Robert Strange McNamara (born June 9, 1916) is an
American business executive and a former United States Secretary of Defense. McNamara served as U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968, during the Vietnam War. He resigned that position to become President of
the World Bank (1968-1981).
McNamara was responsible for the institution of systems analysis in public policy,
which developed into the discipline known today as policy analysis.[1]
Early life and career
Robert McNamara was born in San Francisco, California, where his father was the sales manager of a wholesale shoe company; he got his
middle name "Strange" from his mother's maiden name. He became an Eagle
Scout, and graduated in 1937 from the University of California, Berkeley. He is also a member of the International
Fraternity of Phi Gamma Delta, with a Bachelor of
Arts in economics with minors in mathematics and philosophy, was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in his sophomore year, and earned a varsity letter in crew.
He was a member of the UC Berkeley Golden Bear Battalion, Army ROTC. He then earned a master's degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1939.
After earning his MBA, McNamara worked a year for the
accounting firm Price Waterhouse in
San Francisco. In August 1940 he returned to
Harvard to teach in the Business
School and became the highest paid and youngest Assistant Professor at the time. Following his involvement there in a
program to teach the analytical approaches used in business to officers of the Army Air Forces (AAF), he entered the Army as a captain
in early 1943, serving most of the war with the AAF's Office of Statistical Control. One major responsibility was the analysis of
U.S. bombers' efficiency and effectiveness, especially the B-29 forces commanded by Major General Curtis LeMay in China and the Marianas Islands.[2] He left active duty in 1946 with the rank of lieutenant
colonel and with a Legion of Merit.
In 1946 McNamara joined Ford Motor Company, due to the influence of a Colonel he
worked under named Charles "Tex" Thornton. Thornton had read an article in
Life magazine which reported that the company was in dire need of reform. He was
one of ten former WW II officers known as the "Whiz Kids", who helped the company to stop its
losses and administrative chaos by implementing modern planning, organization, and management control systems. Starting as
manager of planning and financial analysis, he advanced rapidly through a series of top-level
management positions. McNamara opposed Ford's planned Edsel automobile and worked to stop the
program even before the first car rolled off the assembly line. He eventually succeeded in ending the program in November
1960. McNamara also came close to terminating the Lincoln, forcing product planners to reinvent the car for 1961. On November 9, 1960, McNamara became the first president of Ford from outside the family of Henry Ford. McNamara received
substantial credit for Ford's expansion and success in the postwar period.
Secretary of Defense
President-elect John F. Kennedy first
offered the post of secretary of defense to former secretary Robert A. Lovett. Lovett
declined but recommended McNamara; Kennedy had him approached by Sargent Shriver
regarding either the Treasury or the Defense cabinet post less than five weeks after McNamara had become president at
Ford. At first McNamara turned down the Treasury position; but eventually, after
discussions with his family, McNamara accepted Kennedy's invitation to serve as Secretary of Defense.
Although not especially knowledgeable about defense matters, McNamara immersed himself in the subject, learned quickly, and
soon began to apply an "active role" management philosophy, in his own words "providing aggressive leadership questioning,
suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives and stimulating progress." He rejected radical organizational changes, such as
those proposed by a group Kennedy had appointed, headed by Sen. W. Stuart Symington,
which would have abolished the military departments, replaced the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) with a single chief of staff, and established three functional unified commands. McNamara accepted the need
for separate services but argued that "at the end we must have one defense policy, not three conflicting defense policies. And it
is the job of the Secretary and his staff to make sure that this is the case."
Initially, the basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to Congress on March 28, 1961 guided
McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program. Kennedy rejected the concept of first-strike
attack and emphasized the need for adequate strategic arms and defense to deter nuclear attack on the United States and
its allies. U.S. arms, he maintained, must constantly be under civilian
command and control, and the nation's defense posture had to be "designed to reduce the danger of irrational or
unpremeditated general war." The primary mission of U.S. overseas forces, in cooperation with allies, was "to prevent the steady
erosion of the Free World through limited wars." Kennedy and McNamara rejected massive retaliation for a posture of
flexible response. The United States wanted choices in an emergency other than
"inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation," as the president put it. Out of a major review of the military challenges
confronting the United States initiated by McNamara in 1961 came a decision to increase the nation's limited warfare
capabilities. These moves were significant because McNamara was abandoning Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation in favor of a flexible response strategy that relied on
increased U.S. capacity to conduct limited, non-nuclear warfare.
He also created the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Supply Agency.
Anti-communism
The Kennedy administration placed particular emphasis on improving ability to counter communist "wars of national liberation," in which the enemy avoided head-on military confrontation and
resorted to political subversion and guerrilla tactics. As McNamara said in his 1962
annual report, "The military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. The political tactics are terror,
extortion, and assassination." In practical terms, this meant training and equipping U.S. military personnel, as well as such
allies as South Vietnam, for counterinsurgency
operations.
Increased attention to conventional strength complemented these special forces preparations. In this instance he called up
reserves and also proceeded to expand the regular armed forces. Whereas active duty strength had declined from approximately
3,555,000 to 2,483,000 between 1953 (the end of the Korean conflict) and 1961, it increased
to nearly 2,808,000 by 30 June 1962. Then the forces leveled off
at around 2,700,000 until the Vietnam military buildup began in 1965, reaching a peak of nearly 3,550,000 by mid-1968, just after
McNamara left office.
Crisis
In the broad arena of national security, McNamara played a principal part under both presidents Kennedy and Johnson,
especially during international crises. The first occurred in April 1961, when a U.S.-supported Cuban exile group attempted to overthrow the Castro regime. The failure of
the Bay of Pigs invasion, effected by the Kennedy administration, proved
embarrassing. When McNamara left office in 1968, he told reporters that his principal regret was recommending to Kennedy that he
launch the Bay of Pigs operation, that "could have been recognized as an error at
the time."
More successful, from his perspective, was participating in the Executive Committee, a small
advisory group who counseled Kennedy during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
He supported the president's quarantine of Cuba in preventing
Soviet ships from delivering more weapons. During that crisis, the Pentagon alerted the
U.S. military, ready to enforce the administration's demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its missiles from Cuba, believing that
the outcome, "demonstrated the readiness of our armed forces to meet a sudden emergency," and "highlighted the importance of
maintaining a properly balanced Defense establishment."
Similarly, he regarded using some 24,000 soldiers and dozens of Navy ships to put down a revolution in the Dominican Republic, in April 1965, as another successful test of the "readiness and capabilities of
the U.S. defense establishment to support our foreign policy."
As Secretary of Defense, his principal goal was deterrence — convincing Moscow that a
nuclear attack against the West would trigger U.S. retaliation against Russia, thereby, eliminating further Soviet military
pursuits. McNamara also wanted to give the Soviets reason to refrain from attacking cities. "The very strength and nature of the
Alliance forces," he said in the Ann Arbor speech, "make it possible for us to
retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to
it."
Soon, he de-emphasized the no-cities approach, for several reasons: public fear that planning limited use of nuclear weapons
would render nuclear war feasible; after identifying additional targets in the no-cities strategy, the U.S. Air Force requested
more nuclear weapons; the assumption that such a policy would require major air and missile defense, necessitating a vast,
expanded budget; and negative Soviet and North Atlantic Treaty Organization reactions. McNamara
turned to "assured destruction," which he characterized as the capability "to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the
United States and its allies by maintaining the ability to inflict unacceptable damage
upon any aggressor or aggressors after absorbing a surprise first strike". As defined, assured destruction meant that the
U.S. would be able to retaliatorily destroy 20 to 25 per cent of the Soviet Union's
population and 50 per cent of its industry. Later, the term mutual assured
destruction meant each side's capacity to inflict sufficient damage on the other to constitute effective deterrence.
In conjunction with assured destruction he stressed the importance of damage limitation, the use of strategic forces to limit the
death of the population and damage to its industrial capacity, by attacking and diminishing the enemy's strategic offensive
forces.
To make this strategy credible, McNamara accelerated modernization and expansion of weapons and delivery systems. He
accelerated the production and deployment of the solid-fuel Minuteman ICBMs and the Polaris SLBMs, and, by FY 1966, had removed from operational status all of the older
liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan I missiles. At the end of his tenure, the U.S. had deployed 54 Titan II and 1,000 Minuteman
land-based missiles, and 656 Polaris missiles in 41 nuclear submarines. The size of this
long-range strategic missile force remained stable until the 1980s, although the number of
warheads increased much when the multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) system was engaged in the late 1960s and the
1970s.
Other steps
McNamara at a cabinet meeting, 1967.
McNamara took other steps to improve U.S. deterrence posture and military capabilities. He raised the proportion of
Strategic Air Command (SAC) strategic bombers on 15-minute ground alert from 25
percent to 50 percent, thus lessening their vulnerability to missile attack. In December 1961 he established the Strike Command (STRICOM). Authorized to draw forces when needed from the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), the Tactical Air
Command, and the airlift units of the Military Air Transport
Service and the military services, Strike Command had the mission "to respond swiftly and with whatever force necessary to
threats against the peace in any part of the world, reinforcing unified commands or… carrying out separate contingency
operations." McNamara also increased long-range airlift and sealift capabilities and funds for space research and development. After reviewing the separate and often
uncoordinated service efforts in intelligence and communications, McNamara in 1961 consolidated these functions in the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Communications Agency (the latter originally established by Secretary Gates
in 1960), having both report to the secretary of defense through the JCS. The end effect was to remove the Intelligence function
from the control of the military and to put it under the control of the Secretary of Defense. In the same year, he set up the
Defense Supply Agency to work toward unified supply procurement, distribution, and inventory
management under the control of the Secretary of Defense rather than the uniformed military.
McNamara's institution of systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on
force requirements, weapon systems, and other matters occasioned much debate. Two of its main practitioners during the McNamara
era, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, described the
concept as follows: "First, the word 'systems' indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as
necessary… The word 'analysis' emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding.
Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the
method most appropriate to it." Enthoven and Smith said they used mainly civilians as systems analysts because they could apply
independent points of view to force planning. McNamara's tendency to take military advice into account less than had previous
secretaries and to override military opinions contributed to his unpopularity with service leaders. It was also generally thought
that Systems Analysis, rather than being objective, was tailored by the civilians to support decisions that McNamara had already
made.
The most notable example of systems analysis was the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) instituted by United States Department of
Defense Comptroller Charles J. Hitch.
McNamara directed Hitch to analyze defense requirements systematically and produce a long-term, program-oriented Defense budget.
PPBS evolved to become the heart of the McNamara management program. According to Enthoven and Smith, the basic ideas of PPBS
were: "the attempt to put defense program issues into a broader context and to search for explicit measures of national need and
adequacy"; "consideration of military needs and costs together"; "explicit consideration of alternatives at the top decision
level"; "the active use of an analytical staff at the top policymaking levels"; "a plan combining both forces and costs which
projected into the future the foreseeable implications of current decisions"; and "open and explicit analysis, that is, each
analysis should be made available to all interested parties, so that they can examine the calculations, data, and assumptions and
retrace the steps leading to the conclusions." In practice, the data produced by the analysis was so large and so complex that
while it was available to all interested parties, none of them could challenge the conclusions.
Among the management tools developed to implement PPBS were the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the Draft Presidential
Memorandum (DPM), the Readiness, Information and Control Tables, and the Development Concept Paper (DCP). The annual FYDP was a
series of tables projecting forces for eight years and costs and manpower for five years in mission-oriented, rather than
individual service, programs. By 1968, the FYDP covered 10 military areas: strategic forces, general purpose forces, intelligence
and communications, airlift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research and development, central supply and maintenance,
training and medical services, administration and related activities, and support of other nations.
The DPM, intended for the White House and usually prepared by the systems analysis office, was a method to study and analyze
major Defense issues. Sixteen DPMs appeared between 1961 and 1968 on such topics as strategic offensive and defensive forces,
NATO strategy and force structure, military assistance, and tactical air forces. OSD sent the DPMs
to the services and the JCS for comment; in making decisions, McNamara included in the DPM a statement of alternative approaches,
force levels, and other factors. The DPM in its final form became a decision document. The DPM was hated by the JCS and uniformed
military in that it cut their ability to communicate directly to the White House. The DPMs were also disliked because the systems
analysis process was so heavyweight that it was impossible for any service to effectively challenge its conclusions.
The Development Concept Paper examined performance, schedule, cost estimates, and technical
risks to provide a basis for determining whether to begin or continue a research and development program. But in practice, what
it proved to be was a cost burden that became a barrier to entry for companies attempting to deal with the military. It aided the
trend toward a few large non-competitive defense contractors serving the military. Rather than serving any useful purpose, the
overhead necessary to generate information that was often in practice ignored resulted in increased costs throughout the
system.
The Readiness, Information, and Control Tables provided data on specific projects, more detailed than in the FYDP, such as the
tables for the Southeast Asia Deployment Plan, which recorded by month and quarter the schedule for deployment, consumption
rates, and future projections of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.
ABM
Toward the end of his term McNamara also opposed an anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) system proposed for installation in the United States, arguing that it would be too expensive (at least $40 billion) and
ultimately ineffective, because the Soviets would increase their offensive capability to offset the defensive advantage of the
United States. Under pressure to proceed with the ABM program after it became clear that the Soviets had begun a similar project,
McNamara finally agreed to a "thin" system, but he never believed it wise for the United States to move in that direction.
He always believed that the best defense strategy for the US was a parity of mutually assured destruction with the Soviet Union. An ABM system would be an ineffective
weapon as compared to an increase in deployed nuclear missile capacity.
Cost reductions
McNamara's staff stressed systems analysis as an aid in decision making on weapon development and many other budget issues.
The secretary believed that the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, but that "this ability does
not excuse us from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our defense dollars…. You have
to make a judgment on how much is enough." Acting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost reduction
program, which, he reported, saved $14 billion in the five-year period beginning in 1961. Although he had to withstand a storm of
criticism from senators and representatives from affected congressional districts, he closed many military bases and
installations that he judged unnecessary to national security. He was equally determined about other cost-saving measures. But in
the end, most of the cost savings were illusionary. Every base he closed resulted in a new construction project elsewhere to
expand another base, relocation of forces projects and other related spending. The actual cost savings through consolidation of
installations was often minimal or in some cases negative.
Due to the nuclear arms race, the Vietnam War buildup and other projects, total obligational
authority increased greatly during the McNamara years. Fiscal year TOA increased from $48.4
billion in 1962 to $49.5 billion in 1965 (before the major Vietnam increases) to $74.9 billion in 1968, McNamara's last year in
office. Not until FY 1984 did DoD's total obligational authority surpass that of FY 1968 in constant dollars.
Program consolidation
One major hallmark of McNamara's cost reductions was the consolidation of programs from different services, most visibly in
fighter acquisition, believing that the redundancy created waste and unnecessary spending. McNamara directed the Air Force to
adopt the Navy's F-4 Phantom and A-7 fighters, a
consolidation that was quite successful. Conversely, his actions in mandating a premature across-the-board adoption of the
untested M16 rifle proved catastrophic when the weapons began to fail in combat. McNamara
tried to extend his success by merging development programs as well, resulting in the TFX dual service F-111 project. It was to combine Air Force requirements for an air superiority fighter and tactical bomber, His experience in the corporate world led him to
believe that adopting a single type for different missions and service would save money. He insisted on the General Dynamics
entry over the DOD's preference for Boeing because of commonality issues. Though heralded as a fighter that could do
everything — fast supersonic dash, slow carrier and short airfield landings, tactical strike, and even close air support, in
the end it involved too many compromises to succeed at any of them. The Navy version was drastically overweight and difficult to
land, and eventually killed after a Grumman study showed it was incapable of matching the
abilities of the newly revealed Mig-23 and Mig-25. The F-111 would eventually find its niche as a tactical bomber and electronic warfare
aircraft with the Air Force.
However, many analysts believe that even though the TFX project itself was a failure, McNamara was ahead of his time as the
trend in fighter design has continued toward consolidation — the F-16 and
F/A-18 were developed as multi-role fighters, and most modern designs combine many of the
roles the TFX would have had. In many ways, the JSF is seen as a rebirth of the TFX
project, in that it purports to satisfy the needs of three American Air arms (as well as several foreign customers), fulfilling
the roles of strike fighter, carrier-launched fighter, VSTOL, and CAS (and drawing many criticisms similar to those leveled
against the TFX).
Vietnam War
During President John F. Kennedy's term, while McNamara was Secretary of Defense, America's troops in Vietnam increased from
500 to 16,000.
McNamara knew about the potential deadly effects of Dow Chemical’s
Agent Orange even as it was being used in Vietnam, and long before veterans came home to
die or waste away from the herbicide's after effects. Mutant births are still common in Vietnam.
McNamara has said that the Domino Theory was the main reason for entering the
Vietnam War. In the same interview he states, "Kennedy hadn't said before he died whether,
faced with the loss of Vietnam, he would [completely] withdraw; but I believe today that had he faced that choice, he would have
withdrawn." [1]
Departure from SoD
As McNamara grew more and more controversial after 1966 and his differences with the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over Vietnam strategy became the subject of
public speculation, frequent rumors surfaced that he would leave office. In early November 1967, McNamara's recommendation to
freeze troop levels, stop bombing North Vietnam and for the US to hand over ground
fighting to South Vietnam was rejected outright by President Lyndon B. Johnson. McNamara's recommendations amounted to his saying that the strategy of the United
States in Vietnam which had been pursued to date had failed. Largely as a result, on November
29 of that year, McNamara announced his pending resignation and that he would become President of the World Bank. Other factors were the increasing intensity of the anti-war movement in the United States, the
approaching presidential campaign, in which Johnson was expected to seek re-election and McNamara's support over opposition by
the JCS of construction along the 17th parallel separating South and North Vietnam
of a line of fortifications running from the coast of Vietnam into Laos. The President's announcement of McNamara's move to the
World Bank stressed his stated interest in the job and that he deserved a change after seven years as Secretary of Defense, much
longer than any of his predecessors (and longer than any of his successors, to date).
Other sources give a different view of McNamara's departure from office. For example, Stanley
Karnow in his book "Vietnam: A History" strongly suggests that McNamara was asked to leave by the President. McNamara
himself has expressed lack of certainty about the question.[3]
McNamara left office on 29 February 1968; for his efforts,
the President awarded him both the Medal of Freedom and the
Distinguished Service Medal.
Shortly after McNamara departed the Pentagon, he published "The Essence of Security," discussing various aspects of his tenure
and position on basic national security issues. He did not speak out again on defense issues or Vietnam until after he left the
World Bank.
World Bank
McNamara served as head of the World Bank from April 1968 to June 1981, when he turned
65.[4] In his thirteen years at the Bank,
he introduced key changes. He negotiated, with the conflicting countries represented on the Board, a spectacular growth in funds
to channel credits for development, in the form of health, food, and education projects. He also instituted better methods of
evaluating the effectiveness of funded projects. One notable project started during McNamara's tenure was the effort to prevent
river blindness.[4]
The World Bank currently has a scholarship program under his name.[5]
Post-World Bank activities
In 1982 McNamara joined several other former national security officials in urging that the United States pledge not to use
nuclear weapons first in Europe in the event of hostilities; subsequently he proposed the
elimination of nuclear weapons as an element of NATO's defense posture. His memoir, In Retrospect, published in 1995,
presented an account and analysis of the Vietnam War from his point of view. Reviews were
very mixed. The book was viewed as McNamara's attempt to apologize for his role in the war, but it also has been seen as shifting
blame to other people and as an attempt to transform his image from an architect of the war into a virtual opponent.
United States political commentator Noam Chomsky claims that McNamara did not appear to
be sorry for the Vietnam War itself, but rather for the expenditure of America's resources with no clear gain. He quotes McNamara
from In Retrospect:
"We of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who participated in the decisions on Vietnam acted according to what we thought
were the principles and traditions of this nation. We made our decisions in light of those values. Yet we were wrong, terribly
wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why. I truly believe that we made an error not of values and intentions, but of
judgment and capabilities."
McNamara has maintained his involvement in politics during recent years, delivering statements critical of the
Bush administration's 2003 invasion of
Iraq. [1] On
January 5, 2006, McNamara and most living former Secretaries of
Defense and Secretaries of State met briefly at the White House with President Bush,
to discuss the War in Iraq.
The Fog of War
The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara is a 2003
Errol Morris documentary consisting mostly of
interviews with Robert McNamara and archival footage. It received an Academy Award for Documentary Feature. The particular structure of this personal
account is accomplished with the characteristics of an intimate dialogue. As McNamara explains, it is a process of examining the
experiences of his long and controversial period as the United States
Secretary of Defense, as well as other periods of his personal and public life.
Personal information
McNamara married Margaret Craig, his teenage sweetheart, in 1940. The couple had two daughters and a son. Margaret McNamara, a former teacher, used her position as a Cabinet spouse to launch a reading program
for young children, Reading Is Fundamental, which became the largest literacy
program in the country. She died of cancer in 1981.
After his wife's death, McNamara dated Katharine Graham, with whom he had been
friends since the early 1960s. According to Graham's autobiography, she and McNamara had planned to be traveling in California
with two other friends (a married couple) on her 70th birthday, in 1987, so she could avoid any birthday celebration in
Washington. Graham died in 2001.
In September 2004, McNamara wed Diana Masieri Byfield, an Italian-born widow who had lived in the United States for more than
40 years. It was her second marriage.[2]
As of August 2007, Robert McNamara is one of only four surviving members of the John F. Kennedy Cabinet and Administration
Inner Circle. The others are former Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, former Secretary of the
Interior Stewart Udall, and speech writer Theodore
Sorenson.
McNamara's book In Retrospect was seen by many as ironic for the quantitative approach the author took to explaining
the mistakes of the Vietnam War. McNamara is still seen as largely the chief architect for the failed policies of Vietnam.
Trivia
- On September 29, 1972, a passenger on the ferry to
Martha's Vineyard recognized McNamara on board and attempted to throw him into the
ocean. McNamara declined to press charges. The man remained anonymous, but was interviewed years later by author Paul
Hendrickson,[6] who quoted the attacker as saying, "I just
wanted to confront (McNamara) on Vietnam."
- A picture of McNamara's 1995 meeting with General Vo Nguyen Giap hangs in the War
Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, near pictures of John Kerry, Elmo Zumwalt, Warren Christopher, and other American
dignitaries who visited Vietnam after normalization of relations between the two countries.
Other affiliations
- McNamara is a trustee of the Economists for Peace and Security.
See also
Books by Robert S. McNamara
- (1968) The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York, Harper & Row, 1968; London, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1968. ISBN 0-340-10950-5.
- (1973) One hundred countries, two billion people: the dimensions of development. New York, Praeger Publishers,
1973.
- (1981) The McNamara years at the World Bank: major policy addresses of Robert S. McNamara, 1968-1981; with forewords
by Helmut Schmidt and Léopold Senghor. Baltimore: Published for the World Bank by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. ISBN
0-8018-2685-3.
- (1985) The challenges for sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: 1985.
- (1986) Blundering into disaster: surviving the first century of the nuclear age. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. ISBN
0-394-55850-2 (hardcover); ISBN 0-394-74987-1 (pbk.).
- (1989) Out of the cold: new thinking for American foreign and defense policy in the 21st century. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1989. ISBN 0-671-68983-5.
- (1992) The changing nature of global security and its impact on South Asia. Washington, DC: Washington Council on
Non-Proliferation, 1992.
- (1995) . (with Brian VanDeMark.) New
York: Times Books, 1995. ISBN 0-8129-2523-8; New York: Vintage Books, 1996. ISBN 0-679-76749-5.
- (1999) Argument without end: in search of answers to the Vietnam tragedy. (Robert S. McNamara, James G. Blight, and
Robert K. Brigham.) New York: Public Affairs, 1999. ISBN 1-891620-22-3 (hc).
- (2001) Wilson’s ghost: reducing the risk of conflict, killing, and catastrophe in the 21st century. (Robert S.
McNamara and James G. Blight.) New York: Public Affairs, 2001. ISBN 1-891620-89-4.
References
- ^ Radin, Beryl (2000), Beyond Machiavelli : Policy Analysis Comes of
Age. Georgetown University Press.
- ^ Rich Frank: Downfall,
Random House, 1999.
- ^ In The Fog of War he recounts
saying to a friend, "Even to this day, Kay, I don't know whether I quit or was fired?" (See transcript)
- ^ a b Pages from World Bank History - Bank Pays Tribute to Robert McNamara. Archives.
World Bank (March 21, 2003). Retrieved on 2007-05-26.
- ^ Robert S. McNamara Fellowships Program.
Scholarships. World Bank. Retrieved on 2007-05-26.
- ^ Hendrickson, Paul: The Living and the Dead: Robert McNamara and Five
Lives of a Lost War. Vintage, 1997. ISBN 0-679-78117-X.
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