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Largely because of political sensitivities, psychological warfare has had several names during the 20th century, including propaganda, political warfare, and psychological operations (psyops). It encompasses activities to weaken the enemy's will, reinforce loyalty, and gain the military or moral support of the uncommitted, usually through the control and management of news and information. Its rise in importance is directly related to the development of print and other media, particularly in the last 100 years. Put simply, it is perception management. The aggressive needs of psychological warfare in a world war have since given way to the different aims of psychological operations in times of peace. Although the distinction between it and propaganda is often indistinct, the former is based on presenting a version of the truth (or perceived truth) to an enemy, whilst propaganda has come to mean peddling a lie, often to one's own side.
Although handbills appeared in the American independence war and were dropped by balloon on Prussians besieging Paris in 1870-1, modern psyops can be traced back to the Second Boer War. Following widespread criticism in the world's media of British conduct of the war, which had resulted in the deaths of some 20, 000 Boer civilians, many nations came to support their own war effort in WW I with psyops activity. This included recruitment posters, and—with government encouragement—newspapers interwove truth and fiction in a deliberate effort to focus national hate against a common enemy. Incidents like the German execution of British nurse Edith Cavell and the sinking by a U-boat of the liner Lusitania in 1915, together with atrocities committed against the civilian population of Belgium, were inflated in an effort to manipulate public opinion.
Balloons and aircraft dropped newspapers to civilians living behind enemy lines containing summaries of news otherwise censored. Strategic themes in leaflets dropped over enemy trenches included despair—supporting the idea that a defeat was inevitable—and hope—inviting the soldier to surrender and thereby save his life. Other literature suggested that those at home were living in luxury, despite poor rations at the front. Deserters were also used to persuade their comrades at the front to surrender. By 1918, deserters, supported by aerial leaflets, were used by most armies with varying degrees of success. After the war, senior commanders, including Ludendorff, acknowledged that the British leaflet campaign of 1918 was very effective in sapping their soldiers' will to fight.
The growth of adult literacy and expansion of radio broadcasting during the 1930s altered significantly the importance of psyops during WW II. All BBC broadcasts to occupied Europe commenced with ‘V’ (for Victory) in Morse, and the letter was chalked on walls all over occupied Europe. Stations broadcast daily to all European occupied countries, using native speakers who had escaped the invasion of their homelands. Broadcasts contained a mixture of news and current affairs as well as coded messages to resistance movements. All sides in the European and Pacific campaigns sponsored stations that broadcast a mixture of news (a blend of truth and falsehood) and popular music. True news stories were usually items that could be checked independently by the listener, thus giving the lie credence also. Such broadcasting encompasses three categories: white (the origin is known), grey (the origin is unknown or concealed), and black (where the origin is faked). All combatant nations placed heavy emphasis on recruitment posters and the security of information, and in Britain the ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ theme was promoted throughout the war. Using images of Adolf Hitler, the Germans demonstrated the effectiveness of the personality cult via poster campaigns as a unifying weapon.
Vehicle-mounted and manpack amplifiers were deployed in many theatres by front-line troops. The Germans and Russians used propaganda companies with combat troops, and loudspeakers were also used in the Pacific. These broadcast pre-recorded and live messages relating to the local tactical situation. They could also be used as a force multiplier, broadcasting sounds of troops or armour. All sides dropped leaflets encouraging soldiers to surrender during 1939-45. These took the form of a safe conduct pass signed by a senior commander. In total, the Allies dropped over 1.5 billion leaflets, emphasizing the importance attached to psyops during WW II.
Psyop techniques have been used in every war and emergency since 1945. They have been particularly successful in the ‘bush fire wars’ of the 1950s and 1960s, when broadcasting and distributing leaflets by air to rebel tribesmen, guerrillas, and terrorists was the most effective means of communication or persuasion. The success of these techniques in the Malaya emergency and the 1952 Mau Mau uprising convinced field commanders that psyops were an essential component of modern low-intensity Operations, particularly if fully integrated into the activities of government. In Vietnam, over 10 billion leaflets were airdropped or distributed by hand throughout the war.
In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, both sides instigated a psyops campaign, Iraqi radio stations trying to divide the Arab coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. The Coalition eventually dropped 29 million leaflets by air, whilst psyops troops operating on the battlefield induced surrender or withdrawal. However, the term is becoming politically unacceptable, so much so that in Bosnia, psyops were known by the euphemism ‘information operations’. Undoubtedly, the use of psyops against an enemy offers an alternative, or essential precursor, to combat and casualties, while its application to allies or domestic populations will strive to reinforce public support. It will grow in importance, and the omnipresence of the media gives enormous scope for its use.
— Peter Caddick-Adams
is war propaganda directed at enemy audiences to induce surrender, insurrection, or disruption. It is most effective when based on military realities or likelihoods. It is intertwined with twentieth‐century mass media, which allows the dissemination and reception of information behind enemy lines through leaflets, radio, and television. Traditionally, one distinguishes among three kinds of psychological warfare: white, gray, and black. White propaganda openly admits origin, and is disseminated openly by clearly identifiable sources; gray indicates no source; black disguises its source or purports to come from somewhere other than its true source. Black propaganda trades in disinformation, that is, misinformation or untrue statements deliberately spread to sow confusion. Today, disinformation has eclipsed black propaganda as a technique of psychological warfare; it works because it plays on recipients' darkest suspicions: it trades in prejudice and bias.
Psychological warfare may be synonymous with the twentieth century, but it is hardly new to the conduct of warfare. The Chinese military specialist Sun Tzu noted in his fourth‐century B.C. Art of War that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” In 1400 B.C., Joshua used the techniques of psychological warfare when he marched around the city of Jericho seven times sounding his trumpet to intimidate the enemy. The role of deception in siege warfare is famously part of the Siege of Troy. Thanks to the wooden horse in which Greek soldiers were hidden, we consider the Trojan Horse synonymous with “Greeks bearing gifts.” In short, intelligent military commanders have frequently resorted to strategem, particularly in siege warfare, and this is part of what today we consider psychological warfare.
World War I saw the first use of modern propaganda techniques on a large scale. Woodrow Wilson used the tactics of white propaganda in promoting his Fourteen Points (1918) as a basis for ending the war. The enemy was depicted through atrocities propaganda, as the “Brutish Hun,” destroyer of civilization, an enemy who did not scruple to kill innocent women and children in the sinking of the Lusitania (1915). Civilians at home, and doughboys in the trenches, knew it was Germans who bombed the cathedral at Reims. Adolf Hitler paid careful attention to Allied propaganda successes in some of the shrewdest parts of his autobiography, Mein Kampf (1925–26).
World War II led to the advent of “psyops” as a distinct part of military operations and planning. Correctly understood, psychological warfare does not treat home morale or concern itself with public relations involving friendly countries. It is, rather, concerned with the enemy and enemy‐controlled countries. Military force (the alternative to psychological warfare) concerns itself with threats, promises, subversion, and destruction; psychological warfare trades in warnings, alternatives, compassion, and the presumptive surcease of strategic rather than terrorist bombings.
Arguments as to the effectiveness of psychological warfare in World War II turn on what role, if any, these techniques had in persuading the German soldier to surrender before 8 May 1945. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower stressed the significance of psyops to modern warfare in an oft‐quoted statement in the spring of 1945: “Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal.” Most military historians recognize the import of this statement but feel that the doctrine of “Unconditional Surrender” fatally undermined the possibility of effective psyops in World War II by precluding the effective utilization of alternatives and compassion. One must conclude that we know an enormous amount about tricks and ruses (often concocted by brilliant practitioners) but very little about demonstrable impact.
The Korean War introduced a new sort of psyops, the concept of brainwashing, first mentioned in 1950, a translation of the Chinese term for “thought reform.” To brainwash is to change drastically someone's outlook. It involves convincing someone thoroughly, usually through nefarious means. Twenty‐one American prisoners of war refused repatriation in 1953; Cold War hysteria in America led many to believe that they were the victims of totalitarian practitioners with superhuman skills in indoctrination. Though the word brainwashing is part of everyday speech, today it is used to describe the techniques of those who create religious cults; the American military, after exhaustive analysis, concluded that in terms of troop morale, there was no such thing as brainwashing; instead, the problem had to do with a captured soldier's inner psychological strength or emotional vulnerability.
The Vietnam War made substantial—and notorious—use of psyops. Persons trained in civil and political affairs joined Special Operations Forces to bring about so‐called pacification, and to aid in the defection of the Viet Cong to the South Vietnamese side, all part of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). Certainly, psyops operations were mistrusted by conventional soldiers and their commanders, but Vietnam systematized the phrase coined by Gen. Sir Gerald Templer as the goal of British efforts to undermine guerrilla activity in Malaya in the 1950s, “the battle for hearts and minds”—surely the central concern of psychological warfare in all of its guises.
More recently, the Persian Gulf War (1991) made stunning use of disinformation as a tool of military policy, suggesting that future psyops will make the control of information a central concern. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf was happy to let television commentators and newspaper correspondents repeat endlessly the inevitability of an assault on Kuwait City from the sea. Saddam Hussein and his advisers assumed this must be official doctrine and arranged their forces for such an eventuality. When this proved not the case, “the mother of all battles” came to a quick conclusion. Further, the advent of satellite television broadcasting, allowing CNN correspondent Peter Arnett to broadcast from the enemy's capital while the war progressed, suggests that psyops and information policy are more than ever subjects no modern military commander can ignore. Successes in deception may make fascinating reading, but the real success of psyops entails techniques more white than black in an effort “to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
[See also Bombing of Civilians; News Media, War, and the Military; Propaganda and Public Relations, Government.]
Bibliography
The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions, having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.
See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.
Joshua's trumpets at the battle of Jericho suggest that psychological warfare, also called psywar, is probably as old as warfare itself. Nonetheless, only during World War I did the major powers designate official agencies to oversee this effort, the first example of organized psychological warfare. The U.S. Committee on Public Information, otherwise known as the Creel Committee, marked the United States's foray into formal Propaganda activities. In quite a different application, the propaganda section of the American Expeditionary Forces staff headquarters represented the first official U.S. experiment in the military use of psychological warfare.
Psychological warfare aims to complement, not supplant, military operations. It breaks down into two broad categories. First, strategic psychological warfare usually targets the enemy in its entirety: troops, civilians, and enemy-occupied areas. Second, tactical psychological warfare most commonly supports localized combat operations by fostering uncertainty and dissension, and sometimes causing the enemy to surrender.
American World War I psychological warfare techniques appear primitive by later standards. Following the lead of the British and French, the United States used the leaflet as the primary vehicle for the delivery of messages intended to demoralize the enemy and to encourage surrender. Hedgehoppers, balloons, and, to a lesser degree, modified mortar shells delivered these messages to the target audience. The goal was to alienate the German troops from their "militarist" and "antidemocratic" regimes. Later, the Nazis suggested that the World War I German army had not lost that conflict but instead that Allied propaganda had victimized it.
Psychological warfare activities fell into abeyance during the interwar period and did not resume until World War II. At that time the American government set up hastily improvised propaganda agencies, which jealously fought over spheres of interest and mission assignments. This infighting continued until the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). On 9 March 1943, Executive Order 9312 redefined their respective functions.
On the theater level psychological warfare operations differed widely from one command to another because Executive Order 9312 required commander approval for all plans and projects. Under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower a joint British and American military staff, in cooperation with such propaganda agencies as the OWI and the OSS, managed all Allied psychological warfare activities. In the Pacific commands and subcommands, there were varying degrees of official acceptance for psychological warfare. Adm. William F. Halsey's command stood as the sole exception to this rule because he would have nothing to do with psychological warfare and would not allow OWI and OSS civilians to have clearances for this area. As the war progressed, this unconventional weapon of war slowly won grudging official approval and a place on the staffs of Pacific commands. Leaflets were by far the most prevalent means of delivery, but propaganda agencies also employed loudspeaker and radio broadcasts. The American military has continued to use increasingly sophisticated psychological warfare in more recent conflicts, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War.
Bibliography
Katz, Barry M. Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989.
Simpson, Christopher. Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945–1960. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Vaughn, Stephen. Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.
Winkler, Allan M. The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978.
(DOD) The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. Also called PSYWAR.

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Psychological warfare (PSYWAR), or the basic aspects of modern psychological operations (PSYOP), have been known by many other names or terms, including Psy Ops, Political Warfare, “Hearts and Minds”, and Propaganda.[1] Various techniques are used, by any set of groups, and aimed to influence a target audience's value systems, belief systems, emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior. It is used to induce confessions or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives, and are sometimes combined with black operations or false flag tactics. Target audiences can be governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
In Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, Jacques Ellul discusses psychological warfare as a common peace policy practice between nations as a form of indirect aggression in place of military aggression. This type of propaganda drains the public opinion of an opposing regime by stripping away its power on public opinion. This form of aggression is hard to defend against because no international court of justice is capable of protecting against psychological aggression since it cannot be legally adjudicated. The only defense is using the same means of psychological warfare. It is the burden of every government to defend its state against propaganda aggression. "Here the propagandists is dealing with a foreign adversary whose morale he seeks to destroy by psychological means so that the opponent begins to doubt the validity of his beliefs and actions."[2]
The U.S. Department of Defense defines psychological warfare as:
"The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives."[3]
This definition indicates that a critical element of the U.S. psychological operations capabilities includes propaganda and by extension counterpropaganda. Joint Publication 3-53 establishes specific policy to use public affairs mediums to counterpropaganda from foreign origins. [4]
During World War II the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff defined psychological warfare more broadly stating "Psychological warfare employs any weapon to influence the mind of the enemy. The weapons are psychological only in the effect they produce and not because of the weapons themselves."[5]
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Although the first Great king of the Achaemenid Empire was known as a conqueror, he is also remembered for his tolerance towards those he defeated.[6]
To ensure that the new conquered peoples did not revolt, Cyrus the Great showed respect to their customs and allowed them to continue to practice their religions. He also freed 40000 Jewish slaves in Babylon, sent them back to Judah and funded the building of a new temple in Jerusalem, which gave him the title "Liberator" and Messiah in the Old Testament.[7]
Cyrus is also known for the creation of his new Imperial Guards, "The Immortals". Notably, in mid-battle, they removed the dead from the battlefield. So whether the battle is won or lost, their enemies never truly saw a dead Immortal, so no Immortal appeared to have died, hence the name. According to ancient historians such as Herodotus, they have been said at times to wear a thin tiara over their face, in order to give them a faceless, menacing look, coupled with their 'deathless' reputation.
Although not always accredited as the first practitioner of psychological warfare, Alexander the Great undoubtedly showed himself to be effective in swaying the mindsets of the populaces that were conquered in his campaigns. This fact is evident upon study and research into the remaining historical records regarding the terms of peace from the reign of Alexander of Macedonia. Though few records exist, they indicate that Alexander, or at the very least his advisers, were very shrewd negotiators and well versed in achieving diplomacy.[citation needed]
To keep the new Macedonian state and assortment of powerful Greek tribes from revolting against their leader, Alexander the Great left some of his men behind in each city to introduce Greek culture, control it, oppress dissident views, and interbreed. Alexander paid his soldiers to marry non-Greek women. He wanted to assimilate people of all nations.[citation needed]
Genghis Khan, leader of the Mongols in the 13th century AD, united his people to eventually create the largest contiguous empire in human history. Defeating the will of the enemy was the top priority.
Before attacking a settlement, the Mongol generals demanded submission to the Khan, and threatened the initial villages with complete destruction if they refused to surrender. After winning the battle, the Mongol generals fulfilled their threats and massacred the survivors.
Examples include the destruction of the nations of Kiev and Khwarizm. Consequently, tales of the encroaching horde spread to the next villages and created an aura of insecurity that undermined the possibility of future resistance.
Subsequent nations were much more likely to surrender to the Mongols without fighting. Often this, as much as the Mongols' tactical prowess, secured quick Mongol victories.
Genghis Khan also employed tactics that made his numbers seem greater than they actually were. During night operations he ordered each soldier to light three torches at dusk to give the illusion of an overwhelming army and deceive and intimidate enemy scouts. He also sometimes had objects tied to the tails of his horses, so that riding on open and dry fields raised a cloud of dust that gave the enemy the impression of great numbers. His soldiers used arrows specially notched to whistle as they flew through the air, creating a terrifying noise.
The Mongols also employed other gruesome terror tactics to weaken the will to resist. One infamous incident occurred during Tamerlane's Indian campaign. Tamerlane, an heir to the Mongol martial tradition, built a pyramid of 90,000 human heads in front of the walls of Delhi, to convince them to surrender.
Other tactics included firing severed human heads from catapults into enemy lines and over city walls to frighten enemy soldiers and citizens and spread diseases in the close confines of a besieged city. The results were thus not only psychological since in 1347, the Mongols under Janibeg catapulted corpses infected with plague into the trading city of Kaffa in Crimea, making it one of the first known uses of biological warfare.
After the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, the Nationalist General Queipo de Llano started broadcasting transmissions to be heard by Republican zone listeners. Over loudspeakers he could be heard saying: "Red soldiers, abandon arms. Franco forgives and redeems. Follow the example set by your comrades who have joined our ranks. Only then you will achieve victory, happiness at home, and peace in your heart."
One of the first leaders inexorably to gain fanatical support through the use of microphone technology was Germany's Adolf Hitler. By first creating a speaking environment, designed by Joseph Goebbels, he was able to exaggerate his presence to make him seem messianic. Hitler also coupled this with the resonating projections of his orations for effect. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made similar use of radio for propaganda against the Germans.
The British set up the Political Warfare Executive to produce and distribute 'black' and 'white' propaganda (see Categories of psychological warfare section for definitions). Through the use of powerful transmitters, broadcasts could be made across Europe. Sefton Delmer managed a successful black propaganda campaign through several radio stations which were designed to be popular with German troops while at the same time introducing news material that would weaken their morale under a veneer of authenticity.
During World War II, psychological warfare was used by the military. The invasion of Normandy was considered successful in part because of the displayed fusion of psychological warfare and military deception.[citation needed]
As an example, before D-Day, Operation Quicksilver, one element of Operation Fortitude, which itself was part of a larger deception strategy (Operation Bodyguard), created a fictional "First United States Army Group" (FUSAG) commanded by General George Patton that supposedly would invade France at the Pas-de-Calais. American troops used false signals, decoy installations and phony equipment to deceive German observation aircraft and radio interception operators.
The German Stukas used a high-pitch siren attached to the plane to lower the morale of their enemies when they performed air raids on enemy front. The siren is commonly assimilated of the sound of planes falling from the sky, on modern cinematographic industry.
When the actual invasion began, the success of Fortitude was that it misled the German High Command into believing the landings were a diversion and of keeping reserves away from the beaches. Erwin Rommel was the primary target of the psychological aspects of this operation. Convinced that Patton would lead the invasion, Rommel was caught off-guard and unable to react strongly to the Normandy invasion, as Patton's illusory FUSAG had not "yet" landed. Confidence in his own intelligence and judgement rendered the German response to the beachhead ineffectual.
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Most uses of the term psychological warfare refers to military methods such as:
Most of these techniques were developed during World War II or earlier, and have been used to some degree in every conflict since. Daniel Lerner was in the OSS (the predecessor to the US CIA) and in his book, attempts to analyze how effective the various strategies were.
He concludes that there is little evidence that any of them were dramatically successful, except perhaps surrender instructions over loudspeakers when victory was imminent. It should be noted, though, that measuring the success or failure of psychological warfare is very hard, as the conditions are very far from being a controlled experiment.
In the German Bundeswehr, the Zentrum Operative Information and its subordinate Bataillon für Operative Information 950 are responsible for the PSYOP efforts (called Operative Information in German). Both the center and the battalion are subordinate to the new Streitkräftebasis (Joint Services Support Command, SKB) and together consist of about 1,200 soldiers specialising in modern communication and media technologies. One project of the German PSYOP forces is the radio station Stimme der Freiheit (Sada-e Azadi, Voice of Freedom),[8] heard by thousands of Afghans. Another is the publication of various newspapers and magazines in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where German soldiers serve with NATO.
You may not be interested in psychological warfare, but psychological warfare is interested in you.—Xu Hezhen, a major general in the Chinese Army
Some military strategists and foreign policy analysts are bracing for major Chinese onslaughts by way of psychological warfare. According to U.S. military analysts, attacking the enemy’s mind is among the chief strategies China will use in order to catch its adversaries off-guard. Psychological warfare would disarm an enemy in a way even nuclear weapons cannot, and so many say the U.S. must prepare for psychological warfare on an unprecedented level.[10]
This type of warfare, being rooted in Chinese Stratagems outlined in words such as Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and The Thirty-Six Stratagems, has become so engrained in Chinese culture that the same applies to military strategy and foreign policy strategy. In its dealings with its rivals, China is expected to utilize Marxist dialectics to mobilize communist loyalists, as well as flex its economic and military muscle to persuade other nations to do what it wants. The Chinese government will try to control the media to keep a tight hold on propaganda efforts for its people, though the success of this will be mitigated by the ever-increasing global availability of information. U.S. analysts take so seriously the concept of ji (planning) that they take any sign of Chinese military cooperation (e.g., sending troops to Sudan or giving information about Iran’s nuclear program) cautiously.[10]
In the British Armed Forces, PSYOPS are handled by the tri-service 15 Psychological Operations Group. (See also MI5 and Secret Intelligence Service). The British were one of the first major military powers to use psychological warfare in World War II, especially against the Japanese. The Gurkhas, who are Nepalese soldiers in British service, have always been feared by the enemy due to their use of a curved knife called the kukri.
The British used this fear to great effect, as Gurkhas were used to terrorize Japanese soldiers through nighttime raids on their camps and they terrified also to Argentine soldiers, most of them conscripts, during the Falklands War.
The purpose of United States psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to US objectives. The Special Activities Division (SAD) is a division of the Central Intelligence Agency's National Clandestine Service, responsible for Covert Action and "Special Activities". These special activities include covert political influence (which includes psychological operations) and paramilitary operations.[11] SAD's political influence group is the only US unit allowed to conduct these operations covertly and is considered the primary unit in this area.[11]
Dedicated psychological operations units exist in the United States Army. The United States Navy also plans and executes limited PSYOP missions. United States PSYOP units and soldiers of all branches of the military are prohibited by law from targeting U.S. citizens with PSYOP within the borders of the United States(Executive Order S-1233, DOD Directive S-3321.1, and National Security Decision Directive 130.) While United States Army PSYOP units may offer non-PSYOP support to domestic military missions, they can only target foreign audiences.
The United States ran an extensive program of psychological warfare during the Vietnam War. The Phoenix Program had the dual aim of assassinating Viet Cong personnel and terrorizing any potential sympathizers or passive supporters. Chieu Hoi program of the South Vietnam government promoted Viet Cong defections.
When members of the VCI were assassinated, CIA and Special Forces operatives placed playing cards in the mouth of the deceased as a calling card. During the Phoenix Program, over 19,000 Viet Cong supporters were killed.[12]
The CIA made extensive use of Contra death squads in Nicaragua to destabilize the Sandinista government, which the U.S. maintained was communist.[13] The CIA used psychological warfare techniques against the Panamanians by broadcasting pirate TV broadcasts. The CIA has extensively used propaganda broadcasts against the Cuban government through TV Marti, based in Miami, Florida. However, the Cuban government has been somewhat successful in jamming the signal of TV Marti.
During the Waco Siege, the FBI and ATF conducted psychological operations on the men, women and children inside the Mount Carmel complex. This included using loudspeakers to play sounds of animals being slaughtered, drilling noises and clips from talk shows about how much their leader David Koresh was hated. In addition, very bright, flashing lights were used at night.[14]
In the Iraq War, the United States used the shock and awe campaign to psychologically maim, and break the will of the Iraqi Army to fight.
More recently, an article in Rolling Stone magazine alleges the United States has conducted psychological operations on its own senators and other decision makers in order to influence foreign policy. The article quotes U.S. Army Lt. Col. Michael Holmes describing how the U.S. Army illegally ordered a team of soldiers specializing in "psychological operations" to manipulate visiting American senators into providing more troops and funding for the war. According to Holmes, the orders came from the command of Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, a three-star general in charge of training Afghan troops.[15] Gen. David Petraeus commander of the forces in Afghanistan ordered an investigation into the allegations made in the article.[16]
In his book Daniel Lerner divides psychological warfare operations into three categories:[17][page needed]
Mr. Lerner points out that grey and black operations ultimately have a heavy cost, in that the target population sooner or later recognizes them as propaganda and discredits the source. He writes, "This is one of the few dogmas advanced by Sykewarriors that is likely to endure as an axiom of propaganda: Credibility is a condition of persuasion. Before you can make a man do as you say, you must make him believe what you say."[17]:28 Consistent with this idea, the Allied strategy in World War II was predominantly one of truth (with certain exceptions).[citation needed]
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