prior restraint
n.
Judicial prevention of a statement or other expression from being published.
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Judicial prevention of a statement or other expression from being published.
Supreme Court decisions over the past seventy‐five years clearly support the presumption of the unconstitutionality of prior restraint—an attempt by the government to prevent speech or expression of ideas in advance of expression of publication. The Court has held that in light of the First Amendment, the government bears a heavy burden of proof before any such action may be imposed. The right of expression is not absolute, however, and the proper remedy for improper speech (for example, defamation) is subsequent punishment.
In the American view, prior restrain has been equated with censorship. Constitutional historians are nearly unanimous in their conclusion that the framers of the First Amendment intended to codify the English common law as taught by Sir William Blackstone, which banned all prior restraints such as licensing or censorship.
In Near v. Minnesota (1931), the Court heard a case involving a “public nuisance statute” designed to prevent the publication of a scandalous weekly newspaper. The Court held that with only limited exceptions, any such injunction against publication constitutes prior restraint.
The Supreme Court again struck down prior restraints in New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) when it refused to permit the government to halt news coverage of a classified forty‐seven volume study of the history of the Vietnam conflict, a study commonly referred to as the “Pentagon Papers.” The Court held that despite a claim that publication would threaten national security, the government had not met the heavy burden of proof in this particular case. However, the Court did not rule out subsequent punishment in the case or possible constitutional prior restraint in a future case.
In CNN v. Noriega (1990), the Court refused to hear a prior restraint case in which a lower court upheld a contempt citation against CNN for broadcasting information regarding the federal drug trafficking case against former Panamanian leader Manual Noriega. The lower court balanced First Amendment rights with Sixth Amendment rights, and Noriega's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial with an impartial jury prevailed. However, the lower court's holding was limited to the specific convoluted events in Noriega, and no inferences regarding possible future decisions by the Supreme Court should be based on the Court's failure to act in this case.
See also Pretrial Publicity and the Gag Rule; Speech and the Press.
— S. L. Alexander
The taking of legal action before an anticipated wrongdoing. Remedies to prevent a threatened illegality from taking place include the use of injunction or prohibition and declaration. In English law, an injunction may take the form of either a negative or positive requirement, depending on how best to deal with the illegality. In order to obtain an injunction, the plaintiff must show he has an arguable point of law and that on the balance of convenience an injunction ought to be given.
A prohibition will prevent any further action or wrongdoing, in effect telling the offending party to proceed no further. A declaration will issue to declare rights and clarify legal doubts over any potential dispute. Once awarded a prohibition, declaration, or injunction is effective against any potential wrongdoer, within the terms of the courts' decision. American law, especially the First Amendment, outlaws many forms of prior restraint used in Britain, where reformers claim that it has protected rich bullies and fraudsters such as Robert Maxwell.
— John McEldowney
Prior restraint is a form of censorship in which government officials restrict a newspaper or magazine in advance from publishing materials of which they disapprove. The 1st Amendment guarantee of a free press precludes the government's use of prior restraint to control the content of a publication. This 1st Amendment ban on prior restraint was applied to state governments through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment in Near v. Minnesota (1931). In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled that an injunction to stop publication of a newspaper with objectionable content was an example of prior restraint and therefore unconstitutional. The Court did not rule, however, that a publisher was protected from legal action after publishing questionable material.
See also Freedom of speech and press; Near v. Minnesota; New York Times Co. v. United States
Government prohibition of speech in advance of publication.
One of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is the freedom from prior restraint. Derived from the English common law, the rule against prior restraint prohibits government from banning expression of ideas prior to their publication. The rule against prior restraint is based on the principle that freedom of the press is essential to a free society. Attempts by government to obtain a prior restraint have largely been unsuccessful.
The rule against prior restraint was undisputed for much of U.S. history. The landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931), finally settled the issue, with the U.S. Supreme Court finding that the First Amendment imposed a heavy presumption against the validity of a prior restraint.
In Near, the Court struck down a Minnesota state law that permitted public officials to seek an injunction to stop publication of any "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical." The statute was used to suppress publication of a small Minneapolis newspaper, the Saturday Press, which had crudely maligned local police and political officials, often in anti-Semitic terms. The law provided that once a newspaper was enjoined, further publication was punishable as contempt of court.
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in his majority opinion, called the law "the essence of censorship" and declared it unconstitutional. With its decision, the Court incorporated the First Amendment freedom of the press into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This incorporation made freedom of the press fully applicable to the states.
Though Hughes agreed that a rule against prior restraint was needed, he acknowledged that this restriction was not absolute. The rule would not, for example, prevent government in time of war from prohibiting publication of "the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Threats to national security interests are almost certain to prevail over freedom of the press, but it has proved difficult to invoke the "national security" justification.
This was illustrated in the Pentagon Papers case of 1971 (New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822). The Nixon administration sought to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing excerpts from a classified study (the Pentagon Papers) on the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, arguing that publication would hurt national security interests. The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, held that the government's efforts to block publication amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint.
The national security exception failed again in a 1979 case dealing with the publication of a magazine article that purported to explain the process of making a hydrogen bomb (United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 [W.D. Wis. 1979]). The federal government obtained a preliminary injunction against The Progressive, stopping publication of the article until a hearing on a permanent injunction could be held. Before the hearing, however, another publication printed a similar article. The government then dropped its lawsuit, and the magazine published the original article.
Prior restraint issues have arisen over prejudicial pretrial publicity in sensational criminal proceedings. The defendant's right to a fair trial by an unbiased jury must be considered as well as freedom of the press. In exceptional circumstances, a court may depart from prior restraint doctrine by restricting news coverage of a criminal case. These restrictions must be narrowly tailored, and they must not unduly restrict the right of the press to inform the public. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976), made clear, however, that these restrictions are severely limited. The Court invalidated a gag order issued by a state trial judge that forbade the publishing or broadcasting of any confessions, admissions, or facts that strongly implicated the defendant charged with a grisly mass murder.
The rule against prior restraint does not apply to the publication of student-operated school newspapers. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld a public school principal's decision to remove certain controversial material from the school newspaper. The principal based his decision on fears that the articles on teen pregnancy and divorce would allow students to identify classmates who had encountered such difficulties. Justice Byron R. White ruled that educators did not "offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control … so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."
See: incorporation doctrine; New York Times v. United States.
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Prior restraint is a legal term referring to a government's actions that prevent materials from being published. Censorship that requires a person to seek governmental permission in the form of a license or imprimatur before publishing anything constitutes prior restraint every time permission is denied. More recently, prior restraint has often taken the form of an injunction or other governmental order prohibiting the publication of a specific document or subject. Sometimes, the government becomes aware of a forthcoming publication on a particular subject and seeks to prevent it. In other cases, the government attempts to halt ongoing publication and prevent its resumption. These injunctions are also usually considered to be cases of prior restraint, because future publications are stopped before they start.
In William Blackstone’s Commentaries “Freedom of the Press” is defined as the right to be free from prior restraints. In addition, he held that a person should not be punished for speaking or writing the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends. (However, truth alone was not considered a sufficient justification, if published with bad motives.)
This view was the common legal understanding at the time the US constitution was adopted. Only later have the concepts of freedom of speech and the press been extended (in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries sharing their legal tradition) to protect honest error, or truth even if published for questionable reasons.
Prior restraint is often considered a particularly oppressive form of censorship in Anglo-American jurisprudence because it prevents the restricted material from being heard or distributed at all. Other forms of restrictions on expression (such as suits for libel, slander, defamation, or actions for criminal libel) generally involve punishment only after the offending material has been published. While such punishment might lead to a chilling effect, legal commentators argue that at least such actions do not directly impoverish the marketplace of ideas. Prior restraint, on the other hand, takes an idea or material completely out of the marketplace. Thus it is often considered to be the most extreme form of censorship. The United States Supreme Court expressed this view in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart by noting:
Also, most of the early struggles for freedom of the press were against forms of prior restraint. Thus prior restraint came to be looked upon with a particular horror, and Anglo-American courts became particularly unwilling to approve it, when they might approve other forms of press restriction.
The first notable case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled on a prior restraint issue was Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, (1931). In that case the Court held prior restraints to be unconstitutional, except in extremely limited circumstances such as national security issues. The ruling came about after Jay Near's newspaper, The Saturday Press, a small local paper that ran countless exposés of Minneapolis's elected officials’ alleged illicit activities, including gambling, racketeering, and graft, was silenced by the Minnesota Gag Law of 1925, also known as The Public Nuisance Law. Near’s critics called his paper a scandal sheet, and alleged that he tried to extort money threatening to publish attacks on officials and others. In the Near case the Court held that the state had no power to enjoin the publication of the paper in this way – that any such action would be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. It wrote:
And
This was an extension of the Court’s earlier views, which had followed Blackstone. In Patterson v. Colorado, the Court had written: “In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare.” (quoted in the Near decision). The Near decision was the first time that it was held that even alleged untruth or malicious intent would not be sufficient reason to impose prior restraints. Near was decided 5-4, and the four dissenting justices strongly approved of the "gag law", and felt that the nature of the articles in the Saturday Press, including their recurrent anti-Semitism, their frequent (allegedly false) accusations of official misconduct, and their disrespectful and confrontational tone, made them unworthy of protection. But this view did not prevail. After the Near decision, newspapers had a clearly established freedom to criticize public officials without fear of retribution, even when charges made by the papers could not be proven in court. Newspapers could still be punished through libel laws, if they published material found to be untrue. It should be noted that the "Gag Law" was unique in the United States at that time, and even in Minnesota had only been used on two occasions. Indeed the Court commented on the unusual nature of the proceeding in its decision.
The Court in Near left open the possibility of prior restraints for various exceptional purposes, such as national security, control of obscenity, and the like. It wrote:
In a later case (Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart), the Court wrote:
This shows the strong later acceptance of what had been a disputed decision when it was first handed down.
During World War I, and to a greater extent during World War II, war correspondents accompanied military forces, and their reports were subject to advance censorship to preserve military secrets. The extent of such censorship was not generally challenged, and no major court case arose from this issue. In later conflicts the degree to which war reporting was subject to censorship varied, and in some cases it has been alleged that the censorship was as much political as military in purpose. This was particularly true during the Vietnam War and the invasion of Grenada.
Such issues arose again during the
In the Pentagon Papers case (New York Times Co. v. United States, 1971), the Nixon administration sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post newspapers from publishing excerpts from a top-secret United States Department of Defense history of the United States involvement in the Vietnam War from 1945 to 1971. The government tried to use the “national security” exception that had been suggested in the Near decision. The Supreme Court struck down the injunctions. However, the decision was fragmented, with nine separate opinions being filed in the case. It was not clear at the time what the effect would be on future prior restraint cases. j
On March 15 1950 Scientific American published an article by Hans Bethe about thermonuclear fusion, the basic process that makes stars shine, and that is used in the hydrogen bomb (or H-Bomb). The AEC (Atomic Energy Commission) ordered publication stopped. Several thousand copies of the printed magazine were destroyed, and the article was published with some text removed at the direction of the AEC. At this time there existed in the United States no workable designs for a hydrogen bomb (the Teller-Ulam design would not come into existence for another year), but the U.S. was engaged in a crash program to develop one. Gerard Piel, the publisher of Scientific American, complained that the AEC was "suppressing information which the American People need in order to form intelligent judgments." Bethe, however, declined to support this complaint, and the suppression of the unedited version of the article was never litigated.
In February 1979, an anti-nuclear activist named Howard Morland drafted an article for The Progressive magazine, entitled "The H-Bomb Secret: To Know How is to Ask Why." The article was an attempt by Morland to publish what he thought the "H-Bomb Secret" was (the Teller-Ulam design), derived from various unclassified sources and informal interviews with scientists and plant workers. Through a number of complicated circumstances, the Department of Energy attempted to enjoin its publication, alleging that the article contained sensitive technical information which was (1) probably derived from classified sources, or (2) became a classified source when compiled in a correct way, even if it were derived from unclassified sources, based on the "born secret" provisions of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. A preliminary injunction was granted against the article's publication, and Morland and the magazine appealed (United States v. The Progressive, et al.). After a lengthy set of hearings (one in camera, another open to the public), and attracting considerable attention as a "freedom of the press" case, the government dropped its charges after it claimed the case became moot when another bomb speculator (Chuck Hansen) published his own views on the "secret" (many commentators speculated that they were afraid the Atomic Energy Act would become overturned under such scrutiny). The article was duly published in The Progressive (in the November 1979 issue) six months after it was originally scheduled, and remains available in libraries. (As an aside, Morland himself decided that he did not have the secret, and published a "corrected" version a month later.)
Frequently a court will impose advance restrictions on lawyers, parties, and on the press in reporting of trials, particularly criminal trials. These restrictions are intended to protect the right to a fair trial, and to avoid interference with the judicial process. Nonetheless, they are a form of prior restraint, and the press in particular has often objected to such orders.
In Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, (427 U.S. 539) (1976), the United States Supreme Court overturned such a "gag order". It ruled that alternative methods to help ensure a fair trial, short of prior restraints, might have been used, and that it was not all clear, under the circumstances, that the gag order would have the desired effect even if upheld. It also made a particular point of asserting that orders restricting reporting on events that occur in open court are not permissible. It wrote:
The Court's conclusion in this case reaffirmed its general opposition to prior restraints, and indicated that judicial gag orders would be sustained only in exceptional cases. It wrote:
In the United Kingdom judicial gag orders are much more frequently employed, and the strong prejudice against them reflected in the above quote does not seem to be felt by British courts. Other countries also employ such orders more freely than the United States does.
In October 1999 the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), learned of the availability on the internet of DeCSS, a program intended to allow DVDs to be viewed on operating systems that lacked commercial DVD players, and to that end, bypassing the encryption system known as the Content Scrambling System (CSS) generally used on commercial DVDs. The MPAA responded by sending out a number of cease and desist letters to web site operators who posted the software. In January 2000, a lawsuit was filed against the publisher of the online magazine 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, and others. This case is known as Universal v. Reimerdes.
The suit asked for an injunction under the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibiting the 2600 site from posting the DeCSS code. It also asked for a prohibition on linking to other sites that posted the code.
The injunction was issued and sustained in an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the constitutionality of the DMCA was upheld. The district court wrote that the computer code "… does more, in other words, than convey a message" and that "… it has a distinctly functional, non-speech aspect in addition to reflecting the thoughts of the programmers." The appeals court later wrote that "Under the circumstances amply shown by the record, the injunction's linking prohibition validly regulates the Appellants' opportunity instantly to enable anyone anywhere to gain unauthorized access to copyrighted movies on DVDs" thus upholding the injunction against publishing links to the DeCSS code in these circumstances.
The appeals court did consider the prior restraint and free expression issues, but treated the DeCSS program primarily as a means of evading copyright protection, and under that theory, held that the 2600 site could be permanently enjoined from posting the DeCSS code, and from linking to sites that posted it in an attempt to make the code available. The case was not taken to the Supreme Court.
There is a long history of prior restraints on the theater; and, in the United Kingdom, plays still required a license until well into the twentieth century. This attitude was early transferred to motion pictures, and prior restraints have been retained for films long after they have been dropped for other forms of publication. Both the state of Maryland and the province of Ontario retained film censor boards to a particularly late date. However, Maryland abandoned its board in the 1980s, and a 2004 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, reversing a previous trend in favor of the Ontario Film Classification Board's right to insist on cuts, ruled that the province had no right to insist on cuts as a condition of release in view of the fact that Canadian federal obscenity laws were sufficient to deal with obscene material. In May, 2005, the Ontario government ended the power of the Classification Board to insist on cuts, requiring all films that were not judged obscene to be rated "R" for adults only.
In many countries, legally effective rating systems are in effect. See History of British Film Certificates for information on film restrictions in the UK.
Many industries have formulated to "voluntary" codes limiting the content of expression. Examples of these include the Hays Code, which affected Hollywood films from the 1930s to the 1950s, and the Comics Code, which was designed to deal with the rise of horror comics in the 1950s and lasted into the 1970s. The movie rating system currently in effect in the United States, run by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) is another such industry code. Such codes have generally been adopted with the twofold purposes of forestalling possible government intervention, and avoiding unfavorable publicity or boycotts. While such codes are not generally enforced by governmental action, they are generally enforced on content producers by gatekeepers in the marketing chain: studios in the case of the Hayes Code; distributors in the case of the Comics Code; and theater chains in the case of the MPAA rating system. Content producers have often objected to these codes, and argue that they are, in effect, a form of prior restraint.
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