition of intentionality, then we are left with a paradoxical and useless concept of power. For example, the Victim has power over the Bully because his or her weakness and vulnerability is provocative to the Bully's action. On the other hand, there are intuitively satisfactory examples of power without intention: Subserviens may regard Superior as a powerful person and, therefore, try to please him, but he may respond in ways which are not according to Superior's intentions or even contrary to them. If Subserviens is so in awe of Superior that the only reaction of which he is capable is to throw his arms around Superior's ankles and kiss his feet, a practice which Superior detests, then Superior cannot be said to have power over Subserviens since he lacks the capacity to control him. We want the concept of power, ultimately, to tell us about who can get their own way, to distinguish between the Barrack Room Lawyer who appears to obey orders, but is generally capable of manipulating structures and relationships, and the Formal Authority who appears to be obeyed to the letter, but has no close control over his relationships.
The solution to this paradox is to acknowledge that the possession of power can have unintended consequences, but that the test of whether a person has power or not must be conducted in terms of control, of the capacity to achieve intentions. If a person has power, the consequences of that power must be attributable to that person, who is responsible for those consequences. Without intentionality and attributability the concept of power becomes vague to the point of meaninglessness, not like the concept of energy in physics (which Russell wanted it to be), but more like the concept of the ether, the presence of which could not be distinguished from its absence.
(2) Comparability and Quantifiability. If the concept of power is to be the central concept for understanding certain kinds of politics, its use must go beyond isolated remarks of the form ‘A has power over B’ and at least extend to comparative analyses: ‘A has more power than C in context x’ and ‘A has more power than anybody else in context x’. This raises issues of great complexity because the range of variables which might be used to compare the power of two people is considerable. Different writers have given different names to these variables, but an account of power must consider both the geographic and demographic range over which the power extends and the scope of issues affected. There is the question of the objective weighting of A's power in comparison to C's, that is, the extent to which the individuals affected care about the effects which A can control. There is also a question of subjective weighting, the extent to which A is able to control what he or she really cares about. This is complicated by the phenomenon of anticipated reactions: many shrewd political actors modify their aims to the political environment. For them, the possession of power may be an end in itself and the question of comparing the extent to which they can modify events according to their own will becomes obscure and irresoluble.
Thus it is very difficult to compare the power of two individuals, groups, or institutions. Often the difficulty is as logically simple as comparing a person who has apples with a person who has oranges and coming to a conclusion about which possessed the more ‘fruit’. It would be intuitively obvious that fifty apples was more fruit than five oranges, but a closer comparison might evoke alternative standards of market or subjective value, weight, volume, nutrient capacity, and so on. Thus ordinal comparisons of power are impossible in many circumstances, and dealing with the kind of cardinal numbers we would need to make power ‘like energy in physics’ is usually out of the question.
(3) Time and Causation. If A has the power to achieve x at time t and he or she wants x, does that mean x will necessarily occur? The answer must surely be no, because it must be possible for A to possess the power, but to fail to use it. This raises a profound doubt about the nature of power. How would we know at any one time what power a person had? Most exercises of power affect the possession of that power. The use of power may be self-diminishing, particularly where it ‘spends’ the resource (such as money or credibility) on which it is based. Equally it may be self-increasing, as when actors ranging from teachers to the leaders of military coups establish control over their domain. In many cases there are contingent increases and decreases in power: for instance, macroeconomic conditions are bound to affect what can be achieved by entrepreneurs or trade union leaders.
Thus the instances of A exercising power at t⊂1, t⊂2, etc., are of little value in estimating A's power at t. A series of exercises of power may be catastrophically self-diminishing: precisely because a person has succeeded n times, it may be that moves to thwart them are afoot on the (n + 1)th occasion. It is no help to say, as Dahl does, that power is best explained in terms of probability: statistical probability is no use, because it only works for a series of identical instances like the spins of a fair roulette wheel and inductive probability is merely an estimate of the odds which takes everything into account (including, presumably, the ‘power’ of the actors). The fundamental problem is that the concept of power seeks to make static statements about a dynamic reality and the consequent doubt must be as to whether the concept ever really helps us understand or predict real events such as the fall of Margaret Thatcher in 1990.
Power is often classified into five principal forms: force, persuasion, authority, coercion, and manipulation. However, only coercion and manipulation are uncontroversially forms of power.
(1) Force in its narrow sense implies a control of the body rather than the person. We may kill, bind, or render comatose without being able to get a person's actions to conform to our will. Only when they comply because of the threat of force can the relationship be called power and this becomes, strictly, coercion.
(2) Persuasion, by which the slave may persuade the emperor or the professor the Prime Minister. In other words the powerless may persuade the powerful: the offering of ideas is not control until it creates a dependency and, therefore, the capacity to manipulate.
(3) Authority is sometimes defined as ‘legitimate power’. But it can also be understood as the existence (in various senses) of rights to command and corresponding duties to obey. Authority is therefore separate from power, though it constitutes a resource for power in the same way as does money and a capacity for rational persuasion. It can exist in a pure form, without power, as, for instance, the authority of a priest over his flock in a secular society.
(4) Coercion is perhaps the paradigm form of power and is said to consist of controlling people through threats, whether overt or tacit. It is, though, extremely difficult to distinguish a threat from other forms of relationship. Is it a threat if we say we are going to make a person worse off than they expected to be? Or worse off than if we were not to act? Most modern relationships, whether children's pocket money or promotions at work, seem to exist in a middle territory between threats and offers for which we have no established word in English (though Hillel Steiner suggests ‘throffers’).
(5) Manipulation involves control exercised without threats, typically using resources of information and ideas. Usually people do not realize they are being manipulated or the process would not work. Arguably, it is a more durable form of power: Subserviens' obedience to Superior is more securely founded on the belief that God wants him to obey than on the fear of being whipped. But arguments about manipulation can easily slide into unfalsifiable arguments about ‘false consciousness’. Increasingly, as power has failed as a concept for the positive investigation of political systems, it has been taken over by writers like Foucault who see power as permeating all social relationships. This tradition of thought does not, generally, seek to measure or attribute power or to distinguish its forms, but is content to emphasize its transcendence and the effect of power in distorting social relations.
In summary, the concept of power has not filled the central role in the study of politics which many pioneers hoped it would. It has proved much easier to believe generally that ‘Politics is about power’, or, particularly, that individual P or group E possesses power, than it has been to clarify what such beliefs mean or what would constitute proof or disproof of them.
— Lincoln Allison
| Philosophy Dictionary: power |
(social) The power of an individual or institution is the ability to achieve something, whether by right or by control or influence. Power is the ability to mobilize economic, social, or political forces in order to achieve a result. It can be measured by the probability of that result being achieved in the face of various kinds of obstacle or opposition. It is not essential to this definition that the result be consciously intended by the powerful agent: power may be exercised unknowingly, although of course it is frequently deliberate. However, in the views of some theorists, notably Foucault, all social relations are systems of power: fundamental power is not exercised by individuals, but is a dispersed, impersonal aspect of society, and in particular is manifested in the modes of surveillance, regulation, or discipline that adapt human beings to the surrounding social structure. The power of society is not limited to its ability to prevent people doing things, but it includes control of the self-definition and preferred way of living of its members. A principal concern of political theory is to determine when the exercise of power is legitimate; this is often posed as the problem of distinguishing authority from power. See also exploitation, oppression.
| Archaeology Dictionary: power |
Generalized symbolic capacity to make and make stick binding decisions on behalf of a collectivity.
| Law Encyclopedia: Power |
The right, ability, or authority to perform an act. An ability to generate a change in a particular legal relationship by doing or not doing a certain act.
In a restricted sense, a liberty or authority that is reserved by, or limited to, a person to dispose of real or personal property, for his or her own benefit or for the benefit of others, or that enables one person to dispose of an interest that is vested in another.
| Quotes About: Power |
Quotes:
"Let them hate, so long as they fear."
- Accius
"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
- Lord Acton
"Arbitrary power is like most other things which are very hard, very liable to be broken."
- Abigail Adams
"A friend in power is a friend lost."
- Henry Brooks Adams
"Power always thinks it has a great soul and vast views beyond the comprehension of the weak."
- John Adams
"The man whose authority is recent is always stern."
- Aeschylus
See more famous quotes about Power
| Wikipedia: Power (philosophy) |
| This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2008) |
Power is a measure of an entity's ability to control the environment around itself, including the behavior of other entities. The term authority is often used for power, perceived as legitimate by the social structure. Power can be seen as evil or unjust, but the exercise of power is accepted as endemic to humans as social beings.
The use of power need not involve coercion (force or the threat of force). At one extreme, it more closely resembles what everyday English-speakers call "influence", although some authors make a distinction between power and influence - the means by which power is used (Handy, C. 1993 Understanding Organisations).
Much of the recent sociological debate on power revolves around the issue of the enabling nature of power. A comprehensive account of power can be found in Steven Lukes Power: A Radical View where he discusses the three dimensions of power. Thus, power can be seen as various forms of constraint on human action, but also as that which makes action possible, although in a limited scope. Much of this debate is related to the works of the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984), who, following the Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), sees power as "a complex strategic situation in a given society [social setting]". Being deeply structural, his concept involves both constraint and enablement. For a purely enabling (and voluntaristic) concept of power see the works of Anthony Giddens.
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Because power operates both relationally and reciprocally, sociologists speak of the balance of power between parties to a relationship: all parties to all relationships have some power: the sociological examination of power concerns itself with discovering and describing the relative strengths: equal or unequal, stable or subject to periodic change. Sociologists usually analyse relationships in which the parties have relatively equal or nearly equal power in terms of constraint rather than of power. Thus 'power' has a connotation of unilateralism. If this were not so, then all relationships could be described in terms of 'power', and its meaning would be lost.
Even in structuralist social theory, power appears as a process, an aspect to an ongoing social structure.
One can sometimes distinguish primary power: the direct and personal use of force for coercion; and secondary power, which may involve the threat of force or social constraint, most likely involving third-party exercisers of delegated power.
Power may be held through:
JK Galbraith summarises the types of power as being "Condign" (based on force), "Compensatory" (through the use of various resources) or "Conditioned" (the result of persuasion), and their sources as "Personality" (individuals), "Property" (their material resources) and "Organizational" (whoever sits at the top of an organisational power structure). (Galbraith, An Anatomy of Power)
All forms of Power fall under one of two possible sub-headings.
Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) defined power as a man's "present means, to obtain some future apparent good" (Leviathan, Ch. 10).
The thought of Friedrich Nietzsche underlies much 20th century analysis of power. Nietzsche disseminated ideas on the "will to power", which he saw as the domination of other humans as much as the exercise of control over one's environment.
Some schools of psychology, notably that associated with Alfred Adler, place power dynamics at the core of their theory (where orthodox Freudians might place sexuality).
Game theory, with its foundations in the theory of Rational Choice, is increasingly used in various disciplines to help analyse power relationships. One rational choice definition of power is given by Keith Dowding in his book Power.
In rational choice theory, human individuals or groups can be modelled as 'actors' who choose from a 'choice set' of possible actions in order to try and achieve desired outcomes. An actor's 'incentive structure' comprises (its beliefs about) the costs associated with different actions in the choice set, and the likelihoods that different actions will lead to desired outcomes.
In this setting we can differentiate between:
This framework can be used to model a wide range of social interactions where actors have the ability to exert power over others. For example a 'powerful' actor can take options away from another's choice set; can change the relative costs of actions; can change the likelihood that a given action will lead to a given outcome; or might simply change the other's beliefs about its incentive structure.
As with other models of power, this framework is neutral as to the use of 'coercion'. For example: a threat of violence can change the likely costs and benefits of different actions; so can a financial penalty in a 'voluntarily agreed' contract, or indeed a friendly offer.
In ordered groups, such as school classrooms and military groups, the leader's power over an individual is amplified by the virtual power gained from having the other group members already obeying the leader's order. For example, if a school student gets out of her seat, she can be identified easily if all the other students are already sitting in their seats. Each disobedient student is thus easily identified and can expect to be confronted by the teacher.[1]
In the Marxist tradition, the Italian writer Antonio Gramsci elaborated the role of cultural hegemony in ideology as a means of bolstering the power of capitalism and of the nation-state. Drawing on Niccolò Machiavelli in The Prince, and trying to understand why there had been no Communist revolution in Western Europe, whilst there had been in Russia, Gramsci conceptualised this hegemony as a centaur, consisting of two halves. The back end, the beast, represented the more classic, material image of power, power through coercion, through brute force, be it physical or economic. But the capitalist hegemony, he argued, depended even more strongly on the front end, the human face, which projected power through 'consent'. In Russia, this power was lacking, allowing for a revolution. However, in Western Europe, specifically in Italy, capitalism had succeeded in exercising consensual power, convincing the working classes that their interests were the same as those of capitalists. In this way revolution had been avoided.
Like Gramsci stresses the significance of ideology in powerstructures, Marxist-feminist writers like Michele Barrett stress the role of ideologies in extolling the virtues of family life. The classic argument to illustrate this point of view is the use of women as a 'reserve army of labour'. In wartime it's accepted that women perform masculine tasks, while after the war the roles are easily reversed. Therefore, according to Barrett, the destruction of capitalist economic relations is necessary but not sufficient for the liberation of women.[2]
One of the broader modern views of the importance of power in human activity comes from the work of Michel Foucault, who has said, "Power is everywhere...because it comes from everywhere."
—Aldrich, Robert and Wotherspoon, Gary (Eds.), 2001
Foucault's analysis of power is founded on his concept "technologies of power". Discipline is a complex bundle of power technologies developed during the 18th and 19th centuries as Foucault demonstrated in Discipline and Punish. For Foucault power is exercised with intention. Instead of analysing the difficult problem of who has which intentions, he focused on what is intersubjectively accepted knowledge about how to exercise power. For Foucault, power is actions upon others' actions in order to interfere with them. Foucault does not recur to violence, but says that power presupposes freedom in the sense that power is not enforcement, but ways of making people by themselves behave in other ways than they else would have done. One way of doing this is by threatening with violence. However, suggesting how happy people will become if they buy an off-roader is an exercise of power as well; marketing provides a large body of knowledge on techniques for how to (try to) produce such behavior.
Foucault's works analyze the link between power and knowledge. He outlines a form of covert power that works through people rather than only on them. Foucault claims belief systems gain momentum (and hence power) as more people come to accept the particular views associated with that belief system as common knowledge (hegemony). Such belief systems define their figures of authority, such as medical doctors or priests in a church. Within such a belief system—or discourse—ideas crystallize as to what is right and what is wrong, what is normal and what is deviant. Within a particular belief system certain views, thoughts or actions become unthinkable. These ideas, being considered undeniable "truths", come to define a particular way of seeing the world, and the particular way of life associated with such "truths" becomes normalized. This subtle form of power lacks rigidity and other discourses can contest it. Indeed, power itself lacks any concrete form, occurring as a locus of struggle. Resistance, through defiance, defines power and hence becomes possible through power. Without resistance, power is absent, but it would be a mistake, some recent writers insist, to attribute to Foucault an oppositional power-resistance schema as is found in many older, foundationalist theoreticians. This view 'grants' individuality to people and other agencies, even if it is assumed a given agency is part of what power works in or upon. Still, in practice Foucault often seems to deny individuals this agency, which is contrasted with sovereignty (the old model of power as efficacious and rigid).
"Domination" is not "that solid and global kind of domination that one person exercises over others, or one group over another, but the manifold forms of domination that can be exercised within society." (ibid, p.96)
"One should try to locate power at the extreme of its exercise, where it is always less legal in character." (ibid, p.97)
"The analysis [of power] should not attempt to consider power from its internal point of view and...should refrain from posing the labyrinthine and unanswerable question: 'Who then has power and what has he in mind? What is the aim of someone who possesses power?' Instead, it is a case of studying power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices." (ibid, p.97)
"Let us ask...how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours, etc....we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects." (ibid, p.97)
Tarnow[3] considers what power hijackers have over air plane passengers and draws similarities with power in the military. He shows that power over an individual can be amplified by the presence of a group. If the group conforms to the leader's commands, the leader's power over an individual is greatly enhanced while if the group does not conform the leader's power over an individual is nil.
The seminal work of Steven Lukes Power: A radical view (1974) was developed from a talk he was once invited to give in Paris. In this brief book, Lukes outlines two dimensions through which power had been theorised in the earlier part of the twentieth century (dimensions 1 and 2 below) which he critiqued as being limited to those forms of power that could be seen. To these he added a third 'critical' dimension which built upon insights from Gramsci and Althusser. In many ways this work evolved alongside of the writing of Foucault and serves as a good introduction to his thoughts on power.
One-dimensional
In his own words, Lukes states that the "one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation."
Two-dimensional: 1D plus:
Three-dimensional: Includes aspects of model 1 & 2, plus:
Alvin Toffler's Powershift argues that the three main kinds of power are violence, wealth, and knowledge with other kinds of power being variations of these three (typically knowledge). Each successive kind of power represents a more flexible kind of power. Violence can only be used negatively, to punish. Wealth can be used both negatively (by withholding money) and positively (by advancing/spending money). Knowledge can be used in these ways but, additionally, can be used in a transformative way. Such examples are, sharing knowledge on agriculture to ensure that everyone is capable of supplying himself and his family of food; Allied nations with a shared identity forming with the spread of religious or political philosophies, or one can use knowledge as a tactical/strategic superiority in Intelligence (information gathering).
Toffler argues that the very nature of power is currently shifting. Throughout history, power has often shifted from one group to another; however, at this time, the dominant form of power is changing. During the Industrial Revolution, power shifted from a nobility acting primarily through violence to industrialists and financiers acting through wealth. Of course, the nobility used wealth just as the industrial elite used violence, but the dominant form of power shifted from violence to wealth. Today, a Third Wave of shifting power is taking place with wealth being overtaken by knowledge.
The idea of unmarked categories originated in feminism. The theory analyzes the culture of the powerful. The powerful comprise those people in society with easy access to resources, those who can exercise power without considering their actions. For the powerful, their culture seems obvious; for the powerless, on the other hand, it remains out of reach, élite and expensive.
The unmarked category can form the identifying mark of the powerful. The unmarked category becomes the standard against which to measure everything else. For most Western readers, it is posited that if a protagonist's race is not indicated, it will be assumed by the reader that the protagonist is Caucasian; if a sexual identity is not indicated, it will be assumed by the reader that the protagonist is heterosexual; if the gender of a body is not indicated, will be assumed by the reader that it is male; if a disability is not indicated, it will be assumed by the reader that the protagonist is able bodied, just as a set of examples.
One can often overlook unmarked categories. Whiteness forms an unmarked category not commonly visible to the powerful, as they often fall within this category. The unmarked category becomes the norm, with the other categories relegated to deviant status. Social groups can apply this view of power to race, gender, and disability without modification: the able body is the neutral body; the man is the normal status.
Gilles Deleuze, the twentieth century French philosopher, compared voting for political representation with being taken hostage. A representational government assumes that people can be divided into categories with distinct shared interests. The representative is regarded as embodying the interests of the group. Many social movements have been successful in gaining access to governments: the working class, women, young people and ethnic minorities are part of the government in many nation-states. However, there is no government where the government represents the population along the characteristics of the categories.
The problem of finding suitable representatives relates to an individual's membership of different categories at the same time. The only truly representative government for a population is the population itself. These ideas have become popular in social movements for global justice. The logic of government open to all underpins the social forums (such as the World Social Forum) that have developed in contradistinction to the forums of the powerful. These alternative forms are sometimes called counter-power.
This view appears in many projects of social change, but its founder Paulo Freire is largely unknown. Freire assumes that people carry archives of knowledge within them. In particular he rejects the idea that people remain ignorant unless they have learned to communicate using the culture of the powerful. The person is seen as part of a culture circle with its own view of reality, based on the circumstances of everyday living.
Dialogue can bring about social change. Such dialogue directly opposes the monologue of the culture of the powerful. Dialogue expands the understanding of the world rather than teaching a correct understanding. The process of social change starts with action, on which the group then reflects. Commonly, more action of some kind then results...
Social psychologists French and Raven, in a now-classic study (1959),[4] developed a schema of five categories of power which reflected the different bases or resources that power holders rely upon. One additional base (informational) was later added.
Recent experimental psychology suggests that the more power one has, the less one takes on the perspective of others, implying that the powerful have less empathy. Adam Galinsky, along with several coauthors, found that when those who are reminded of their powerlessness are instructed to draw Es on their forehead, they are 3 times more likely to draw them such that they are legible to others than those who are reminded of their power.[7][8] Powerful people are also more likely to take action. In one example, powerful people turned off an irritatingly close fan twice as much as less powerful people. Researchers have documented the "bystander effect" in which they found that powerful people are three times as likely to first offer help to a "stranger in distress".[9]
A study involving over 50 college students suggested that those primed to feel powerful through stating 'power words' were less susceptible to external pressure, more willing to give honest feedback, and more creative.[10]
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