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Russo-Japanese War

 
Military History Companion: Russo-Japanese war

Russo-Japanese war (1904-5), major but ultimately indecisive war, noted for its political consequences—the first (1905) Russian revolution—but most important militarily as a full dress rehearsal for WW I. It was a war of extended fronts and protracted battles, leading to the emergence of the operational level of war, trench warfare, the use of machine guns, mortars, grenades, land and sea mines, submarines, barbed wire (sometimes electrified) and indirect fire, radio transmission and even electronic warfare (jamming). Foreign observers from the USA, UK, France, and Germany were present on both sides and their detailed and perceptive reports help make it the best-documented war up to that time.

In 1898 Russia leased the Kwantung peninsula from Japan and set up its naval base at Port Arthur. In autumn 1900 it occupied Manchuria. In 1902 the Japanese concluded an agreement with Britain and began preparing for war. Russia's ability to influence events in the region was dependent on the trans-Siberian railway, first discussed in 1860, studied in 1875, and begun in 1891. By 1896 the western section, through Irkutsk to Lake Baikal and from its eastern shore to Sretensk near the Amur river, was built. However, the Russians then decided not to follow the great bend of the Amur round to the north but to cut straight across Manchuria from Chita, 300 miles (483 km) east of Baikal, via Harbin to Vladivostok—the Chinese Eastern railway. The occupation of Manchuria upset the Japanese even more, so the line by which the Russian troops would have to be supplied was itself a cause of the war, and it was single track, with lightweight rails and badly laid.

At the outbreak of war Russia had the world's largest standing army—1, 350, 000 men—but most of it was in Europe. In the Far East Russia had two corps totalling 98, 000 men, plus 24, 000 local troops and 198 guns, scattered across Manchuria, the Pacific coast, and the trans-Baikal region. The Russian Far Eastern Fleet comprised 63 warships including seven battleships and 11 cruisers, mostly obsolete. Japan, much nearer to the theatre of war, had an army of 375, 000 on mobilization, with 1, 140 guns and 147 machine guns, and 80 warships including six battleships and 20 cruisers. The Russian army in the west—5, 000 miles (8, 045 km) away—was re-equipped with the 76 mm M-1900 and M-1902 field guns, described by foreign observers as ‘really excellent’ and ‘the most powerful field gun in the world’ respectively. However, most of the fortress artillery in Port Arthur was antiquated. Russia was not ready for war with Japan in the Far East, and the Japanese knew it. The Russian plan, sensibly enough, was to delay the Japanese while they built up their own strength in the Liao-Yang area, bringing forces south from the Chinese Eastern railway at the top of the ‘T’ at Harbin.

Neither were the Russian command arrangements ideal. The commander of the Manchurian Army, Gen Aleksey Kuropatkin, a highly academic general and former war minister, was appointed in February 1904, but as such he was junior to the C-in-C Far East, Adm Yevgeniy Alekseyev, which led to friction. Kuropatkin was made C-in-C in October 1904, but after the battles of Liao-Yang and Mukden he was demoted to command First Army.

On 6 February 1904 Japan cut off diplomatic relations with Russia and two days later launched a surprise attack before declaring war—a technique repeated in 1941. On the night of 8/9 February Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur and the following day sank two Russian warships at Inchon, Korea. In spite of heavy losses, the Port Arthur squadron remained a threat and was blockaded, permitting the Japanese to transport its armies to the peninsula. These deployed for a land offensive under Marshal Oyama and at the end of April Gen Kuroki's 45, 000-strong Japanese First Army, which had advanced north through Korea, met the Russians at the river Ya-lu. The Russians withdrew, the first of many withdrawals under Kuropatkin's probably overcautious command. On 5 May Gen Oku's Second Army, with 35, 000 men, landed on the Liao-dun peninsula, cutting Port Arthur off from the Russian Manchurian Army. After an unsuccessful attempt by the Russian I Siberian Corps to re-establish communications at the battle of Wafangkou (Telissu) on 14-15 June, the Japanese laid siege to the fortress, shipping in the new Third Army under Nogi with 60, 000 men and 400 guns. Second Army meanwhile tried to push the Russians north up the railway line, in the battle of Tashichao (23-4 July). The Russians fought the Japanese off but Gen Kuropatkin nevertheless ordered a withdrawal north. Here, from 24 August to 3 September the great battle of Liao-Yang took place. Once again the Russians, dug in on a wide front, and exploiting the emerging supremacy of the defensive, held the Japanese but again Kuropatkin ordered withdrawal. On 6 September the Russians pulled back to the Shah-ho, where Kuropatkin intended to build up his strength further and then counter-attack. By this time the Manchurian Army was 214, 000 strong with 758 guns against total Japanese forces of 170, 000 with 648 guns. Kuropatkin, who still believed in the possibility of a decisive battle, decided the time was now right to go over to the offensive. However, the encounter engagement on the Shah-ho proved indecisive and a continuous front 37 miles (60 km) wide developed, just as it would in WW I, giving rise to a positional battle from 5 to 17 October.

The Russo-Japanese war 1904-5. (Click to enlarge)
The Russo-Japanese war 1904-5.
(Click to enlarge)


After the Shah-ho battle there was a lull in the fighting. In January 1905 the Russians launched Mishchenko's raid, round the left (western) flank of the Japanese to cut the railway supplying their troops in the front line north of Liao-Yang. The raid by a force of 7, 500 Cossacks cut the line in several places—a classic ‘strategic’ cavalry raid and prototype of the Soviet manoeuvre group (see operational concepts).

Realizing that the Russians were gaining strength, Oyama decided to reduce Port Arthur, which had been blockaded since February and under land attack since May, in the shortest possible time and switched his main effort to achieving this, increasing the besieging force from 70, 000 to 100, 000. Two attempts by Russian squadrons to break in from the sea, on 23 June and 10 August, failed. The 50, 000 Russians, well dug-in, repelled numerous land assaults, using, among other things, trench mortars and hand grenades, but on 2 January 1905 the commander, Gen Anatoliy Stoessel, surrendered the fortress. The Russians claim to have inflicted 60, 000 casualties on the Japanese in its defence. The siege of Port Arthur was certainly not taken to suggest that fortresses were obsolete but, on the contrary, that they could hold up huge armies for periods of time unacceptable to the enemy.

Following a Russian attempt to outflank the Japanese at San-de-pu from 25 to 28 January 1905, the final land battle at Mukden lasted nineteen days and nights from 19 February to 10 March 1905. This was the shape of future war. Both commanders tried, in Napoleonic fashion, to destroy the other army. Both failed. From the middle of March active military operations ceased on land.

The main Russian forces, meanwhile, had been supplied and reinforced along the trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways—a distance of 4, 000 miles (6, 436 km) from European Russia and 5, 400 miles (8, 689 km) from their main bases, most of it single track. The section around Lake Baikal, the largest freshwater lake in the world, had not been built. The ingenuity and effort shown by the Russians in overcoming these problems attracted the admiration of foreign observers. Lake Baikal froze over at the end of January 1904, just in time for the war. When the ice reached a metre and a half in thickness, a 25 mile (40 km) railway was laid over it, and the supplies were carried across. Meanwhile, the Russians pushed ahead with the circum-Baikal section at a cost equivalent to £52, 000 per mile (1.6 km) —£20, 000 a mile more expensive than usual in Russia. It was completed at the end of September 1904. Down this single line the Russians carried vast quantities of munitions, barbed wire, and all the requisites for a fully modern war. They even brought submarines, built in St Petersburg, by rail, to Vladivostok, where they launched them into the Pacific.

Kuropatkin maintained that even after the bloody but indecisive battle of Mukden he was still gathering strength. By the end of the war he had a million men, two-thirds of whom had not yet seen action, and new machine guns, artillery including howitzers, with growing numbers of shells and even wireless supplies.

Meanwhile, there had been a revolution in European Russia, starting with the massacre of peaceful protesters in St Petersburg on 22 January 1905. Protest, which began with industrial workers, spread rapidly to the army and fleet. Kuropatkin, understandably perhaps, blamed the 1905 revolution for his failure:
What single authority would have admitted a few years ago the possibility of concentrating an army of a million men 5, 400 miles [8, 689 km] away from its base of supply and equipment by means of a poorly constructed single-line railway? Wonders were effected but it was too late. Affairs in the interior of Russia for which the War Department could not be held responsible were the cause of the war being brought to an end at a time when decisive military operations should have only just been beginning.


Japanese control of the sea was a major problem for the Russians and in October 1904 and February 1905 Russian squadrons were sent from the Baltic fleet round Europe, Africa, and Asia to the Far East to form the Second Pacific Squadron. Shortly after leaving the Baltic, the Russians were panicked by some British North Sea trawlers, which they thought might be Japanese torpedo boats, and opened fire, causing outrage. On 27 May 1905, after half circumnavigating the world, the Russian fleet was surprised by the Japanese in the Straits of Tsushima between Korea and Japan. Vice Adm Zinoviy Rozhdestvenskiy commanded the Russian force. His eight battleships, nine cruisers (only one of them armoured), three coast defence monitors, and an assortment of other ships ran into Adm Togo's four battleships and 24 cruisers, eight of them armoured. The Russians had 228 guns to the Japanese 910 but their strength in big guns—8 to 12 inch—was almost equal, with 54 Russian to 60 Japanese. At 07.00 on 27 May the Russians spotted a Japanese cruiser. At 13.15 the Russians encountered the main Japanese fleet trying to cross their bows, and at 13.49 they opened fire at a range of 38 cables (more than 7, 000 yards (6401 metres) ). In the battle that followed the Russians lost all eight battleships and their armoured cruiser, and one of the monitors, plus a number of other ships. The cruiser Aurora, which later signalled the storming of the Winter Palace in the Russian Revolution of November 1917, made it to Manila, but only one cruiser and two torpedo boats reached Vladivostok. The Russian fleet had been utterly destroyed.

The destruction of the Russian fleet was one setback too many. As the 1905 protests at home gathered strength, the Russians sued for peace. At Portsmouth (USA) on 5 September the Russians recognized Korea as lying within the Japanese sphere of influence and gave up southern Sakhalin island and the lease of the Liao-dun peninsula, Port Arthur, and Dalny. Both sides withdrew their forces from Manchuria. After the 1917 revolution the Soviet government agreed to honour the peace terms, but after the occupation of Manchuria by Japan in 1931, which violated it, the peace treaty became irrelevant.

The Russo-Japanese war is sometimes cited as an example of the backwardness of the Russian armed forces, and this is true of the navy, but the foreign observers who were there with the Russian army were impressed by its performance and equipment, and particularly its artillery and the way it utilized indirect fire—the first time these techniques were generally used in war. ‘The army as a whole’, one wrote, ‘is distinctly a good one, and presents many points worthy of imitation.’ It could have won, had the home front not collapsed behind it.

Bibliography

  • Kuropatkin, Gen A. N., The Russian Army and the Japanese War, trans. Capt A. B. Lindsay, ed. Maj E. D. Swinton, 2 vols. (London, 1909).
  • Reports of British Observers attached to the Russian and Japanese Armies in the Field (General Staff, London, 1907).
  • US Official Reports on the Russo-Japanese War (War Department, Washington, 1906)

— Christopher Bellamy

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US Military Dictionary: Russo-Japanese War
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A war fought 1904-05 between Russia and Japan over conflicting claims to sovereignty in parts of east Asia. The Russians were decisively defeated and abandoned their expansionist policies. The war shifted the balance of power in the East and also changed the perception of modern warfare, presaging many of the strategies deployed in World War I.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Russo-Japanese War
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(1904 – 05) Conflict between Russia and Japan over territorial expansion in East Asia. After Russia leased the strategically important Port Arthur (now Lüshun, China) and expanded into Manchuria (northeastern China), it faced the increasing power of Japan. When Russia reneged on its agreement with Japan to withdraw troops from Manchuria, the Japanese fleet attacked the Russia naval squadron at Port Arthur and began a siege of the city in February 1904. Japanese land forces cut the Russian army off from coming to aid Port Arthur and pushed it back to Mukden (now Shenyang). The reinforced Russian army took the offensive in October, but poor military leadership blunted its effectiveness. After the long Japanese siege of Port Arthur, in January 1905 the corrupt Russian commander surrendered the garrison without consulting his officers, despite adequate stores and ammunition for its continued defense. Heavy fighting around Mukden ended in March 1905 with the withdrawal of Russian troops under Aleksey Kuropatkin. The decisive naval Battle of Tsushima gave the Japanese the upper hand and brought Russia to the peace table. With the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia abandoned its expansionist policy in eastern Asia and Japan gained effective control of Korea and much of Manchuria.

For more information on Russo-Japanese War, visit Britannica.com.

Russian History Encyclopedia: Russo-Japanese War
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After brokering the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894 - 1895) with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia placed itself on a collision course with Japan over the issue of spheres of influence in Manchuria. Relations between the two countries further deteriorated in 1898, when Russia occupied the Chinese fortress of Port Arthur (now Lu-shun), and again in 1903, when Russian economic interest focused on Korea. Japan's response to Russia's aggressive eastern policy became apparent on February 8, 1904 when Admiral Heihachiro Togo launched a surprise attack on Port Arthur. Having won control of the sea, the Japanese began landing land troops at Chemulpo (now Inchon), as far north as possible on the Korean Peninsula to avoid the bad roads. Nonetheless, the weather did not cooperate, and it was six weeks before General Tamemoto Kuroki's First Army was ready to march around the northern tip of the Bay of Korea and invade the Liao Tung Peninsula.

Russia, meanwhile, had entered the war unprepared for conflict in Asia. Its military planners had given priority to the empire's European frontiers and had not dedicated sufficient resources to the defense of its Asian interests. While the Japanese considered mainland northeastern Asia vital to their national security, the Russians viewed the region merely as a colonial interest for potential economic development and wealth. No one understood Russia's predicament as clearly as War Minister Alexei N. Kuropatkin, who, upon the outbreak of war, resigned his ministerial portfolio, assumed command of the Russian army, and proceeded to Manchuria, where he arrived in March 1904. Since his forces were being transferred from one end of the empire to the other on the single-track and still incomplete Trans-Siberian Railroad, Kuropatkin set up defenses that he hoped would give Russia at least three months to build up its military presence in the Far East.

Kuropatkin began concentrating troops between Harbin and Liao Yang, but the Japanese thwarted his plan by beginning operations in the middle of March. The Japanese movements unnerved the commander of Port Arthur, General A.M. Stoessel, who immediately appealed to Nicholas II's personally appointed viceroy for the Far East, Admiral E. I. Alexiev, for help. Alexiev ordered Kuropatkin to attack the Japanese, but the commander-in-chief, holding that he was answerable only to the tsar, refused. Thinking that Port Arthur had supplies enough to withstand a long siege, Kuropatkin had no intention of deviating from his plan. Before this dispute could be resolved, the Japanese forced Kuropatkin's hand by defeating the Russians in the hotly contested Battle of Nanshan in April.

With Port Arthur's supply lines cut after Nanshan, Kuropatkin no longer had the luxury of waiting until an overwhelming force was assembled. The major battles of the war followed: Va Fan Gou (May), Liao Yang (August), and the river Sha Ho (October), effectively concluding with Mukden in February 1905. The Russians were soundly defeated in each of these battles by an enemy that first out-thought and then outmaneuvered them. Having concentrated three armies under the overall command of Marshal Iwao Oyama, the Japanese were able to fight the war on their own terms. Ironically, by the Battle of Mukden, Kuropatkin had finally achieved numerical superiority just as the Japanese reached the end of their material and human resources, but he, his staff, and the Russian intelligence services never became aware of this advantage and were intimidated by the Japanese army's maneuverability. Further aggravating the Russian predicament was the inexplicable capitulation of Port Arthur on January 2, 1905. The situation was best described by the numerous military observers representing most of the world's nations, who noted how unmotivated Russia's army seemed in comparison to the patriotic Japanese soldiers with their strong sense of national mission.

A final event that captured the attention of the world was the saga of Russia's Baltic Fleet. By the autumn of 1904, Russia's Pacific Fleet lay in ruins, and to regain control of the sea, Nicholas II ordered the Baltic fleet to the Far East. Under the command of Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, the Baltic Fleet sortied on October 15, 1904. Its round-the-world voyage attracted the interest of the international press, which reported its attack on British fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank (the Russians mistakenly imagined that they were Japanese warships), its search to find places to refuel and refit ships that had not been designed for such an arduous journey; and its rendezvous with reinforcements at Madagascar. By the time the fleet arrived in Asia, Togo was lying in wait and had little difficulty defeating it in the Battle of the Tsushima Straits on May 27, 1905, which dashed Russia's last hopes.

The Russo-Japanese War was the first global conflict of the modern era and the first war in which an emerging Asian nation defeated a European great power. The Japanese victory inflamed Asian nationalism and contributed to the struggle against colonialism throughout the region. The military debacle exposed the weakness of the tsarist regime and is usually considered the prime cause of the Revolution of 1905. After the complete defeat of Russia's land and naval forces, the tsar sued for peace. U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt brokered the Treaty of Portsmouth (August 23, 1905), but the Japanese believed that they had lost the peace and did not trust Western diplomacy again until after World War II. Finally, from the technical standpoint, the Russo-Japanese War was a precursor to World War I. Both sides mobilized mass armies and used trenches, machine guns, and rapid-fire artillery - weapons that help define the early twentieth century battlefield.

Bibliography

Committee of Imperial Defence, Historical Section. (1910 - 1920). Official History, Naval and Military, of the Russo Japanese War. 3 vols. London: Committee of Imperial Defence.

Connaughton, Richard M. (1988). The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904 - 05. London: Routledge.

Corbett, Julian S. (1994). Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904 - 05. 2 vols. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

German General Staff, Historical Section (1909). The Russo-Japanese War, tr. Karl von Donat. 9 vols. London: H. Rees.

Kinai, M., ed. (1907). The Russo-Japanese War: Official Reports. 2 vols. Tokyo: Shimashido.

United States, War Department, General Staff. (1907). Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. 5 parts. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office.

Walder, David. (1973). The Short Victorious War: The Russo-Japanese Conflict, 1904 - 1905. New York: Harper & Row.

Westwood, J. N. (1986). Russia against Japan, 1904 - 05: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War. Albany: State University of New York Press.

—JOHN W. STEINBERG

 
Columbia Encyclopedia: Russo-Japanese War
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Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, imperialistic conflict that grew out of the rival designs of Russia and Japan on Manchuria and Korea. Russian failure to withdraw from Manchuria and Russian penetration into N Korea were countered by Japanese attempts to negotiate a division of the area into spheres of influence. The Russian government, however, was inflexible, and it was willing to risk an armed conflict in the belief that Japan was bound to be defeated and that a Russian victory would head off the growing threat of internal revolution in Russia. Japan broke off negotiations and severed (Feb. 6, 1904) diplomatic relations with Russia. Two days later, without a declaration of war, Japan attacked Port Arthur and bottled up the Russian fleet. A series of quick Japanese victories, which astounded the world, culminated in the fall of Port Arthur (Jan., 1905), the victory of troops under General Oyama at Shenyang (Feb.-Mar., 1905), and the destruction of the Russian fleet under Rozhdestvenski at Tsushima by Admiral Togo's fleet (May, 1905). Through the mediation of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, peace was made in September at Portsmouth, N.H. (see Portsmouth, Treaty of). The disastrous outcome of the war for Russia was one of the immediate causes of the Russian Revolution of 1905. Japan gained the position of a world power, becoming the first non-European and non-American imperialist modern state.

Bibliography

See I. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (1985); J. N. Westwood, Russia against Japan (1986).


History Dictionary: Russo-Japanese War
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A war fought in 1904-1905 between Russia and Japan over rival territorial claims. In winning the war, Japan emerged as a world power.

  • President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States was largely responsible for bringing the two sides together and working out a treaty. For his efforts, Roosevelt won the Nobel Prize for peace.

  • Wikipedia: Russo–Japanese War
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    Russo–Japanese War
    RUSSOJAPANESEWARIMAGE.jpg
    Date 8 February 1904 – 5 September 1905
    Location Manchuria, Yellow Sea
    Result Japanese victory; Treaty of Portsmouth
    Belligerents
    Russia Russian Empire Empire of Japan Empire of Japan
    Commanders
    Russia Tsar Nicholas II
    Russia Aleksey Kuropatkin
    Russia Stepan Makarov 
    Empire of Japan Emperor Meiji
    Empire of Japan Oyama Iwao
    Empire of Japan Tōgō Heihachirō
    Empire of Japan Nogi Maresuke
    Strength
    500,000 800,000
    Casualties and losses
    80,700 killed
    146,032 wounded
    12,128 died of disease.[1]
    106,300 killed
    173,425 wounded
    27,192 died of disease.[2]
    20,000 Chinese dead

    The Russo–Japanese War (Japanese: 日露戦争; Romaji: Nichi-Ro Sensō; Russian: Русско-японская война Russko-Yaponskaya Voyna; simplified Chinese: traditional Chinese: pinyin: Rìézhànzhēng, 10 February 1904 – 5 September 1905) or the Manchurian Campaign in some English sources,[citation needed] was a conflict that grew out of the rival imperial ambitions of the Russian Empire and Japanese Empire over Manchuria and Korea. The major theatres of operations were Southern Manchuria, specifically the area around the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden, and the seas around Korea, Japan, and the Yellow Sea.

    The Russians were in constant pursuit of a warm water port on the Pacific Ocean, for their navy as well as for maritime trade. The recently established Pacific seaport of Vladivostok was only operational during the summer season, but Port Arthur would be operational all year. From the end of the First Sino-Japanese War and 1903, negotiations between the Tsar's government and Japan had proved futile. Japan chose war to maintain exclusive dominance in Korea. All European countries expected that Russia would ultimately win.[citation needed]

    The resulting campaigns, in which the fledgling Japanese military consistently attained victory over the Russian forces arrayed against them, were unexpected by world observers. These victories, as time transpired, would dramatically transform the balance of power in East Asia, resulting in a reassessment of Japan's recent entry onto the world stage. The embarrassing string of defeats increased Russian populace's dissatisfaction with the inefficient and corrupt Tsarist government and proved a major cause of the Russian Revolution of 1905.

    Contents

    Origins of the Russo-Japanese war

    After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Meiji government embarked on an endeavor to assimilate Western ideas, technological advances and customs. By the late 19th century, Japan had emerged from isolation and transformed itself into a modernized industrial state in a remarkably short time. The Japanese wished to preserve their sovereignty and to be recognized as an equal with the Western powers.

    Russia, a major Imperial power, had ambitions in the East. By the 1890s it had extended its realm across Central Asia to Afghanistan, absorbing local states in the process. The Russian Empire stretched from Poland in the west to the Kamchatka peninsula in the East[3]. With its construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the port of Vladivostok, Russia hoped to further consolidate its influence and presence in the region. This was precisely what Japan feared, as they regarded Korea (and to a lesser extent Manchuria) as a protective buffer.

    Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)

    The Japanese government regarded Korea, which was geo-politically close to Japan, as an essential part of its national security; Japan's population explosion and economic needs were also factored into Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese wanted, at the very least, to keep Korea independent, if not under Japanese influence. Japan's subsequent defeat of China during the First Sino-Japanese War led to the Treaty of Shimonoseki under which China abandoned its own suzerainty over Korea and ceded Taiwan, Pescadores and the Liaodong Peninsula (Port Arthur) to Japan.

    However, the Russians, having their own ambitions in the region persuaded Germany and France to apply pressure on Japan. Through the Triple Intervention, Japan relinquished its claim on the Liaodong Peninsula for an increased financial indemnity.

    Russian Encroachment

    In December 1897, a Russian fleet appeared off Port Arthur. After three months, in 1898, a convention was agreed between China and Russia by which Russia was leased Port Arthur, Talienwan and the surrounding waters. It was further agreed that the convention could be extended by mutual agreement. The Russians clearly believed that would be the case for they lost no time in occupation and in fortifying Port Arthur, their sole warm-water port on the Pacific coast, and of great strategic value. A year later, in order to consolidate their position, the Russians began a new railway from Harbin through Mukden to Port Arthur. The development of the railway was a contributory factor towards the Boxer Rebellion and the railway stations at Tiehling and Lioyang were burnt. The Russians also began to make inroads into Korea, by 1898 they acquired mining and forestry concessions near Yalu and Tumen rivers,[4] causing the Japanese much anxiety. Japan decided to strike before the Trans-Siberian Railway was complete.

    The Boxer Rebellion

    The Russians and the Japanese were both part of the eight member international force which was sent in to quell the Boxer Rebellion and to relieve the international legations under siege in the Chinese capital. As with other member nations, the Russians sent troops into China, specifically Manchuria to protect its interests.[5] Russia assured other powers that it would vacate the area after the crisis. However, by 1903 the Russians had not yet adhered to any timetable for withdrawal[6] and actually strengthened their position in Manchuria.

    Negotiations

    The Japanese statesman, Itō Hirobumi, started to negotiate with the Russians. He believed that Japan was too weak to evict Russia militarily, so he proposed giving Russia control over Manchuria in exchange for Japanese control of northern Korea. Meanwhile, Japan and Britain had signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, the British seeking to restrict naval competition by keeping the Russian Pacific seaports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur from their full use. The alliance with the British meant, in part, that if any nation allied itself with Russia during any war with Japan, then Britain would enter the war on Japan's side. Russia could no longer count on receiving help from either Germany or France without there being a danger of the British involvement with the war. With such an alliance, Japan felt free to commence hostilities, if necessary.

    On 28 July 1903, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg was instructed to represent his country's view opposing Russia's consolidation plans over Manchuria. Trade-offs followed and the situation was reached on 13 January 1904 whereby Japan proposed a formula of Manchuria being outside her sphere of influence and sought in return a similar statement relating to Russia's discontinuing interest in Korea. By 4 February 1904, no formal reply had been forthcoming and on the 6th February Mr. Kurino Shinichiro, the Japanese Minister, called on the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorf, to take his leave.[7] Japan severed diplomatic relations on 6 February 1904.

    A "sense of urgency" within the Japanese government was now prevalent and they sought to acquire naval submarines from a "neutral" government as quickly as possible. Several months thereafter, the Imperial Japanese Navy purchased five Holland Type VII-P submarines from the American Electric Boat Company. They were assembled at Fore River Ship and Engine Company of Quincy, Massachusetts by December 1904. These first of five submarines were shipped to the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal under the direction of Arthur Leopold Busch. Busch was a naval architect and shipbuilder who was responsible for the IJN's first fleet of underwater craft – delivered and (reassembled) under his direction on behalf of the Electric Boat Company in 1905. Another Electric Boat representative, Frank Cable was sent to Japan in the summer of 1905 to train the IJN (officers) in the handling and operation of these underwater naval craft.

    War

    Declaration of War

    Greater Manchuria, Russian (outer) Manchuria is the lighter red region to the upper right.

    Japan issued a declaration of war on 8 February 1904. However, three hours before Japan's declaration of war was received by the Russian Government, the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the Russian Far East Fleet at Port Arthur. Tsar Nicholas II was stunned by news of the attack. He could not believe that Japan would commit an act of war without a formal declaration, and had been assured by his ministers that the Japanese would not fight. Russia declared war on Japan eight days later.[8] However, the requirement to declare war before commencing hostilities was not made international law until after the war had ended in October 1907, effective from 26 January 1910.[9] Montenegro also declared war against Japan as a gesture of moral support for Russia out of gratitude for Russian support in Montenegro's struggles against the Ottoman Empire. However, due to logistical reasons and distance, Montenegro's contribution to the war effort was limited to those Montenegrins who served in the Russian armed forces.[citation needed]

    Campaign of 1904

    Battlefields in the Russo-Japanese War.

    Port Arthur, on the Liaodong Peninsula in the south of Manchuria, had been fortified into a major naval base by the Imperial Russian Army. Since it needed to control the sea in order to fight a war on the Asian mainland, Japan's first military objective was to neutralize the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

    Battle of Port Arthur

    On the night of 8 February 1904, the Japanese fleet under Admiral Heihachiro Togo opened the war with a surprise torpedo boat attack on the Russian ships at Port Arthur. The attack badly damaged the Tsesarevich and Retvizan, the heaviest battleships in Russia's far Eastern theater, and the 6,600 ton cruiser Pallada.[10] These attacks developed into the Battle of Port Arthur the next morning. A series of indecisive naval engagements followed, in which Admiral Togo was unable to attack the Russian fleet successfully as it was protected by the shore batteries of the harbor, and the Russians were reluctant to leave the harbor for the open seas, especially after the death of Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov on 13 April 1904.

    However, these engagements provided cover for a Japanese landing near Incheon in Korea. From Incheon the Japanese occupied Seoul and then the rest of Korea. By the end of April, the Imperial Japanese Army under Kuroki Itei was ready to cross the Yalu river into Russian-occupied Manchuria.

    Battle of Yalu River

    In contrast to the Japanese strategy of rapidly gaining ground to control Manchuria, Russian strategy focused on fighting delaying actions to gain time for reinforcements to arrive via the long Trans-Siberian railway which was at the time incomplete near Irkutsk. On 1 May 1904, the Battle of Yalu River became the first major land battle of the war, when Japanese troops stormed a Russian position after an unopposed river crossing. Japanese troops proceeded to land at several points on the Manchurian coast, and, in a series of engagements, drove the Russians back towards Port Arthur. These battles, including the Battle of Nanshan on 25 May 1904, were marked by heavy Japanese losses from attacking entrenched Russian positions, but the Russians maintained their focus on defending, and did not counterattack.

    Blockade of Port Arthur
    Japanese soldiers near Chemulpo, Korea, August-September 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War.

    The Japanese attempted to deny the Russians use of Port Arthur. During the night of 13 February – 14 February, the Japanese attempted to block the entrance to Port Arthur by sinking several cement-filled steamers in the deep water channel to the port, but they sank too deep to be effective. Another similar attempt to block the harbor entrance during the night of 3–4 May also failed. In March, the charismatic Vice Admiral Makarov had taken command of the First Russian Pacific Squadron with the intention of breaking out of the Port Arthur blockade.

    On 12 April 1904, two Russian pre-dreadnought battleships, the flagship Petropavlovsk and the Pobeida slipped out of port but struck Japanese mines off Port Arthur. The Petropavlovsk sank almost immediately, while the Pobeida had to be towed back to port for extensive repairs. Admiral Makarov, the single most effective Russian naval strategist of the war, had perished on the battleship Petropavlovsk.

    On 15 April 1904, the Russian government made overtures threatening to seize the British war correspondents who were taking the ship Haimun into warzones to report for the London-based Times newspaper, citing concerns about the possibility of the British giving away Russian positions to the Japanese fleet.

    The Russians learned quickly, and soon employed the Japanese tactic of offensive minelaying. On 15 May 1904, two Japanese battleships, the Yashima and the Hatsuse, were lured into a recently laid Russian minefield off Port Arthur, each striking at least two mines. The Hatsuse sank within minutes, taking 450 sailors with her, while the Yashima sank while under tow towards Korea for repairs. On 23 June 1904, a breakout attempt by the Russian squadron, now under the command of Admiral Wilgelm Vitgeft failed. By the end of the month, Japanese artillery were firing shells into the harbor.

    Siege of Port Arthur
    Bombardment during the Siege of Port Arthur.

    Japan began a long siege of Port Arthur. On 10 August 1904, the Russian fleet again attempted to break out and proceed to Vladivostok, but upon reaching the open sea were confronted by Admiral Togo's battleship squadron. Known to the Russians as the Battle of August 10[dubious ], but more commonly referred to as the Battle of the Yellow Sea, battleships from both sides exchanged gunfire. The battle had the elements of a decisive battle, though Admiral Togo knew that another Russian battleship fleet would soon be sent to the Pacific. The Japanese had only one battleship fleet and Togo had already lost two battleships to Russian mines. The Russian and Japanese battleships continued to exchange gunfire, until the Russian flagship, the battleship Tsesarevich, received a direct hit on the bridge, killing the fleet commander, Admiral Vitgeft. At this, the Russian fleet turned around and headed back into Port Arthur. Though no warships were sunk by either side in the battle, the Russians were now back in port and the Japanese navy still had battleships to meet the new Russian fleet when it arrived.

    Fall of Port Arthur

    Eventually, the Russian warships at Port Arthur were sunk by the artillery of the besieging army. Attempts to relieve the besieged city by land also failed, and, after the Battle of Liaoyang in late August, the Russians retreated to Mukden (Shenyang). Port Arthur finally fell on 2 January 1905 when the garrison's commanding officer ceded the port to the Japanese without consulting his high command.

    Baltic Fleet

    Meanwhile, at sea, the Russians were preparing to reinforce the Far East Fleet by sending the Baltic Fleet, under Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky The fleet sailed around the world from the Baltic Sea to China via the Cape of Good Hope. The Baltic Fleet would not reach the Far East until May 1905.

    On 21 October 1904, while passing by the United Kingdom (an ally of Japan but neutral in this war), vessels of the Baltic Fleet nearly provoked a war in the Dogger Bank incident by firing on British fishing boats that they mistook for enemy torpedo boats.

    Campaign of 1905

    Retreat of Russian soldiers after the Battle of Mukden.
    Harsh winter and final battles

    With the fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese 3rd army was now able to continue northward and reinforce positions south of Russian-held Mukden. With the onset of the severe Manchurian winter, there had been no major land engagements since the Battle of Shaho the previous year. Both sides camped opposite each other along 60 to 70 miles (110 km) of front lines, south of Mukden.

    The Russian Second Army under General Oskar Grippenberg, between January 25–29, attacked the Japanese left flank near the town of Sandepu, almost breaking through. This caught the Japanese by surprise. However, without support from other Russian units the attack stalled, Grippenberg was ordered to halt by Kuropatkin and the battle was inconclusive. The Japanese knew that they needed to destroy the Russian army in Manchuria before Russian reinforcements arrived via the Trans-Siberian railroad.

    The Battle of Mukden commenced on 20 February 1905. In the following days Japanese forces proceeded to assault the right and left flanks of Russian forces surrounding Mukden, along a 50-mile (80 km) front. Both sides were well entrenched and were backed with hundreds of artillery pieces. After days of harsh fighting, added pressure from both flanks forced both ends of the Russian defensive line to curve backwards. Seeing they were about to be encircled, the Russians began a general retreat, fighting a series of fierce rearguard actions, which soon deteriorated in the confusion and collapse of Russian forces. On 10 March 1905 after three weeks of fighting, General Kuropatkin decided to withdraw to the north of Mukden.

    The retreating Russian Manchurian Army formations disintegrated as fighting units, but the Japanese failed to destroy them completely. The Japanese themselves had suffered large casualties and were in no condition to pursue. Although the battle of Mukden was a major defeat for the Russians it had not been decisive, and the final victory would depend on the navy.

    Victory at Tsushima

    The Russian Second Pacific Squadron (the renamed Baltic Fleet) sailed 18,000 miles (29,000 km) to relieve Port Arthur. The demoralizing news that Port Arthur had fallen reached the fleet while at Madagascar. Admiral Rozhestvensky's only hope now was to reach the port of Vladivostok. There were three routes to Vladivostok, with the shortest and most direct passing through Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan. However, this was also the most dangerous route as it passed very close to the Japanese home islands.

    Admiral Togo was aware of the Russian progress and understood that with the fall of Port Arthur, the Second and Third Pacific Squadrons would try to reach the only other Russian port in the Far East, Vladivostok. Battle plans were laid down and ships were repaired and refitted to intercept the Russian fleet.

    The Japanese Combined Fleet, which had originally consisted of six battleships, was now down to four (two had been lost to mines), but still retained its cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Russian Second Pacific Squadron contained eight battleships, including four new battleships of the Borodino class, as well as cruisers, destroyers and other auxiliaries for a total of 38 ships.

    By the end of May the Second Pacific Squadron was on the last leg of its journey to Vladivostok. They decided to take the shorter, riskier route between Korea and Japan. They travelled at night so they might not be discovered. Unfortunately for the Russians, one of their hospital ships exposed a light, which was sighted by the Japanese armed merchant cruiser Shinano Maru. Wireless communication was used to inform Togo's headquarters, where the Combined Fleet was immediately ordered to sortie. Still receiving naval intelligence from scouting forces, the Japanese were able to position their fleet so that they would "cross the T" of the Russian fleet. The Japanese engaged the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Straits on 27 May–28 May 1905. The Russian fleet was virtually annihilated, losing eight battleships, numerous smaller vessels, and more than 5,000 men, while the Japanese lost three torpedo boats and 116 men. Only three Russian vessels escaped to Vladivostok. After the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese army occupied the entire Sakhalin Islands chain to force the Russians to sue for peace.

    Military attachés and observers

    Japanese General Kuroki and his staff, including foreign officers and war correspondents after the Battle of Shaho (1904).

    Military and civilian observers from every major power closely followed the course of the war. Most were able to report on events from a perspective somewhat like what is now termed "embedded" positions within the land and naval forces of both Russia and Japan. These military attachés and other observers prepared voluminous first-hand accounts of the war and analytical papers. In-depth observer narratives of the war and more narrowly-focused professional journal articles were written soon after the war; and these post-war reports conclusively illustrated the battlefield destructiveness of this conflict. This was the first time the tactics of entrenched positions for infantry defended with machine guns and artillery became vitally important, and both were dominant factors in World War I. From a 21st century perspective, it is now apparent that tactical lessons which were available to the observer nations were disregarded or not used in the preparations for war in Europe and during the course of World War I.[11]

    In 1904–1905, Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton was the military attaché of the British Indian Army serving with the Japanese army in Manchuria. Amongst the several military attachés from Western countries, he was the first to arrive in Japan after the start of the war.[12] As the earliest, he would be recognized as the dean of multi-national attachés and observers in this conflict; but he was out-ranked by a soldier who would become a better known figure, British Field Marshal William Gustavus Nicholson, 1st Baron Nicholson, later to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

    Peace and aftermath

    Treaty of Portsmouth

    Negotiating the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905). From left to right: the Russians at far side of table are Korostovetz, Navohoff, Witte, Rosen, Plancoff; and the Japanese at near side of table are Adachi, Ochiai, Komura, Takahira, Sato. The large conference table is today preserved at the Museum Meiji Mura in Inuyama, Aichi Prefecture, Japan.

    The defeats of the Russian Army and Navy shook Russian confidence. Throughout 1905, the Imperial Russian government was rocked by revolution. Tsar Nicholas II elected to negotiate peace so he could concentrate on internal matters.

    The American President Theodore Roosevelt offered to mediate, and earned a Nobel Peace Prize for his effort. Sergius Witte led the Russian delegation and Baron Komura, a graduate of Harvard, led the Japanese Delegation. The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on 5 September 1905[13] in the U.S. naval station in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Witte became Russian Prime Minister the same year.

    Russia recognized Korea as part of the Japanese sphere of influence and agreed to evacuate Manchuria. Japan would annex Korea in 1910, with scant protest from other powers.

    Russia also signed over its 25-year leasehold rights to Port Arthur, including the naval base and the peninsula around it. Russia also ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan. It was regained by the USSR in 1952 under the Treaty of San Francisco following the Second World War. However, the cession of Southern Sakhalin to the USSR was not supported by the majority of Japanese politicians.

    Casualties

    Sources do not agree on a precise number of deaths from the war because of lack of body counts for confirmation. The number of Japanese dead in combat is put at around 47,000 with around 80,000 if disease is included. Estimates of Russian dead range from around 40,000 to around 70,000. The total number of dead is generally stated at around 130,000.[14] China suffered 20,000 collateral deaths, and financially the loss amounted to over 69 million taels worth of silver.

    Political consequences

    This was the first major victory in the modern era of an Asian power over a European one (albeit not one of the strongest European powers). Russia's defeat had been met with shock both in the West and across the Far East. Japan's prestige rose greatly as it began to be considered a modern Great Power. Concurrently, Russia lost virtually its entire Pacific and Baltic fleets, and also lost international esteem. This was particularly true in the eyes of Germany and Austria–Hungary; Russia was France and Serbia's ally, and that loss of prestige had a significant effect on Germany's future when planning for war with France, and Austria–Hungary's war with Serbia.[citation needed]

    In the absence of Russian competition and with the distraction of European nations during World War I, combined with the Great Depression which followed, the Japanese military began its efforts to dominate China and the rest of Asia, which eventually led to the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War, theatres of World War II.

    Revolution in Russia

    Popular discontent in Russia after the war added more fuel to the already simmering Russian Revolution of 1905, an event Nicholas II of Russia had hoped to avoid entirely by taking intransigent negotiating stances prior to coming to the table at all. Twelve years later, that discontent boiled over into the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In Poland, which Russia partitioned in the late 18th century, and where Russian rule already caused two major uprisings, the population was so restless that an army of 250,000–300,000 – larger than the one facing the Japanese – had to be stationed to put down the unrest.[15] Notably, some political leaders of Polish insurrection movement (in particular, Józef Piłsudski) sent emissaries to Japan to collaborate on sabotage and intelligence gathering within the Russian Empire and even plan a Japanese-aided uprising.[16]

    In Russia, the defeat of 1905 led in the short term to a reform of the Russian military that allowed it to face Germany in World War I. However, the revolts at home following the war planted the seeds that presaged the Russian Revolution of 1917.

    All above dates are believed to be New-Style (Gregorian, not the Julian used in Tsarist Russia: for conformity, where there are two, use the one that reads 13 days "later" than the other).

    Effects on Japan

    Although the war had ended in a victory for Japan, there was a noteworthy gap between Japanese public opinion and the very restrained peace terms which negotiated at the war's end.[17] Widespread discontent spread through the populace upon the announcement of the treaty terms. Riots erupted in major cities in Japan. Two specific demands, expected from such a costly victory, were especially lacking: territorial gains and monetary reparations to Japan. The peace accord led to feelings of distrust, as the Japanese had intended to retain all of Sakhalin Island, but they were forced to settle for half of it after being pressured by the US.[citation needed]

    Assessment of war results

    Russia had lost two of its three fleets. Only its Black Sea Fleet remained, and this was the result of an earlier treaty that had prevented the fleet from leaving the Black Sea. Japan became the sixth-most powerful naval force,[18] while the Russian navy declined to one barely stronger than that of Austria–Hungary.[18] The actual costs of the war were large enough to have affected the Russian economy; and despite grain exports, the nation developed an external balance of payments deficit. The cost of military re-equipment and re-expansion after 1905 pushed the economy further into deficit, although the size of the deficit was obscured.[19]

    A lock of Admiral Nelson's hair was given to the Imperial Japanese Navy from the Royal Navy after the war to commemorate the victory of the Battle of Tsushima; which was in tune with Britain's victory at Trafalgar in 1805. It is still on display at Kyouiku Sankoukan, a public museum maintained by the Japan Self-Defense Force.

    The Japanese were on the offensive for most of the war and used massed infantry human wave attacks against defensive positions, which were the standard of all European armies during World War I. Battles during the Russo-Japanese War were a precursor to trench warfare of World War I,[citation needed] in which machine guns and artillery had taken their toll on Japanese troops. Jakob Meckel, a German military advisor sent to Japan, had a tremendous impact on the development of the Japanese military training, tactics, strategy and organization. His reforms were credited with Japan's overwhelming victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. However, his over-reliance on the use of infantry in offensive campaigns also led to the large number of Japanese casualties.

    Military and economic exhaustion affected both countries.[citation needed] Japanese historians consider this war to be a turning point for Japan, and a key to understanding the reasons why Japan may have failed militarily and politically later on. The acrimony was felt at every level of Japanese society and it became the consensus within Japan that their nation had been treated as the defeated power during the peace conference.[citation needed] As time went on, this feeling, coupled with the sense of "arrogance" of becoming a Great Power[citation needed], grew and added to their growing hostility towards the West and fueled their own military and imperial ambitions, which would culminate in Japan's invasion of East, Southeast, and South Asia in World War II in an attempt to create their own great colonial empire in the name of creating the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Only five years after the war, Japan de jure annexed Korea as its colonial empire, and invaded Manchuria in the Mukden Incident 21 years after in 1931. As a result, most Chinese historians note the war as a key development of Japanese militarism.

    Not only Russia and Japan were affected by the war. As a consequence, the British Admiralty enlarged its docks at Auckland, Bombay, Freemantle, Hong Kong, Simonstown, Singapore and Sydney.[20] The 1904–1905 war confirmed the direction of the admiralty's thinking in tactical terms while undermining its strategic grasp of a changing world.[21] For example, the Admiralty's tactical orthodoxy assumed that a naval battle would imitate the conditions of stationery combat, and that ships would engage in one long line sailing on parallel courses; but in reality, more flexible tactical thinking would be required in the next war. A firing ship and its target would maneuver independently at various ranges and at various speeds and in convergent or divergent courses.[22]

    List of battles

    Art and literature

    Painting of Admiral Togo on the bridge of the Japanese battleship Mikasa, before the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.

    World attention to this military conflict inspired unanticipated consequences in art and literature:

    • Between 1904–05 in Russia, the war was covered by anonymous satirical graphic luboks that were sold at common markets and recorded much of the war for the domestic audience. Around 300 were made before their creation was banned by the Russian government.
    • The disatrous war was among the reasons that spurred Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov to compose his satirical opera, The Golden Cockerel, which was immediately banned by the government.
    • The Russo-Japanese War was covered by dozens of foreign journalists who sent back sketches that were turned into lithographs and other reproducible forms. Propaganda images were circulated by both sides and quite a few photographs have been preserved.
    • The role of Russian-born British Spy Sidney Reilly in providing intelligence that allowed the Japanese surprise attack which started the Siege of Port Arthur is dramatised in Episode 2 of the TV series Reilly, Ace of Spies.
    • Siege of Port Arthur is covered in an encompassing historical novel 'Port Arthur' by Alexander Stepanov (1892–1965), who, at the age of 12, lived in the besieged city and witnessed many key events of the siege. He took a personal role in Port Arthur defense by carrying water to front line trenches; was contused; narrowly evaded amputation of both legs while in the hospital. His father, Nikolay Stepanov, commanded one of Russian onshore batteries protecting the harbor; through him Alexander personally knew many top military commanders of the city – generals Stessels, Belikh, Nikitin, Kondratenko, admiral Makarov and many others. The novel itself was written in 1932, based on the author's own diaries and notes of his father; although it might be subject to ideological bias, as anything published in the USSR at that time, it was (and still is) generally considered in Russia one of the best historical novels of Soviet period[23].
    • The Russo-Japanese War is occasionally alluded to in James Joyce's novel, Ulysses. In the "Eumaeus" chapter, a drunken sailor in a bar proclaims, "But a day of reckoning, he stated crescendo with no uncertain voice—thoroughly monopolizing all the conversation—was in store for mighty England, despite her power of pelf on account of her crimes. There would be a fall and the greatest fall in history. The Germans and the Japs were going to have their little lookin, he affirmed."
    • The Russo-Japanese War is the setting for the naval strategy computer game Distant Guns developed by Storm Eagle Studios.
    • The Russo-Japanese War is the setting for the first part of the novel The Diamond Vehicle, in the Erast Fandorin detective series by Boris Akunin.
    • The Domination series by S.M. Stirling has an alternate Battle of Tsushima where the Japanese use airships to attack the Russian Fleet. This is detailed in the short story "Written by the Wind" by Roland J. Green in the Drakas! anthology.

    See also

    Notes

    1. ^ Samuel Dumas, Losses of Life Caused By War (1923)
    2. ^ Samuel Dumas, Losses of Life Caused By War (1923)
    3. ^ University of Texas: Growth of colonial empires in Asia
    4. ^ S.C.M. Paine, p. 317
    5. ^ Connaughton R., p. 7–8.
    6. ^ S.C.M. Paine, p. 320.
    7. ^ Connaughton, p. 10.
    8. ^ Connaughton, p. 34.
    9. ^ Yale University: Laws of War: Opening of Hostilities (Hague III); October 18, 1907, Avalon Project at Yale Law School.
    10. ^ Shaw, Albert (March, 1904), "The Progress of the World – Japan's Swift Action", The American Monthly Review of Reviews (New York: The Review of Reviews Company) 29 (No. 3): 260, http://books.google.com/books?id=Jr8CAAAAYAAJ&dq=%22Review+of+Reviews%22&lr=&as_brr=1&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0 
    11. ^ Sisemore, James D. (2003). "The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons Not Learned." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
    12. ^ Chapman, John and Ian Nish. (2004). "On the Periphery of the Russo-Japanese War," Part I, p. 53 n42, Paper No. IS/2004/475. Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
    13. ^ Connaughton, p. 272; "Text of Treaty; Signed by the Emperor of Japan and Czar of Russia," New York Times. October 17, 1905.
    14. ^ Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls and Casualty Statistics for Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides
    15. ^ Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray, Stanford University Press, 1994, ISBN 0804723273, Google Print, p.157–158
    16. ^ For Polish–Japanese negotiations and relations during the war, see:Bert Edström, The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, Routledge, 2000, ISBN 1873410867, Google Print, p.126–133
      Jerzy Lerski, "A Polish Chapter of the Russo-Japanese War", Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, III/7 p. 69–96
    17. ^ "Japan's Present Crisis and Her Constitution; The Mikado's Ministers Will Be Held Responsible by the People for the Peace Treaty – Marquis Ito May Be Able to Save Baron Komura," New York Times. September 3, 1905.
    18. ^ a b Sondhaus, Lawrence, Naval Warfare, 1815–1914, P.192
    19. ^ Strachan, Hew. (2001). The First World War: To Arms, p. 844.
    20. ^ Strachan, p. 384.
    21. ^ Strachan, p. 386.
    22. ^ Strachan, p. 388.
    23. ^ 'Port Arthur' by Alexander Stepanov, published by 'Soviet Russia' in 1978, 'About Author' section

    References

    • Connaughton, R.M., The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear—A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–5, London, 1988, ISBN 0-415-00906-5.
    • Paine, S.C.M., The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, 2003, ISBN 0-521-81714-5
    • Corbett, Sir Julian. Maritime Operations In The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. (1994) Originally classified, and in two volumnes, ISBN 155-7501-297.
    • Grant, R., Captain, D.S.O. Before Port Arthur In A Destroyer. (The Personal Diary Of A Japanese Naval Officer – Translated from the Spanish Edition by Captain R. Grant, D.S.O. Rifle Brigade). John Murray, Albemarle St. W. (1907).
    • Hough, Richard A. The Fleet That Had To Die. Ballantine Books. (1960).
    • Jukes, Geoffry. The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Osprey Essential Histories. (2002). ISBN 9-78184-17644-67.
    • Kowner, Rotem (2006). Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. Scarecrow. ISBN 0-8108-4927-5.
    • Morris, Edmund (2002). Theodore Rex[1]. New York: Random House. 10-ISBN 0-812-96600-7; 13-ISBN 978-0-812-96600-8
    • Novikov-Priboy, Aleksei. Tsushima. (An account from a seaman aboard the Battleship Orel (which was captured at Tsushima). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (1936).
    • Nish, Ian Hill. (1985). The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London: Longman. 10-ISBN 0-582-49114-2; 13-ISBN 978-0-582-49114-4
    • Okamoto, Shumpei (1970). The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. Columbia University Press.
    • Pleshakov, Constantine. The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima. ISBN 0-46505-792-6. (2002).
    • Saaler, Sven und Inaba Chiharu (Hg.). Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05 im Spiegel deutscher Bilderbogen, Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien Tokyo, (2005).
    • Seager, Robert. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man And His Letters. (1977) ISBN 0870-21359-8.
    • Semenov, Vladimir, Capt. The Battle of Tsushima. E.P. Dutton & Co. (1912).
    • Semenov, Vladimir, Capt. Rasplata (The Reckoning). John Murray, (1910).
    • Strachan, Hew. (2001). The First World War: To Arms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10-ISBN 0-199-26191-1; 13-ISBN 978-0-199-26191-8
    • Tomitch, V. M. Warships of the Imperial Russian Navy. Volume 1, Battleships. (1968).
    • Warner, Denis & Peggy. The Tide at Sunrise, A History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. (1975). ISBN 0-7146-5256-3.

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