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Social mobility

 
Political Dictionary: social mobility

Movement from one class—or more usually status group—to another. There has been extensive and detailed study of social mobility both between generations and within individuals' careers. Those who study mobility from occupations of one status to those of another typically note that the proportion of occupations which require formal qualifications and where work is physically light and done in a relatively pleasant environment is increasing at the expense of their opposites. Thus there can be more ‘upward’ than ‘downward’ mobility despite the laws of arithmetic. Their opponents point out that a change of occupation is not necessarily a change of class: and that there is no long-term upward trend in the proportion of the population who are in higher-class jobs. Indeed, in so far as class is defined in terms of hierarchy at work, it could be argued that there never could be net upward mobility. The proportion of those who give orders to those who take them is likely to be stable. Feminists point out that for decades social mobility and related subjects were studied by reference to the occupation of the head of the household, making women almost invisible to mobility researchers. See also social stratification.

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History 1450-1789: Social Mobility
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Early modern European societies were by definition nonegalitarian. Social position or status was determined by an individual's place within the institutions of family and social hierarchy. Removed from these hierarchies, the isolated individual appeared marginal at best. The hereditary nature of position and status was supported by systems of family lineage, patronclient relations, and loyalty. Marriages usually joined one "house," lineage, or family to another of equivalent social status. Thus, for the early modern period, social mobility, when it occurred, generally involved family and kinship groups and bore little resemblance to its modern counterpart. Nevertheless, there were opportunities for "upward mobility," as in sixteenth-century France, when réussite sociale (social success) enabled so many of the bourgeoisie to become gentlemen, and their families with them.

Nearly everything in the structure and function of European societies was opposed to social mobility of any great consequence. These were ordered societies with nobility at the top of the hierarchy. Because it was hereditary, the nobility was difficult to join. Thus, short of massive ennoblement, ascension to the social elite was inherently a minor, even marginal phenomenon. Heredity was also important in the artisan classes throughout Europe, as the sons of master craftsmen had privileged access to their fathers' skills. Indeed, social division was sometimes stricter among commoners than among the nobility. Finally, in a world where learning and literacy were not available to all of society, the fact of belonging to a noble or bourgeois elite, or even an artisan elite, conferred advantages that were as decisive as family wealth and constituted another obstacle to social ascension.

The fear of social backsliding—slipping down the social ladder—was a veritable obsession. When nobility was particularly institutionalized, as it was in France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, loss of status and its accompanying privileges became a permanent worry. Even among commoner families, there was a constant fear of social backsliding. However, this should not be considered solely a question of wealth: in the Maine region of France, the fact of belonging to an old, wellestablished, and honorable family was sufficient to dispel many of the social differences linked purely to wealth. There were three main avenues leading to loss of status:

  • • Marrying beneath one's station. However, marriage was also a means of "enriching the stock," that is, bailing out the sons of impoverished noble families by marrying them to rich heiresses from the bourgeoisie, especially the daughters of financiers. Such exogamous marriages resulted in pulling women upward in social status.
  • • Shame, linked to loss of honor or due to misbehavior. This was a consequence much feared by good families. It gave rise to many lettres de cachet.
  • • Ruination, as a result of bad investments or careless spending.

Social backsliding could also be the result of bad luck, such as the premature death of the head of the family or of the only male heir. Also, a considerable number of families simply disappeared, either because a family produced no children at all or no male heir. Research based on patronyms can be misleading by exaggerating both geographic and social mobility of certain family names, because it was the women who ensured the continuity of the family. It is clear, however, that the lack of male offspring was a serious concern for strongly patriarchal families, especially among the social elites. It was the social destiny of the males that was essential, not that of the females.

In many countries—and primarily for the nobility—there were legal mechanisms to protect male heirs while simultaneously ensuring the survival and integrity of estates. Obstacles to social mobility were also imposed in the name of religion. In Ireland during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when Britain's Penal Laws prohibited the practice of Roman Catholicism, Catholics saw their lands confiscated and were prohibited from constituting or reconstituting their estates, forced instead to live as tenant farmers. The central and western Pyrenees also had laws preventing the unification of estates. For the smooth running of this society, in which only the eldest inherited the ancestral patrimony, it was considered essential not only to preserve farms but also to maintain their number. Thus, the eldest child in a family, regardless of its sex, was supposed to marry a younger child from another family, or vice versa, but marriage between an "heir" and an "heiress" was forbidden because it would cause one "house" to disappear and reduce the number of farms. The corollary of this extremely constraining system was that younger sons and daughters could either marry with uncertain prospects, or choose to emigrate because they could not look forward to inheriting the estate.

Migration

A minority of migrants managed to improve their condition during the first generation, but many failed, and mortality was high among migrants, particularly when the migration was to a country with a tropical climate, which suited very few Europeans. Still, migration could enable some people to climb the social ladder. Stonemasons migrating from the Limousin region to Paris or Bordeaux were able to devote their earnings to enlarging the family holding. Migrants settling in Spain were able to use their earnings to become large rural landowners. And there can be no doubt that there were remarkable successes in the East and West Indies.

The agrarian colonization of North America, especially among the English, often resulted in a firmly rooted peasantry. Generally speaking, this was also the case for the soldier-colonists, including those that the French installed on the banks of the Saint Lawrence River, particularly after 1668, with the officers and troops of the Carignan-Salières regiment that came to fight the Iroquois.

In the world of trade, some of the younger and less fortunate sons and cousins sent abroad to serve as commissioners or representatives for trading houses proved to be spectacularly successful. The success could be entirely individual, as in the case of Jacques Necker (1732–1804), the son of a poor Geneva family, who enjoyed unrivaled success as a banker and served as director general of finance for France in 1777. Success in the colonies could be accompanied by a reputation for knavery or could result in shocking nouveau-riche behavior, as in the case of the "nabobs"—the most famous being Robert Clive (1725–1774), who went to the East Indies poor and returned in 1767, having conquered a large part thereof and possessed of a considerable income of £40,000 sterling—or the West Indian planters, known in France as the "Américains," many of whom enjoyed a high profile in eighteenth-century London. It is clear that upward social mobility was often the result of successful migration accompanied by chance and talent. This was true even in sixteenth-century Russia, where a small but important merchant bourgeoisie developed, consisting of men of varied status, based on their extremely heterogeneous origins.

Upward Mobility

In Russia, as in western Europe, social mobility most often affected the nobility. However, Russian nobility was unique in that, until Peter I the Great (ruled 1682–1725), the hereditary elite was based on service to the state, or "chin." There were some very intense class struggles, but access to employment, therefore a higher "chin" level, depended on skills and personal success. Peter the Great restructured all that, particularly in 1721 and 1722. He created new titles, such as count or baron, which he borrowed from other realms. The nobility was divided into fourteen ranks, and while it was still possible to rise in the "chin" system, only the tsar could authorize such a rise. This resulted in a nobiliary social elite, as elsewhere, except that it was linked very directly to state functions and needs for service, which ensured real flexibility for the ruler, until Catherine II the Great (ruled 1762–1796) agreed in 1785 to emphasize the hereditary divisions among the nobility. Until then, social ascension both into and within the Russian social elite was perfectly possible.

The opportunity for social ascension was much more widespread than is generally believed. A great many painters, sculptors, and artists of all kinds came from very common and even humble origins. Moreover, it was often the case that neither their family background nor their place of birth predisposed them in any way toward their future status. For example, the painter Hans Memling (c. 1430 or 1435–1494), who was so important in Bruges during the fifteenth century, was born into a peasant family in a village situated some twenty kilometers from Frankfurt am Main. The flowering of his talent and his enormous success will always remain a profound mystery. Similarly, nothing in Sir Richard Arkwright's (1732–1792) origins offers any inkling of his future success. He may not have been scrupulously honest, but his invention, the water-powered spinning frame, was astonishing and led to his accession to the gentry.

The church also provides many examples of "self-made" men, with one significant difference: the benefits of a successful career in the church could not be passed on to one's descendants (however, there was no shortage of nephews and nieces to favor). The career of Cardinal Jules Mazarin (1602–1661) provides a remarkable example. Born into a Roman family of very modest extraction, he entered the service of Cardinal Richelieu (Armand-Jean du Plessis; 1585–1642), chief minister to Louis XIII (ruled 1610–1643) of France, and later succeeded him as prime minister (1642–1661). Mazarin amassed a considerable fortune, from which his nieces benefited greatly. Although distinctly less impressive, the success of Robert Gaguin (c. 1433–1501) is no less exemplary: born near the boundary between Flanders and Artois, his family may have been common laborers. But this did not stop him from quickly becoming the leader of the Trinitarian Order, a major figure in the University of Paris, a central character for the history of humanism and the Renaissance in France, a great author, a diplomatic adviser, and a representative of the kings of France. These very well-known examples provide us with the key to upward social mobility: the power to make personal talents bear fruit through networks of allied families and kinship groups.

Although family lines and kinship groups preserve social structures, and slow, limit, or prevent social backsliding, they also foster social ascension. J. M. Moriceau's study of powerful peasant families in the Île-de-France region provides a good illustration of these different aspects. Beginning in the fifteenth century, the group studied constituted a veritable village aristocracy that practiced endogamy and maintained very effective networks; it even tended to develop into a caste. Only major crises, like the one that followed the Fronde (1648–1652), could shake it, by multiplying failures and social mobility. However, this did not ruin the families. The rest of the family line, collaterals if necessary, recovered the positions. In this very closed milieu—more closed than the nobility—families had considerable power. During the second half of the eighteenth century, this resulted in their becoming veritable gentlemen farmers and, later on, rural notables.

In the eighteenth century, widespread interest in science and technology increased the number of direct ascensions to fame and wealth, as in the case of Gaspard Monge (1746–1818), the great mathematician and physicist, born at Beaune (Burgundy) to a knife-grinder father and a mother whose father was a coachman. Literature offers similar examples: the French writers Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau(1712–1778)camefromvery modest backgrounds.

While ability and talent were a means to rapid social ascension in science, literature, and the church, the same cannot really be said for the army because the officer level was only barely open to men rising from the ranks. Of course the army can provide some examples of swift ascension, but only when the position of the officer was not the absolute monopoly of the nobility, as in Russia. It was generally exceptional for a commoner to rise to the rank of officer. For example, the careers of British officers, who came largely from the lower branches of the gentry, were fixed in advance by their level of wealth. Whenever we find social ascension in the army, it relates primarily to members of the petite noblesse.

Degrees of Closure

We therefore find multiple social groups—the term class is too precise and should be avoided: master craftsmen, for example, did not constitute a class—seeking to preserve their positions and most of all to ensure their status through their progeny and by jealously maintaining their positions. Craft communities or corporations were very much attached to their privileges and monopolies: these monopolies were "the key to the decent level of living to which the corporation masters considered they had a right, and the basis of their economic independence" (M. Prak). At the high end of society, patriciates, like that of Venice, provide classic examples of the self-protective group. The ranks of the nobility were nowhere more restricted than in Venice, where they remained closed from 1297 onward. Their members were listed in a golden book or in noble genealogies, and members could not form alliances with outsiders. This patriciate held all power and authority in Venice.

In Geneva also, the "Geneva aristocracy" completely dominated social and political life, just as it dominated trade and banking. Unlike other patriciates, however, it was more than willing to open its ranks, even to immigrants, when they were at the head of a great fortune or had acquired a great reputation in religion or the sciences. The Geneva patriciate was therefore remarkable by virtue of its cosmopolitan aspect, which clearly distinguished it from that of Venice.

The tendency for groups to remain closed was nevertheless a much more general phenomenon. In pre-Revolutionary, rural French society, many of the notarial acts to which families had recourse were aimed specifically at excluding girls from the greater part of the inheritance, particularly land inheritance. Girls received a dowry, usually a sum of money and some items of furniture (trousseau, bed, etc.) but the future inheritance went to the male heirs. There was much greater diversity for boys, ranging from egalitarian inheritance to the choice of a single distinctly privileged heir. There was in fact no standard, uniform practice. For example, customs in the region of Paris and Orléans aimed solely at preserving the family bond, paying no particular attention to whether the presumptive heir was male or female, older or younger. In Normandy and Anjou, however, the customary system was egalitarian, and estates in that region were far more difficult to preserve.

Furthermore, the closed nature of nobilities and patriciates was much less extensive than is often thought. It varied from period to period and from country to country. The sixteenth century was undoubtedly a period of great upward mobility in Europe as a whole. The high mortality caused by difficult living conditions combined with the effect of the multiple wars that marked the century to form a social context that was far less rigid than it later became. The passage to nobility was, indeed, more difficult from the eighteenth century onward. However, even when openness and mobility clearly existed, they were accompanied by a strong resistance to change, the Neapolitan nobility being a good example. Victory in the "Spanish affair" certainly ushered in some immediate upheavals in the positions of families, as well as many downfalls. Yet, the composition of the Neapolitan nobility manifested "a remarkable continuity compared to the previous period" (M. A. Visceglia). This resistance was no doubt facilitated by a shared belief in common values and social rules. Having been provost of Parisian merchants from 1622 to 1627 and having also become president of the parlement in 1627, Nicolas de Bailleul decided in 1639 to have his family tree drawn up. He managed to root the preeminence of his family in the distant past in order to erase the obstacles to his rapid ascension and efface all traces of social mobility in a world where prestige, virtue, and success were not linked to meteoric social ascension but to the reality of family and lineage.

Bibliography

Bush, M. L. The European Nobility. 2 vols. Manchester, U.K., 1983–1988.

Corvisier, André. Armées et sociétés en Europe, de 1494 à 1789. Paris, 1976.

Huppert, G. Bourgeois et gentilshommes: La réussite sociale en France au XVIème siècle. Paris, 1983.

Kaufmann-Rochard, J. Origines d'une bourgeoisie russe, XVIème–XVIIème siècles. Paris, 1969.

Labatut, Jean-Pierre. Les noblesses européennes, de la fin du XVème siècle à la fin du XVIIIème siècle. Paris, 1978.

Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel. "Système de la coutume: Structures familiales et coutume d'héritage en France au XVIème siècle." Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 4 and 5 (1972): 825–846.

Meyer, J. Noblesse et pouvoirs dans l'Europe d'ancien régime. Paris, 1973.

Moriceau, Jean-Marc. Les fermiers de l'Ile de France XVème–XVIIIème siècle. Paris, 1994.

Mousnier, Roland. Les hiérarchies sociales de 1450 à nos jours. Paris, 1969.

Parreaux, A. La société anglaise de 1760 à 1810. Paris, 1966.

Prak, M. "Identité urbaine, identités sociales: Les bourgeois de Bois-le-Duc au XVIIIème siècle." Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 4 (1993): 907–934.

Ruggiu, François-Joseph. Les élites et les villes moyennes en France et en Angleterre (XVIIème–XVIIIème siècles). Paris, 1997.

Visceglia, M. A. "Un groupe social ambigu: Organisation, stratégies, et représentations de la noblesse napolitaine XVIème–XVIIème siècles." Annales: É conomies, Sociétés, Civilisations 4 (1993): 819–852.

—JEAN-PIERRE POUSSOU (TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY

Science Dictionary: social mobility
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The ability of individuals or groups to move upward or downward in status based on wealth, occupation, education, or some other social variable.

  • American society operates on the principle that an individual's achievements can be rewarded by upward social mobility.
  • Wikipedia: Social mobility
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    Social mobility is the degree to which an individual's family or group's social status can change throughout the course of their life through a system of social hierarchy or stratification. Subsequently, it is also the degree to which an individual's or group's descendants move up and down the class system. The individual or family can move up or down the social classes based on achievements or factors beyond their control. It is a sociological concept.

    Contents

    Inter- and Intra-generational mobility

    Intra-generational mobility ("within" a generation) is defined as changes in social status over a single life-time. Inter-generational mobility ("across" generations) is defined as changes in social status that occur from the parents' to the children's generation. These definitions are particularly useful when analyzing how social status changes from one time period to another, and if a person's parents' social status influences that of their own. Sociologists usually focus on intergenerational mobility because it is easier to depict changes across generations rather than within one. This information helps sociologists determine whether inequality in a culture changes over time.

    Intra-generational mobility occurs when a person strives to change his or her own social standing. In some societies, this type of change is easier than in others. In social systems where people are divided into castes or ethnic groups, social mobility is limited. Whatever caste or ethnic group a person is born into, is what they will remain for the entirety of their life. However, in cultures where social standing is determined by factors that can change across generations, such as merit, education, skills, abilities, actions or wealth, people can move up and down the social ladder.

    Intra-generational mobility can move a person either higher or lower in the social ladder. If one starts at a low level, they can improve their status by working hard, getting a better job, or becoming more culturally sound, to name a few. Pierre Bourdieu describes three types of capital that place a person in a certain social category. These are economic capital, social capital, and cultural capital. Economic capital is command over economic resources such as money and assets. Social capital is resources one achieves based on group membership, relationships, networks of influence, and support from other people. Cultural capital is any advantage a person has that gives them a higher status in society, such as education, skills, and any other form of knowledge. Usually, people with all three types of capital have a high status in society.

    Inter-generational mobility occurs across generations. This mobility is both merit- and non-merit-based. Ability and hard work affect social mobility, but so does parents’ wealth, race, gender, and luck. Fiona Devine wrote a book, Class practices: how parents help their children get good jobs, specifically on inter-generational mobility and how parents’ influence can affect the child’s social mobility. Nearly every chapter emphasizes the importance of a good education in order to be successful. Parents also help children make important connections with people in order to expand their social network. Parents that can create social capital for their children tend to increase their child’s social mobility.

    Recent researchers collecting data on the economic mobility of families across generations, looked at the probability of reaching a particular income distribution in regards to where their parents were ranked and found that 42 percent of those whose parents were in the bottom quintile ended up in the bottom quintile themselves, 23 percent of them ended in the second quintile, 19 percent in the middle quintile, 11 percent in the fourth quintile and 6 percent in the top quintile.[1] These data indicate the difficulty of upward intergenerational mobility.

    Annette Lareau argues regarding child-raising in her book, Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life. She describes two different ways to raise children: concerted cultivation and natural growth. Concerted cultivation, normally used by middle-class families, incorporates scheduling many structured, organized activities for the child. They are taught to use their language to reason with parents and other adults, and often the child adopts a sense of entitlement. Natural growth is almost the exact opposite of concerted cultivation. Occurring mainly in poor or working-class families, this style of childrearing does not include organized activities, and there is a clear division between the adult and the child. Children usually spend large amounts of their day creating their own activities, and they hardly ever speak with adults. In fact, adults use language in order to direct or order the children, never to negotiate with them. These two different types of childrearing can affect inter-generational mobility. Children who grow up with a concerted cultivation style of childrearing learn from their parents how to talk with adults as equals and negotiate to get favorable outcomes in any situation. This skill helps them create powerful social networks, which can improve their social standing. Children with natural growth accomplishment tend to have a more difficult time improving their social standing. They lack the social skills and sense of entitlement that children raised with the concerted cultivation method have, and therefore are less likely to acquire good jobs (and therefore, improve their social standing). Children who have been raised with natural growth do learn to comply with authority figures, instead of argue with them, which gives them an advantage over concerted cultivated children in certain fields of employment. However, those are generally the entry-level fields where you are paid to follow orders and not to think, and are therefore the lower-paying ones, whereas the middle-class concertedly cultivated children's reasoning skills aid them in attaining the higher-paying, higher-prestige white collar jobs.

    Absolute and Relative Mobility

    Absolute mobility means that living standards are increasing in absolute terms: You are better off than your parents, and your children will be better off than you.[2] Structural changes, such as changes in occupational structure rates, means that there is more room at the top, which leads to high absolute mobility rates.[2] For example, suppose a person begins his working career with an income of $32,000. If a decade later his income is $36,000 (adjusting for inflation), he has experienced upward absolute income mobility.

    Relative mobility refers to the degree to which individuals move up or down compared to others in their cohort.[2] In other words, relative mobility means that if your family is poor, you have a decent chance of moving up the relative income ladder. That is, the rank order of people in society is malleable. Relative mobility relates to the openness or fluidity of society and is insensitive to the impact of structural changes.[2] For example, suppose a person’s income increases from $32,000 at the start of his working career to $36,000 a decade later, but most people who began their work life around the same time experience a larger increase. The person has experienced upward absolute mobility but downward relative mobility.

    Because relative mobility depends on one’s place in the distribution, it is a zero-sum phenomenon.[2] In other words, if one person moves up in relative terms, another by definition must have moved down. In contrast, absolute mobility is not zero-sum.

    Although both absolute and relative mobility are both forms of intragenerational mobility, these two have very little to do with each other. High absolute mobility rates can co-exist with highly unequal relative mobility chances. Thus, you can have an economy with a lot of absolute mobility, and little relative mobility or an economy with a lot of relative mobility, and little absolute mobility. Social mobility is an act of moving from one social class to another. The amount of movement up and down the class structure would indicate the extent of social mobility prevalent in the society. The social mobility is greatly influenced by the level of openness of the society. Open society is the one where people attain their status primarily by their own efforts. In fact the extent of mobility may be taken as an index of openness of a society indicating how far talented individuals born into lower strata can move up the socioeconomic ladder. In this respect, social mobility is an important political issue, particularly in countries committed to liberal vision of equality of opportunity to all citizens. In this perspective industrial societies are mostly open societies portraying high social mobility. Compared with them, pre-industrial societies have mostly been found to be closed societies where there has been low social mobility. People in such societies have been confined to their ancestral occupations and their social status has mostly been ascribed. Social mobility can be classified as: Vertical mobility: The movement of individuals and groups up or down the socioeconomic scale. Those who gain in property, income, status, and position are said to be upwardly mobile, while those who move in the opposite direction are downwardly mobile. Horizontal mobility: The movement of individuals and groups in similar socioeconomic positions, which may be in different work situations. This may involve change in occupation or remaining in the same occupation but in a different organization, or may be in the same organization but at a different location. Lateral mobility: It is a geographical movement between neighborhoods, towns or regions. In modern societies there is a great deal of geographical mobility. Lateral mobility is often combined with vertical as well as horizontal mobility. The movement of people up or down the social hierarchy can be looked at either within one generation called intra-generational mobility or between generations labeled as inter-generational mobility. Intra-generational mobility consists of movement up and down the stratification system by members of a single generation (the-social class in which you began life compared with your social class at the end of your life). Inter-generational mobility consists of movement up and down the stratification system by members of successive generations of a family (your social class location compared with that of your parents, for example). Comparison is usually made between social class status of son and father. Mobility is functional. Open societies provide opportunities to its members for the development of their talents and working toward their individual fulfillment. At the same time a person can select the best person for doing a particular job

    Rules of status: ascription and achievement

    Achieved status is a position gained based on merit, or achievement (used in an open system). An open system describes a society with mobility between different social classes. Individuals can move up or down in the social rankings; this is unlike closed systems, where individuals are set in one social position for life despite their achievements. Ascribed status is a position based on who a person is, not what they can do (used in a closed system). When this ascriptive status rule is used (Medieval Europe), people are placed in a position based on personal traits beyond their control. Mobility is much more frequent in countries that use achievement as the basis for status (U.S. & Canada). However, societies differ on the amount of mobility that occurs due to the direction of structural changes in their overall status systems. The process by which an individual alters the ascribed social status of their parents into an achieved social status for themselves is called Social Transformation.

    Structural and exchange mobility

    Structural mobility is a type of forced vertical mobility that results from a change in the distribution of statuses in a society. It occurs when the demands of a particular occupation reach its max and more people are needed to help fill the positions. Exchange mobility is that which is not structural. The key word "exchange" means trade-off. This means instead of positions reaching the max and more people are needed, positions are dropped and someone else must step up to fill the position. When ascriptive status is in play, there is not much exchange mobility occurring.

    Upward and downward mobility

    Upward social mobility is a change in a person's social status resulting in that person receiving a higher position in their status system. Likewise, downward mobility results in a lower position. A prime example of an opportunity for upward mobility nowadays is athletics. There is an increased number of minorities seeking careers as professional athletes which can either lead to improved social status or could potentially harm them due to neglecting other aspects of their life (ex. education). Transformative assets would also allow one to achieve a higher status in society, as they increase wealth and provide for more opportunity. A transformative asset could be a trust fund set up by family that allows you to own a nice home in a nice neighborhood, instead of an apartment in a down trodden community. This type of move would allow the person to develop a new circle of friends of the same economic status.

    Mobility in the American workforce

    Intra-generational mobility refers to the social mobility within a single generation. It measures shifts in career at some point in the individual’s lifetime, where your occupational status is determined by individual merit. Thus, irrespective of family background, one can move from being an unskilled blue collar worker to becoming a CEO of a multi-million dollar corporation.

    Intra-generational mobility within the work force is a concept that has been heavily influenced by the American dream. Meritocracy, the idea that everybody who has a good work ethic can succeed and move up in class, is a notion that has been put into question using statistics through sociological research. There are several factors which complicate a strictly meritocratic view of an individual's ability to "climb the corporate ladder." These factors primarily include education, gender and race, and social networks.

    Sociologists Blau and Duncan collected mobility data along with the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1962. The data included information on occupational family backgrounds. In 1962, 56.8% of son's with fathers who had occupations in upper nonmanual ended up with occupations in the same level. Only 1.2% of sons with fathers who had farming occupations ended up in upper nonmanual occupations. In 1973, these differences increased. 59.4% of sons with fathers in upper nonmanual occupations achieved occupations of this same level and .9% of sons with fathers in farming occupations ended up in upper nonmanual occupations. However, the occupational structure is more rigid towards the top and bottom. Those in lower nonmanual occupations, and upper and lower manual occupations were more likely to be vertically mobile. Upper nonmanual occupations have the highest level of occupational inheritance.[3]

    Educational factor

    Wages and earnings tend to correlate with the amount of education a person has obtained. In 2003, those workers with less than a high school diploma earned a median income of $21,000; while those workers with a four year college degree earned a median income of $53,000 (James 2005). The poverty line in 2005 according to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services was $19,350 for a four-person household; therefore, those with less education are more likely to be bordering on this line than those with more education. With a college degree, it is more likely for one to attain a professional-level job wherein he or she may earn a higher salary in comparison to someone working in a secondary, service-based job.[citation needed]

    Higher educational opportunities are necessary in order to pull away from the poverty line. Of the 30 fastest growing occupations, more than half require an associates degree or higher. Yet, these jobs are less likely to supply additional jobs to the labor market; meaning, the majority of job growth is found in low-wage jobs (Jacobs 2005). These low-wage jobs are associated with those people who have less education. Workers in these areas are deemed unskilled because it does not require a great amount of education in order to perform these jobs, so the stereotype goes.[citation needed] White collar jobs, however, necessitate more human capital and knowledge and therefore produce higher earnings and require greater education. Therefore, it can be understood that education is a main determinant for potential social mobility in the American workforce.[citation needed]

    An important factor for social mobility is how higher education is financed. In several countries including the US, it is hard for a young person from a poor family to finance higher education. In other countries, like for example Sweden, generous loans are given, which allow also poor people to study at universities.

    Gender and race factor

    When examining status mobility within the American labor force, race and gender inevitably come into play. History has shown that women and minorities have a disadvantage in earning promotions; thus, being a woman or minority is one of the main determinants in hindering status mobility within the labor market.[citation needed]

    Women and minorities hold jobs with less rank, authority, opportunity for advancement, and pay than men and whites (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission 1995; Reskin & Padavic 1994). This concept is considered to be the "glass ceiling" effect. Despite the increased presence of blacks and women in the work force over the years, there remains a very small percentage that holds top managerial positions, implying the "glass ceiling."

    One explanation is seen in the networks of different genders and minorities. The more managers that are in employees' immediate work environment, the higher their chances are of interacting and spending time with high status employees. The race and sex composition of employees' immediate work environment should indirectly affect the status of their network members. For instance, the more women with whom employees work, the more women with whom they will interact, and thus the more women they will have in their networks. The more women and minorities that employees have in their networks, the more low-status network members they should have because women and minorities tend to occupy low-level positions in work organizations (Brass 1985; Ibarra 1992). Less than half of all managers are women, whereas the vast majority of all clerical and office workers are women. Furthermore, less than fifteen percent of all managers were minorities, whereas roughly a quarter of all clerical and office employees were minorities. The networks of women and minorities are simply not as strong as those of males and whites. Therefore, women and minorities have a clear disadvantage in status mobility from the beginning.

    In regards to women, another explanation for this "glass ceiling" effect in the American work force is due to the job-family trade off that women face compared to men. Data from the 1996 General Social Survey examined the trade-offs that women and men made as they attempted to balance their employment and family obligations, and the multiple ways that gender affects those trade-offs (Davis & Smith 1996). Evidence suggests that both parents face job-family conflict, but that men and women are almost equivalent in feeling like such a conflict exists. However, there is information that suggests women adjust their jobs around their family responsibilities more than men do. Some of these adjustments include adding flex-time, changing jobs, or creating part-time work. Women with children, particularly married women, are more likely to either temporarily leave the labor force or cut back on employment by working part-time or part of the year (Carlisle 1994; Estes & Glass 1996; Shelton 1992). Unfortunately, part time employment generally applies to lower paying jobs. When women with children remain in these jobs, it takes out any chance they have of being promoted into a higher status job. Also, research shows that after a woman has had children and gone to part-time employment, she is not very likely to return to full-time employment for at least a few years. This gap of time can often lead to a decrease in the number of jobs that will become available to her.

    Taking a break from the work force tends to decreases human capital when it comes to find a job[4]. Women are also more likely than men to take leave from their jobs to care for others rather than themselves (Gerstel & McGonagle 1999; Sandberg 1999; Sandberg & Cornfield 2000). This evidence makes employers wary of hiring and promoting women in the work force.[citation needed] Others have pointed out that men have statistically been willing to accept job conditions that women were not, such as working outside in extreme weather, working where you can become physically dirty on a regular basis, working more hours, etc. This is based on survey information,[citation needed] not speculation or stereotype, and shows that it is difficult to make direct comparisons ('apples to apples'). Economically, if it were less expensive to hire women for exactly the same duties, then every business interested in increasing profit margins would try to hire women exclusively; so it seems paradoxical that women have a harder time getting a job and also get paid less. This leaves doubt about the objectivity of the allegations.

    Social mobility is especially difficult for immigrants in the United States. As George J. Borjas explains in his paper, Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population, the first generation of immigrants has the most difficult time adjusting to American society. They have to deal with language barriers in addition to trying to adjust to the new environment and culture. Second generation immigrants (those with at least one parent not born in the United States) adjust to life in the United States more easily. “There is significant economic ‘catching up’ between the first and second generations, with the relative wage of the second generation being, on average, about 5 to 10 percent higher than that of the first generation” states Borjas. Since the second generation has access to American schools, they typically learn English in addition to their native language and understand the culture of their society better than their parents do. Borjas also argues that social mobility across generations depends on “ethnic capital,” characteristics of the ethnic environment where children are raised. “A highly advantaged ethnic environment—where most parents are college graduates, for example—imbues the children who grow up in that environment with valuable characteristics that enhance the children's socioeconomic achievement later in life,” Borjas explains. Especially true for immigrant families, ethnic capital largely affects the second generation’s social mobility.

    Intergenerational mobility is particularly apparent in immigrant households. Every generation following the original immigrants appears to increase their income by 5 to 10 percent, thus creating social mobility. Thus, if a family started out very poor when it migrated to the United States, they will improve their position in society substantially with every generation. However, Borjas noticed a trend known as regression towards the mean. It “acts like a double-sided magnet,” pulling both extremes (very poor and very rich) towards the middle. For example, if parents in a family are very successful, it is likely that the children will also be successful but unlikely that they will be as successful as their parents were. Regression towards the mean creates more equality in the United States, regardless of where the parents start out.

    The negative impact of incarceration on social mobility

    Within the United States the prison population has been steadily increasing since the early 1970s and has now surpassed two million. This is the highest per capita rate in the world. This boom is largely fueled by the “War on Drugs” that was started with President Nixon in 1971 as an effort to help Vietnam vets recover from their addictions. It wasn't until Ronald Reagan that the "War on Drugs" took on its modern meaning. This war has had the effect of effectively creating an underclass by providing a number of ways to deny one of the most important tools for social mobility, Education.

    1. The drug war has combined with public school zero-tolerance policies to remove tens of thousands of adolescents from their public schools.
    2. Denial of higher education has been adopted as an additional punishment for drug offenders.
    3. The war on drugs siphons drug users out of society and into prison.[5]

    The lack of education for convicted felons is compounded with difficulties in finding employment. These two factors contribute towards a high recidivism rate and downward social mobility.

    Class cultures and networks

    Cultural capital, a term first coined by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is the process of distinguishing between the economic aspects of class and powerful cultural assets. Bourdieu found that the culture of the upper social class is oriented more toward formal reasoning and abstract thought. The lower social class is geared more towards matters of facts and the necessities of life. He also found that the environment that a person is developed in has a large affect on the social class that a person will have.

    Social system

    Societies which use slavery are an example of low social mobility because, for the enslaved individuals, upward mobility is practically nonexistent, and for their owners, downward mobility is practically outlawed.

    Social mobility is normally discussed as "upward only", but it is a two-sided phenomenon - where there is upward mobility, there can also be relative downward mobility. If merit and fortune play a larger role in life chances than the luck of birth, and some people can manage a relative upward shift in their social status, then some people can also move downward relative to others. This is the risk that motivates people in power to increasingly devise and commission political, legal, education, and economic mechanisms that permit them to fortify their advantages. However, by controlling that inclination, it is possible in a growing economy for there to be greater upward mobility than downward - as has been the case in Western Europe.

    Official or legally recognized class designations do not exist in modern western democracies and it is considered possible for individuals to move from poverty to wealth or political prominence within one generation. Despite this formal opportunity for social mobility, recent research suggests that Britain and particularly the United States have less social mobility than the Nordic countries and Canada.[6][7] These authors state that "the idea of the US as ‘the land of opportunity’ persists; and clearly seems misplaced."

    Not only does social mobility vary across types of countries, it can also change over time. Comparing the United States to the United Kingdom, there was social mobility of different degrees existing between the two countries during different historical periods. In the United States in the mid-19th century inequality was low and social mobility was high. In the late 19th century, the U.S. had much higher social mobility than in the UK, due to the common school movement and open public school system, a larger farmer sector, as well as higher geographic mobility in the United States. However, during the latter half of the 20th and early 21st centuries, the difference between the social mobilities of the two countries has declined, as social inequality has grown in both countries, but particularly in the United States. In other words, the individual's family background is more predictive of social position today than it was in 1850.

    In market societies like the modern United States, class and economic wealth are strongly correlated. However, in some societies, such as feudal societies transitioning to market societies, there is a reduced probability that class status and wealth overlap. Usually, though, membership in a high social class provides more opportunities for wealth and political power, and therefore economic fortune is often a lagging indicator of social class. In newly-formed societies with little or no established tradition (such as the American West in the 19th century) the reverse is true: Made wealth precipitates the elite of future generations.

    Examples

    Popular examples of upward social mobility from America include Abraham Lincoln and Bill Clinton, who were born into working-class families yet achieved high political office in adult life, and Andrew Carnegie, who arrived in the U.S. as a poor immigrant and later became a steel tycoon. Examples from other countries include Pierre Bérégovoy who started working at the age of 16 as a metal worker and later became Prime Minister of France, Ramsay MacDonald the illegitimate son of a farm labourer and a housemaid who became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Sir Joseph Cook, an Englishman who had no schooling and worked as a coal miner at the age of nine and went on to become Prime Minister of Australia.

    Symbols and on social mobility

    Social science and understanding segmentation

    Theory suggests that there is a connection between Social Psychologists understanding of collective identity and the way sociologists conceive it. Individuals are always seeking ways to define themselves with regard to the world around them and they can do this with the meaning given to community and the concept that people are different from others because of arbitrary differences.

    Boundaries could be sexual, racial, or lingual, or they could look at other definitions of boundaries. Geographical boundaries are an example that is strongly reinforced but not as apparent without extra symbols. Sports teams are an excellent example of symbols that define geographic boundaries. When people place themselves, they must find a balance between their community or subgroup and larger communities and out groups (which are groups that can be perceived as having a distinct difference). Scientists “have been studying the segmentation between ‘us’ and ‘them.’”

    The social definition of groups creates entry and exit barriers that can help us understand the reasons that social mobility across group boundaries can be difficult. With symbols ranging from tattoos to elite prep schools, the concept of a boundary is readily apparent and seems to be instinctual. The interplay of ‘achievement’ with status with actual economic success depends largely on the way that the in-group perceives these values. The nonparallel views of different groups at different point on the economic scale mean that advancement in some groups could be counter to the goals and directions of another group. High-income urban culture can define itself with multiple symbolic boundaries stemming from prejudice against other groups that they perceive to be of a different economic status. These actions make it difficult for others to interact with people who may be geographically very close. When groups consider themselves mutually exclusive, it is unlikely that they will worry about the well being of the others and are unwilling to share resources (In the form of social capital in this case)[8]

    An urban planning perspective on group boundaries

    Kevin A. Lynch touches on the concept of geographic boundaries and their social impact, as well as ways they can be manipulated in his book Image of the City. This work addresses the visible and invisible boundaries that are created in urban environments from an urban planners perspective. The spatial information people use to create boundaries can be as important to perception as other more culturally entrenched symbols. To use some of Lynch’s own terms, the Paths that people use dictate their flow in every day behavior, and what is accessible to them easily. Districts are large sections of the city that have some specific character; these create a means of building individual identity that is shared by those who live and work inside them, and felt by those that must cross Edges for various reasons. When seeking jobs or healthcare for instance.[9]

    How sociology views neighborhood boundaries

    According to Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley’s article Assessing “Neighborhood Effects”: Social Processes and New Directions in Research on the relationship between adolescent behavior and indicators of residential differentiation, “Robert Park and Ernest Burgess laid the foundation for urban sociology by defining local communities as 'natural areas' that developed as a result of competition between businesses for land use and between population groups for affordable housing.” This indicates that resources that are available to the community will largely be affected by the wealth of the population.

    There is change that happens in communities however, and they evolve over time. This study suggests that longitudinal studies could observe trends in the community over time. As neighborhood dynamics change, there could be a movement of social groups into proximity with other similar groups creating a hybrid of the two cultures. Another possibility is that the groups in an area move around, but do not intermingle, and when they feel pressure that threatens their hold of an area, they could fight back at the local level, or choose to relocate to a place where economic conditions restrict entry.[10]

    Influences that cross multiple boundaries

    The benefits of having symbols that define social boundaries work to keep people from falling down as much as they can prevent others from moving up. The value of work ethic that is shared in many cultures maintains an individual’s drive and prompts them to seek out and hold employment. Symbols of social status such as leadership roles are important for developing role models, and leadership models are often seen by children as bridging the more detrimental class boundaries. As shown here: “There are also cross-cultural differences in how symbolic boundaries are linked to social boundaries. The same social boundary can be coupled with different symbolic boundaries as class distinctions in Europe are tied to the symbolic boundary between high culture and popular culture.”[10]

    Social mobility v. economic mobility

    The ability for an individual to become wealthy out of poverty does not necessarily indicate that there is social mobility in his or her society. Some societies with low or nonexistent social mobility afford free individuals opportunities to initiate enterprise and amass wealth, but wealth fails to "buy" entry into a higher social class. In feudal Japan and Confucianist China, wealthy merchants occupied the lowest ranks in society (at least in theory). In pre-revolutionary France, a nobleman, however poor, was from the "second estate" of society and thus superior, at least in theory, to a wealthy merchant (from the "third estate").

    Current research

    In recent decades, new status hiearchies has emerged, leading to new opportunities for competition. India has seen a recent boom in employment, communication, distribution of goods, centralized administration, and urban living. This urbanization provides an escape from the ties of memberships in rural based communities. Factors that would predetermine an individual's status are not as effective in urban areas. According to Harold Gould, the criteria for determining occupations in India are a person's skill and quality of performance rather than place of birth. The status of any given role is based on its economic rewards and mobility. Studies have also shown that technological advances have both displaced certain groups as well as offered the chance for upward mobility. Some groups find themselves displaced by developing technology because their economic and social status have declined (ex. water carriers in parts of Northern India have been displaced by the introduction of handpumps). In other cases, individuals are finding new occupation with the opportunity for upward mobility. Most advances, however, appear to coincide with the opportunity for enhancement of social status.

    Comparison of different mobility regimes

    According to sociologist John H. Goldthorpe, social mobility is normally seen in two ways. The first being that it is a basic source of social "structuration." The second is that the extent of mobility may be a strong indicator to the balance of power and different characteristics within a society.

    Change across time within mobility regimes

    Morris and Hancock have a recent book on US mobility.

    See also

    References

    1. ^ Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). (2006). Institute for Social Science Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
    2. ^ a b c d e Grusky, D., & Manwai, C. (2008). Social Stratification: Class race and gender in sociological perspective. Westview Press.
    3. ^ Kerbo, Harold. "Social Stratification and Inequality" (1996) pg 331-332 ISBN 0-07-034258
    4. ^ [1] Jacobs, Sheila. "Trends in Women's Career Patterns and in Gender Occupational Mobility in Britain." Gender, Work, & Organization 6 (1999): 32-46. InterScience. Wiley. 19 Nov. 2008
    5. ^ Blumenson, Eric; Eva S. Nilsen (2002-05-16). How to construct an underclass, or how the War on Drugs became a war on education (PDF). Drug Policy Forum of Massachusetts.
    6. ^ Jo Blanden; Paul Gregg and Stephen Machin (April 2005). "Intergenerational Mobility in Europe and North America" (PDF). The Sutton Trust. http://www.suttontrust.com/reports/IntergenerationalMobility.pdf. 
    7. ^ Matthew Taylor (25 April 2005). "UK low in social mobility league, says charity". The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/britain/article/0,2763,1469685,00.html. 
    8. ^ Michele Lamont; Virag Molnar (2002). "[users.fmg.uva.nl/jrath/educ/@Lamont_Molnar_Boundaries_ARS_2002.pdf the study of boundaries in the social sciences]" (PDF). users.fmg.uva.nl/jrath/educ/@Lamont_Molnar_Boundaries_ARS_2002.pdf. 
    9. ^ Kevin Lynch (1960), The Image of The City, The MIT Press 
    10. ^ a b Robert J. Sampson; Jeffery Morennoff and Thomas Gannon-Rowley (2002), Assessing Neighborhood Effects: Social Process and New Directions in Research, Annual Review of Sociology 
    • Stark, Rodney. 2007 Sociology Tenth Edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson Higher Education
    • 2006 Social Mobility <http://www.sociologyguide.com/social-mobility/systems-of-mobility.php>
    • Bertaux, Daniel and Thompson, Paul.1997 Pathways To Social Class. A Qualitative Approach To Social Mobility. Clarendon Press, Oxford
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge.
    • Borjas, George J. "Working Paper 12088." Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population. 2006. National Bureau of Economic Research. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12088>.
    • Devine, Fiona. Class Practices: How Parents Help Their Children Get Good Jobs. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
    • Eitzen, D S."Upward Mobility Through Sport?."1 26 Sep. 2007 <http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/mar99eitzen.htm>.
    • Francis, David R."'Upward Mobility' In Real Decline, Studies Charge." The Christian Science Monitor.27 Jan. 2003. 26 Sep. 2007 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0127/p21s01-coop.html>
    • Goldthorpe, John H. 1987 Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain. New York: Oxford, Clarendon Press
    • Jacobs, Eva E. (ed). "'Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics: Employment, Earnings, Prices, Productivity, and other Labor Data.'" Lanham, MD. Bernam Press. 8th ed. 2005.
    • Lareau, Annette. Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life. University of California Press, 2003.
    • Maume, David J. "'Glass Ceilings and Glass Escalators: Occupational Segregation and Race and Sex Differences in Managerial Promotions.'" Work and Occupations vol. 26. November 1999: 483-509.
    • McGuire, Gail M. "'Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Networks: The Factors Affecting the Status of Employees’ Network Members.'" Work and Occupations vol. 27. November 2000: 500-523.
    • Western, Bruce. Punishment and Inequality in America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006.
    • Levinson, Paul. "Cellphone". ROutledge, New York, 2004

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