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Term employed to mean different things at different times by various groups in the history of C20 architecture, but mostly applied to mean the architectural principles behind the International Modern Movement led by such personalities as Gropius and Mies van der Rohe subscribing to the so-called Machine Aesthetic and to Functionalism. However, the word has been so loosely used that some expanded explanations are necessary.
Classical and Renaissance architectural treatises argued that architecture was a science with principles that could be understood on a rational basis. C18 and C19 theorists, notably J.-N.-L. Durand, Viollet-le-Duc, Semper, and others also argued for reasonable approaches to design derived from the culture of the European Enlightenment. Those arguing for C20 Rationalism did not have any one coherent theory, but made assumptions that architectural and urban problems could be solved primarily through an abandonment of Historicism and of movements such as the Arts-and-Crafts, Art Nouveau, and Expressionism (which they regarded as dead-ends), thus creating a tabula rasa on which to start again. They tended to be messianic in their desire for a new world, better architecture, Socialist structures, and a belief in the inherent rightness of what they were seeking, drawing on a Machine Aesthetic to achieve an appropriate image.
Advocates of Rationalism evolved certain principles by which their aims were to be met. First, architecture, industrial design, and planning could be used for social engineering and educational purposes, and so design had a moral meaning (a notion drawn partly from the writings of A. W. N. Pugin and Ruskin). Second, strict economy, cheap industrialized building methods, and a total absence of ornament were to be employed to achieve a minimum standard for everyone's habitation. Third, prefabrication, industrial technologies, and mass-production at all levels were to be used in the making of the new environment, but, even if traditional methods of construction were employed (bricks, after all, are mass-produced, standardized, prefabricated building-components), buildings should look machine-made in their pristine state (so brickwork was disguised by being covered with smooth render). Fourth, wholesale clearances, demolitions, and the destruction of existing urban fabric were deemed to be essential so that vast housing-estates could be erected. Lastly, form itself should be evolved for constructional, economic, functional, political, and social reasons, and so was not (in theory) subject to individual fancy (but in fact was largely determined by a few paradigms).
In practice, Rationalism encouraged an approved International style from which all historical and decorative elements were expunged, drawing on influences from e.g. Constructivism and de Stijl. Among key buildings were Gropius's Bauhaus, Dessau (1925–6), Le Corbusier's Maison Stein, Garches (1927), and houses at the Weissenhofsiedlung, Stuttgart (1927), while theoretical and unifying bases were provided by CIAM and certain writers, notably Giedion and Pevsner.
It is one of the curiosities of Rationalism that it flourished in Italy under Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime (1922–43), and in fact International Modernism was also called Rationalism by Gruppo 7. Terragni was perhaps the most distinguished Italian Rationalist, with his Fascist Party Headquarters, Como (1932–6). Gruppo 7 expanded to form the Movimento Italiano per l'Architettura Razionale (MIAR), inspired partly by Futurism. After the 1939–45 war Rationalism was adopted, virtually as the de rigueur style of Western Europe and America. Looked at objectively, it was just another style, drawing its motifs from a limited range of features approved in the 1920s, and owing very little to rationalism at all, but more to the desire for images thought to be appropriate for the times, and that, in any case, were usually only metaphors of mass-production, modernity, and industrialization.
Bibliography
The full bibliography for this book is available to download as a pdf file.
Download the bibliography for A Dictionary of Architecture and Landscape Architecture (PDF: 1.2MB)
Any philosophy magnifying the role played by unaided reason, in the acquisition and justification of knowledge. The preference for reason over sense experience as a source of knowledge began with the Eleatics, and played a central role in Platonism. Its most significant modern development was in the 17th-century belief that the paradigm of knowledge was the non-sensory intellectual intuition that God would have into the workings of all things, and that human beings taste in their acquaintance with mathematics. The Continental rationalists, notably Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, are frequently contrasted with the British empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), but such oppositions usually oversimplify a more complex picture. For example, it is worth noticing the extent to which Descartes approves of empirical enquiry, and the extent to which Locke shares the rationalist vision of real knowledge as a kind of intellectual intuition. In spite of the authority of Kant, the subsequent history of philosophy has tended to minimize or even to deny the possibility of a priori knowledge, so rationalism depending on this category has also declined. However the idea that the mind comes with pre-formed categories that determine the structure of our language and ways of thought has survived in the work of linguists influenced by Chomsky. The term rationalism is also used more broadly for any anti-clerical, antiauthoritarian humanism, but it is unfortunate that it is empiricists such as Hume who are in this other sense rationalists.
Bibliography
See E. Heimann, Reason and Faith in Modern Society (1961); T. F. Torrance, God and Rationality (1971); R. L. Arrington, Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism (1989).

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In epistemology and in its modern sense, rationalism is "any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification" (Lacey 286). In more technical terms, it is a method or a theory "in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive" (Bourke 263). Different degrees of emphasis on this method or theory lead to a range of rationalist standpoints, from the moderate position "that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge" to the more extreme position that reason is "the unique path to knowledge" (Audi 771). Given a pre-modern understanding of reason, "rationalism" is identical to philosophy, the Socratic life of inquiry, or the zetetic (skeptical) clear interpretation of authority (open to the underlying or essential cause of things as they appear to our sense of certainty). In recent decades, Leo Strauss sought to revive Classical Political Rationalism as a discipline that understands the task of reasoning, not as foundational, but as maieutic. Rationalism should not be confused with rationality, nor with rationalization.
In politics, rationalism is a development of the Enlightenment that emphasizes a "politics of reason" centred upon support of the concepts of rational choice, utilitarianism, secularism and irreligion; this has especially been promoted by liberalism.[1]
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Since the Enlightenment, rationalism is usually associated with the introduction of mathematical methods into philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza (Bourke 263). This is commonly called continental rationalism, because it was predominant in the continental schools of Europe, whereas in Britain empiricism dominated.
Rationalism is often contrasted with empiricism. Taken very broadly these views are not mutually exclusive, since a philosopher can be both rationalist and empiricist (Lacey 286–287). Taken to extremes the empiricist view holds that all ideas come to us through experience, either through the external senses or through such inner sensations as pain and gratification, and thus that knowledge is essentially based on or derived from experience. At issue is the fundamental source of human knowledge, and the proper techniques for verifying what we think we know (see Epistemology).
Proponents of some varieties of rationalism argue that, starting with foundational basic principles, like the axioms of geometry, one could deductively derive the rest of all possible knowledge. The philosophers who held this view most clearly were Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, whose attempts to grapple with the epistemological and metaphysical problems raised by Descartes led to a development of the fundamental approach of rationalism. Both Spinoza and Leibniz asserted that, in principle, all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, could be gained through the use of reason alone, though they both observed that this was not possible in practice for human beings except in specific areas such as mathematics. On the other hand, Leibniz admitted that "we are all mere Empirics in three fourths of our actions" (Monadology § 28, cited in Audi 772). Rationalism is predicting and explaining behavior based on logic.
The distinction between rationalists and empiricists was drawn at a later period, and would not have been recognized by the philosophers involved. Also, the distinction was not as clear-cut as is sometimes suggested; for example, the three main rationalists were all committed to the importance of empirical science, and in many respects the empiricists were closer to Descartes in their methods and metaphysical theories than were Spinoza and Leibniz.
Descartes thought that only knowledge of eternal truths – including the truths of mathematics, and the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the sciences – could be attained by reason alone; other knowledge, the knowledge of physics, required experience of the world, aided by the scientific method. He also argued that although dreams appear as real as sense experience, these dreams cannot provide persons with knowledge. Also, since conscious sense experience can be the cause of illusions, then sense experience itself can be doubtable. As a result, Descartes deduced that a rational pursuit of truth should doubt every belief about reality. He elaborated these beliefs in such works as Discourse on Method, Meditations on First Philosophy, and Principles of Philosophy. Descartes developed a method to attain truths according to which nothing that cannot be recognised by the intellect (or reason) can be classified as knowledge. These truths are gained "without any sensory experience", according to Descartes. Truths that are attained by reason are broken down into elements that intuition can grasp, which, through a purely deductive process, will result in clear truths about reality.
Descartes therefore argued, as a result of his method, that reason alone determined knowledge, and that this could be done independently of the senses. For instance, his famous dictum, cogito ergo sum, is a conclusion reached a priori i.e. not through an inference from experience. This was, for Descartes, an irrefutable principle upon which to ground all forms of other knowledge. Descartes posited a metaphysical dualism, distinguishing between the substances of the human body ("res extensa") and the mind or soul ("res cogitans"). This crucial distinction would be left unresolved and lead to what is known as the mind-body problem, since the two substances in the Cartesian system are independent of each other and irreducible.
The philosophy of Baruch Spinoza is a systematic, logical, rational philosophy developed in seventeenth-century Europe.[2][3][4] Spinoza's philosophy is a system of ideas constructed upon basic building blocks with an internal consistency with which Spinoza tried to answer life's major questions and in which he proposed that "God exists only philosophically."[4][5] He was heavily influenced by thinkers such as Descartes,[6] Euclid[5] and Thomas Hobbes,[6] as well as theologians in the Jewish philosophical tradition such as Maimonides.[6] But his work was in many respects a departure from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Many of Spinoza's ideas continue to vex thinkers today and many of his principles, particularly regarding the emotions, have implications for modern approaches to psychology. Even top thinkers have found Spinoza's "geometrical method"[4] difficult to comprehend: Goethe admitted that he "could not really understand what Spinoza was on about most of the time."[4] His magnum opus, Ethics, contains unresolved obscurities and has a forbidding mathematical structure modeled on Euclid's geometry.[5] Spinoza's philosophy attracted believers such as Albert Einstein[7] and much intellectual attention.[8][9][10][11][12]
Leibniz was the last of the great Rationalists who contributed heavily to other fields such as mathematics. He did not develop his system, however, independently of these advances. Leibniz rejected Cartesian dualism and denied the existence of a material world. In Leibniz's view there are infinitely many simple substances, which he called "monads" (possibly taking the term from the work of Anne Conway).
Leibniz developed his theory of monads in response to both Descartes and Spinoza. In rejecting this response he was forced to arrive at his own solution. Monads are the fundamental unit of reality, according to Leibniz, constituting both inanimate and animate things. These units of reality represent the universe, though they are not subject to the laws of causality or space (which he called "well-founded phenomena"). Leibniz, therefore, introduced his principle of pre-established harmony to account for apparent causality in the world.
Immanuel Kant started as a traditional rationalist, having studied the rationalists Leibniz and Wolff, but after studying David Hume's works, which "awoke [him] from [his] dogmatic slumbers", he developed a distinctive and very influential rationalism of his own, which attempted to synthesise the traditional rationalist and empiricist traditions.
Kant named his branch of epistemology Transcendental Idealism, and he first laid out these views in his famous work The Critique of Pure Reason. In it he argued that there were fundamental problems with both rationalist and empiricist dogma. To the rationalists he argued, broadly, that pure reason is flawed when it goes beyond its limits and claims to know those things that are necessarily beyond the realm of all possible experience: the existence of God, free will, and the immortality of the human soul. Kant referred to these objects as "The Thing in Itself" and goes on to argue that their status as objects beyond all possible experience by definition means we cannot know them. To the empiricist he argued that while it is correct that experience is fundamentally necessary for human knowledge, reason is necessary for processing that experience into coherent thought. He therefore concludes that both reason and experience are necessary for human knowledge.
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Dansk (Danish)
n. - rationalisme, baseret på fornuftsbeslutning
Nederlands (Dutch)
rationalisme
Français (French)
n. - rationalisme
Deutsch (German)
n. - Rationalismus
Ελληνική (Greek)
n. - (θρησκ., φιλοσ.) ορθολογισμός, ρασιοναλισμός
Italiano (Italian)
razionalismo
Português (Portuguese)
n. - racionalismo (m)
Español (Spanish)
n. - racionalismo
Svenska (Swedish)
n. - (fil) rationalism
中文(简体)(Chinese (Simplified))
合理主义, 纯理论, 理性论
中文(繁體)(Chinese (Traditional))
n. - 合理主義, 純理論, 理性論
한국어 (Korean)
n. - 이성론, 합리주의, 이성주의
日本語 (Japanese)
n. - 合理論, 合理主義, 理性論, 理性主義
العربيه (Arabic)
(الاسم) المذهب العقلي
עברית (Hebrew)
n. - שכלתנות, רציונליזם
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