Source

• Born: c. 1285
• Birthplace: Ockham, England
• Died: 1347 or 1349
• Best Known As: Medieval thinker responsible for the principle of Ockham's Razor

William of Ockham (also spelled Occam) was a 14th century English philosopher who was also a Franciscan friar. Resistant to the popular wave of Scholasticism, a philosophical position that tried to unify worldly and religious ideas, William of Ockham asserted that one could not know God through reason and rationality. His philosophy is sometimes called nominalism, and he is now most famous for only one of his many ideas, what is called the principle of Ockham's Razor (or The Law of Parsimony): that the simplest explanation to any problem is the best explanation. Because of his views challenging papal supremacy, Ockham was charged with heresy in 1324. He fled to Bavaria, where he spent the remainder of his life.

[b. Ockham, Surrey, England, c. 1284, d. Munich (Germany), 1349]

William was among the last of the scholars of the Middle Ages, and like most, a churchman (required for teaching at Oxford in his time), but in more trouble with the church for his heretical views than most earlier scholars. Ockham's principal fame resulted from his battle against the Platonic philosophy of nominalism, for which his famous "razor," or rule against complicated explanations, was intended. Its prime use, however, has been in choosing between competing scientific theories.

A parallel processing language designed to handle concurrent operations. The INMOS Transputer executes occam almost directly. In the following statements, two items of data are read and incremented at the same time. PAR specifies that following statements are to be executed concurrently, and SEQ indicates that the following statements are executed sequentially.

   PAR
    SEQ
      chan1 ? item1
      item1 := item1 + 1
    SEQ
      chan2 ? item2
      item2 := item2 + 1

---

The English philosopher and theologian William of Ockham (ca. 1284-1347) was the most important intellectual figure in the 14th century and one of the major figures in the history of philosophy.

The first half of the 14th century was one of the most active, creative periods in medieval thought. Building on the solid foundation of the 13th-century achievements in science, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, William of Ockham and his immediate followers developed an approach to philosophy and theology that became known as nominalism. This school of thought, alongside the humanist movement, aided in the transition from the medieval to the modern world.

Early Life

William was born in the village of Ockham in Surrey. Having received his early education in Latin grammar and the liberal arts, possibly at the nearby monastic house of Augustinian canons at Newark, he joined the Franciscan order and studied arts and philosophy at their convent in London. In February 1306 he was ordained a subdeacon at the church of St. Saviour at Southwark in London, where Southwark Cathedral now stands. The following fall Ockham began his 13 years of theological study at Oxford.

During the years 1317 to 1320 Ockham lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, the standard theological textbook from the 12th to the 16th centuries. After the completion of his theological studies, he became lecturer at the Franciscan convent in Reading, where he taught off and on until 1324. There he revised the first book of his commentary on the Sentences, lectured on logic and Aristotle's Physics, and engaged in quodlibetic disputes with other theologians.

In these various works Ockham set forth ideas which, within 20 years, earned him an international reputation and placed him alongside Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus as one of the most significant minds of the age. Like Thomas and Scotus, the different areas of Ockham's thought are closely interrelated and marked by distinctive features that give his thought a special character. Ockham's ideas should not, however, be seen as a rejection or destruction of 13th century thought. He borrowed from the past and perfected constructive tendencies already present in the previous period.

Epistemology and Empiricism

The 13th-century tendency to base scientific knowledge, knowledge of the physical world, on sense experience was accepted and extended by Ockham. In place of the Aristotelian description of how man comes to know (a description that sees the human mind primarily as a passive receptacle that abstracts the universal form or concept from particular things that are experienced and transmitted through a multistage process), Ockham described the mind as an active agent that knows the particular immediately and directly through intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition is the direct apprehension by the mind of a particular, existing thing according to which the mind forms a judgment that such a thing exists and apprehends those facts contingent upon its existence, such as size, shape, color, and so on. In addition to intuitive cognition, which is the initial and primary means of knowledge, there is abstractive cognition, closely related to memory, which can reflect on an object but does not convey any knowledge of whether the object presently exists.

This direct apprehension of the existing particular thing by means of intuitive cognition increased the empirical quality of medieval thought at the expense of the Platonic reliance on forms or ideas. It also meant that man initially and primarily knows the particular, and only on the basis of that and similar experiences does he begin to form a more general concept known as the universal.

It is because of Ockham's rejection of the "realistic" interpretation of the universal or general concept that the term "nominalist" is applied to him. Ockham rejected the idea that there is similarity among things of the same species because there exists a "common nature," prior to existing individual things, which inheres in the latter and makes them similar. While recognizing similarities among things in nature, Ockham saw that similarity as the result of a generic relationship that does not endanger the peculiar individuality of each object. The concept is formed when several individuals of the same species are considered at the same time, and when one forms a composite in the mind of those features they have in common. One of the results of this approach, with its stress on the priority and importance of knowledge of the particular, was to give added impulse to the scientific tradition of the 13th and 14th centuries by stressing both empiricism and an inductive method.

Theology and Ethics

By restricting the objects of scientific knowledge to those individuals known directly through sense experience and by rejecting the idea of a common nature prior to and inherent in the things experienced, Ockham limited the kind of things man could know by reason apart from revelation, and he thus changed the character of metaphysical discussion. In much the same way, Ockham limited the number of truths in theology that can be established by reason alone, thus making theological propositions depend much more on revelation and the teaching of the Church than would be true for earlier scholastic theologians from Anselm to Aquinas. Most "truths" of natural theology are, for Ockham, learned by way of revelation.

Because most theological propositions are known only through revelation, this does not make them any the less certain for Ockham, who saw certainty as the result of different types of evidence. Scientific knowledge produces a certainty based on belief in the way man's mind operates and in the validity of human sense experience. For Ockham this form of knowledge is so compelling that it is impossible not to acknowledge its certainty. The certainty of theological knowledge is based on belief that what God has revealed through Scripture and the Church cannot be in error. Such "knowledge" is compelling only for the Christian and is not of the same order as scientific knowledge.

The overriding conception of Ockham's theology is the freedom and omnipotence of God, an idea that shapes much of his philosophy as well. The realm of God's choice is limited only by the principle of contradiction, namely, that God cannot do that which is logically impossible. Since God wills from eternity and not within time, the choices made by God have become the reliable principles upon which the human world depends. The uniformity in nature which Ockham continually asserted is basically a uniformity in God's will, which can never be arbitrary because it is one with His intellect and wisdom. By His initial choices God has freely bound Himself to act in reliable, definable ways, both within the physical world and within the Church.

The contingency of the universe and the theological order upon the will of God includes the ethical system according to which God rewards and punishes. Good deeds are defined by their conformity to God's revealed law, and although God retains his freedom to reject as meritorious those good deeds done in a state of grace, he has in fact committed himself to accept them as meritorious of eternal life.

Final Years

In 1324 Ockham was called to Avignon to answer charges of heretical doctrine in his writings. Two lists of suspect opinions were drawn up, but neither resulted in a formal condemnation.

While living in Avignon near the papal court awaiting the results of the investigation, Ockham wrote a defense of his theories on the Eucharist, which was one of the major areas of his thought under attack. In addition, at the urging of the head of the Franciscan order, Michael of Cesena, Ockham undertook a study of the concept of apostolic poverty, a concept basic to the Franciscan ideal and one under attack by Pope John XXII. When in 1328, Ockham came to the conclusion that John XXII was incorrect on the issue of apostolic poverty and perhaps even heretical - and when it appeared that the Pope was about to deliver a pronouncement on the issue that would make the Franciscan position appear heretical - Ockham, Cesena, and several others fled Avignon on the night of May 26 toward Italy, and they sought and received the protection of John's major enemy, Emperor Louis of Bavaria.

The remainder of Ockham's life was spent at the Franciscan convent in Munich, where he wrote political treatises against the positions of John XXII and his successors. In these treatises Ockham argued that Scripture and the established theological tradition of the Church are the two sources for authority in doctrine. Neither the papacy nor secular political powers have the authority to proclaim doctrines that go against Scripture or tradition. Ockham agreed with Marsilius of Padua that Christ did not establish the papacy, and one can find in Ockham a strong defense of the authority of a general Church council. However, unlike Marsilius, Ockham believed that the pope did possess administrative authority within the Church, and as long as he did not fall into heresy he should not have his administrative or judicial power questioned.

Further Reading

The best introduction in English to Ockham's thought is The Collected Articles on Ockham (1958) by Philotheus Böehner, who, more than anyone else, was responsible for the revised understanding of Ockham. Particular aspects of Ockham's thought are examined in Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (1935); Damascene Webering, The Theory of Demonstration according to William Ockham (1953); and Herman Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place according to William Ockham (1957). For background see Philotheus Böehner, Medieval Logic: An Outline of Its Development from 1250 to c. 1400 (1952); Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham (1958) and Paris and Oxford Universities in the 13th and 14th Centuries (1968); David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (1962); and Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions (1967).

Additional Sources

Adams, Marilyn McCord, William Ockham, Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.

(c.1285-1349) Philosopher who developed ideas on sovereignty and discussed natural rights. On sovereignty, he was original in the emphasis he placed on the right and freedom of the people to choose their ruler and form of government. On rights, which were mainly rights to property, he distinguishes between natural and conventional right, and both from permission. A natural right is a legitimate power (in conformity with right reason) that is anterior to human convention. The Franciscans have the natural right to property, which they renounce, yet they have permission to use things that they do not own, which is revocable (usus nudus or facti), as distinct from permission, which gives a right, for example tenancy (usus juris).

— Cyril Barrett

For more information on William of Ockham, visit Britannica.com.

William of Occam (c.1289-1349). Occam is a village near Guildford in Surrey, from which William presumably took his name. An Oxford Franciscan, he is said to have been a pupil of Duns Scotus. His thought developed when his order became involved in a protracted dispute with the papacy on the subject of evangelical poverty, which the Franciscans embraced. Occam's writings in defence of his order led to a summons to Avignon and a condemnation by Pope John XXII. The continuing controversy led Occam to examine the relations of church and state. He argued that the papacy had no standing in temporal matters and that within the church it was subordinate to a general council. In his methodology, he emphasized both the power and limitations of logic: it could not touch revealed truth and faith, and since it dealt largely with terms of argument, the principle of economy should apply and as few assumptions as possible should be made—hence, ‘Occam's razor’.

Ockham, William of (c. 1285-1349) English theologian and philosopher. The first certain date of Ockham's life is that he was ordained subdeacon in 1306. He joined the Franciscans, and lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard in Oxford between 1317 and 1319. His progress towards master of theology was halted by one Peter Lutterell, an ‘overzealous Thomist’, who accused Ockham of heresy before the university and the Pope. In 1328 his relations with the papacy deteriorated further when he defended, on behalf of the Franciscans and against the papacy, the doctrine that Jesus and the disciples owned no property; Ockham was forced to take refuge with Emperor Louis of Bavaria. He may have died of the Black Death, in the course of moves of reconciliation with the papacy.

Ockham is famous as the leader of the nominalists, or those who denied the reality of universals, or real distinct properties and natures apart from the things possessing them. While Ockham certainly held that everything that exists outside the mind is singular, he also allowed the mind a power of abstractive cognition (e.g. Bk. ii of the Sentences, q. 15), so his position may be nearer to a form of conceptualism. With the abandonment of realism about universals goes the epistemology postulating cognitions of intelligible species, and Ockham's own epistemology depends on the intuitive cognition of particular, single things, and subsequent abstraction. Ockham's scrupulous attention to the nature of language and to logic, as well as his doctrine of abstraction, makes him a forerunner of subsequent British empiricism. Ockham's chief works are the Four Books of the Sentences, written around 1323, the Summa of Logic (before 1329), and the Quodlibeta septem (before 1333).

Ockham (both: ŏk'əm) , c.1285–c.1349, English scholastic philosopher. A Franciscan, Occam studied and taught at Oxford from c.1310 until 1324, when he was summoned to the papal court at Avignon to answer charges of heresy in his writings. He waited there until 1328 for a judgment. When it appeared that Pope John XXII was about to condemn his position Occam fled to the protection of Holy Roman Emperor Louis IV, whom he supported in his struggle with Pope John. He is thought to have died in the black plague that swept Europe in the middle of the 14th cent. Occam's teachings mark an important break with previous medieval philosophy, especially with the Aristotelian realism of St. Thomas Aquinas. A nominalist, he denied that the forms of knowledge corresponded to those of being. He saw our concepts to be naturally occasioned by the world, but thought could not be taken as a measure of being. Specifically, Occam denied the existence of universals except in our minds and in language. An empiricist, Occam disputed the self-evidence of principles of Aristotelian logic (like the final cause) and of Christian theology (like the existence of God). For this reason Occam severely restricted the province of philosophy in order to safeguard theology, denying the competence of reason in matters of faith. Just as he had maintained a distinction between our concepts and being, he saw creation not as a necessary consequence of the divine intellect, as Aquinas had, but as an expression of God's limitless will. In the area of logic, where he had great influence, he is remembered for his use of the principle of parsimony, formulated as “Occam's razor,” which enjoined economy in explanation with the axiom, “What can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more.” Like Marsilius of Padua, Occam strongly opposed the temporal power of the pope and wrote numerous works on the subject. His Dialogus is a thorough discussion of political theories.

Bibliography

See his philosophical writings (tr. and ed. by P. Boehner, 1957); biography by M. M. Adams (2 vol., 1986); see also E. A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (1935, repr. 1965); A. S. McCrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham (1974).

This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have been reviewed by professional editors (see full disclaimer)