Stephen Breyer

For more information on Stephen Gerald Breyer, visit Britannica.com.

(b. San Francisco, 15 Aug. 1938), associate justice, 1994–. Appointed to the Supreme Court by President Bill Clinton in 1994 to replace Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Breyer served as circuit justice for the Tenth Circuit. Educated at Stanford University (1959) and Oxford University (1961), Breyer received his law degree from Harvard University (1964). After serving as a law clerk for Justice Arthur Goldberg, Breyer held governmental positions in the office of the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (1965–1967), as assistant special prosecutor in the Watergate Investigation (1973), as special counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee (1974–1975), and as chief counsel to that committee (1979–1980). Subsequently, Breyer became a leading member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (1985–1989) that developed the sentencing guidelines now in effect in the federal courts. These governmental assignments occurred while Breyer was pursuing his academic career as a Harvard University law professor, where he specialized in antitrust law, administrative law, economic regulation, and risk management.

Record on the Court

Appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1980, Breyer was known for his intellect, the thoroughness of his preparation, his keen interest in the cases, and his respect for counsel. Breyer became chief judge of the First Circuit in 1990. His wide‐ranging interests and deep commitment to his office were manifest, for example, in the special effort he made to understand the Spanish sources of Puerto Rican law, since Puerto Rico comes within the appellate jurisdiction of the First Circuit. As chief judge, Breyer was a key figure in the design and construction of the new federal courthouse overlooking Boston harbor. In his nearly fifteen years of service on the First Circuit, Breyer gained a reputation for outstanding judicial work, earning comparisons to his illustrious predecessor on the First Circuit, Calvert Magruder, a jurist known for his intelligence, fairness, integrity and realism.

One of the nation's leading thinkers on the subject of deregulation, Breyer is by no means a deregulation ideologue. His major book on the subject, Regulation and Its Reform (1982), is a program for regulatory reform rather than a deregulation manifesto. The book is a detailed analysis of the need for change in such areas as regulatory impact statements, agency accountability, legislative and executive oversight, information gathering, and cost‐benefit analysis. Many of the proposals made in Breyer's book were adopted by presidents and by Congress in the 1980s and 1990s. Given his special expertise in the field of administrative law, it is not surprising that Breyer rendered the decision for the Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Zurko (1999), a patent case that asked if the “substantial evidence” standard of the federal Administrative Procedure Act was the same as the “clearly erroneous” standard used by the federal appeals courts in reviewing the findings of the federal district courts. In reviewing landmark Supreme Court decisions in the field of modern administrative law, Breyer concluded that court/agency review was less strict than court/court review. While Congress had directed reviewing courts to exercise meaningful judicial review of agency findings of fact and not merely to rubber‐stamp such findings, the difference between the two standards was “a subtle one” so that as a practical matter there was no real difference between them. In general, this has meant that the “substantial evidence” requirement in federal administrative law is a reasonableness test not unlike the standard used in the review of most other federal administrative agency determinations.

Breyer's nonideological approach to judging is also manifest in several cases involving the interface between the First Amendment and the electronic media. In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC (1996) and in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1997), Breyer went beyond traditional categorical approaches to First Amendment analysis. He outlined a new balancing approach that recognized the competing interests in freedom of expression on the part of all groups involved in the electronic media such as listeners, media operators, programmers, and local distributors.

One of Justice Breyer's most controversial decisions was Stenberg v. Carhart (2000), the case where a closely divided Supreme Court struck down Nebraska's late‐term abortion statute. The Nebraska law had no provision protecting the life or health of the mother. Breyer argued that the statute was overly broad and jeopardized abortions using common surgical techniques even in the early stages of pregnancy. Breyer drew upon the landmark abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, decided by the Court in 1992, which prohibited laws that placed an “undue burden” on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. Acknowledging the controversial nature of the decision and the fact that millions of Americans believed that life begins at conception, and despite the fact that the Court was closely divided on the issue, Breyer declared that “this Court, in the course of a generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic protection to the woman's right to choose” (p. 920).

Equally emphatic in his defense of basic constitutional rights was Breyer's decision for the Court in Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), a case that involved certain detention provisions of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (as amended). In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed the authorization to civilly detain aliens who violated Immigration and Naturalization Service conditions beyond a statutory period of ninety days. Since the statute failed to limit this continuous period of detention, confinement could, in some instances, become indefinite in the event that an alien's country of origin would not permit return or, for some other reason, the alien was nondeportable. Reacting to this possibility of indefinite detention, Breyer held that confinement after six months beyond the specified ninety‐day period was presumed to be unconstitutional and a violation of due process. To overcome the presumption that such indefinite detention was justified, the government would have to make a showing that there was significant likelihood that removal was reasonably foreseeable and that additional detention was required because of the presence of a further set of aggravating circumstances.

Assessment

In the decade following his appointment, the composition of the Supreme Court did not change. On many issues the Court was divided 5 to 4, and Breyer was one of the moderate minority in most of those cases. As a result, many of Breyer's most notable utterances from the bench were made in dissent rather than in opinions for the Court. Notable among these was his detailed dissenting opinion in United States v. Lopez (1995), the first case in almost sixty years to turn back the power of Congress to regulate commerce under Article I of the Constitution. The statute in question, the Gun‐Free School Zones Act, proscribed the possession of firearms within certain defined zones in and around schools. The majority held that this was not a commercial problem and, therefore, beyond the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Justice Breyer, in his exhaustively documented dissent, argued that “Congress also could have found … that gun‐related violence in and around schools is a commercial, as well as a human, problem” (p. 620). Breyer drew upon the long history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence going back to the bitter struggles over the meaning of interstate commerce at the time of the New Deal. He reminded the Court that its decision in the case would resurrect the discredited jurisprudence of the 1930s. The dissent is illustrative of Breyer's consciousness of the importance of history in constitutional adjudication.

Breyer's pragmatic approach to judging was similarly evident in the case brought by Paula Jones against President Bill Clinton. Concurring in the judgment of a unanimous Court in Clinton v. Jones (1997), that a sitting president did not have automatic immunity from civil lawsuits, Breyer cautioned that such suits could cause “significant interference with the President's ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities” (p. 724). Most telling of all was Breyer's vigorous dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore (2000), which effectively put George W. Bush into the White House. Breyer declared that “the Court was wrong to take this case.” Using the historical experience of the disputed election of 1876, Breyer reminded the Court and the nation that the majority's decision in Bush v. Gore would undermine respect for the judicial process. “What it does today, the court should have left undone,” noted Breyer (p. 156). Breyer's dissent in this memorable and far‐reaching decision showed his respect for federalism, for Congress, for the political process, and for the Constitution. It was the best expression of his understanding of the limits of judicial power.

In his first decade on the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer established a number of benchmarks to his jurisprudence. In addition to his pragmatism, Breyer is noted for his interest in comparative law and his openness to the legal systems and rights provisions of other nations. He is among those justices willing to cite other fundamental rights documents besides the U.S. Bill of Rights in deciding individual rights cases. In the debate over the question as to whether legislative history can be used in statutory analysis, Breyer is on the side of those who do not disclaim its importance as an interpretive tool. On issues of federalism, Breyer remains a strong advocate for the role of Congress and the federal government in economic and environmental regulation. And while he is identified with the liberal wing of the Court, Breyer remains a nonideological moderate. He examines each case on its merits and has few fixed positions.

Breyer is a highly visible Supreme Court justice. His is a familiar face on television, particularly on programs having to do with the legal system and the courts. His nonjudicial publication output remains substantial. Breyer continues to speak and lecture widely even on issues of great public controversy such as the trade‐offs between counterterrorism and human rights, and the dangers of mandatory minimum sentences for criminal defendants under the sentencing guidelines. In the years ahead, as more issues of scientific and technological change come before the Court, Breyer will undoubtedly play a leading role in the developing complexity of Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Bibliography

• Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982).
• Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).
• Stephen Breyer, Reforming Regulation, Tulane Law Review (1984).
• Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, New York University Law Review (2002).
• Walter E. Joyce, The Early Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Stephen G. Breyer: A Study of the Justice's First Year on the United States Supreme Court, Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal (1996)

— George Dargo

The general consensus on Stephen Breyer (born 1938), the 108th member of the United States Supreme Court, is that he has a brilliant legal mind. However, when those same observers try to label him as either a conservative or a liberal, or attempt to figure out how his decisions and opinions will shape the court, there is little agreement. Breyer is considered a centrist, a man who comes to the nation's highest court unlikely to radically transform the institution.

Like President Bill Clinton's other Supreme Court appointment, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Breyer mirrors his president's political style: he has strong convictions, but he is known as much for his spirit of evenhandedness and compromise as for his passionate views on subjects.

Evidence of Breyer's centrist views became clear during his July, 1994 confirmation hearings before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee. Breyer sailed through the hearings with little rancor from either Republicans or Democrats, and won unanimous approval from the committee. Those hearings were vastly different from the contentious committee meetings that greeted other recent Supreme Court nominees. And, perhaps, Breyer's ability to appease political foes was one of the reasons President Clinton chose him as nominee.

Stephen Gerald Breyer was born on August 15, 1938, in San Francisco. His father was an attorney for the San Francisco School Board and his mother was active in Democratic political circles. Upon his appointment to the court, Breyer was quoted as saying he was moved by the fact that he was able to rise so highly in America considering that his grandfather, a cobbler, came to the country just two generations ago. A brilliant student, Breyer attended Stanford University, choosing it over Harvard at the request of his parents, and graduated as a Phi Beta Kappa member with highest honors. He then studied at Oxford University in England as a prestigious Marshall Scholar. He received his law degree, magna cum laude, from Harvard.

Teaches at Harvard

Upon graduation, Breyer became a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. After a stint at the U.S. Department of Justice between 1965 and 1967, Breyer returned to Cambridge, where he taught law at Harvard. But "he is no stranger to Washington politics, " the Boston Globe noted of him upon his appointment to the Supreme Court. That is because in 1973 he was involved in the biggest political story of the century: Watergate, the scandal that revealed then-President Richard M. Nixon's role in the break-in of Democratic Party headquarters at Washington's Watergate Hotel. Breyer became part of the special prosecutor's force led by his former law professor, Archibald Cox. That job led to the position of assistant special counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1975. Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy, who once chaired the committee, named Breyer as chief counsel in 1979. The Judiciary Committee is the same group that, 19 years later, held hearings and voted on Breyer's confirmation to the Supreme Court. The Boston Globe reported that one reason for Breyer's success before Judiciary was because "most of the lawmakers have longstanding ties to Breyer from his days as the committee's legal counsel."

Appointed to Court of Appeals

After the 1980 elections, President Jimmy Carter, who had lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan, made his final judicial appointment before leaving office; he chose Breyer to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals. Republicans, who could have opposed the nomination and allowed Reagan to pick his own nominee, did not oppose Breyer. In supporting Breyer's nomination to the Supreme Court 14 years later, the Wall Street Journal noted of his 1980 nomination: "Mr. Breyer was the last Carter appointee confirmed by the Senate - confirmed even after the 1980 election because of his bipartisan support. For a president [Clinton] who needs a victory, this choice [of Breyer] is really easy." Breyer would become chief judge of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston in 1990.

Once on the bench, Breyer began to develop the legal reputation that would lead to his Supreme Court nomination. Legal scholars describe his decisions in numerous cases before the appeals court as reasoned and moderate, and lacking passion. "Breyer has not used his writings to launch a perceptible constitutional manifesto, " the Boston Globe opined in an article analyzing Breyer's "paper trail" of opinions. He has adhered to the theory that cases need not be decided within the strict formal structures of a particular law; that is, Breyer has been known to consider not just the laws Congress has made, but the "legislative intent" behind those laws. He looks at the legislative history of the struggle to pass a law, and what congressmen and senators meant the law to do when issuing his rulings. He has also been known to consider the effects of his rulings in the future, and not just consider past precedents.

"Law requires both a heart and a head, " the New York Times quoted him as saying during his confirmation hearings. "If you don't have a heart, it becomes a sterile set of rules removed from human problems, and it won't help. If you don't have a head, there's a risk that in trying to decide a particular person's problem in a case that may look fine for that person, you cause trouble for a lot of other people, making their lives yet worse…. It's a question of balance."

Observers say that such opinions fly directly in the faces of other sitting justices, such as Antonin Scalia, who is regarded as forming decisions based on strict interpretations of the law. While Breyer may not be able to win over Scalia to his views, he is seen as a "coalition builder, " someone who will occupy the political center of the court and woo other, centrist-leaning justices to his way of thinking. Or, as the Boston Globe reported, "Breyer's capacity for consensus-building causes some court analysts to believe he could lead a new moderate-liberal coalition."

On key controversial issues, Breyer has become known as a defender of First Amendment freedoms. On the First Circuit court he found that a federally-imposed "gag order" preventing family-planning clinics from providing abortion counseling was unconstitutional; it violated free speech provisions. He also wrote a majority decision that rejected the federal government's requirement that doctors working for the World Health Organization go through a "loyalty check." Allowing the government to examine someone's political leanings as a basis for judging loyalty violated that person's free speech rights, Breyer ruled. He also has a strong environmental record: in 1983 he ruled that oil companies and the federal government had no right to allow oil exploration in the environmentally sensitive George's Bank fishing area off the coast of Massachusetts.

Breyer is much more conservative when it comes to criminal cases. He has allowed improper police testimony to stand in a drug case, calling the police error "harmless" in light of the strong evidence against the drug dealers. Even friends, such as noted Harvard Law School professor and celebrity lawyer Alan Dershowitz, have expressed displeasure with some aspects of Breyer's opinions. Dershowitz was quoted in the New York Times as saying, "A lot of 'liberal' or 'moderate' judges establish their liberal credentials by supporting women's rights and press rights, which are very popular with their constituencies, and then establish their conservative credentials by an almost knee-jerk, pro-prosecutorial approach in criminal cases…. This certainly characterizes … Breyer."

Breyer's best known - and most controversial - work in the field of criminality occurred in 1987 when he served on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a group dedicated to reviewing what sort of jail time criminals should receive across America. The commission's set of proposals drew mixed reviews, with some crediting Breyer for finally getting something down on paper after extensive meetings. But others say the guidelines are too strict, that they do not allow judges enough flexibility, and that in some instances the proposed sentences are too harsh.

As regards the new Supreme Court justice's personal life, he has been married to the former Joanna Hare since 1967. She is the daughter of former British Conservative Party leader Lord John Blackenham. The pair met in Washington, D.C., and after 16 years of marriage Joanna Breyer went back to school and received a Ph.D. in psychology. She works at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute with children stricken with cancer. The Breyers own 160 acres in Plainfield, New Hampshire, and often visit there to hike. The couple have three grown children. Breyer is known as an avid birdwatcher, a good cook, a fan of both old movies and football. "He has been known to wear the same suit for weeks while focusing on something he considers more important than wardrobe, " the Boston Globe reported. He is Jewish, "speaks with a hint of a British accent, " according to the New York Times, and "is more glib than smart and has an impish, often odd, sensibility that could come across as flakiness and could antagonize his potential colleagues on the Supreme Court."

Breyer's other major hobby - bicycle riding - probably cost him his first chance at being named to the Supreme Court. In May of 1993, Breyer was being considered to fill the seat of retiring Justice Byron White. But he was hit by a car while bicycling in the Boston area and was hospitalized. During his recuperation, President Clinton summoned the judge to Washington for an interview. The Boston Globe reported him as telling a friend "that he feared his prospects for the job were poor because he was ill at the meeting with the president … and nearly fainted afterward." But during the interview process it also became clear that Breyer had done what other recently rejected government nominees had done: he had failed to pay Social Security taxes on his part-time housekeeper. The same oversight forced Clinton to reject his first two choices for attorney general: Zoe Baird and Kimba Wood. Clinton eventually chose Ruth Bader Ginsburg over Breyer for the Supreme Court. But a year later, when Clinton chose Breyer to fill the seat of Justice Harry Blackmun, Breyer, quoted in the Boston Globe, was able to joke to the president, "I'm glad I didn't bring my bicycle down."

After being passed over in favor of Ginsburg in June of 1993, Breyer returned to Boston. Although many of his friends were critical of the way Clinton had dangled the job before Breyer and had made him travel while still feeling the ill effects of his bicycle accident, Breyer remained reserved and uncritical. After the rejection, according to the Wall Street Journal, Breyer called his friends, "cheering them up, rather than vice versa."

He returned to Boston to continue work on his biggest, non-legal project: helping design and construct a new $200 million federal courthouse in Boston. The courthouse is situated on the waterfront area known as Fan Pier. "This most beautiful site in Boston, " Breyer was quoted as saying in the New York Times, "does not belong to the lawyers, it does not belong to the federal government, it does not belong to the litigants. It belongs to the people." According to all reports, Breyer threw himself into the project: interviewing and choosing architects, meeting with community groups, even visiting courts around the country that he and the architect either admired or wanted to avoid duplicating. In the end, the worldly and intelligent judge pressed for a courthouse that includes a community meeting hall, art exhibition space, and a restaurant.

Nomination Approved

In May of 1994, when Clinton was forced to fill another vacancy on the court, he returned to Breyer. White House officials were quoted as saying they liked the "classy" way Breyer handled his rejection a year before. Clinton called him "a jurist who I deeply believe will take his place as one of nation's outstanding justices, " according to a report in the Boston Globe. His confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee were not controversial. The biggest concern was Breyer's financial stake in Lloyd's of London, the giant insurance firm. Some senators questioned whether Breyer's financial interest in Lloyd's clouded his rulings on environmental cases. If Lloyd's had to pay for certain toxic waste cleanups, the senators wondered how Breyer could rule impartially in those cases. Breyer responded that Lloyd's was not a direct party to any clean-ups he was involved in, but added that he would sell off his investment in the insurance concern anyway. Breyer was also accused by consumer activists, such as Ralph Nader, of siding with big business in all of the antitrust cases on which he ruled. When asked about abortion, he said it was "settled law" that women have a right to an abortion under Roe v. Wade, the landmark 1973 ruling. The committee approved his nomination 18 to 0.

In ascending to the Supreme Court, Breyer "beat out" Clinton's other top choice, secretary of the interior Bruce Babbitt. For about a month during the summer of 1994, Washington engaged in a great guessing game about who would get the nomination: Babbitt or Breyer. Babbitt was opposed by many Western senators who did not like his tough stand on cattle-grazing fees. Clinton liked Babbitt, however, because he had said he wanted more than a legal mind on the court; the president wanted someone who would bring a politician's passion to the court. But Babbitt's political disadvantages proved too great. As the Boston Globe reported, "In the end, Breyer's greatest asset was the way he met a key element of Clinton's job description: someone with political skills who could sail through confirmation."

How Breyer would actually fit into the liberal-to-conservative spectrum on the court was unclear; and since his appointment he has been the focus of controversy. Supreme Court justices have a way of surprising the presidents who appointed them to the court; some are more liberal than expected, some more conservative. But most court observers agree that Breyer sits on the opposite spectrum of Antonin Scalia, arguing not so much on political lines, but for a broader interpretation of the law. As Breyer himself was quoted in the New York Times as telling senators during his confirmation hearing, "Consensus is important because law is not theoretical; law is a set of opinions and rules that lawyers have to understand, judges have to understand them, and eventually the labor union, the business, small business, everyone else in the country has to understand how they are supposed to act or not act according to the law."

Further Reading

Boston Globe, May 14, 1994; May 15, 1994; May 17, 1994; July 10, 1994; July 13, 1994; July 25, 1994.

Boston Magazine, October 1994, p. 60.

New Republic, July 11, 1994, p. 19.

New York Times, May 30, 1993; June 11, 1993; June 18, 1993;September 9, 1993; July 14, 1994.

Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1993.

• Born: Aug. 15, 1938, San Francisco, Calif.
• Education: Stanford University, A.B., 1959; Oxford University, B.A., 1961; Harvard Law School, LL.B., 1964
• Previous government service: law clerk to Justice Arthur Goldberg, 1964–65; assistant to the attorney general, U.S. Department of Justice, 1965–67; assistant special prosecutor of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 1973; special counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1974–75; chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1979–80; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1980–94
• Appointed by President Bill Clinton May 17, 1994; replaced Harry A. Blackmun, who resigned
• Supreme Court term: confirmed by the Senate July 29, 1994, by a 87–9 vote

Stephen G. Breyer showed great promise as a thinker and writer from the beginning of his legal career. As clerk to Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg, he wrote the first draft of Goldberg's landmark opinion on the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965).

From 1967 to 1981, Breyer moved back and forth between the academic life of Harvard and the civic life of the federal government. He served on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, which conducted investigations that led to President Richard Nixon's resignation in 1974. During this period, Breyer also served on the faculty of Harvard Law School, where he developed a widely respected theory on government regulation of economic activity. He brought this theory to his subsequent service as a federal judge, from 1980 to 1994.

When President Bill Clinton appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1994, Breyer had earned a reputation as a practical and innovative thinker about fundamental problems of when and how government agencies should regulate various industries. In 1994 he expressed his views on this topic in a series of lectures at Harvard, which were published as Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Towards Effective Risk and Regulation.

During his 14-year term as a federal judge, Breyer achieved respect as a consensus builder and as a mediator of conflicting views. His reputation influenced the Senate to confirm his nomination to the Supreme Court in 1994.

During his first term on the Court, Breyer acted forcefully and decisively. He broke Court tradition by participating in the questioning during the first oral argument he heard and by dissenting from the Court's decision in his first written opinion. Further, he wrote a sharp dissent against the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez (1995). In this case, the Court overturned as unconstitutional a federal law regulating the possession of guns in school zones. The Court's majority decided that under the federal system of the United States, this type of regulation is a power of each state government. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, defended the authority of Congress to regulate this type of gun possession.

Justice Breyer has tended to support concerns of local communities for public order and safety in regard to criminal law issues. For example, he joined the Court's opinion permitting random drug testing of public school athletes in the 1995 case of Vernonia School District v. Acton.

As an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Stephen Breyer is regarded as a judicial moderate. The author, former law professor, and Senate counsel locates his approach to the law in a deep pragmatism: he distrusts broad legal theory, endorses judicial restraint, and wants his legal opinions to be clear enough for a high school student to read. His reputation for forging consensus earned him a nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1980, on which he later served as chief of the court from 1990 to 1994. During the 1980s he also helped shape a far-reaching and controversial revision of criminal sentencing guidelines. In April 1994 President Bill Clinton nominated Breyer to replace the outgoing Supreme Court Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and his appointment was confirmed in July 1994.

Breyer was born on August 15, 1938, in San Francisco. His attorney father and politically active mother set him on a course for achievement. He earned an A.B. from Stanford University in 1959, followed by a B.A. in philosophy and economics at Oxford University in England. He added a law degree from Harvard Law School in 1964, graduating magna cum laude. Breyer clerked for Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg III from 1965 to 1967 and helped write the justice's opinion in the landmark right-to-privacy case, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965).

In 1967 Breyer embarked on dual careers in academia and government. He taught courses in antitrust, administrative law, and economic regulation at his alma mater, Harvard Law School. In the same year he was appointed to the office of the Assistant U.S. Attorney General. He gained further prominence in 1974 by serving on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, which pursued the possibility of impeaching President Richard M. Nixon. As a senior aide to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in the 1970s and chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1979 to 1980, Breyer crafted deregulation of the airline and trucking industries while also working on prison reform, judicial confirmations, and fair housing law. He became known for an empirical approach to law, one less swayed by ideology than by careful balancing of facts.

By 1980 Breyer was well-respected by liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Although he had been an aide to the liberal Senator Kennedy, he was adept at promoting agreement between such political opposites as Kennedy and Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah). This record served Breyer well when President Jimmy Carter nominated him to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. After Carter lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan, the Republicans, as is common in an incoming administration, scrapped all but one of Carter's pending judicial appointments. Breyer's appointment was allowed to go through.

Breyer's record on the Court of Appeals was generally moderate. In a 1983 environmental regulatory case, he blocked the Department of the Interior from auctioning oil drilling rights in the North Atlantic without giving ample consideration to alternative proposals (Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 [1st Cir. 1983]). In the area of abortion, he voted to uphold a Massachusetts parental notification law (Planned Parenthood of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 868 F.2d 459 [1st Cir. 1983]). But he joined the majority on the First Circuit in striking down the Bush administration's ban on abortion counseling at family planning clinics funded by the federal government (Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53 [1st Cir. 1990]).

Appointed to the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1985, Breyer undertook the job of revising criminal sentencing guidelines. Against strong opposition he persuaded the other seven judges on the panel to base the guidelines on national averages. The changes, which took effect in 1987, have proven controversial. Critics charge that they have too tightly bound judges and produced inequitable results for minority defendants. In response, Breyer has argued that the guidelines have built-in flexibility that allows judges to influence the Sentencing Commission in future revisions.

President Clinton sought Breyer twice for appointment to the Supreme Court. Although close to choosing him in 1993, Clinton instead selected Ruth Bader Ginsburg after Breyer became the target of criticism for late payments on Social Security taxes for a part-time housekeeper. When a second vacancy on the Court opened in 1994, Clinton returned to Breyer. The president compared his intellectual vigor to that of Judge Learned Hand, the renowned appellate judge of the 1920s and 1930s. Minor opposition met the nomination. Critics questioned whether Breyer's 1993 book Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation went too far in attacking government regulation; others raised doubts about his investment judgment in losing money in the early 1990s in the Lloyd's of London scandal, Britain's largest insurance disaster ever. At the same time, however, he received praise for his past achievements and for a strong commitment to First Amendment rights. The Senate easily confirmed his appointment on July 29, 1994, by a vote of 87-9.

After two years on the Court, Breyer had aligned himself with the Court's moderates. He dissented when the majority struck down a 1990 federal law prohibiting the carrying of handguns outside schools, arguing that protecting schools should fall under Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce (U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 [1995]). He also dissented from the Court's ruling in Tribe of Florida v. Florida (116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 [1996]), which struck down the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act for violating states' rights. In a major victory for gay and lesbian rights, Breyer joined the majority in overturning Colorado's Amendment 2, which would have removed all legal protection for homosexuals against discrimination (Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 [1996]). And in a significant First Amendment decision, Breyer wrote the plurality opinion declaring that the government may not require cable TV operators to segregate and block leased access channels that feature offensive or indecent programming (Denver Area Consortium v. Federal Communications Commission, 116 S. Ct. 2374 [1996]).

Stephen Gerald Breyer
Stephen Breyer, U.S Supreme Court justice
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court
Incumbent
Assumed office  August 3, 1994
Nominated by	Bill Clinton
Preceded by	Harry A. Blackmun
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
In office 1980 – 1994
Nominated by	Jimmy Carter
Preceded by	New Seat
Succeeded by	Sandra Lea Lynch
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
In office 1990 – 1994
Preceded by	Levin Hicks Campbell
Succeeded by	Juan R. Torruella
Born	August 15, 1938 (1938-08-15) (age 71) San Francisco, California
Spouse(s)	Hon. Joanna Freda Hare
Alma mater	Stanford University Magdalen College, Oxford Harvard Law School
Religion	Jewish

Stephen Gerald Breyer (pronounced /ˈbraɪər/; born August 15, 1938) is an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton in 1994, and known for his pragmatic approach to constitutional law, Breyer is generally associated with the more liberal side of the Court.^[1]

Following a clerkship with Supreme Court Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg in 1964, Breyer became well-known as a law professor and lecturer at Harvard Law School starting in 1967. There he specialized in the area of administrative law, writing a number of influential text books that remain in use today. He held other prominent positions before being nominated for the Supreme Court, including special assistant to the United States Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, and assistant special prosecutor on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force in 1973.

In his 2005 book Active Liberty, Breyer made his first attempt to systematically lay out his views on legal theory, arguing that the judiciary should seek to resolve issues so as best to encourage popular participation in governmental decisions.

Contents 1 Early life and education 2 Legal career 3 Judicial career 4 Judicial philosophy 4.1 In general 4.2 Active Liberty 5 See also 6 Footnotes 7 References 8 External links

Early life and education

Breyer was born to Irving Gerald Breyer and Anne A. Roberts,^[2] a middle-class Jewish family in San Francisco, California. Breyer's father was legal counsel for the San Francisco Board of Education.^[3] Both Breyer and his younger brother Charles, who is a federal district judge, are Eagle Scouts of San Francisco's prestigious Troop 14.^[4][5] In 2007, Breyer was honored with the Distinguished Eagle Scout Award by the Boy Scouts of America.^[6] In 1955, Breyer graduated from Lowell High School. At Lowell, he was a member of the Lowell Forensic Society and debated regularly in high school debate tournaments, including against future California governor Jerry Brown and future Harvard Law School professor Laurence Tribe.^[7]

After graduating from Lowell, Breyer went on to receive a Bachelor of Arts in philosophy from Stanford University, a Bachelor of Arts from Magdalen College at Oxford University as a Marshall Scholar, and a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) from Harvard Law School. Breyer is also fluent in French.

In 1967, he married Hon. Joanna Freda Hare, a psychologist and member of the British aristocracy (the youngest daughter of John Hare, 1st Viscount Blakenham). The Breyers have three adult children, Chloe (an Episcopal priest, and author of The Close), Nell, and Michael.^[8]

Legal career

Breyer served as a law clerk to Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg during the 1964 term (list). He was a special assistant to the United States Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust from 1965 to 1967 and an assistant special prosecutor on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force in 1973. Breyer was a special counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary from 1974 to 1975 and served as chief counsel of the committee from 1979 to 1980.^[8] He worked closely with the chairman of the committee, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, and helped pass the Airline Deregulation Act that closed the Civil Aeronautics Board.^[7]

Breyer became an assistant professor, law professor, and lecturer at Harvard Law School starting in 1967. Breyer taught at Harvard Law School until 1994, also serving as a professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government from 1977 to 1980. At Harvard, Breyer was known as a leading expert on administrative law.^[9] While there, he wrote two highly influential books on deregulation: Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation and Regulation and Its Reform. In 1970, Breyer wrote "The Uneasy Case for Copyright", one of the most widely cited skeptical examinations of copyright. Breyer was a visiting professor at the College of Law in Sydney, Australia, the University of Rome,^[8] and the Tulane University Law School.^[10]

Judicial career

Stephen Breyer

From 1980 to 1994, Breyer served as a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, including as the court's Chief Judge from 1990 to 1994.^[8] He was nominated to the Court of Appeals by President Jimmy Carter on November 13, 1980. The U.S. Senate confirmed Breyer on December 9, 1980 by an 80-10 vote, in the last days of the Carter administration.^[11] He served as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United States between 1990 and 1994 and the United States Sentencing Commission between 1985 and 1989.^[8] On the sentencing commission, Breyer played a key role in reforming federal criminal sentencing procedures, producing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were formulated to increase uniformity in sentences for criminal cases.^[12]

In 1993, President Bill Clinton considered him for the seat vacated by Byron White that ultimately went to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.^[13] Breyer's appointment came shortly thereafter, however, following the retirement of Harry Blackmun in 1994, and Clinton nominated Breyer as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on May 13 of that year. Breyer was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in an 87 to 9 vote and took his seat August 3, 1994.^[8] Breyer was the second-longest-serving junior justice in the history of the Court, close to surpassing the record set by Justice Joseph Story of 4,228 days (from February 3, 1812 to September 1, 1823); Breyer fell 29 days short of tying this record, which he would have reached on March 1, 2006, had Justice Samuel Alito not joined the Court on January 31, 2006. Although Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court in September 2005, the duties of the junior Justice never fall upon the Chief Justice, who is considered primus inter pares—first among equals.

Judicial philosophy

In general

On the bench, Breyer generally takes a pragmatic approach to constitutional issues, interested more in producing coherence and continuity in the law than in following doctrinal, historical or textual strictures.^[14] He has said that while some of his colleagues "emphasize language, a more literal reading of the text, history and tradition," he looks more closely to the "purpose and consequences" of the text.^[15]

Breyer most frequently sides with Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, generally acknowledged as the liberal wing of the court.^[16] He has consistently voted in favor of abortion rights,^[17] one of the most controversial areas of the Supreme Court's docket. He has also defended the Supreme Court's use of foreign law and international law as persuasive (but not binding) authority in its decisions.^[18][19][20] However, Breyer is also recognized to be deferential to the interests of law enforcement and to legislative judgments in the Supreme Court's First Amendment rulings. Breyer has also demonstrated a consistent pattern of deference to Congress, voting to overturn congressional legislation at a lower rate than any other Supreme Court justice since 1994.^[21]

Breyer's extensive experience in administrative law is accompanied by his staunch defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Breyer rejects the strict interpretation of the Sixth Amendment espoused by Justice Scalia that all facts necessary to criminal punishment must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.^[22] In many other areas on the Court, too, Breyer's pragmatism is considered the intellectual counterweight to Scalia's textualist philosophy.^[23]

In describing his interpretive philosophy, Breyer has sometimes noted his use of six interpretive tools: text, history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a statute, and the consequences of competing interpretations.^[24] Breyer notes that only the latter two differentiate him from textualists on the Supreme Court such as Scalia. Breyer argues that these sources are necessary, however, and in the former case (purpose, or legislative intent), can in fact provide greater objectivity in legal interpretation than looking merely to what can often be ambiguous statutory text.^[25] With the latter (consequences), Breyer argues that considering the impact of legal interpretations is a further way of ensuring consistency with a law's intended purpose.^[26]

Active Liberty

Breyer expounded on his judicial philosophy in 2005 in Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution. In it, Breyer urges judges to interpret legal provisions (of the Constitution or of statutes) in light of the purpose of the text and how well the consequences of specific rulings will fit those purposes. The book is considered a response to the 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation, in which Antonin Scalia emphasized adherence to the original meaning of the text alone.^[16][27]

In Active Liberty, Breyer argues that the Framers of the Constitution sought to establish a democratic government involving the maximum liberty for its citizens. Breyer refers to Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty. The first Berlinian concept, being what most people understand by liberty, is "freedom from government coercion;" Berlin termed this negative liberty and warned against its diminution. Breyer terms this "modern liberty." The second Berlinian concept — to Berlin, "positive liberty" — is the "freedom to participate in the government;" In Breyer's terminology, this is the "active liberty," which the judge should champion. Having established this premise of what liberty is, and having posited the primary importance of this concept over the competing idea of "Negative Liberty" to the Framers, Breyer argues a predominantly utilitarian case for judges making rulings which give effect to the democratic intentions of the Constitution.

Both of the books' historical premises and practical prescriptions have been challenged. For example, according to Prof. Peter Berkowitz,^[28] the reason that "[t]he primarily democratic nature of the Constitution's governmental structure has not always seemed obvious," as Breyer puts it, is "because it’s not true, at least in Breyer's sense that the Constitution elevates active liberty above modern [negative] liberty." Breyer's position "demonstrates not fidelity to the Constitution," Berkowitz argues, "but rather a determination to rewrite the Constitution’s priorities." Berkowitz suggests that Breyer is also inconsistent, in failing to apply this standard to the issue of abortion, instead preferring decisions "that protect women’s modern liberty, which remove controversial issues from democratic discourse." Failing to answer the textualist charge that the Living Documentarian Judge is a law unto himself, Berkowitz argues that Active Liberty "suggests that when necessary, instead of choosing the consequence that serves what he regards as the Constitution’s leading purpose, Breyer will determine the Constitution’s leading purpose on the basis of the consequence that he prefers to vindicate."

Against the last charge, Professor Cass Sunstein has defended Breyer, noting that of the 9 justices on the late Rehnquist Court, Breyer in fact showed the highest percentage of votes to uphold acts of Congress and also to defer to the decision of the executive branch.^[29] However, according to Jeffrey Toobin in The New Yorker, "Breyer concedes that a judicial approach based on 'active liberty' will not yield solutions to every constitutional debate," and that, in Breyer's words, "Respecting the democratic process does not mean you abdicate your role of enforcing the limits in the Constitution, whether in the Bill of Rights or in separation of powers."^[30]

To his point, and from a discussion at the New-York Historical Society in March 2006, Breyer has noted that "democratic means" did not bring about an end to slavery, or the concept of "one man, one vote," which allowed corrupt and discriminatory (but democratic-inspired) state laws to be overturned in favor of civil rights.^[31]

See also

Bill Clinton Supreme Court candidates Demographics of the Supreme Court of the United States List of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States List of law clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States

List of United States Chief Justices by time in office List of U.S. Supreme Court Justices by time in office United States Supreme Court cases during the Rehnquist Court United States Supreme Court cases during the Roberts Court

Footnotes

1. ^ Kersch, Ken (2006). "Justice Breyer's Mandarin Liberty". University of Chicago Law Review 73: 759 [p. 765]. "As his decision to characterize both the New Deal and Warren Courts as centrally committed to democracy and "active liberty" makes clear, Justice Breyer identifies his own constitutional agenda with that of these earlier courts, and positions himself, in significant respects, as a partisan of midcentury constitutional liberalism.". 
2. ^ Genealogy records, Ancestry.com. Accessed 10/26/2007
3. ^ Oyez Bio, Retrieved 3/21/07
4. ^ Townley, Alvin (2007). Legacy of Honor: The Values and Influence of America's Eagle Scouts. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 56–59. ISBN 0-312-36653-1. http://www.thomasdunnebooks.com/TD_TitleDetail.aspx?ISBN=0312366531. Retrieved 2006-12-29. 
5. ^ Ray, Mark (2007). "What It Means to Be an Eagle Scout". Scouting Magazine. Boy Scouts of America. http://www.scoutingmagazine.org/issues/0701/a-what.html. Retrieved 2007-01-05. 
6. ^ "Distinguished Eagle Scout Award". Scouting Magazine (November - December 2007): 10. 2007. http://www.scoutingmagazine.org/issues/0711/d-news.html. Retrieved 2007-11-01. 
7. ^ ^{a b} Oyez Bio, retrieved 3/21/07 (For Brown; need cite for Tribe)
8. ^ ^{a b c d e f} The Justices of the Supreme Court, retrieved on 3/20/2007
9. ^ The dilemmas of risk regulation -- Breaking the Vicious Circle by Stephen Breyer, by Sheila Jasanoff. Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1994.
10. ^ http://www.law.tulane.edu/abroad/index.aspx?ekmensel=c580fa7b_168_0_4386_1
11. ^ "Sharp Questions for Judge Breyer". New York Times. 2004-07-10. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE0DF153FF933A25754C0A962958260. Retrieved 2008-03-08. 
12. ^ "Justice Breyer Should Recuse Himself from Ruling on Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Duke Law Professor Says". Duke University News. 2004-09-28. http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2004/09/breyertip_0904.html. 
13. ^ Berke, Richard (1993-06-15). "The Overview; Clinton Names Ruth Ginsburg, Advocate for Women, to Court". New York Times. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE7DB163EF936A25755C0A965958260. 
14. ^ Sunstein, Cass Breyer's Judicial Pragmatism University of Chicago Law School. November, 2005. (SSRN)
15. ^ "Supreme Court Justices Says Consequences Key To Constitutionality". The Associated Press. 2006-02-09. http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1139393109736. Retrieved 2007-03-23. 
16. ^ ^{a b} Wittes, Benjamin (2005-09-25). "Memo to John Roberts: Stephen Breyer, a cautious, liberal Supreme Court justice, explains his view of the law". Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/22/AR2005092201017.html. 
17. ^ Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
18. ^ Transcript of Discussion Between Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer. AU Washington College of Law, Jan. 13. Retrieved on 3/21/07
19. ^ Pearlstein, Deborah (2005-04-05). "Who's Afraid of International Law". American Prospect Online. http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=9456. Retrieved 2007-03-21. 
20. ^ Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
21. ^ Gewirtz, Paul; Golder, Chad (2005-07-06). "So Who Are the Activists?". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/06/opinion/06gewirtz.html. Retrieved 2007-03-23. 
22. ^ Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
23. ^ Sullivan, Kathleen M. (2006-02-05). "Consent of the Governed". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/books/review/05sullivan.html. 
24. ^ Lithwick, Dalia (2006-12-06). "Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar". Slate. http://www.slate.com/id/2154993/. Retrieved 2007-03-19. 
25. ^ "Interview with Nina Totenberg". NPR. 2005-09-30. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4929668. Retrieved 2007-03-19. 
26. ^ Sunstein at 12 ("Breyer thinks that as compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it 'helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution's democratic purpose.' Breyer concludes that an emphasis on legislative purpose 'means that laws will work better for the people they are presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life; and a failure to understand how a statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to benefit' (p. 100).")
27. ^ Feeney, Mark (2005-10-03). "Author in the Court: Justice Stephen Breyer's New Book Reflects His Practical Approach to the Law". Boston Globe. 
28. ^ Berkowitz, Peter. "Democratizing the Constitution" (PDF). http://www.peterberkowitz.com/democratizingtheconstitution.pdf. Retrieved 2007-10-26. 
29. ^ Sunstein, pg. 7, citing Lori Ringhand, "Judicial Activism and the Rehnquist Court", available on ssrn.com and Cass R. Sunstein and Thomas Miles, "Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical investigation of Chevron", U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2006).
30. ^ Toobin, Jeffrey (2005-10-31). "Breyer's Big Idea". The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/10/31/051031fa_fact?currentPage=1. 
31. ^ Pakaluk, Maximilian (13 March 2006). "Chambered in a "Democratic Space". Justice Breyer explains his Constitution". National Review. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/pakaluk_200603130802.asp. Retrieved 2007-10-31. 

References

• Clinton, Bill (2005). My Life. Vintage. ISBN 1-4000-3003-X.
• Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Key Compromises on Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1988)
• Dissenting opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
• Opinion for remedial majority in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
• Dissenting opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)

External links

• Supreme court official bio (PDF)
• Stephen Gerald Breyer at the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, a public domain publication of the Federal Judicial Center.
• Oyez.org bio
• CSPAN Q&A with Justice Breyer
• Review of Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution
• 'Stephen Breyer, the court's necromancer', a book review of "Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution" in the New English Review
• 'Active Liberty' from Justice Stephen Breyer, October 20, 2005 NPR's Fresh Air
• "Supreme Court Justice Breyer on 'Active Liberty'" Part 1 of Interview, September 29, 2005 NPR's Morning Edition
• "Justice Breyer: The Case Against 'Originalists'" Part 2 of Interview, September 30, 2005 NPR's Morning Edition
• Justice Breyer's appearance on NPR's quiz show Wait Wait... Don't Tell Me March 24th, 2007
• WGBH Forum Network: one and a half hours with US Supreme Court Justice of Law Stephen Breyer September 8th, 2003.

Legal offices
New seat	Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 1980-1994	Succeeded by Sandra Lea Lynch
Preceded by Levin Hicks Campbell	Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 1990-1994	Succeeded by Juan R. Torruella
Preceded by Harry Blackmun	Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 1994-present	Succeeded by Incumbent
United States order of precedence
Preceded by Ruth Bader Ginsburg Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States	United States order of precedence Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States	Succeeded by Samuel Alito Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

v • d • e Judicial opinions of Stephen Breyer U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (1980 - 1994); by calendar year 1980 • 1981 • 1982 • 1983 • 1984 • 1985 • 1986 • 1987 • 1988 • 1989 • 1990 • 1991 • 1992 • 1993 • 1994 Supreme Court of the United States (August 3, 1994 - present); by term 1994 • 1995 • 1996 • 1997 • 1998 • 1999 • 2000 • 2001 • 2002 • 2003 • 2004 • 2005 • 2006 • 2007 • 2008 • 2009

Supreme Court of the United States

The Rehnquist Court Chief Justice: William Hubbs Rehnquist (1986–2005) 1994–2005: J.P. Stevens | S.D. O'Connor | A. Scalia | A. Kennedy | D. Souter | C. Thomas | R.B. Ginsburg | S. Breyer The Roberts Court Chief Justice: John Glover Roberts, Jr. (2005-present) 2005–2006: J.P. Stevens | S.D. O'Connor | A. Scalia | A. Kennedy | D. Souter | C. Thomas | R.B. Ginsburg | S. Breyer 2006–2009: J.P. Stevens | A. Scalia | A. Kennedy | D. Souter | C. Thomas | R.B. Ginsburg | S. Breyer | S. Alito 2009–present: J.P. Stevens | A. Scalia | A. Kennedy | C. Thomas | R.B. Ginsburg | S. Breyer | S. Alito | S. Sotomayor

Persondata
NAME	Breyer, Stephen Gerald
ALTERNATIVE NAMES
SHORT DESCRIPTION	Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
DATE OF BIRTH	August 15, 1938
PLACE OF BIRTH	San Francisco, California
DATE OF DEATH
PLACE OF DEATH

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