railway

n.

1. A railroad, especially one operated over a limited area: a commuter railway.
2. A track providing a runway for wheeled equipment.

The prospect of land forces being transported further, faster, and more efficiently than on foot or on horseback pre-dated the appearance of working steam railways. The precursors of the railways, the canals, had already shown what might be possible. In December 1806, British troops bound for Dublin were taken from London to Liverpool by barge which took only seven days, rather than the fourteen they would have taken to march, and with ‘comparatively little fatigue’. Steam locomotives became a practical proposition when George Stephenson's Rocket won the prize at the Rainhill locomotive trials in 1829. The following year the London and Manchester railway carried a regiment of soldiers 34 miles (55 km) in two hours. Under contemporary planning assumptions it would have taken a military unit two days to march that distance. In 1832 Gen Lamarque told the French Chamber of Deputies that the strategic use of railways would lead to ‘a revolution in military science as great as that which had been brought about by the invention of gunpowder’. By an extraordinary coincidence with profound repercussions for the conduct of war, the electric telegraph appeared the same year (see also communications). The following year a Westphalian, Frederick Wilhelm Harkort, made the first serious proposal for the strategic use of railways, a railway from Weder to Lippe and one on the right bank of the Rhine from Mainz to Wesel, running alongside a telegraph line. This would permit rapid concentration of forces, making a Rhine crossing by the French impossible. The Germans, who lacked the advantages enjoyed by powers with sea lines of communication, were first to grasp the railway's strategic potential.

However, it was another generation before that potential was fulfilled. In 1846 the Prussian VI Army Corps of 12, 000 men was moved by rail to Cracow and in 1849 a Russian corps of 30, 000 was moved from Poland to G'oding in Moravia where it effected a junction with the Austrian army to help suppress one of the revolutions which had convulsed the continent the year before. But it was not until the French Italian campaign of 1859 that railways were used to transport thousands of men directly to the battlefield. Writing in 1861, a British officer described how the visitor to Magenta, scene of one of the terrible battles of the war, would see, close to the railway platform, rough mounds and black crosses marking the graves of hundreds of men. ‘This first employment of railways in close connexion with vast military operations’, he wrote, ‘would alone be enough to give a distinction to this campaign in military history.’ In 86 days between 19 April and 15 July the French moved 604, 000 men and 129, 000 horses by rail, peaking at 8, 421 men and 512 horses a day at the end of April. Furthermore, the troops were going straight to the front. As The Times reported from Pavia, ‘from the heights of Montebello the Austrians beheld a novelty in the art of war. Train after train arrived by railway from Voghera, each train disgorging its hundreds of armed men and immediately hastening back for more.’ Railways were now clearly part of the war and both sides attacked track, bridges, and tunnels to deny them to the enemy.

The use of public railways to deploy troops required special measures to run them and a special organization to deal with damage to track and rolling stock by the enemy and to inflict such damage upon them. The American civil war, fought over an area the size of Europe, could hardly have been fought without railways. Much of the land was not well-enough cultivated to enable armies to live off it and it was only by rail that the new vast armies could be supplied.

An experienced railway man, Daniel Craig McCallum, a Scot, was immediately appointed Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in the USA by order of Pres Lincoln, with the honorary rank of colonel (later brigadier general). In 1861 the USA enjoyed no fewer than six railway gauges: 6 feet (183 cm), 5 feet 6 inches (167 cm), 5 feet (152 cm), 4 feet 10 inches (147 cm), 4 feet 9 inches (144 cm), and 4 feet 8½ inches (143 cm) (the standard British gauge, later adopted as uniform). In spite of the problems, the combatants adapted and exploited railways to an astonishing degree. In September 1863 the Union wanted to send reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac to eastern Tennessee. McCallum calculated that he could move 23, 000 men with guns and ammunition 1, 200 miles (1, 931 km) in seven days, a distance it would have taken them three months to march. In December 1864 Gen Schofield's corps of 15, 000 men was moved the other way, from Tennessee to the Potomac by river and rail, a distance of 1, 400 miles (2, 253 km) in eleven days.

For all its strategic significance, the ‘iron road’ was terribly vulnerable, and its rails were made of precious steel that was also needed for ordnance and ammunition. The first destruction of a railway line for military purposes had been by the Venetians, during their insurrection against the Austrians in 1848. In April 1862 the USA formed a rail construction corps under Herman Haupt to make good damage done to the Richmond-Washington railway by the Confederates. The USA became brilliant at replacing destroyed bridges, spanning huge gaps with raw timber, like the Potomac Creek bridge which was 414 feet (126.2 metres) long and 82 feet (25 metres) high. They also developed prefabricated bridges with 60 foot (18.3 metre) spans. During his March to the Sea, Sherman destroyed hundreds of miles of railway track, while at the same time US construction troops reopened 300 miles (483 km) of railway in North Carolina ready to receive and supply the Union force.

In the 1870-1 Franco-Prussian war both sides deployed by rail (the Germans with infinitely greater efficiency), but a new threat which had been oddly rare in the American civil war emerged—sabotage by civilian resistance fighters. From the start, European armies came down very heavily on anyone trying to sabotage their rail communications. In 1866 the Prussians advertised ‘the terror of reprisals’. In France, where after the defeat of the field armies war became more diffuse, the Germans deployed 100, 000 troops to protect 2, 000 miles (3, 218 km) of French railway line with detachments at each station and signal box.

The Russians, observing all this, hit upon an admirable defensive ploy. They made their rail gauge 5 feet, as opposed to the usual 4 feet 8½ inches used by Germany. This meant that if Germany invaded Russian territory (which then included Poland) they would either have to build their own railways or build special rolling stock able to run on Russian lines which would still mean having to trans-ship supplies from one train to another at the border. However, in 1877-8, when the Russians were largely on the offensive against Turkey, they suffered a disadvantage, as they had to trans-ship their supplies on the Romanian-Turkish border.

As German strategic railways expanded towards the Russian frontier before 1914, the German ability to deploy beyond the border became problematic. Observers noted that the main lines approached the border, and that there were then numerous branches, which stopped on the frontier itself. The only explanation was that these were jumping-off points for military light railways, which the Germans would then construct across conquered territory. Observers just before the war reported ‘diminutive little engines and rails in sections so that they could be bolted together and even bridges that could be put across ravines in a twinkling’—and were promptly invited to leave the country.

In addition to using the civil main lines, railways were constructed for purely military purposes, with no commercial value. The first was one of the earliest used in war, the 7 mile (11 km) line from the port of Balaclava to the Allied camp at Sevastopol. The most striking example was probably the line constructed during the British expedition to Abyssinia in 1867-8 on the orders of Sir Robert Napier. Intent on rescuing British prisoners held by Emperor Theodore at Magdala, the British planned to build a railway to cover part of the 63 mile (101.4 km) journey. In October 1867 the advanced brigade arrived at the start point, but work did not begin until January 1868. The line, built by Indian labourers, was of the 5 foot 6 inch Indian gauge. It clung to a hillside in country which was largely timberless and waterless. Six locomotives were imported from Bombay. For four months they laboured on 11 miles (18 km) of railway (12 miles (19 km) if sidings are included). At the end of April they decided not to complete it as Magdala had by then fallen. Instead, they strengthened it to carry the troops coming back.

Trains were also developed as weapons of war themselves. During the 1859 invasion scare in Britain, there were plans to build a circular track at a 15 mile (24 km) radius from the centre of London and mobile artillery mounted on trains was an attractive option for coast defence. The problem was how to get a big gun to fire at right angles to the direction of travel without tipping the train off the track. In the American civil war it did not take long for a proposal to reach Herman Haupt for ‘an armor-clad car, bullet proof and mounting a cannon’—the origin of the armoured train which proved a prominent instrument of war in numerous subsequent conflicts including the Second Boer War and the Russian civil war. Trains, protected by railway sleepers and metal plates, were used—also in the Franco-Prussian war when four were fitted out to defend Paris during the siege. During the Second Boer War the British brought control of the railways to a fine art, and also used armoured trains which, as Churchill observed from bitter personal experience, while formidable, could be brought to the fighting efficiency of a beached whale if derailed.

The railway—or lack of it—was not only the cause of Russia's failure to achieve a decisive land victory in the Russo-Japanese war. It was also the cause of the war. Parsimony about building a line round the north of the Amur river bend led to a decision to put a railway across a more direct route, which precipitated hostilities. The Russian achievements in keeping their one single-track trans-Siberian line open were remarkable, but ultimately inadequate.

By the end of the 19th century bringing ‘million-strong’ armies to battle along railway lines had become the apotheosis of war planning. As A. J. P. Taylor observed, the war came about, in part, because the railway timetables decreed it. The problems of different gauges encountered in the east may have confounded German plans for victory over Russia, while in the west, ironically, the rail timetables mandated an ultimately fatal clash with Britain, as well as France (in their quest for rapid victory, the Germans violated Belgian neutrality, thus bringing Britain into the war).

The appearance of the automobile, tank, and truck revolutionized war at the tactical and operational levels, but strategic mobility on land continued to be by rail. In WW II major operational movements were conducted by rail, especially on the eastern front. German reinforcement to attack the Normandy landings would come, overwhelmingly, by rail, and before D-Day the British and Americans diverted their strategic bombers to attack the French rail network to interdict the invasion area. And even in the Cold War, rail gauges—and rail tunnels—remained the ultimate determinant of strategic mobility. The dimensions of the main battle tank were ultimately limited by their ability, mounted on rail flats, to pass through European rail tunnels. When Russia started removing its forces from eastern Germany at the end of the Cold War, they went by rail. And when Britain wanted to send Challenger tanks to Bosnia to enforce the 1995 Dayton agreement, complete with their additional armour packages to further overawe the Bosnian Serbs, they were—unlike the basic tanks—too big to go through the tunnels from Germany through Hungary to Bosnia. So they had to be taken by sea. Right up to the end of the Cold War, and beyond, when tactical and operational mobility belonged to the petrol engine, the jet engine, the helicopter, the track, and the road wheel, strategic mobility on land was still dependent on the railway.

Bibliography

• Pratt, Edwin A., The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest (London, 1915).
• Taylor, A. J. P., War by Timetable (London, 1969).
• Terraine, John, White Heat (London, 1983)

— Christopher Bellamy

The railway and the camera have been closely linked since the earliest days of photography. Perhaps the earliest surviving railway photograph is a daguerreotype made in 1845 by David Octavius Hill and Robert Adamson, which shows the new station at Linlithgow on the Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway. In the same year the Great Western Railway's Daniel Gooch was photographed alongside a model of the Firefly class locomotive he designed, and one of these engines, Damon, appears in a daguerreotype dating from the same period.

Photographers soon turned their attention to the massive railway construction projects that were transforming the natural landscape. In the USA in the mid-1850s the Langenheim brothers photographed the building of the New York Central and Great Western Central Railroads. In England in the same decade photographs were made of the construction of Robert Stephenson's Britannia Bridge over the Menai Straits, and of Isambard Kingdom Brunel's bridges over the rivers Tamar and Wye.

In France in 1861 Hippolyte Auguste Collard was commissioned by the Chemins de Fer du Bourbonnais to photograph its operations, producing memorable views of the engine shed and station at Nevers. In the same year Édouard Denis Baldus's photographs for the Paris, Lyon et Mediterranée railway included images of its bridges over the Rhône, and of Toulon station.

During the American Civil War (1861-5) photographers recorded the railways' role in the war effort and documented the damage caused to the Confederate railway network by the advancing Union forces. At the end of the conflict the opening of the West provided new opportunities for war photographers like Andrew Russell (1830-1902) and Alexander Gardner, who were commissioned to photograph the building of the transcontinental railway. They were joined by Alfred A. Hart (1816-1908), William Henry Jackson, Carleton Watkins, and other photographers, who produced spectacular images of the building of the railway and the landscapes that it traversed.

British railway companies also commissioned photographs of railway construction. In the late 1860s, John Ward and J. B. Pyne photographed the building of the Midland Railway's extension to St Pancras station, while Henry Flather (fl. 1860-75) recorded the construction of the Metropolitan Railway in London, the world's first underground system. In the 1880s Frank Meadow Sutcliffe recorded the construction of the North Eastern Railway's Whitby line, and a decade later S. W. A. Newton (1875-c.1960) produced remarkable images of navvies at work on the new Great Central Railway.

Railway vehicles were photographed too. In 1856 Beyer Peacock Ltd. of Manchester employed James Mudd (1821-c. 1905) to photograph its new locomotives so that they could be advertised to overseas customers. This example was followed by the Midland Railway and the London & North Western Railway, and by the late 19th century most of the UK's major railway companies employed official photographers, briefed to photograph new locomotives and rolling stock, accidents, construction projects, and locations served by the railway. Production of scenic photographs to decorate railway carriages became a minor industry in its own right, and photography played an important role in the railway's emerging public relations and advertising departments. So that they could be photographed, new locomotives were specially painted in ‘works grey’, which showed up best on orthochromatic emulsions, and the engines' final livery was only applied once the negatives had been successfully developed.

As official photography became commonplace, a growing band of private photographers began to produce railway images. For some photographers the railway has provided an occasional subject: Alfred Stieglitz's 1902 image of the New York Central rail yards in the snow, and André Kertész's street scene at Meudon in 1928, with the railway viaduct as an imposing backdrop, are examples. Railway enthusiasts, however, focused on little else. In Britain, early enthusiast photographers, like R. H. Bleasdale (1837-97) who began working in the 1850s, concentrated on static locomotives, sometimes conveniently posed in sidings with the assistance of their crews. By the 1880s faster shutter speeds and more sensitive photographic emulsions allowed photographers like the Revd A. H. Malan (fl. 1875-95), Roger Langdon, and E. J. Bedford (c. 1865-1953) to ‘freeze’ movement, and by the 1890s Dr Tice F. Budden (c. 1870-c. 1950) was experimenting with panning shots of passing trains.

In Britain, where railway enthusiasm was strongest, specialist photographers, many of them professional men with the time and money to indulge their hobby, were encouraged by a growing market for railway images. Some, like Henry Priestley (b. c. 1910), travelled and photographed across the entire railway network, while others like Ivo Peters (1915-89) on the Somerset & Dorset, and Maurice Earley (c. 1900-1982) on the Great Western Railway became associated with particular locations that they returned to again and again.

In 1922 the Railway Photographic Society was formed to improve the standard of railway images. Prints were circulated among members for criticism and, although this encouraged high-quality photography, it limited experimentation with camera angles or focus. Railway photography was also restricted by technology. Large-aperture lenses were extremely expensive, and conservative photographers proved reluctant to abandon their heavy, large-format glass plates for miniature or medium-format film negatives. Most railway photographers, whether official or private, produced monochrome images, and it was not until cheap processing and printing became available in the 1960s that they turned in any numbers to colour photography.

In the inter-war years railway publicity machines became increasingly sophisticated, and the production of press images became an important part of the work of official photographers, like Stan Micklewright of the Great Western Railway. The Canadian Pacific Railway employed Nicholas Morant (1910-99) as its ‘special photographer’ for more than 50 years from the 1920s to 1980s, and he provided them with striking scenic views of trains in the Rocky Mountains or amidst prairie skyscapes.

Security restrictions halted enthusiast photography during the Second World War, but it reached its peak in the following two decades, as steam locomotives began to be phased out in favour of diesel and electric traction. In the UK, for instance, Bishop Eric Treacy (1907-78) travelled across northern England and Scotland photographing passing steam trains in his favourite locations. In the USA between 1955 and 1960 O. Winston Link documented the demise of steam on the Norfolk & Western Railway in intricately lit night shots. His images of locomotives thundering past the front porches, grocery stores, drive-in movies, and courting couples of small-town America are perhaps the most evocative of all railway photographs. Link's one-time assistant David Plowden (b. 1932) was also fascinated by America's disappearing industrial heritage and produced a series of images of steam locomotives.

In Britain during the final days of the steam railway in the 1960s a new ‘progressive’ railway photography emerged, typified by Colin Gifford, who saw the railway as an integral feature of the urban and industrial landscape. Unlike most enthusiast photographers he produced many images in which locomotives barely featured. As steam engines disappeared in Europe and the USA many railway photographers either retired, or travelled further afield to countries like India or China, where steam locomotives continued to work. The British photographer Colin Garratt (b. 1940), for instance, has visited over 50 countries to produce his meticulously prepared images of surviving steam railways.

As the railway declined in economic importance, the role of official photographers declined too. Their units closed as works were shut and nationalized railways were privatized, and their work was contracted out to commercial photographers. In the early 21st century, much railway photography is driven by the demands of enthusiasts and magazine markets, with nostalgic images of steam locomotives at least as popular as photographs of the modern railway. In Europe and the USA many preserved lines run special photographic charters intended to recreate the ‘golden age’ of steam. Captivated by the railway's machinery and infrastructure, few railway photographers have devoted much time to its most important element, the passengers. It has been largely left to ‘outsiders’, like Walker Evans and Bruce Davidson, to photograph the railway from the users' point of view.

— Ed Bartholomew

Bibliography

• Link, O. Winston, Steam, Steel and Stars (1987).
• Simmons, J., Image of the Train (1993).
• Baker, Michael H. C., Taking the Train: A Tribute to Britain's Greatest Railway Photographers (1993).
• Chéroux, C., ‘Vues du train. Vision et mobilité au XIXe siècle’, Études photographiques, 1 (Nov. 1996).
• Bartholomew, E., and Blakemore, M., Railways in Focus (1998).
• Lyden, A. M., Railroad Vision: Photography, Travel and Perception (2003)

The first Russian railways, built as early as 1838, were tsarist whimsies that ran from St. Petersburg to the summer palaces of Tsarskoye Selo and Pavlovsk. Emperor Nicholas I (r. 1825 - 1855) ordered the construction of these and the Moscow - St. Petersburg line, which, according to legend, the tsar designed by drawing a line on a map between the two cities using a straight-edge and pencil. One hundred fifty years later, the railway system had expanded to almost 150,000 kilometers (90,000 miles), or almost two-thirds the length of the network serving the United States. With 2.3 times the territory of the United States, however, the net density of the Soviet Union's rail system was only about one-fourth as concentrated. It was, and is, a system of trunk lines with very few branches, which supplied only minimum service to major sources of tonnage.

Naturally, this spartan system was severely strained at any given time. Soviet freight turnover was more than 2.5 times as great as that of the United States, making it the most densely used rail network in the world. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, Soviet railways carried 55 percent of the globe's railway freight (in tons per kilometer) and more than 25 percent of its railway passenger-kilometers. Compared to other domestic transportation alternatives, Soviet railways had no comparison: They hauled 31 percent of the tonnage, accounted for 47 percent of the freight turnover (in billions of ton-kilometers), and circulated almost 40 percent of the inter-city passenger-kilometers.

Regional Rail Systems and Commodities

In the Russian Federation of the early twenty - first century, the leading rail cargoes, ranked according to tonnage, comprise coal, oil and oil products, ferrous metals, timber, iron ore and manganese, grain, fertilizers, cement, nonferrous metals and sulfurous raw materials, coke, perishable foods, and mixed animal feedstocks. The most conspicuous Russian carrier is the Kemerovo Railway, which hauls more than 200 million tons of freight per year, two-thirds of which is coal from the mines of the Kuznetsk Basin (Kuzbas), Russia's greatest coal producer. When the West Siberian and Kuznetsk steel mills operate at full capacity, the Kemerovo Line also carries iron and manganese, iron and steel metals, fluxing agents, and coke. Rounding out the freight structure are cement and timber.

The only other railway that ships more than 200 million tons of freight is the Sverdlovsk, or Yekaterinburg, Railway in the Central Urals. The system's most important cargoes include timber from the nearby forests; ferrous metals from iron and steel mills at Nizhniy Tagil, Serov, Chusovoy and others; and petroleum products from the refineries at Perm and Omsk. Other heavily used railways comprise the October (St. Petersburg), Moscow, North Caucasus, South Ural, and Northern lines, each shipping more than 140 million tons per year. The much-heralded Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) Railway, which became fully operational in December 1989, remains Russia's most lightly used network. Three-fifths of the freight it transports is coal from the South Yakutian Basin.

Regional Bottlenecks

In terms of combined freight and passenger turnover (ton-and passenger-kilometers), the world's most heavily used segment of railroad track stretches between Novokuznetsk in the Kuzbas and Chelyabinsk in the southern Urals. Parts of the Kemerovo, West Siberian, and South Urals railways each maintain a share of this traffic. While touring the Soviet Union in 1977, geographer Paul Lydolph observed train frequencies on this segment as often as one every three minutes in different locations and at various times during the day. By the 1990s, operating at 95 percent of its capacity, the West Siberian arm of the Trans-Siberian Railway was critically overloaded. Ironically, 40 percent of the freight cars were usually empty: Had these cars not been on the track, the West Siberian line would have been running at only 48 percent of capacity! Such was the waste inherent in the Soviet centrally planned command economy.

Since 1991, because of the alterations in the freight-rate structure - the Soviet system was heavily subsidized to keep the rates artificially low - and the post-Soviet depressed economy throughout Russia, particularly in coal mining, iron and steel, and other bulk sectors, both the Kemerovo and West Siberian railway networks have witnessed sharp declines in usage. They continue to represent bottlenecks, but these were much less severe than the ones they became in the Soviet period. The worst bottlenecks in the post-Soviet era occur in ports - both river and sea - and at junctions. The absolute worst are found in Siberia and the Russian Far East, where traffic is heavy, there are few lines, and management traditionally has been lax.

Post - soviet Problems

Since 1991, railway headaches have been less associated with capacity and more with costs. In the early 1990s, the Yeltsin government introduced free - market principles and eliminated the artificial constraints on prices and freight rates that had prevailed in the USSR. The de-emphasis on the military sector, which controlled at least one-fourth of the Soviet economy, proved to be a devastating blow to heavy industry and rail transport. The multiplier effect diffused throughout the economy of the Russian Federation, and soon fewer goods and less output required circulation, and those needing it had to be sent it at burdensome rates. Spiraling inflation and underemployment brought many industries to the edge of bankruptcy. Those industries that survived often were deep in debt to the railroads, which carried the output simply because they had nothing else to carry. Soon the railroads, which were themselves in debt to their energy suppliers, began to demand payment from the indebted industries. This engendered a vicious cycle wherein everyone was living on IOUs: industries owed the railways, which owed the energy suppliers, who in turn owed the mining companies that owed the miners, who could not buy the products of industry.

By 1991, the Soviet rail network was 35 to 40 percent electrified, and much of this electricity came from coal-fired power plants. When the railways could not pay their energy bill, coal miners did not get paid. Since 1989, miners' strikes over wages and perquisites have often crippled the electrified railways. At times the miners have blocked the track to protest their privations. Since the year 2000, this vicious cycle has been alleviated because of high international prices on petroleum and natural gas. The resultant increase in foreign exchange income has brought some relief to the Russian economy. Wage arrears have been eliminated at least temporarily, and the economy, including the Russian railways, appears to have turned the corner.

Bibliography

Ambler, John, et al. (1985). Soviet and East European Transport Problems. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hunter, Holland. (1957). Soviet Transportation Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lydolph, Paul E. (1990). Geography of the USSR. Elkhart Lake, WI: Misty Valley Publishing.

Mote, Victor L. (1994). An Industrial Atlas of the Soviet Successor States. Houston, TX: Industrial Information Resources, Inc.

Westwood, John N. (1964). A History of the Russian Railways. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

—VICTOR L. MOTE

IN BRIEF: A track along which trains run.

A railway ran between the two cities and was used by commuters from each.

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Dansk (Danish)
n. - jernbane

Nederlands (Dutch)
spoorweg(maatschappij)

Français (French)
n. - (GB) rail, chemin de fer, (ligne) de chemin de fer, voie ferrée, compagnie des chemins de fer

Deutsch (German)
n. - (Bahn)gleis, Bahnstrecke, Eisenbahn

Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - σιδηρόδρομος, σιδηροδρομική γραμμή

Italiano (Italian)
ferrovia, ferrovie

Português (Portuguese)
n. - ferrovia (f)

Русский (Russian)
железная дорога

Español (Spanish)
n. - vía férrea, ferrocarril, tranvía

Svenska (Swedish)
n. - järnväg

中文（简体）(Chinese (Simplified))
铁路, 铁路系统, 铁道, 铁路公司

中文（繁體）(Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 鐵路, 鐵路系統, 鐵道, 鐵路公司

한국어 (Korean)
n. - 철도, 궤도

日本語 (Japanese)
n. - 鉄道, 鉄道会社, 軽便鉄道

العربيه (Arabic)
‏(الاسم) السكه الحديديه‏

עברית (Hebrew)
n. - ‮מסילת-ברזל, רכבת‬

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garden railway	model railway shop
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