Voting Rights Act of 1965

Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to improve voter registration and turnout among African‐Americans. Since 1965, it has been amended or reauthorized in 1970, 1975, and 1982, and parts of it are scheduled to expire in 2007.

History of African‐American Voting Rights

Prior to passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the national government responded to racial discrimination in voting in the South in a tepid, haphazard way that relied on litigation. This was due in part to restrictive Supreme Court decisions, such as the Civil Rights Cases (1883), which limited the reach of congressional authority to enforce the Civil War Amendments. But it was also due to the South's disproportionate influence in Congress, and particularly in the Senate, where southern Democrats could successfully filibuster.

Prior to World War II, minority voter registration in the deep South was virtually nonexistent. In 1940 about 150,000 blacks, representing about 3 percent of the five million southern blacks of voting age, were registered. Various tactics and devices, such as literacy tests (often discriminatorily applied), economic and physical coercion, and the white primary, combined to keep blacks from voting. The demise of the white primary, banned by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwright (1944), and the return from World War II of many black soldiers no longer willing to accept the Jim Crow system, resulted in some increases in voter registration. But the hostile southern resistance to Brown v. Board of Education (1954) temporarily ended those gains.

The Civil Rights Movement

Brown was about school desegregation, but it soon became a symbol of the drive for complete racial equality. It was extended to prohibit all forms of public segregation, and it energized a robust civil rights movement. Beginning late in the 1950s, black civil rights organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Council on Racial Equality (CORE) organized and implemented various sit‐ins, boycotts, voter registration drives, freedom rides, and “freedom summers” in order to end racial discrimination of all kinds. Enfranchising African‐Americans was a major goal.

In 1961 there were fewer than five cases in the federal courts challenging southern voter discrimination. The 1963 report of the Civil Rights Commission pointed to the inadequacies of a litigation strategy in both a Republican (Eisenhower) and Democratic (Kennedy) administrations, and it called for more direct action by the national government to implement meaningful voter‐registration plans.

Civil rights was not initially a major agenda item for the Kennedy administration. Its concern increased and its response became more forceful with the escalation of the protest movement, the need to protect the freedom riders, the 1963 march on Washington, and resistance to integrating the universities of Mississippi and Alabama.

More confrontational strategies to combat voting discrimination increased pressure on Congress to pass meaningful legislation. The 1965 SCLC march to Selma, Alabama, was designed to create a scenario that would force the federal government to pass a more aggressive, interventionist voting‐rights bill. The (expected and hoped for) harsh reaction of Selma sheriff Jim Clark to the protesters, and the murder of several of them, carried around the world by television, engendered a dramatic reaction to the indiscriminate use of police dogs, fire hoses, and excessive force and violence against the nonviolent civil‐rights protesters. Shortly thereafter, the Johnson administration introduced the Voting Rights Act, and within five months it was the law of the land.

Direct Federal Intervention

The Voting Rights Act, based on Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, broadly restated the amendment's prohibitions against voting discrimination. But it was specially directed toward seven southern states that had used various tests and devices to obstruct black voter registration.

The “covered” states (or subdivisions) were those that employed a “test or device” to determine voter qualifications and in which less than 50 percent of the voting age population was registered to vote for president on 1 November 1964: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina (parts), South Carolina, Virginia, and, additionally, Alaska. The act suspended for five years the use of all such tests and devices in the covered states. Arkansas, Texas, and Florida were not covered because they did not employ literacy tests, although they too had large nonvoting African‐American populations. A covered state could “bail out” by demonstrating to a federal district court in Washington, D.C., that no test or device had been used for racial discrimination in the preceding five years. Alaska, which was initially covered although not an intended target of the act, was permitted to bail out in 1969. No other covered state has been permitted to do so.

Under the act, U.S. marshals and other federal officers could be used as examiners to ensure that African‐Americans and members of other minority groups could register to vote without delay or harassment by local white registrars. Indeed, they were authorized to register qualified voters directly.

Most controversial was section 5, the preclearance provision. To ensure that covered states did not pass new legislation to obstruct black voter registration or to dilute the expected emergent voting strength of blacks, the states were prohibited from enacting any change in “voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standard, practice or procedures with respect to voting” without first obtaining clearance from the attorney general or a federal district court in Washington, D.C. Thus these states had an affirmative burden to secure federal permission to change their voting laws. (Section 5 was not formally implemented until 1971; the vast majority of all changes submitted have been precleared by the attorney general.)5

The Voting Rights Act shifted the burden from the victims of discrimination to the perpetrators; it was the latter who now had to demonstrate that they did not discriminate. This was an unprecedented use of federal power and limit on the powers of the covered states to set and enforce voter qualifications (see Federalism), but the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966). The decision was unanimous except for Justice Hugo Black's objection to section 5 as a violation of the Tenth Amendment. A special provision of the law, which was inserted to enfranchise a large group of voters in the Puerto Rican community in New York City, provided that English‐language literacy tests could not be used to deny the vote to persons with at least a sixth‐grade education in another language in an “American flag” school. This was upheld as an appropriate congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment in Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966).

Extensions of the Act

In 1970 the Voting Rights Act was extended for five years. The ban on literacy tests was made nationwide, the coverage formula was amended to include additional jurisdictions, and extended durational residency requirements to vote for president were prohibited. A minimum voting age of eighteen was also enacted for both state and federal elections. These changes, except for the eighteen‐year‐old voting age in state elections (see Twenty‐sixth Amendment) were upheld in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970). In 1975 the act was extended for an additional seven years. The ban on literacy tests was made permanent, and bilingual assistance and federal enforcement efforts for language‐minority voters (Native Americans, Alaskan natives, and Spanish‐heritage citizens) was required in twenty‐four states.

The act was extended once again in 1982, but only after extensive debate and initial opposition from the *Reagan administration, which claimed that it had achieved its purposes and should be allowed to expire. Section 5 was extended for twenty‐five years, and the bail‐out procedure for covered states was amended. Now a state may bail out of the preclearance requirement if it can show that it has not discriminated for 10 years and has made efforts to promote minority voting.

A heated controversy in the 1982 debates concerned section 2, which had been the focus of the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolden (1980). In that case the Court overturned a federal court order that the city of Mobile, Alabama, revamp its at‐large electoral system to ensure that its 40 percent African‐American minority had a fair opportunity to elect some representatives. Under the existing system, dating back to 1911, no black had ever been elected to the three‐member city commission. The Court held that there was no violation of either section 2 of the act or of the Fifteenth Amendment because blacks could both register and vote, and because there was no evidence that the Mobile electoral system was motivated by a discriminatory intent.

As revised in 1982, section 2 (which now applies nationwide) allows a voter to challenge a voting practice or procedure by showing that the results of such a practice or procedure, based on a totality of the evidence presented, are racially discriminatory. Plaintiffs are forbidden, however, to use section 2 to establish racial quotas, and a system of proportional representation designed to protect a particular minority from electoral defeat cannot be required. The revision of section 2 has led to much litigation—and to dozens of cases won or successfully settled by minority plaintiffs.

After the 1990 round of redistricting, the amended section 2 was employed to prevent racially dilutive or retrogressive effects. This lead to efforts to maximize the creation majority‐minority districts, or seats to which people of color could elect representatives. Often these seats were irregular in shape, or otherwise did not follow some traditional principles of reapportionment, such as geographical compactness.

In Shaw v. Reno (1993), white voters challenged a majority‐minority district in North Carolina, and the Supreme Court ruled that the use of race for redistricting to improve minority representation was unconstitutional if the redistricting occurred solely on account of race. According to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the use of race to create minority seats, as had been the practice under section 2, would have to survive strict scrutiny. This decision was subsequently reemphasized in Miller v. Johnson (1995). These two cases appeared to doom section 2 and the use of the Voting Rights Act to improve minority representation.

But in Bush v. Vera (1996) the Supreme Court stated that section 2 compliance could be an interest compelling enough to justify creating a “race‐predominant” district. Eventually, in Hunt v. Cromartie (2001), the Court upheld the creation of minority seats fashioned under section 2, and into the new round of redistricting that occurred after the 2000 census, it appears that race may be used as one of several factors when drawing new lines.

The Voting Rights Act was subject to other litigation in the 1990s. In Presley v. Etowah County Commissioners (1992), the Supreme Court limited the application of section 5, and in Johnson v. De Grandy (1994), the Court held that the proportion of opportunity districts to a minority group's share of the electorate was “relevant” as a measure of the section 2 fairness of redistricting plans. In Holder v. Hall (1994), section 2 was deemed not to authorize courts to require increases in the size of governing bodies as a vote dilution remedy, while in Bossier Parish School Board v. Reno (2000), the Court stated that the only purpose prohibited by section 5 was a purposive retrogression. Finally in Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003), the Court enunciated a totality of circumstances test for evaluating section 5, stating that courts must consider the overall influence of a minority group in all districts to ascertain whether retrogression had occurred. This ruling appeared to depart from previous readings of section 5, potentially opening up new Voting Rights Act litigation.

Overall, the Voting Rights Act has been the most successful civil rights act ever passed by Congress. It has resulted in significant increases in minority registration, voting, and the election of representatives. Efforts at vote dilution focus on reapportionment, gerrymandering, and the misuse of multimember districts and at‐large elections (see Fair Representation). Covered states are still monitored by the attorney general under section 5, and vote‐dilution efforts in other states have increasingly been challenged under section 2. More than a quarter of a century after its passage, the Voting Rights Act is alive and well.

See also Race and Racism; Vote, Right to.

Bibliography

• Howard Ball, Dale Krane, and Thomas P. Lauth, Compromised Compliance: Implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (1982).
• Numan V. Bartley and Hugh Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction (1975).
• Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters (1988).
• David I. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (1978).
• Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson eds., The Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–1990 (1994).
• Stephen Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944–1969 (1976)

— Howard Ball

For more information on Voting Rights Act, visit Britannica.com.

Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) abolished a set of tactics that had prevented most African Americans in the South from voting since the beginning of the twentieth century. The VRA also established a variety of oversight mechanisms that gave the law the teeth absent from the Civil Rights Acts passed in 1957, 1960, and 1964. The provisions included the preclearance of any changes in state and local election laws with the federal government (section 5), authorization of federal "registrars" who would make sure that blacks were being allowed to register (sections 6 and 7), and provision for federal observers who would oversee elections (section 8).

By 1964, 43.3 percent of voting-age blacks in the South were registered to vote, up from only 3 percent in 1940. However, in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina, black registration was only 22.5 percent. Continued resistance in these states, along with the violence against peaceful voting rights demonstrators in Selma, Alabama, early in 1965, galvanized national public opinion in favor of the VRA.

President Lyndon Johnson signed the VRA into law on 6 August 1965. The positive effects were immediate and substantial; within two years, black registration in Mississippi increased from 6.7 percent to 59.8 percent, and in Alabama it went from 19.3 percent to 51.6 percent. The impact on black officeholders was even more dramatic. Only seventy-two blacks served in elective office in the South in 1965. By 1985 there were 143 blacks in state houses (10.8 percent of the total), 33 in state senates (7.8 percent), 425 on county councils (5.9 percent), and 1,330 on city councils (5.6 percent).

Many states actively resisted the growing influence of black voters. Initial legal challenges to the constitutionality of the VRA were rejected by the Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966). Other tactics were more invidious. Racial gerrymanders, at-large elections, prohibition of "single-shot" voting in multimember districts, majority runoff provisions, and impediments to voter registration were used widely throughout the South. In a landmark ruling in Allen v. Board of Election (1969), the Supreme Court gave the Justice Department the ability to challenge these practices under the section 5 pre-clearance provision of the VRA. Ruling that the right to vote encompassed the entire electoral process, not simply the acts of registering or casting a ballot, the Court significantly expanded the reach of the VRA. In 1975, section 4 was expanded to include language minorities in Texas, Alaska, Arizona, and parts of several other states.

The most important of the VRA amendments, passed in 1982, extended key provisions of the law for twenty-five years and overturned City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980). The Bolden case had required that plaintiffs demonstrate the intent to discriminate rather than discriminatory effects, which made it almost impossible to prove a vote dilution claim. The 1982 VRA amendments restored the pre-Bolden standard of proof by amending section 2 to prohibit any voting procedure that results in protected classes having "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." This amendment was the impetus behind the racial redistricting of the early 1990s, which was subsequently challenged in a series of court cases, starting with Shaw v. Reno (1993). While this area of the law is in flux, the VRA has remained the single most important contribution to minority voting rights in U.S. history. The VRA is up for renewal in 2007. The outcome of that legislative process will determine the direction of voting rights for the next generation.

Bibliography

Davidson, Chandler, and Bernard Grofman, eds. The Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–1990. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi. Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Kousser, J. Morgan. Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second Reconstruction. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

An enactment by Congress in 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq.) that prohibits the states and their political subdivisions from imposing voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standards, practices, or procedures that deny or curtail the right of a U.S. citizen to vote because of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is a sweeping federal law that seeks to prevent voting discrimination based on race, color, or membership in a language minority group. A product of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the Voting Rights Act has proven to be an effective, but controversial, piece of legislation. The act was extended in 1970 and again in 1982, when its provisions were renewed for an additional twenty-five years.

In the early 1960s very few African Americans in the South were allowed to vote. Southern states used literacy tests and physical and economic coercion to prevent African Americans from registering to vote. The state legal system supported these practices, leaving African Americans and other minority groups with few options to challenge voting discrimination. Civil rights leaders organized public protests and voter registration drives, but met intense resistance from local authorities.

A 1965 march to Selma, Alabama, by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil rights supporters to demand voting rights led to police violence and the murder of several marchers. The Selma violence galvanized voting rights supporters in Congress. President Lyndon B. Johnson responded by introducing the Voting Rights Act, the toughest civil rights law in one hundred years. Congress enacted the measure five months later.

Congress based its authority to regulate voting practices on the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which gives all citizens the right to vote regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The passage of the act ended the traditional practice of allowing states to handle all matters concerning voting and elections. The Voting Rights Act is premised on the active participation of the U.S. Department of Justice and the federal courts. Southern states challenged the legislation as a dangerous attack on states' rights, but the U.S. Supreme Court, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S. Ct. 803, 15 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1966), upheld the constitutionality of the act, despite the fact that the law was, in the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, "inventive."

The original act was directed at seven southern states — Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia — which had used poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices to obstruct registration by African Americans.

Under the law, a federal court can appoint federal examiners, who are authorized to place qualified persons on the list of eligible voters. The act waived accumulated poll taxes and abolished literacy tests and similar devices in those areas to which the statute applied. It required that bilingual election materials be made available in areas where more than five percent of the citizens are members of a single-language minority.

The act also required the seven states to obtain "preclearance" from the Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before making changes in the electoral system. The state has the burden of proving that the proposed changes do not have the purpose or effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." The Supreme Court has liberally construed this provision to require approval of even inconsequential alterations. As a result, relocation of polling sites, changes in ballot forms, reapportionment of election districts, municipal annexations, and revision of rules pertaining to the qualifications of candidates and the appointive or elective nature of the office fall within the ambit of federal supervision. If a modification of the election law, such as redistricting, has the purpose or effect of denying or curtailing the right to vote on the basis of race, it may be held to violate the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 extension of the act revised this provision, extending it to all states. This means that a voter may challenge a voting practice or procedure on the ground that it is racially discriminatory either by intent or by effect.

The most controversial issue for the courts has been whether voting districts can be redrawn to facilitate the election of racial minorities. The lower federal courts had approved such reapportionment plans, but the Supreme Court dealt a severe blow to these attempts in Shaw v. Hunt, ___U.S.___, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996). In Shaw the Court ruled that the redrawing of a North Carolina congressional district into a "bizarre-looking" shape so as to include a majority of African Americans could not be justified by the Voting Rights Act, because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Voting Rights Act has proven effective in breaking down discriminatory barriers to voting. Enforcement of the act in the South resulted in substantially higher levels of voter registration among African Americans. Many politicians who formerly made overt appeals to white supremacy tempered their racist rhetoric to draw support from new black voters. In addition, many African Americans have been elected to public office in areas where whites had ruled exclusively.

See: equal protection; gerrymander.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is a sweeping federal law that seeks to prevent voting discrimination based on race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The act was passed in the aftermath of one of the more violent episodes in the history of the civil rights movement. In 1965 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., led a group of civil rights supporters on a march to Selma, Alabama, to demand voting rights. They were met by police violence that resulted in the deaths of several marchers. The Selma violence galvanized voting rights supporters in Congress. President Lyndon B. Johnson responded by introducing the Voting Rights Act, the most sweeping piece of civil rights law in one hundred years. Congress enacted the measure five months later.

The passage of the Voting Rights Act was a watershed event in U.S. history. For the first time the federal government undertook voting reforms that had traditionally been left to the states. The act prohibits the states and their political subdivisions from imposing voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting or from imposing standards, practices, or procedures that deny or curtail the right of a U.S. citizen to vote because of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The act was extended in 1970 and again in 1982, when its provisions were given an additional term of twenty-five years.

Southern states challenged the legislation as a dangerous attack on states' rights, but in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S. Ct. 803, 15 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act, even though it was, in the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, "inventive."

The initial act covered the seven states in the South that had used poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices to obstruct registration by African Americans. Under the law a federal court can appoint federal examiners, who are authorized to place qualified persons on the list of eligible voters. The act waived accumulated poll taxes and abolished literacy tests and similar devices in the states to which it applied.

In addition, the act requires the seven states to obtain "preclearance" from the Justice Department or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before changing the electoral system. The 1982 extension of the act expanded this provision to include all the states. Thus, a voter in any state may challenge a voting practice or procedure on the grounds that it is racially discriminatory either by intent or by effect.

The act has been used to create congressional districts that have a majority of minority voters so as to ensure minority representation. In Shaw v. Hunt, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996), however, the Supreme Court ruled that the redrawing of a North Carolina congressional district into a "bizarre-looking" shape so as to include a majority of African Americans violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore could not be justified by the Voting Rights Act.

Voting Rights Act of 1965

For Legislative History of Act, see p. 2437

Public Law 89-100; 79 Stat. 437

[S. 1564]

An Act to enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That:

This Act shall be known as the "Voting Rights Act of 1965".

Sec. 2. No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.

Sec. 3 (a) Whenever the Attorney General institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the Court shall authorize the appointment of Federal examiners by the United States Civil Service Commission in accordance withe section 6 to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment (1) as part of any interlocutory order if the court determines that the appointment of such examiners is necessary to enforce such guarantees or (2) as part of any final judgment if the court finds that violations of the fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred in such State or subdivision: Provided, That the court need not authorize the appointment of examiners if any incidents of denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color (1) have been few in number and have been promptly and effectively corrected by State or local action, (2) the continuing of effect of such incidents has been eliminated, and (3) there is no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the future.

(b) If in a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General under any statute to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the court finds that a test or device has been used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, it shall suspend the use of tests and devices in such State or political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate and for such period as it deems necessary.

(c) If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General under any statute to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the court finds that violations of the fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred within the territory of such State or political subdivision, the court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during such period no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying abridging the right to vote on account of race or color: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the court's finding nor the Attorney General’s failure to object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.

Sec. 4 (a) To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not denied or abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with respect to which the determinations have been made under subsection (b) or in political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United States has determined that no such test or device has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color: Provided, That no such declaratory judgment shall issue with respect to any plaintiff for a period of five years after the entry of a final judgment of any court of the United States, other than the denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered prior to or after the enactment of this Act, determining that denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account of race or color through the use of such tests or devices have occurred anywhere in the territory of such plaintiff.

An action pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. The court shall retain jurisdiction of any action pursuant to this subsection for five years after judgment and shall reopen the action upon motion of the Attorney General alleging that a test or device has been used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.

If the Attorney General determines that he has no reasons to believe that any such test or device has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, he shall consent to the entry of such judgment.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any State or in any political subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1, 1964.

A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the Director of the Census under this section or under section 6 or section 13 shall not be reviewable in any court and shall be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

(c) The phrase "test or device" shall mean any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.

(d) For purposes of this section no State or political subdivision shall be determined to have engaged in the use of tests or devices for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color if (1) incidents of such use have been few in number and have been promptly and effectively corrected by State or local action, (2) the continuing effect of such incidents has been eliminated, and (3) there is no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the future.

(e) (1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language.

(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language, except that in States in which State law provides that a different level of education is presumptive of literacy, he shall demonstrate that he has successfully completed an equivalent level of education in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.

Sec. 5. Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General’s failure to object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

Sec. 6. Whenever (a) a court has authorized the appointment of examiners pursuant to the provisions of section 3(a), or (b) unless a declaratory judgment has been rendered under section 4(a), the Attorney General certifies with respect to any political subdivision named in, or included within the scope of, determinations made under section 4(b) that (1) he has received complaints in writing from twenty or more residents of such political subdivision alleging that they have been denied the right to vote under color of law on account of race or color, and that he believes such complaints to be meritorious, or (2) that in his judgment (considering, among other factors, whether the ration of nonwhite persons to white persons registered to vote within such subdivision appears to him to be reasonably attributable to violations of the fifteenth amendment or whether substantial evidence exists that bona fide efforts are being made within such subdivision to comply with the fifteenth amendment), the appointment of examiners is otherwise necessary to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment, the Civil Service Commission shall appoint as many examiners for such subdivision as it may deem appropriate to prepare and maintain lists of persons eligible to vote in Federal, State and local elections. Such examiners, hearing officers provided for in section 9(a), and other persons deemed necessary by the Commission to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act shall be appointed, compensated, and separated without regard to the provisions of any statute administered by the Civil Service Commission, and service under this Act shall not be considered employment for the purposes of any statute administered by the Civil Service Commission, except the provisions of section 9 of the Act of August 2, 1939, as amended (5 U.S.C. 118i), prohibiting partisan political activity: Provided, That the Commission is authorized, after consulting the head of the appropriate department or agency, to designate suitable persons in the official service of the United States, with their consent, to serve in these positions. Examiners and hearing officers shall have the power to administer oaths.

Sec. 7. (a) The examiners for each political subdivision shall, at such places as the Civil Service Commission shall by regulation designate, examine applicants concerning their qualifications for voting. An application to an examiner shall be in such form as the Commissioner may require and shall contain allegations that the applicant is not otherwise registered to vote.

(b) Any person whom the examiner finds, in accordance with instructions received under section 9(b), to have the qualifications prescribed by State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States shall promptly be placed on a list of eligible voters. A challenge to such listing may be made in accordance with section 9(a) and shall not be the basis for a prosecution under section 12 of this Act. The examiner shall certify and transmit such list, and any supplements as appropriate, at least once a month, to the offices of the appropriate election officials, with copies to the Attorney General and the attorney general of the State, and any such lists and supplements thereto transmitted during the month shall be available for public inspection on the last business day of the month and in any event not later than the forty-fifth day prior to any election. The appropriate State or local election official shall place such names on the official voting list. Any person whose name appears on the examiner’s list shall be entitled and allowed to vote in the election district of his residence unless and until the appropriate election officials shall have been notified that such person has been removed from such list in accordance with subsection (d): Provided, That no person shall be entitled to vote in any election by virtue of this Act unless his name shall have been certified and transmitted on such a list to the offices of the appropriate election officials at least forty-five days prior to such election.

(c) The examiner shall issue to each person who name appears on such a list a certificate evidencing his eligibility to vote.

(d) A person whose name appears on such a list shall be removed therefrom by an examiner if (1) such person has been successfully challenged in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 9, or (2) he has been determined by an examiner to have lost his eligibility to vote under State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

Sec. 8. Whenever an examiner is serving under this Act in any political subdivision, the Civil Service Commission may assign, at the request of the Attorney General, one or more persons, who may be officers of the United States, (1) to enter and attend at any place for holding an election in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote, and (2) to enter and attend at any place for tabulating the votes cast at any election held in such subdivision for the purpose of observing whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated. Such persons so assigned shall report to an examiner appointed for such political subdivision, to the Attorney General, and if the appointment of examiners has been authorized pursuant to section 3(a), to the court.

Sec. 9. (a) Any challenge to a listing on an eligibility list prepared by an examiner shall be heard and determined by a hearing officer appointed by and responsible to the Civil Service Commission and under such rules as the Commission shall by regulation designate, and within ten days after the listing of the challenged person is made available for public inspection, and if supported by (1) the affidavits of at least two persons having personal knowledge of the facts constituting grounds for the challenge, and (2) a certification that a copy of the challenge and affidavits have been served by mail or in person upon the person challenged at his place of residence set out in the application. Such challenge shall be determined within fifteen days after has been filed. A petition for review of the decision of the hearing officer may be filed in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the person challenged resides within fifteen days after service of such decision by mail on the person petitioning for review but no decision of a hearing officer shall be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Any person listed shall be entitled and allowed to vote pending final determination by the hearing officer and by the court.

(b) The times, places, procedures, and form for application and listing pursuant to this Act and removal from eligibility lists shall be prescribed by regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission and the Commission shall, after consultation with Attorney General, instruct examiners concerning applicable State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to (1) the qualifications required for listing, and (2) loss of eligibility to vote.

(c) Upon the request of the applicant or challenge or on its own motion the Civil Service Commission shall have the power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence relating to any matter pending before it under the authority of this section. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena, any district court of the United States or the United States court of any territory or possession, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides of is domiciled or transacts business, or has appointed an agent for receipt of service of process, upon application by the Attorney General of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Commission or a hearing officer, there to produce pertinent, relevant, and nonprivileged documentary evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

Sec. 10. (a) The Congress finds that the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting (i) precludes persons of limited means from voting or imposes unreasonable financial hardship upon such persons as a precondition to their exercise of the franchise, (ii) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate State interest in the conduct of elections, and (iii) in some areas has the purpose or effect of denying persons the right to vote because of race color. Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares the constitutional right of citizens to vote is denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.

(b) In the exercise of the powers of Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Attorney General is authorized and directed to institute forthwith in the name of the United States such actions, including actions against States or political subdivisions, for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief against the enforcement of any requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting, or substitute therefore enacted after November 1, 1964, as will be necessary to implement the declaration of subsection (a) and the purposes of this section.

(c) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of such actions which shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. It shall be the duty of the judges designates to hear the case to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.

(d) During the pendency of such actions, and thereafter if the courts, notwithstanding this action by the Congress, should declare the requirement of the payment of a poll tax to be constitutional, no citizen of the United States who is a resident of a State or political subdivision with respect to which determinations have been made under subsection 4(b) and declaratory judgment has not been entered under subsection 4(a), during the first year he becomes otherwise entitled to vote by reason of registration by State or local officials or listing by an examiner, shall be denied the right to vote for failure to pay a poll tax if he tenders payment of such tax for the current year to an examiner or to the appropriate State or local official at least forty-five days prior to election, whether or not such tender would be timely or adequate under State law. An examiner shall have authority to accept such payment from any person authorized by this Act to make an application for listing, and shall issue a receipt for such payment. The examiner shall transmit promptly any such poll tax payment to the office of the State or local official authorized to receive such payment under State law, together with the name and address of the applicant.

Sec. 11. (a) No person acting under color of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote under any provision of this Act or is otherwise qualified to vote, or willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and report such person’s vote.

(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers or duties under section 3(a), 6, 8, 9, 10, or 12(e).

(c) Whoever knowingly or willfully gives false information as to his name, address, or period of residence in the voting district for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or vote, or conspires with another individual for the purpose of encouraging his false registration to vote or illegal voting, or pays or offers to pay or accepts payment either for registration to vote or for voting shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both: Provided, however, That this provision shall be applicable only to general, special, or primary elections held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the United States Senate, Member of the United States House of Representatives, or Delegates or Commissioners from the territories or possessions, or Resident Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(d) Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of an examiner or hearing officer knowingly and willfully falsifies or conceals a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Sec. 12. (a) Whoever shall deprive or attempt to deprive any person of any right secured by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, or 10 or shall violate section 11(a) or (b), shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b) Whoever, within a year following an election in a political subdivision in which an examiner has been appointed (1) destroys, defaces, mutilates, or otherwise alters the marking of a paper ballot which has been cast in such election, or (2) alters any official record of voting in such election tabulated from a voting machine or otherwise, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(c) Whoever conspires to violate the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or interface with any right secured by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, or 11(a) or (b) shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(d) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 7,10, 11, or subsection (b) of this section, the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, an action for preventive relief, including an application for a temporary or permanent injunction, restraining order, or other order, and including an order directed to the State and State or local election officials to require them (1) to permit persons listed under this Act to vote and (2) to count such votes.

(e) Whenever in any political subdivision in which there are examiners appointed pursuant to this Act any persons allege to such an examiner within forty-eight hours after the closing of the polls that notwithstanding (1) their listing under this Act or registration by an appropriate election official and (2) their eligibility to vote, they have not been permitted to vote in such election, the examiner shall forthwith notify then Attorney General may forthwith file with the district court and application for an order providing for the marking, casting, and counting of the ballots of such persons and requiring the inclusion of their votes in the total vote before the results of such election shall be deemed final and any force or effect given thereto. The district court shall hear and determine such matters immediately after the filing of such application. The remedy provided in this subsection shall not preclude any remedy available under State of Federal law.

(f) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section and shall exercise the same without regard to whether a person asserting rights under the provisions of this Act shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law.

Sec. 13. Listing procedures shall be terminated in any political subdivision of any State (a) with respect to examiners appointed pursuant to clause (b) of section 6 whenever the Attorney General notifies the Civil Service Commission, or whether the District Court for the District of Columbia determines in an action for declaratory judgment brought by any political subdivision with respect to which the Director of the Census has determined that more than 50 per centum of the nonwhite persons of voting age residing therein are registered to vote, (1) that all persons listed by an examiner for such subdivision have been placed on the appropriate voting registration roll, and (2) that there is no longer reasonable cause to believe that persons will be deprived of or denied the right to vote on account of race or color in such subdivision, and (b), with respect to examiners appointed pursuant to section 3(a), upon order of the authorizing court. A political subdivision may petition the Attorney General for the termination of listing procedures under clause (a) of this section, and may petition the Attorney General to request the Director of the Census to take such survey or census as may be appropriate for the making of the determination provided for in this section. The District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction to require such survey or census to be made by the Director of the Census and it shall require him to do so if it deems the Attorney General’s refusal to request such survey or census to be arbitrary or unreasonable.

Sec. 14. (a) All cases of criminal contempt arising under the provisions of this Act shall be governed by section 151 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (42 U.S.C. 1995).

(b) No court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia or a court of appeals in any proceeding under section 9 shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to section 4 or section 5 or any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of any provision of this Act or any action of any Federal officer or employee pursuant hereto.

(c) (1) The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this Act, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are received in an election.

(2) The term "political subdivision" shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.

(d) In any action for a declaratory judgment brought pursuant to section 4 or section 5 of this Act, subpoenas for witnesses who are required to attend the District Court for the District of Columbia may be served in any judicial district of the United States: Provided, That no writ of subpoena shall issue for witnesses without the District of Columbia at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of holding court without the permission of the District Court for the District of Columbia being first upon proper application and cause shown.

Sec. 15. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1971), ¹ as amended by section 131 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71 Stat. 637), and amended by section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (74 Stat. 90), and as further amended by section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 241), is further amended as follows:

(a) Delete the word "Federal" wherever it appears in subsections (a) and (c);

(b) Repeal subsection (f) and designate the present subsections (g) and (h) as (f) and (g), respectively.

Sec. 16. The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, jointly, shall make a full and complete study to determine whether, under the laws or practices of any State or States, there are preconditions to voting, which might tend to result in discrimination against citizens serving in the Armed Forces of the United States seeking to vote. Such officials shall, jointly, make a report to the Congress not later than June 30, 1966, containing the results of such study, together with a list of any States in which such preconditions exist, and shall include in such report such recommendations for legislation as they deem advisable to prevent discrimination in voting against citizens serving in the Armed Forces of the United States.

Sec. 17. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise adversely affect the right to vote of any person registered to vote under the law of any State or political subdivision.

Sec. 18. There are hereby authorized to be appropriate such sums as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 19. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of the provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be not be affected thereby.

Approved August 6, 1965.

Excerpt from the Voting Rights Act of 1965

Section 2: No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or ... procedure shall be imposed ... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.

Section 5: Whenever a [covered] State ... shall enact ... any voting qualification ... differ ent from that in force ... on November 1, 1964, such State ... may institute an action ... for a declaratory judgment that such qualification ... does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of...denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color ... Provided ... that such qualification ... may be enforced ... if [it] has been submitted ... to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) (P. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437) was designed to protect and ensure the right to vote that is guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited racial discrimination in voting, was enacted in the immediate post-Civil War period. Yet as late as the early 1960s the country witnessed systematic efforts to deny the right to vote to racial and ethnic minorities, especially blacks in the South. Southern politicians attempted to prevent blacks from voting by using a variety of devices, including literacy and good character tests that were easily manipulated by poll officials. As a result, blacks participated in voting and political activity in very low numbers in the areas where such devices were employed. The VRA was designed to eliminate the use of these devices as a means of preventing blacks from exercising their right to vote.

Features of the Act

The most important provisions of the VRA are contained in sections 2 and 5. Section 2 prohibits states from establishing voting qualifications or standards in a way that results in a denial of the right to vote on account of race. Section 5 requires states and other jurisdictions with a history of race discrimination in voting to obtain the approval of the United States Department of Justice before changing any law with regard to voting. This provision has become known as the "preclearance" provision because it requires states to obtain the clearance of the Justice Department before changing its voting laws.

The preclearance provision has a wide scope. It includes, for example, the redrawing of electoral districts that occurs after every national census (a population count conducted every ten years), voter qualification rules, and changes in government structure. (Such changes include the decision to change some offices from elective to appointive, or to change a city council from one in which one representative is elected from each district to one in which all representatives run city-wide.) All of these changes have the potential to weaken, or, in the words of the statute, "dilute" the strength of minority voting. To prevent such dilution, the statute requires Justice Department clearance before such changes can be put into effect. If a state concludes that the Justice Department's disapproval of a desired change is unwarranted, the matter is decided by a federal court. The Supreme Court may review these federal court decisions if it so chooses. In its review of several decisions, the Court has interpreted section 2 to prohibit a broad array of government conduct.

Sections 2 and 5 are similar, in that they both seek to combat government practices making it difficult for minorities either to vote or, more generally, to participate effectively in government. Section 5 differs from section 2, though, in that it puts the burden on state and local governments with a history of discrimination to obtain approval for any changes that might possibly have these effects. Section 2, which applies throughout the nation, does not include such a preclearance requirement.

Other important sections of the act forbid the use of literacy and good character tests to determine eligibility for voting and provide for federal officials to register voters and observe elections in certain circumstances.

Constitutionality

The constitutional basis for the VRA is Congress' power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 1 of that Amendment states that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Section 2 states that "the Congress shall have the power to enforce [the Amendment] by appropriate legislation." In debating the VRA, Congress uncovered a large number of examples of states violating the Fifteenth Amendment, and determined that guaranteeing (or, in the words of section 2, "enforcing") the rights granted in that amendment justified enactment of the VRA.

Circumstances Leading to Adoption of the Act

In the late 1950s and early 1960s leaders of the Civil Rights movement realized that race-based voting restrictions severely impeded the political, economic, and social progress of black Americans. Civil rights activists initiated voter registration drives and educational campaigns in the early 1960s to encourage greater black political participation. In the summer of 1964, for example, white college students traveled to the South to assist in voter registration and educational efforts, and civil rights organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) spearheaded similar drives. Some whites responded to these campaigns with violence, both against the civil rights leadership, the workers in the civil rights campaigns, and local blacks who expressed sympathy or support for them. This violence, and pressure from the civil rights community, prompted Congress to take action.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had become president after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, made completion of his predecessor's civil rights agenda one of his top priorities and one of the foundations of his Great Society program. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the acknowledged leader of the Civil Rights movement, was also a major supporter of the VRA. The civil rights agenda was not limited to the VRA. It also included the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided broad guarantees against racial and other discrimination in private employment and federally sponsored activities, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which prohibited racial discrimination in the housing market.

Legislative Debate

The legislative debate leading to the act focused on the seriousness and breadth of states' deprivations of the right to vote. The debate also concerned the appropriateness of federal legislation overseeing states' conduct of their elections. Under the Constitution, the conduct of elections is a matter for state regulation. Opponents of the VRA argued that the VRA was an inappropriate federal interference in state affairs. On the other side, proponents noted that the right to vote was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, and argued, ultimately successfully, that it was appropriate for the federal government to take steps to safeguard that right.

The debate on the VRA was heavily influenced by current events. The Civil Rights movement was in full swing by the mid-1960s. Southern opposition to that movement, in particular acts of violence and intimidation led both by private parties and by government officials, were national news. Pictures of police using dogs and water cannons on nonviolent protesters appeared prominently on national television, and reports of mob violence against civil rights activists appeared on the front pages of newspapers. All of this persuaded many Americans who had previously been uninformed or apathetic about civil rights issues that strong federal action was necessary.

Important Court Interpretations

The constitutionality of the VRA was established in an important 1966 case, South Carolina v. Katzenbach. In that case the Supreme Court held that the VRA was an appropriate use by Congress of its power to "enforce" the Fifteenth Amendment. South Carolina is notable because it inaugurated a period during which the Supreme Court gave a more permissive interpretation to Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. Also in 1966, the Court gave a similarly broad reading to Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in Katzenbach v. Morgan.

In other important cases the Supreme Court interpreted provisions of the VRA itself. For example, in Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969), the Court interpreted section 5's preclearance requirements to apply to any change that had the effect of diluting the voting strength of minorities, rather than merely to changes in laws dealing with the act of voting itself. Vote dilution occurs when a government entity, such as a city government, changes its structure in a way that reduces minority voting strength. In Perkins v. Matthews (1971), for example, the Court held that a city's annexations of surrounding areas had to be precleared under section 5. If the annexed area was primarily occupied by whites, then such annexations might dilute minority voting strength. The result would be a new, larger city with a larger percentage of whites than before, thus weakening minority political power.

Another important electoral practice involves redistricting. States redraw their legislative districts every ten years to take account of population changes reflected in the census. Depending on how those districts are drawn, minority voting strength might be diluted. For example, a black neighborhood might be split up into several districts rather than concentrated in one, with the result that in no one district would black voting power be decisive. In Georgia v. United States (1973), the Court held that state legislative redistricting would also have to be precleared. Today both state legislative and congressional district lines must be precleared in the states subject to section 5.

At other times, the Court has adopted narrower interpretations of the VRA. For example, in Mobile v. Bolden (1980), the Court held that section 2's prohibitions on voter qualification tests that are racially discriminatory included only those tests specifically motivated by a desire to discriminate on the basis of race. The VRA does not apply, the Court said, to those requirements that merely affect blacks and other minorities differently than they affect whites. Two years later, Congress amended the VRA to make clear that it intended to prohibit actions with discriminatory results, not just actions that were intentionally discriminatory.

The VRA was originally written to expire in five years. In 1970 Congress renewed the act for another five years, and in 1975 and subsequent years it was renewed again. Each time, Congress has renewed the act for only a limited period, with the idea that it would reconsider whether the federal intrusions on state electoral processes were still necessary, or even needed strengthening. In each case Congress decided to renew the act. In renewing the act in 1970, Congress indicated its approval of the broad interpretations the Supreme Court gave to the act in cases like Allen.

The Vra and Equal Protection

In the 1990s the Justice Department's use of the VRA to prevent minority vote dilution came under attack in the Supreme Court. The Justice Department has sometimes insisted that compliance with section 5 requires maximizing minority voter strength. This in turn would require taking race significantly into account when states redraw their legislative and congressional districts. Some legal scholars and political leaders have claimed that the practice of placing voters in particular districts based on their race violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause prevents states from denying to individuals "the equal protection of the laws" and has long been understood as prohibiting government from classifying individuals on the basis of their race. In Shaw v. Reno (1993) and Miller v. Johnson (1995), the Court suggested that such use of race might violate the equal protection clause if race was the predominant motivating factor in the state's redistricting plan. The Court's suggestion raises questions about how stringently the VRA may be used in the districting context. So far, the Court has not squarely faced those questions.

Effectiveness

Section 2 of the VRA has gone a long way toward ending the discriminatory use of voter qualifications tests. Before the VRA these tests were used to deprive blacks and other minorities of their rights to vote. Today it is rare, though still not unknown, for government officials to seek to deprive minority voters of their rights through obvious means such as voter qualification tests. Dilution claims, however, are far more common, given how broadly "voter dilution" is defined. In fact, this loose understanding of the term has the potential to affect almost any structural or electoral change a government may make.

Section 5 has also become extraordinarily important. Congressional district boundaries are redrawn every ten years to correspond with population changes as reflected in the census. In the states subject to section 5 of the VRA, the U.S. Justice Department heavily influences the redrawing of those lines, a practice normally performed by state legislatures. Under section 5, the Justice Department must approve those district lines before they can go into effect to become the new congressional and state legislative boundaries. Redistricting is a hotly contested political issue, because the shape of legislative districts influences how heavily Democratic or Republican the district will be. Thus Justice Department involvement in redistricting has often led to lengthy legal and political conflicts.

Bibliography

Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963–1965. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.

Garrow, David J. Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978.

Thernstrom, Abigail. Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. A Citizen's Guide to the Voting Rights Act. Washington, DC: The Commission, 1984.

Williams, Juan. Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years 1954–1965. New York: Viking, 1987.

A law passed at the time of the civil rights movement. It eliminated various devices, such as literacy tests, that had traditionally been used to restrict voting by black people. It authorized the enrollment of voters by federal registrars in states where fewer than fifty percent of the eligible voters were registered or voted. All such states were in the South.