psychological warfare

The use of various techniques, such as propaganda and terror, to lower an enemy's morale.

Largely because of political sensitivities, psychological warfare has had several names during the 20th century, including propaganda, political warfare, and psychological operations (psyops). It encompasses activities to weaken the enemy's will, reinforce loyalty, and gain the military or moral support of the uncommitted, usually through the control and management of news and information. Its rise in importance is directly related to the development of print and other media, particularly in the last 100 years. Put simply, it is perception management. The aggressive needs of psychological warfare in a world war have since given way to the different aims of psychological operations in times of peace. Although the distinction between it and propaganda is often indistinct, the former is based on presenting a version of the truth (or perceived truth) to an enemy, whilst propaganda has come to mean peddling a lie, often to one's own side.

Although handbills appeared in the American independence war and were dropped by balloon on Prussians besieging Paris in 1870-1, modern psyops can be traced back to the Second Boer War. Following widespread criticism in the world's media of British conduct of the war, which had resulted in the deaths of some 20, 000 Boer civilians, many nations came to support their own war effort in WW I with psyops activity. This included recruitment posters, and—with government encouragement—newspapers interwove truth and fiction in a deliberate effort to focus national hate against a common enemy. Incidents like the German execution of British nurse Edith Cavell and the sinking by a U-boat of the liner Lusitania in 1915, together with atrocities committed against the civilian population of Belgium, were inflated in an effort to manipulate public opinion.

Balloons and aircraft dropped newspapers to civilians living behind enemy lines containing summaries of news otherwise censored. Strategic themes in leaflets dropped over enemy trenches included despair—supporting the idea that a defeat was inevitable—and hope—inviting the soldier to surrender and thereby save his life. Other literature suggested that those at home were living in luxury, despite poor rations at the front. Deserters were also used to persuade their comrades at the front to surrender. By 1918, deserters, supported by aerial leaflets, were used by most armies with varying degrees of success. After the war, senior commanders, including Ludendorff, acknowledged that the British leaflet campaign of 1918 was very effective in sapping their soldiers' will to fight.

The growth of adult literacy and expansion of radio broadcasting during the 1930s altered significantly the importance of psyops during WW II. All BBC broadcasts to occupied Europe commenced with ‘V’ (for Victory) in Morse, and the letter was chalked on walls all over occupied Europe. Stations broadcast daily to all European occupied countries, using native speakers who had escaped the invasion of their homelands. Broadcasts contained a mixture of news and current affairs as well as coded messages to resistance movements. All sides in the European and Pacific campaigns sponsored stations that broadcast a mixture of news (a blend of truth and falsehood) and popular music. True news stories were usually items that could be checked independently by the listener, thus giving the lie credence also. Such broadcasting encompasses three categories: white (the origin is known), grey (the origin is unknown or concealed), and black (where the origin is faked). All combatant nations placed heavy emphasis on recruitment posters and the security of information, and in Britain the ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ theme was promoted throughout the war. Using images of Adolf Hitler, the Germans demonstrated the effectiveness of the personality cult via poster campaigns as a unifying weapon.

Vehicle-mounted and manpack amplifiers were deployed in many theatres by front-line troops. The Germans and Russians used propaganda companies with combat troops, and loudspeakers were also used in the Pacific. These broadcast pre-recorded and live messages relating to the local tactical situation. They could also be used as a force multiplier, broadcasting sounds of troops or armour. All sides dropped leaflets encouraging soldiers to surrender during 1939-45. These took the form of a safe conduct pass signed by a senior commander. In total, the Allies dropped over 1.5 billion leaflets, emphasizing the importance attached to psyops during WW II.

Psyop techniques have been used in every war and emergency since 1945. They have been particularly successful in the ‘bush fire wars’ of the 1950s and 1960s, when broadcasting and distributing leaflets by air to rebel tribesmen, guerrillas, and terrorists was the most effective means of communication or persuasion. The success of these techniques in the Malaya emergency and the 1952 Mau Mau uprising convinced field commanders that psyops were an essential component of modern low-intensity Operations, particularly if fully integrated into the activities of government. In Vietnam, over 10 billion leaflets were airdropped or distributed by hand throughout the war.

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, both sides instigated a psyops campaign, Iraqi radio stations trying to divide the Arab coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. The Coalition eventually dropped 29 million leaflets by air, whilst psyops troops operating on the battlefield induced surrender or withdrawal. However, the term is becoming politically unacceptable, so much so that in Bosnia, psyops were known by the euphemism ‘information operations’. Undoubtedly, the use of psyops against an enemy offers an alternative, or essential precursor, to combat and casualties, while its application to allies or domestic populations will strive to reinforce public support. It will grow in importance, and the omnipresence of the media gives enormous scope for its use.

— Peter Caddick-Adams

is war propaganda directed at enemy audiences to induce surrender, insurrection, or disruption. It is most effective when based on military realities or likelihoods. It is intertwined with twentieth‐century mass media, which allows the dissemination and reception of information behind enemy lines through leaflets, radio, and television. Traditionally, one distinguishes among three kinds of psychological warfare: white, gray, and black. White propaganda openly admits origin, and is disseminated openly by clearly identifiable sources; gray indicates no source; black disguises its source or purports to come from somewhere other than its true source. Black propaganda trades in disinformation, that is, misinformation or untrue statements deliberately spread to sow confusion. Today, disinformation has eclipsed black propaganda as a technique of psychological warfare; it works because it plays on recipients' darkest suspicions: it trades in prejudice and bias.

Psychological warfare may be synonymous with the twentieth century, but it is hardly new to the conduct of warfare. The Chinese military specialist Sun Tzu noted in his fourth‐century B.C. Art of War that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” In 1400 B.C., Joshua used the techniques of psychological warfare when he marched around the city of Jericho seven times sounding his trumpet to intimidate the enemy. The role of deception in siege warfare is famously part of the Siege of Troy. Thanks to the wooden horse in which Greek soldiers were hidden, we consider the Trojan Horse synonymous with “Greeks bearing gifts.” In short, intelligent military commanders have frequently resorted to strategem, particularly in siege warfare, and this is part of what today we consider psychological warfare.

World War I saw the first use of modern propaganda techniques on a large scale. Woodrow Wilson used the tactics of white propaganda in promoting his Fourteen Points (1918) as a basis for ending the war. The enemy was depicted through atrocities propaganda, as the “Brutish Hun,” destroyer of civilization, an enemy who did not scruple to kill innocent women and children in the sinking of the Lusitania (1915). Civilians at home, and doughboys in the trenches, knew it was Germans who bombed the cathedral at Reims. Adolf Hitler paid careful attention to Allied propaganda successes in some of the shrewdest parts of his autobiography, Mein Kampf (1925–26).

World War II led to the advent of “psyops” as a distinct part of military operations and planning. Correctly understood, psychological warfare does not treat home morale or concern itself with public relations involving friendly countries. It is, rather, concerned with the enemy and enemy‐controlled countries. Military force (the alternative to psychological warfare) concerns itself with threats, promises, subversion, and destruction; psychological warfare trades in warnings, alternatives, compassion, and the presumptive surcease of strategic rather than terrorist bombings.

Arguments as to the effectiveness of psychological warfare in World War II turn on what role, if any, these techniques had in persuading the German soldier to surrender before 8 May 1945. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower stressed the significance of psyops to modern warfare in an oft‐quoted statement in the spring of 1945: “Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal.” Most military historians recognize the import of this statement but feel that the doctrine of “Unconditional Surrender” fatally undermined the possibility of effective psyops in World War II by precluding the effective utilization of alternatives and compassion. One must conclude that we know an enormous amount about tricks and ruses (often concocted by brilliant practitioners) but very little about demonstrable impact.

The Korean War introduced a new sort of psyops, the concept of brainwashing, first mentioned in 1950, a translation of the Chinese term for “thought reform.” To brainwash is to change drastically someone's outlook. It involves convincing someone thoroughly, usually through nefarious means. Twenty‐one American prisoners of war refused repatriation in 1953; Cold War hysteria in America led many to believe that they were the victims of totalitarian practitioners with superhuman skills in indoctrination. Though the word brainwashing is part of everyday speech, today it is used to describe the techniques of those who create religious cults; the American military, after exhaustive analysis, concluded that in terms of troop morale, there was no such thing as brainwashing; instead, the problem had to do with a captured soldier's inner psychological strength or emotional vulnerability.

The Vietnam War made substantial—and notorious—use of psyops. Persons trained in civil and political affairs joined Special Operations Forces to bring about so‐called pacification, and to aid in the defection of the Viet Cong to the South Vietnamese side, all part of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). Certainly, psyops operations were mistrusted by conventional soldiers and their commanders, but Vietnam systematized the phrase coined by Gen. Sir Gerald Templer as the goal of British efforts to undermine guerrilla activity in Malaya in the 1950s, “the battle for hearts and minds”—surely the central concern of psychological warfare in all of its guises.

More recently, the Persian Gulf War (1991) made stunning use of disinformation as a tool of military policy, suggesting that future psyops will make the control of information a central concern. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf was happy to let television commentators and newspaper correspondents repeat endlessly the inevitability of an assault on Kuwait City from the sea. Saddam Hussein and his advisers assumed this must be official doctrine and arranged their forces for such an eventuality. When this proved not the case, “the mother of all battles” came to a quick conclusion. Further, the advent of satellite television broadcasting, allowing CNN correspondent Peter Arnett to broadcast from the enemy's capital while the war progressed, suggests that psyops and information policy are more than ever subjects no modern military commander can ignore. Successes in deception may make fascinating reading, but the real success of psyops entails techniques more white than black in an effort “to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

[See also Bombing of Civilians; News Media, War, and the Military; Propaganda and Public Relations, Government.]

Bibliography

• Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I, 1927; repr. 1971.
• Daniel Lerner, Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign, D‐Day to VE‐Day, 1949; repr. 1971.
• Terrence H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, 1962.
• Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War, 1992.
• Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day, 1995.
• Robert Cole, Propaganda in Twentieth Century War and Politics: An Annotated Bibliography, 1996

The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions, having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

For more information on psychological warfare, visit Britannica.com.

Joshua's trumpets at the battle of Jericho suggest that psychological warfare, also called psywar, is probably as old as warfare itself. Nonetheless, only during World War I did the major powers designate official agencies to oversee this effort, the first example of organized psychological warfare. The U.S. Committee on Public Information, otherwise known as the Creel Committee, marked the United States's foray into formal Propaganda activities. In quite a different application, the propaganda section of the American Expeditionary Forces staff headquarters represented the first official U.S. experiment in the military use of psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare aims to complement, not supplant, military operations. It breaks down into two broad categories. First, strategic psychological warfare usually targets the enemy in its entirety: troops, civilians, and enemy-occupied areas. Second, tactical psychological warfare most commonly supports localized combat operations by fostering uncertainty and dissension, and sometimes causing the enemy to surrender.

American World War I psychological warfare techniques appear primitive by later standards. Following the lead of the British and French, the United States used the leaflet as the primary vehicle for the delivery of messages intended to demoralize the enemy and to encourage surrender. Hedgehoppers, balloons, and, to a lesser degree, modified mortar shells delivered these messages to the target audience. The goal was to alienate the German troops from their "militarist" and "antidemocratic" regimes. Later, the Nazis suggested that the World War I German army had not lost that conflict but instead that Allied propaganda had victimized it.

Psychological warfare activities fell into abeyance during the interwar period and did not resume until World War II. At that time the American government set up hastily improvised propaganda agencies, which jealously fought over spheres of interest and mission assignments. This infighting continued until the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). On 9 March 1943, Executive Order 9312 redefined their respective functions.

On the theater level psychological warfare operations differed widely from one command to another because Executive Order 9312 required commander approval for all plans and projects. Under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower a joint British and American military staff, in cooperation with such propaganda agencies as the OWI and the OSS, managed all Allied psychological warfare activities. In the Pacific commands and subcommands, there were varying degrees of official acceptance for psychological warfare. Adm. William F. Halsey's command stood as the sole exception to this rule because he would have nothing to do with psychological warfare and would not allow OWI and OSS civilians to have clearances for this area. As the war progressed, this unconventional weapon of war slowly won grudging official approval and a place on the staffs of Pacific commands. Leaflets were by far the most prevalent means of delivery, but propaganda agencies also employed loudspeaker and radio broadcasts. The American military has continued to use increasingly sophisticated psychological warfare in more recent conflicts, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War.

Bibliography

Katz, Barry M. Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Simpson, Christopher. Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945–1960. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Vaughn, Stephen. Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

Winkler, Allan M. The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978.

(DOD) The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. Also called PSYWAR.

The U.S. Department of Defense defines psychological warfare (PSYWAR) as: "The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives."^{[citation needed]} Psychological Warfare is also known as infowars. This type of warfare is often used in modern situations, such as the dropping of leaflets and propaganda campaigns. Psychological warfare could be considered a type of unconventional warfare. This is because it attempts to influence the mind of the enemy rather than destroy its military. The press is one of the most commonly used weapons for spreading propaganda.

A U.S. Air Force C-47 releases psychological warfare leaflets near Nha Trang, South Vietnam in 1969.

History

Alexander the Great

Although not always accredited as the first practitioner of psychological warfare, Alexander the Great of Macedon undoubtedly showed himself to be effective in swaying the mindsets of the populaces that were expropriated in his campaigns. In order to keep the new Macedonian states from revolting against their leader, Alexander the Great would leave a number of his men behind in each city to introduce Greek culture and interbreed. Since this method of persuasion did indeed influence loyalist and separatist opinions alike, it directly altered the psyches of the occupied people to conform. A famous example of Alexander the Great using this technique is when he was being pursued by the Vandals. He had his men construct breastplate made for a man that would be over 12 ft. tall. He then left this armor behind and the Vandals saw this armor and delayed their advancement for two weeks to construct longer and thicker weapons.

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The Mongols

Genghis Khan, leader of the Mongols in the 13th century AD, united his people to eventually conquer more territory than any other leader in human history. Defeating the will of the enemy was the top priority.

Before attacking a settlement, the Mongol generals demanded submission to the Khan, and threatened the initial villages with complete destruction if they refused to surrender. After winning the battle, the Mongol generals fulfilled their threats and massacred the survivors. Examples include the destruction of the nations of Kiev and Khwarizm. Consequently, tales of the encroaching horde spread to the next villages and created an aura of insecurity that undermined the possibility of future resistance. Subsequent nations were much more likely to surrender to the Mongols without fighting. Often, this more than the Mongol's tactical prowess secured quick Mongol victories.

Genghis Khan also employed tactics that made his numbers seem greater than they actually were. During night operations he ordered each soldier to light three torches at dusk in order to deceive and intimidate enemy scouts and give the illusion of an overwhelming army. He also sometimes had objects tied to the tails of his horses, so that when riding on an open and dry field, would raise a cloud of dust that gave the enemy the impression of great numbers.

The Mongols also employed other gruesome terror tactics to weaken the will to resist. In one infamous incident during the Indian campaign, the Mongol leader Tamerlane built a pyramid of 90,000 human heads in front of the walls of Delhi, to convince them to surrender. Other tactics included firing severed human heads from catapults into enemy lines and over city walls to frighten enemy soldiers and citizens, and spread diseases in the close confines of a besieged city.

Vlad Tepes

Vlad Tepes would physically and psychologically torture his enemies with brutality. His most well-known psychological tactic was an incident involving impalement (thus earning him the title "Vlad the Impaler"), where the bodies of thousands of Ottoman soldiers were suspended in the air, impaled through the heart or rectum on giant wooden sticks. This was so effective, it made an Ottoman army cancel their campaign to invade Romania.

Propaganda Warfare

Most of the events throughout history involving psychological warfare utilized tactics that instilled fear or a sense of awe towards the enemy. But as humanity continued into the 19th century, advances in communication technology acted as a catalyst for mass propaganda usage.

One of the first leaders to inexorably gain fanatical support through the use of microphone technology was leader of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler. By first creating a speaking environment, designed by Joseph Goebbels, that exaggerated his presence to make him seem almost god-like, Hitler then coupled this with the resonating projections of his orations through a microphone. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made similar use of radio for propaganda against the Nazis.

During WWII, psychological warfare was used effectively by the military as well. The enormous success, that the invasion of Normandy displayed, was a fusion of psychological warfare with military deception. Before D-Day, Operation Quicksilver created a fictional "First United States Army Group" (FUSAG) commanded by General George Patton that supposedly would invade France at the Pas-de-Calais. American troops used false signals, decoy installations and phony equipment to deceive German observation aircraft and radio interception operators. This had the desired effect of misleading the German High Command as to the location of the primary invasion, and of keeping reserves away from the actual landings. Erwin Rommel was the primary target of the psychological aspects of this operation. Convinced that Patton would lead the invasion, as he was clearly the best Allied armored commander, Rommel was caught off-guard and unable to react strongly to the Normandy invasion, since Patton's illusory FUSAG had not "yet" landed. Confidence in his own intelligence and judgement was also reduced enough that the German response to the beachhead was not decisive.

British use of psychological warfare

The British were one of the first major military powers to use psychological warfare in World War II, especially against the Japanese. The Gurkhas, who are Nepalese soldiers in British service, have always been feared by the enemy due to their favoritism for the bayonet. The British put this fear to great effect, as Gurkhas were used to terrorize Japanese soldiers through nighttime raids on their camps. It has also been reported that when the Gurkhas landed on the Falkland Islands, some Argentinian troops abandoned their positions and fled.

United States use of psychological warfare

See also Psychological Operations (United States)

The United States ran an extensive program of psychological warfare during the Vietnam War. The Phoenix Program had the dual aim of assassinating Viet Cong personnel and terrorizing any potential sympathizers or passive supporters. When members of the VCI were assassinated, CIA and Special Forces operatives placed playing cards in the mouth of the deceased as a calling card. During the Phoenix Program, over 19,000 Viet Cong supporters were killed^[1][2][3][4].

The CIA made extensive use of Contra death squads in Nicaragua to destabilize the Sandinista government which the US claimed was communist[1]. The CIA used psychological warfare techniques against the Panamanians by broadcasting pirate TV broadcasts. The CIA has extensively used propaganda broadcasts against the Cuban government through TV Marti, based in Miami, Florida. However, the Cuban government has been somewhat successful in jamming the signal of TV Marti, making the CIA effort partly useless.

In the Iraq War, The United States used the Shock and awe campaign to terrorize, psychologically maim, and break the will of the Iraqi Army to fight.

United States PsyOp leaflet from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The CIA conducted several experiments in its MKULTRA project. Some of these experiments were performed on hospitalized persons in Montreal, Canada, without the informed consent of the subjects. LSD, electroshocks, and drug-induced comas were used trying to find efficient brainwashing methods. The affected patients eventually received financial compensation from the government of Canada, which knew about the CIA experiments.

Recent military psychological warfare methods

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Psychological warfare

However, most uses of the term psychological warfare refers to military methods, such as:

• Distributing pamphlets, e.g. in the Gulf War, encouraging desertion or (in WWII) supplying instructions on how to surrender.
• Propaganda radio stations, such as Lord Haw-Haw in World War II on the Germany calling station
• Renaming cities and other places when captured, such as Baghdad airport
• Shock and awe military strategy
• Projecting repetitive and annoying sounds and music for long periods at high volume towards groups under siege.
• The use of Humvees and other vehicles to create mobile broadcasting stations, allowing the US military to verbally harass and agitate Taliban fighters in Afghanistan so that they emerge from hiding places and engage US troops.
• Spreading rumours, hoaxes and wild stories.
• Use of loudspeaker systems to communicate with enemy soldiers.
• The tactic of hanging of dead terrorists with their intestines torn out from their anuses with barbed wire was used successfully by Sri Lankan special forces during the 1980s phase of the Sri Lankan civil war to demoralize various Tamil terrorist groups.
• Raping the enemy women. This was conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces after they gained partial control of Germany. This type of warfare technique is regarded as one of the most powerful methods of completely destroying the morale of enemy forces. However, their are dangers to this, depending on the enemy. Two outcomes will occur, either the enemy forces will surrender and pose no more threat or the enemy forces will engage in fanatical resistance and enagage in fierce guerilla warfare even after the main force is destroyed. Example of this was when the Chinese engaged in fanatical resistance againist the Imperial Japanese Army, which had a strong reputation of brutalizing civilians and raping women.

Most of these techniques were developed during WWII or earlier, and have been used to some degree in every conflict since. Daniel Lerner was in the OSS (the predecessor to the US CIA) and in his book, attempts to analyze how effective the various strategies were. He concludes that there is little evidence that any of them were dramatically successful, except perhaps surrender instructions over loudspeakers when victory was imminent. It should be noted, though, that measuring the success or failure of psychological warfare is very hard, as the conditions are very far from being a controlled experiment.

Lerner divides psychological warfare operations into three categories:

White 

Truthful and not strongly biased, where the source of information is acknowledged.

Grey 

Largely truthful, containing no information that can be proven wrong; the source may or may not be hidden.

Black 

Intended to deceive the enemy.

Lerner points out that grey and black operations ultimately have a heavy cost, in that the target population will sooner or later recognize them as propaganda and discredit the source. He writes, "This is one of the few dogmas advanced by Sykewarriors that is likely to endure as an axiom of propaganda: Credibility is a condition of persuasion. Before you can make a man do as you say, you must make him believe what you say." (Lerner, 1971 p. 28) Consequently, the Allied strategy in WWII was predominantly one of truth (with certain exceptions).

References

1. ^ Operation Phoenix
2. ^ Special operation - Phoenix
3. ^ Vietnam and the Phoenix program
4. ^ CIA and the Vietnam War

• Fred Cohen. Frauds, Spies, and Lies - and How to Defeat Them. ISBN 1-878109-36-7 (2006). ASP Press.
• Fred Cohen. World War 3 ... Information Warfare Basics. ISBN 1-878109-40-5 (2006). ASP Press.
• Paul M. A. Linebarger. Psychological Warfare. International Propaganda and Communications. ISBN 0-405-04755-X (1948). Revised second edition, Duell, Sloan and Pearce (1954).
• Daniel Lerner. Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day. ISBN 0-262-12045-3 or 0-262-62019-7 (1949). George W. Stewart, New York; Reprinted (1971) MIT Press.

See also

• Information Operations Roadmap
• Political Warfare Executive
• Psychological Warfare Division
• PSYOP
• Propaganda
• Psychological operations (United States)
• Zarqawi PSYOP program

External links

• The history of psychological warfare
• Pentagon psychological warfare operation
• OSS - The Psychology of War

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