Pyrrhonism

[From Pyrrho, the founder of a school of skeptics in Greece (about 300 b. c.): cf. F. pyrrhonisme.]
Skepticism; universal doubt.

A version of scepticism, so called after Pyrrho of Elis (d. c.275 bc), but known in the Renaissance through the life of Pyrrho by Diogenes Laertius and the summary of his doctrines by Sextus Empiricus (c. ad 200). Pyrrhonian scepticism is usually distinguished from academic scepticism: the latter is identified with the claim that no knowledge is possible, whereas the former argues for suspension of judgement on all questions concerning knowledge. Pyrrhonism is associated with a technique of argumentation (the putting forward of propositions which contradict those of your adversary, followed by a refusal to come down on either side of the argument), and is sometimes confused with relativism; but whereas a relativist would argue that there can be no grounds for comparing the merits or truth-values of competing systems of thought, the Pyrrhonist suspends judgement on such questions.

Pyrrhonian scepticism as such became widely known through the publication in 1562 and 1569 of Latin translations of Sextus Empiricus' works. Already the ground had been prepared for acceptance of those ideas and philosophical practices by the anti-intellectual movements of the late Middle Ages (Thomas à Kempis, Nicholas of Cusa, Cornelius Agrippa) and by the various attacks on scholastic Aristotelianism, notably that of Ramus; the intellectual ferment provoked by the Reformation with its implicit anti- dogmatism and anti-authoritarianism contributed also to the favourable reception of Pyrrhonism. Even before the publication of Sextus Empiricus, Guy de Bruès had written three, probably fictional, Dialogues contre les nouveaux Académiciens (1557), which pitted Ronsard and Nicot, as representatives of traditional rationalism, against Baïf and Aubert, who defend sceptical positions; but the full force of of Pyrrhonism is first represented in Montaigne's Essais, and especially in his ‘Apologie de Raymond Sebond’.

Montaigne had already had a medal struck which showed him to be aware of the distinction between anti-dogmatism, academic scepticism, and Pyrrhonism: it bore the device ‘Que sçay-je?’ When he came to write his defence of the 15th-c. Spanish theologian Sebond (Sabunde), whose Theologia naturalis he had translated in 1569 at his father's behest, he produced a comprehensive (but not systematic) account of Pyrrhonism, and showed how it could be employed in the service of Catholic apologetics. From a confusing welter of destructive argument, only Pyrrhonism, the philosophy of doubt, emerges unscathed; it is associated by Montaigne not only with intellectual humility but also with a marked tendency to conformism. In theology his exercise in Pyrrhonian philosophy results in the proposition of fideism (the doctrine of the separate truths of faith and reason), which is made consistent with the reassertion of the authority of the traditional Church. In ethics and politics it leads to both conformist and relativist views: conformist, because there can be no valid reason for changing from one's present mode of life; relativist, because there can be no way of establishing by reason which of a number of competing systems is to be preferred. Pyrrhonism constituted, furthermore, a powerful critique of humanism and its optimistic vision of human capacities; and it added weight to the antischolastic and anti-intellectual movements, which affected in turn the development of science and scientific method in the early 17th c.

Montaigne's arguments were repeated by Charron, and were pressed into the service of the Counter-Reformation by writers such as Jean-Pierre Camus. They were violently opposed in turn by Garasse and others, who perceived their potential for weakening the case for religion. This potential may be detected in the writings of libertins such as La Mothe le Vayer and anti-Aristotelian philosophers such as Gassendi. Descartes recognized the need to answer Pyrrhonism (which to some degree is represented in the figure of the ‘malin génie’), as did Pascal. Their discussions of this philosophy definitively altered the terms in which the debate about hyperbolic doubt was conducted.

[Ian Maclean]

Bibliography

• R. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (1960)

n.

An ancient philosophy, named for its inventor. It consisted of an absolute disbelief in everything but Pyrrhonism. Its modern professors have added that.

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Pyrrhonism, or Pyrrhonian skepticism, was a school of skepticism founded by Aenesidemus in the first century BC and recorded by Sextus Empiricus in the late 2nd century or early 3rd century AD. It was named after Pyrrho, a philosopher who lived from c. 360 to c. 270 BC, although the relationship between the philosophy of the school and of the historical figure is murky. A renaissance of the term is to be noted for the 17th century when the modern scientific worldview was born.

Contents 1 Ancient Pyrrhonism 2 The second debate of Pyrrhonism in the early modern period 3 See also 4 Notes 5 External links

Ancient Pyrrhonism

Whereas 'academic' skepticism, with as its most famous adherent Carneades, claims that "Nothing can be known, not even this", Pyrrhonian skeptics withhold any assent with regard to non-evident propositions and remain in a state of perpetual inquiry. They disputed the possibility of attaining truth by sensory apprehension, reason, or the two combined, and thence inferred the need for total suspension of judgment (epoché) on things.^[1] According to them, even the statement that nothing can be known is dogmatic. They thus attempted to make their skepticism universal, and to escape the reproach of basing it upon a fresh dogmatism.^[2] Mental imperturbability (ataraxia) was the result to be attained by cultivating such a frame of mind.^[2] As in Stoicism and Epicureanism, the happiness or satisfaction of the individual was the goal of life, and all three philosophies placed it in tranquility or indifference.^[2] According to the Pyrrhonists, it is our opinions or unwarranted judgments about things which turn them into desires, painful effort, and disappointment.^[2] From all this a person is delivered who abstains from judging one state to be preferable to another.^[2] But, as complete inactivity would have been synonymous with death, the skeptic, while retaining his consciousness of the complete uncertainty enveloping every step, might follow custom in the ordinary affairs of life.^[2]

The second debate of Pyrrhonism in the early modern period

The traditions of ancient skepticism found a new reception in the early modern era climaxing in the 17th century in the discussion of historical doubt "Pyrrhonismus historicus" and "Fides historica" the 'belief' in history. The fundamental question of the debate could not, and cannot, be solved: How can we prove historical data? History is a realm that does not allow experimental proofs. Questions such as with how many stabs was Julius Caesar killed can only be discussed on the basis of documents. If they contradict each other historians can try to balance them against each other. Do certain documents have precedence over others as eye witness reports, can they be validated through experience, or do they include unlikely, marvelous incidents one should disqualify as legend?

The result of the debate was not a final solution of the inherent problem but the implementation of a new science of critical analysis of documents. The questions had a potential to destabilize religious histories. They lost much of their momentum with the transformation of history from a narrative project to a project of critical debate and with the 19th-century implementation of archeology as a comparatively objective and experimental science.

See also

• Aenesidemus
• Agrippa the Skeptic
• Apophasis
• Apophatic theology
• Arcesilaus
• Quietism
• Epoche
• Sextus Empiricus
• Timon
• Benson Mates
• Nassim Nicholas Taleb

Notes

1. ^ Oskar Seyffert, (1894), Dictionary of Classical Antiquities, page 483
2. ^ ^{a b c d e f} This article incorporates text from the article "Scepticism" in the Encyclopædia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, a publication now in the public domain.

External links

• "Ancient Skepticism" article by Leo Groarke in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Ancient Greek Skepticism entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Harold Thorsrud

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