purpose

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noun

1. The proper activity of a person or thing: function, job, role, task. See do/not do.
2. What one intends to do or achieve: aim, ambition, design, end, goal, intent, intention, mark, meaning, object, objective, point, target, view, why. Idioms: end in view, why and wherefore. See planned/unplanned, purpose/purposelessness.
3. Unwavering firmness of character, action, or will: decidedness, decision, decisiveness, determination, firmness, purposefulness, resoluteness, resolution, resolve, toughness, will, willpower. See certain/uncertain, strong/weak.

verb

To have in mind as a goal or purpose: aim, contemplate, design, intend, mean¹, plan, project, propose, target. Regional mind. See planned/unplanned, purpose/purposelessness.

An intention, expressed as a conscious thought in the present, to realize a future goal or aim.

We commonly explain what people (and perhaps animals) do by assuming they have some purpose in doing it, some idea in mind which guides their activity towards their goal in an intelligently flexible fashion.

We say, for instance: Why is Mary buying arsenic? Maybe she intends to poison Martha, but more likely she needs it to get rid of the rats. Why did the chicken cross the road? To get to the corn on the other side. What made Jill insult Joan? I don't know, but she must have had some reason. As these examples suggest, we rarely use the word 'purpose' itself; perhaps this is why the Mock Turtle got the word wrong when assuring Alice that 'No wise fish would go anywhere without a porpoise. ... Why, if a fish came to me, and told me he was going a journey, I should say "With what porpoise?" '. But we assume that we can explain or make sense of what people do by referring to their intentions, goals, aims, interests, ambitions, desires, wants, motives, needs, in a word, to their purposes.

Despite this universal acceptance of the concept of purpose in our everyday thinking about why people do what they do, it is not universally accepted by theoretical psychologists. On the contrary, throughout the history of psychology this concept has been, and remains, one of the most controversial of all. (It follows that the position argued in this article would not be endorsed by all current psychologists, although it is an increasingly accepted view. Examples of more 'reductive' approaches are given by the neurophilosopher Paul Churchland and the ethologist David Macfarland.) People do not merely disagree about purpose, but get more than usually heated in discussing it, often ascribing gross irresponsibility of one sort or another to their opponents in debate.

Some psychologists refuse point-blank to admit the concept of purpose into their theories, regarding it as not merely unhelpful but positively mystifying. Others are content to use it as a convenient shorthand, but believe that purposive explanations of behaviour could in principle be replaced by complicated stimulus–response or neurophysiological explanations in which the concept of purpose would not appear. Yet others insist that psychology must give a central role to purpose, that action and experience cannot possibly be explained without it; usually, they add that what it is to be a human being cannot be understood without this notion, so that to reject it is to adopt an essentially dehumanizing image of mankind.

Theoretical resistance to purpose arises primarily from its close connection with the mind–body problem. It is difficult to understand how purposes can function as guiding factors in behaviour, for how can an idea affect bodily action? (There is no help in identifying the purpose with the actual goal state, rather than with the subject's idea of the goal; for the goal state is always in the future until the action has been completed, and is often not achieved at all. How can a not-yet-existent state, which may in fact never exist, cause anything to happen here and now?) The behaviourists, with the exception of Tolman, rejected purposive explanation, because they avoided all reference to consciousness, subjectivity, ideas, or mind. And neurophysiology, at least at first sight, seems to leave no place for purpose, since it deals with brain cells and brain functions whose physical description does not involve reference to ideas.

However, with the work of Kenneth Craik, neurophysiology gained the concept of a cerebral model, or inner representation of the world. According to Craik, we possess physical mechanisms in the brain that function as inner models of the world by which we perceive, think about, and act upon the environment. Explanations of psychological phenomena must refer to these models, since it is only via these internal representations that action and experience can take place. But inner models may sometimes be misleading: the fact that there are no unicorns does not prevent people from developing internal representations of such mythical beasts. Similarly, an inner model may represent a state of affairs that does not yet exist, or a plan of action that cannot be fully carried out; the person can nevertheless use this model to guide present behaviour in various ways. So there is no radical difficulty in understanding how it can be that a person acts with the purpose, or goal, of finding a unicorn even though this purpose can never be achieved.

Cerebral models correspond to the 'schemas' described by the psychologist F. C. Bartlett. They are essentially subjective, in that they constitute the psychological subject's view of the world — and of itself. This is why action and experience possess what Brentano and phenomenologists call intentionality. Many psychologists and philosophers have claimed that intentionality could not possibly be explained in terms of a physical system, so that physiology is in principle incapable of helping us understand how psychological phenomena arise. In any case since very little is known about the detailed physiological basis of cerebral models, neurophysiologists cannot yet offer precise explanations of specific psychological characteristics.

But the concept of internal representation has entered artificial intelligence, the science of writing computer programs which enable computers to do the sort of things that are done by human minds. Programs using different inner models of cubes, for instance, recognize (and misrecognize) cubes in different ways and on different occasions. (See object perception; pattern recognition.) Each program has its own view of the world, and its behaviour (saying that this is a cube whereas that is not) can be fully understood and explained only by reference to its inner schemata or models. Even though electronic engineers know precisely how the underlying mechanism works, it is the representational functions of the program which explain the 'psychological' characteristics of the programmed computer. Whether or not every aspect of human psychology could in principle be simulated on a computer is irrelevant here. The important point is that, even though the computer's 'physiology' is fully understood, its 'psychology' can be explained only in terms of its subjective (internal) models of the world.

By analogy, then, even if neurophysiologists knew everything there is to know about the brain, psychological explanations would still be required to understand psychological phenomena. So psychology is not reducible to physiology, if by that is meant the claim that with sufficient physiological knowledge we could stop talking about purposes, ideas, beliefs, mistakes, and the like. Psychology is reducible to physiology only in the quite different sense that psychological features like purposes are generated by cerebral mechanisms, rather than being mysteriously inexplicable features outside the scope of science. A faith in the second kind of reducibility need not entail a faith in the first kind. It follows that the concepts in terms of which we express everything specifically human about human beings would still be needed, even if we understood in detail how purposes are embodied in brain mechanisms.

(Published 2004)

— Margaret A. Boden

Bibliography
• Boden, M. A. (1972). Purposive Explanation in Psychology.
• Churchland, P. M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective.
• McFarland, D. J. (1996). 'Animals as cost-based robots'. In Boden, M. A., (ed.), The Philosophy of Artificial Life.
• Woodfield, A. (1976). Teleology.

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IN BRIEF: Aim or goal. Also: The reason or use for something.

The purpose of life is a life of purpose. — Robert Byrne

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sign description: The index finger begins at the head and then changes to the V-hand moving back and forth on the palm of the opposite hand.

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Quotes:

"A man should conceive of a legitimate purpose in his heart, and set out to accomplish it. He should make this purpose the centralizing point of his thoughts. It may take the form of a spiritual ideal, or it may be a worldly object, according to his nature at the time being; but whichever it is, he should steadily focus his thought forces upon the object which he has set before him. He should make this purpose his supreme duty, and should devote himself to its attainment, not allowing his thoughts to wander away into ephemeral fancies, longings, and imaginings. This is the royal road to self-control and true concentration of thought. Even if he fails again and again to accomplish his purpose (as he necessarily must until weakness is overcome), the strength of character gained will be the measure of his true success, and this will form a new starting point for future power and triumph." - James Allen

"Above all be of single aim; have a legitimate and useful purpose, and devote yourself unreservedly to it." - James Allen

"To put away aimlessness and weakness, and to begin to think with purpose, is to enter the ranks of those strong ones who only recognize failure as one of the pathways to attainment; who make all conditions serve them, and who think strongly, attempt fearlessly, and accomplish masterfully." - James Allen

"What allows us, as human beings, to psychologically survive life on earth, with all of its pain, drama, and challenges, is a sense of purpose and meaning" - Barbara De Angelis

"Never be afraid to treat the path alone. Know which is your path and follow it wherever it may lead you; do not feel you have to follow in someone else's footsteps." - Gita Bellin

"One thing I have desired of the Lord, that will I seek: That I may dwell in the house f the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and to inquire in His temple. [Psalms 27:4]" - Bible

See more famous quotes about Purpose

See words rhyming with "purpose."

  See crossword solutions for the clue Purpose.

Dansk (Danish)
n. - hensigt, formål, øjemed
v. tr. - have til hensigt, påtænke

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    af alle praktiske grunde
• on purpose    med vilje
• to little purpose    til ringe nytte
• to no purpose    til ingen nytte
• to the purpose    sagen vedkommende, relevant

Nederlands (Dutch)
doel, bedoeling, doelgerichtheid, bedoelen

Français (French)
n. - but, objectif, résolution
v. tr. - se proposer (de faire) (arch)

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    en pratique
• on purpose    exprès
• to little purpose    inutilement
• to no purpose    inutilement
• to the purpose    à propos

Deutsch (German)
n. - Zweck, Absicht, Entschlossenheit
v. - beabsichtigen

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    praktisch
• on purpose    absichtlich
• to little purpose    mit wenig Erfolg
• to no purpose    ohne Erfolg
• to the purpose    damit

Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - (αντικειμενικός) σκοπός, πρόθεση
v. - προτίθεμαι

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    για κάθε περίπτωση
• on purpose    επίτηδες, από σκοπού, σκόπιμα
• to little purpose    με ελάχιστα αποτελέσματα
• to no purpose    άσκοπος, άσκοπα, ασκόπως, άδικα, ματαίως
• to the purpose    εύστοχος

Italiano (Italian)
fine, proposito, intenzione, disegno, scopo, decisione, fermezza, risolutezza, proporsi di, intendere, avere l'intenzione di

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    a tutti gli effetti, praticamente
• on purpose    apposta, di proposito
• to no/little purpose    inutilmente
• to the purpose    a proposito, pertinente, utile

Português (Portuguese)
n. - propósito (m)
v. - tencionar

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    para todos os efeitos
• on purpose    de propósito
• to no/little purpose    inútil, sem resultado
• to the purpose    para o fim

Русский (Russian)
цель, намерение, намереваться

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    практически
• on purpose    нарочно
• to no/little purpose    бесполезно
• to the purpose    по существу, с целью

Español (Spanish)
n. - propósito, intención, objetivo
v. tr. - proponerse, tener la intención de

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    a efectos prácticos
• on purpose    a propósito, adrede
• to little purpose    en vano, para nada, para poco
• to no purpose    en vano, para nada, para poco
• to the purpose    que viene al caso, a propósito

Svenska (Swedish)
n. - syfte, avsikt, ändamål, uppgift, mening
v. - ha för avsikt, planera

中文（简体）(Chinese (Simplified))
目的, 决心, 意向, 意欲, 计划, 企图

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    实际上
• on purpose    存心地, 有意地
• to little purpose    无甚效果地, 少有成就地
• to no purpose    无结果地, 无目的地
• to the purpose    中肯, 合适

中文（繁體）(Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 目的, 決心, 意向
v. tr. - 意欲, 計劃, 企圖

idioms:

• for all practical purposes    實際上
• on purpose    存心地, 有意地
• to little purpose    無甚效果地, 少有成就地
• to no purpose    無結果地, 無目的地
• to the purpose    中肯, 合適

한국어 (Korean)
n. - 목적, 의도
v. tr. - 의도하다, 꾀하다

idioms:

• to little purpose    거의 예상 밖으로
• to no purpose    전연 헛되이
• to the purpose    요령 있게, 적절히

日本語 (Japanese)
n. - 目的, 意図, 用途, 決意, 決心, 成果, 論点
v. - 意図する, …することを意図する

idioms:

• accidentally on purpose    偶然を装って, わざと
• on purpose    わざと, …するために
• to no/little purpose    ほとんどむだに
• to the purpose    適切な

العربيه (Arabic)
‏(الاسم) هدف, قصد, غايه, عزم (فعل) قصد, نوى, صمم على‏

עברית (Hebrew)
n. - ‮כוונה, מטרה, דבקות במטרה, החלטיות‬
v. tr. - ‮התכוון, היה בדעתו ל-‬

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